

**The 19th Stony Brook Game Theory Festival
of the Game Theory Society**

**Workshop on Recent Advances in Repeated Games
July 20-22, 2008**

Sunday, July 20

Morning Sessions:

- 08:30-09:00 Breakfast
- 09:00-10:30 Martin Cripps, University College London
The Value of a Reputation under Imperfect Monitoring
- Qingmin Liu, University of Pennsylvania
Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics
- 11:00-12:30 Ilya Khayutin, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Communication with Unobservable constraints
- Alon Shapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Symmetric Online Matching Pennies
- 12:30-14:30 Lunch Break

Afternoon Sessions:

- 14:30-16:00 Eilon Solan, Tel Aviv University
Sequential Decision Problems with Imperfect Monitoring
- Tadashi Sekiguchi, Kyoto University
Repeated Games with Costly Imperfect Monitoring
- 16:30-18:00 Abraham Neyman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
TBA
John Nash, Princeton University
TBA
- 18:30-21:00 Reception Dinner at Curry Club

Monday, July 21

Morning Sessions:

- 08:30-09:00 Breakfast
- 09:00-10:30 George Mailath, University of Pennsylvania
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring
- Stefano Lovo, HEC Paris
*Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information:
The N- Player Case*
- 11:00-12:30 Tristan Tomala, HEC Paris
Protocols for Fault Identification in Partially Known Networks
- Sergiu Hart, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
On the Optimality of Regret Matching in Repeated Games
- 12:30-14:30 Lunch Break

Afternoon Sessions:

- 14:30-16:00 David Miller, University of California, San Diego
A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games with Renegotiation
- Axel Anderson, Georgetown University
The Durable Information Monopolist
- 16:30-18:00 Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
- V Bhaskar, University College London
Purification and Finite Memory in Repeated Games
- 19:00–21:00 Reception Dinner at Three Village Inn

Tuesday, July 22

Morning Sessions:

08:30-09:00 Breakfast

09:00-10:30 Larry Samuelson, Yale University
Common Learning

Thomas Wiseman, University of Texas at Austin
A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning

11:00-12:30 Nicolas Vieille, HEC Paris
Strategic Information Exchange in Repeated Games

Mehmet Ekmekci, Northwestern University
Reputation with Long Run Players

12:30-14:30 Lunch Break

Afternoon Sessions:

14:30-16:00 Jérôme Renault, University Paris Dauphine
Existence of the Value in Repeated Games with an Informed Controller

Satoru Takahashi, Princeton University
Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play

16:30-17:15 Julio Gonzalez-Diaz, Northwestern University
Community Enforcement Beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma