International Conference on Game TheoryOrganized by William ThomsonJuly 20 to July 24, 1998Stony Brook, New YorkPROGRAM | |
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MONDAY, JULY 20
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| Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Lloyd S. Shapley | |
| 9:00-10:00 | M.O. Jackson, E. Kalai, and R. Smorodinsky:
Endogenous Representations of Priors in Bayesian
Learning
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| Dynamic Games Chair: Abraham Neyman | |
| 10:30-10:55 | D. Bergmann and J. Valimaki: Learning and Efficient Matching |
| 11:00-11:25 | V. Bala and J. Greenberg: Sequential Bargaining with Elimination |
| 11:30-11:55 | P.K. Dutta and R. Radner: A Strategic
Analysis of Global Warming
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| Interdependent Preferences Chair: Motty Perry | |
| 10:30-10:55 | L. Kockesen, E.A. Ok, and R. Sethi: On the Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences |
| 11:00-11:25 | G. Lopomo and E.A. Ok: Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division |
| 11:30-11:55 | M. Baucells and L.S. Shapley: A Theory of
Multi-Person Utilities
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| TU Games Chair: Youngsub Chun | |
| 10:30-10:55 | T.S.H. Driessen, and T. Radzik: Consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell of Efficient, Linear, and Symmetric Values for TU-Games |
| 11:00-11:25 | L.A. Liu and S. Luo: On the Shapley and Banzhaf Values |
| 11:30-11:55 | M. Grabisch and M. Roubens: An Axiomatic
Approach to the Concepts of Interaction Among Players in Cooperative Games
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| Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: William Thomson | |
| 2:00-3:00 | L.S. Shapley:
Multiperson Utilities
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| Stochastic Games Chair: Prajit K. Dutta | |
| 3:30-3:55 | T. Parthasarathy: Ordered Field Property and Linear Complementarity in Stochastic Games |
| 4:00-4:25 | J. Wooders and M. Walker: Minimax Play in Binary Markov Games |
| 4:30-4:55 | E. Maskin:
Markov Perfect Equilibria II: Imperfect Observability
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| Economic Applications I Chair: Efe A. Ok | |
| 3:30-3:55 | D. Filipovich: Prices and Reputation |
| 4:00-4:25 | K. Krishna and T. Winston: A New Model of Quality |
| 4:30-4:55 | E.J. Friedman:
Reputations, Impersistent Identities, and the Internet
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| Axiomatic Bargaining and Social Choice Chair: Eiichi Miyagawa | |
| 3:30-3:55 | R.P. McLean: Utopian Point Solution for Multi-Objective Choice Problems |
| 4:00-4:25 | Y. Chun: Egalitarian Solutions for
Quasi-Linear Social Choice Problems
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TUESDAY, JULY 21
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| Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Kala Krishna | |
| 9:00-10:00 | P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin:
Efficient Auctions
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| Repeated Games I Chair: Jim Bergin | |
| 10:30-10:55 | A. Neyman: N-Person Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automaton |
| 11:00-11:25 | P. Hernández and A. Urbano: Communication and Automata |
| 11:30-11:55 | M.R. Johnson: Choice Learning Automata
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| Selected Topics I Chair: Beth Allen | |
| 10:30-10:55 | K. C. Lo: Epistemic Conditions for Agreement and Stochastic Independence of epsilon-Contaminated Beliefs |
| 11:00-11:25 | T. Kamihigashi: Necessity of Transversality Conditions for Infinite Horizon Problems |
| 11:30-11:55 | W. Thomson: On the Axiomatic Method
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| TU Games II Chair: Anne van den Nouweland | |
| 10:30-10:55 | B. Feldman: The Powerpoint |
| 11:00-11:25 | A.B. Khmelnitskaya: Marginalist and Efficient Values for TU Games |
| 11:30-11:55 | M.J. Ryan: Frame Related Restrictions, Cores
and Shapley Values
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| Learning and Evolution I Chair: Ehud Kalai | |
| 2:00-2:25 | A.F. Tieman, H. Houba and G. van der Laan: Cooperation in a Multi-Dimensional Local Interaction Model |
| 2:30-2:55 | J. Oechssler and F. Riedel: Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces |
| 3:00-3:25 | A. Neyman and D. Okada: Two-Person Repeated
Games with Finite Automata
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| Equilibrium in Economies Chair: David Wettstein | |
| 2:00-2:25 | J. Ma: Competitive Equilibrium in a Production Economy |
| 2:30-2:55 | M. Perry and K. Krishna: Efficient Mechanism Design |
| 3:00-3:25 | B. Shitovitz: On the Notion of Von Neumann
and Morgenstern Stability in Edgeworth Markets
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| Coalition Structure and Networks Chair: Marilda Sotomayor | |
| 2:00-2:25 | A. Watts: A Dynamic Model of Network Formation |
| 2:30-2:55 | E. Calvo, J. Perez, and A. Urbano: A Noncooperative Approach to the Coalitional Structure Value |
| 3:00-3:25 | A.J. Potter and I. Dragan: A Generalization
of the Potential Function of the Shapley Value for Games in Partition Function
Form
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| Oligopoly and Evolution Chair: Yair Tauman | |
| 4:00-4:25 | A. Possajennikov: Optimality of Imitative Behavior in Oligopolistic Markets |
| 4:30-4:55 | J. Bergin: Survival of the Fittest as a Paradigm for Economic Dynamics |
| 5:00-5:25 | C. Ni:
Simulating the Adaptive Behavior of Oligopolists: An Application of Genetic
Algorithms
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| Topics on Strategic Games Chair: Eric Maskin | |
| 4:00-4:25 | A. Urbano and J.E. Vila: Unmediated Communication in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-Standard Information |
| 4:30-4:55 | E. Altman, E.A. Feinberg, and J. Filar: Perturbed Zero-Sum Games with Application to Dynamic Games |
| 5:00-5:25 | L. Kockesen:
Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregate Games
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| Economic Mechanisms Chair: Sang-Chul Suh | |
| 4:00-4:25 | H. Konishi, R. Quint, and J. Wako: On the Shapley-Scarf Economy: The Case of Multiple Types of Indivisible Goods |
| 4:30-4:55 | E. Miyawaga: Mechanisms for Providing a Menu of Public Objects: Strategy-Proofness and Nash Implementation |
| 5:00-5:25 | A. van den Nouweland:
Designing Mechanisms for Inducing Cooperative Behavior in Non-Cooperative
Environments: Theory and Applications
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 22
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| Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Karl Vind | |
| 9:00-10:00 | Robert J. Aumann:
If
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| Extensive Form Games Chair: Stephen J. Willson | |
| 10:30-10:55 | M. Dufwenberg and G. Kirchsteiger: A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity |
| 11:00-11:25 | X. Luo and C. Ma: Stable Equilibrium in Beliefs in Extensive Games with Perfect Information |
| 11:30-11:55 | G.B. Asheim: On the Epistemic Foundation of
Backward Induction
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| Economies with Asymmetric Information Chair: Rajiv Vohra | |
| 10:30-10:55 | J. Yazar: Ex Ante Contracting with Endogenously Determined Communication Plans |
| 11:00-11:25 | R. Serrano and O. Volij: Walrasian Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior |
| 11:30-11:55 | N. Yannelis: On Coalitionally Bayesian
Incentive Compatible Allocations
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| Social Choice Chair: Mark R. Johnson | |
| 10:30-10:55 | J. Duggan: Stationary Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model of Social Choice |
| 11:00-11:25 | D.E. Campbell: Research Grant Awards by Committee: Manipulation When More Than One Alternative is Selected |
| 11:30-11:55 | C. Ponsati and J. Sákovics: Randomly
Available Options in Bargaining
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| Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Steven J. Brams | |
| 2:00-3:00 | K. Vind:
Uncertainty on Products
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| Non-Cooperative Bargaining Chair: John Duggan | |
| 3:30-3:55 | S.J. Brams and D.M. Kilgour: Fallback Bargaining |
| 4:00-4:25 | A. Westermark: A Firm Bargaining with Many Workers |
| 4:30-4:55 | M. Montero:
A Bargaining Game with Coalition Formation
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| Selected Topics II Chair: Licun Xue | |
| 3:30-3:55 | S.-F. Ueng: Minor Players' Freedom and Major Players' Global Efficiency |
| 4:00-4:25 | S.J. Willson: Axioms for the Outcomes of Negotiation in Matrix Games |
| 4:30-4:55 | Z. Wiener and E. Winter:
Gradual Nash Bargaining
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| TU Games III Chair: Nicholas Yannelis | |
| 3:30-3:55 | E. Einy, D. Moreno, and B. Shitovitz: The Asymptotic Nucleolus of Large Monopolistic Market Games |
| 4:00-4:25 | O. Haimanko: The Non-Symmetric Values of Cooperative Games |
| 4:30-4:55 | O. Voshtina: Earliness-Tardiness Scheduling
Game
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THURSDAY, JULY 23
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| Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Robert J. Aumann | |
| 9:00-10:00 | J.F. Nash, Jr.:
Reduction of Coalitions to Agencies: A Scheme for
the Analysis of Cooperative Games
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| Repeated Games II Chair: Jean-François Mertens | |
| 10:30-10:55 | T. Sekiguchi: Robustness of Efficient Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring |
| 11:00-11:25 | I. Arribas and A. Urbano: Repeated Games with Unknown Horizon |
| 11:30-11:55 | L. Xue: Credible Renegotiation and Equilibria
in Infinitely Repeated Games
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| Political Economy Chair: Donald E. Campbell | |
| 10:30-10:55 | E. Hauk and M. Saez Marti: On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption |
| 11:00-11:25 | C. Yavas: Whistleblowing and False Accusations |
| 11:30-11:55 | J. Duggan and C. Martinelli: Jury Decision
with Continuous Signals of Guilt
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| TU Games IV Chair: Anna B. Khmelnitskaya | |
| 10:30-10:55 | R. Garratt and C.-Z. Qin: On Market Games when Agents Cannot be Two Places at Once |
| 11:00-11:25 | I. Dragan: Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative T.U. Games |
| 11:30-11:55 | T. Hokari: Weighted Dutta-Ray Solutions on
Convex Games
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| Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: H. Peyton Young | |
| 2:00-3:00 | M. Kandori:
Long Terms Relationship and Information
Accumulation
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| Learning and Evolution II Chair: Amparo Urbano | |
| 3:30-3:55 | B. Hehenkamp: Asymmetry and the Evolution of Behavior |
| 4:00-4:25 | E. Hopkins: Modelling How People Play Games: Some Analytic Results on Reinforcement Learning |
| 4:30-4:55 | D.P. Foster and H.P. Young:
When Rational Learning Fails
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| Economic Applications II Chair: Rabah Amir | |
| 3:30-3:55 | G.-J. Fann: Advertising Competition: An Application on Voting Games |
| 4:00-4:25 | C.-H. Liao and Y. Tauman: Bundling in Oligopoly Competition |
| 4:30-4:55 | B. Allen:
Capacity Precommitment as a Barrier to Entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth Approach
|
| Matching Problems Chair: Simon Wilkie | |
| 3:30-3:55 | M. Sotomayor: Existence of Stable Outcomes and the Lattice Property for a Unified Matching Market |
| 4:00-4:25 | S.-C. Suh: Games Implementing the Stable Rule of Marriage: Problems in Strong Nash Equilibria |
| 4:30-4:55 | E. Damiano and R. Lam: Self-Sustaining
Stability in Dynamic Two-Sided Matching Markets
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FRIDAY, JULY 24
| |
| Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Michihiro Kandori | |
| 9:00-10:00 | J.-F. Mertens:
TBA
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| Bayesian Games Chair: Cesar Martinelli | |
| 10:30-10:55 | K. Nygren: Generic Full Information-Revelation and Finiteness of Equilibria in Bayesian Games |
| 11:00-11:25 | D. Sonsino: On Cheap Talk and the Impossibility of Zero-Sum Betting |
| 11:30-11:55 | N. Feltovich and R. Harbaugh: Statement
through Understatement: A Theory and Test of Countersignaling
|
| Economic Applications III Chair: Eric J. Friedman | |
| 10:30-10:55 | V. Pasetta: On Simple Economic Property Rights Game |
| 11:00-11:25 | T. Kaplan, I. Luski, and D. Wettstein: Sunk Research Investments in Patent Races |
| 11:30-11:55 | R. Amir: Modelling Imperfectly Appropriable
R&D via Spillovers
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| Auctions Chair: Pradeep Dubey | |
| 10:30-10:55 | S. Wilkie: Explaining Anomalies in the FCC Spectrum Auctions |
| 11:00-11:25 | K. Krishna and T. Tranaes: Allocating Multiple Units by Sealed-Bid Auctions |
| 11:30-11:55 | I.-K. Cho, K. Jewel, and R. Vohra: Auctions
and Coalitions: Joint Bidding by Budget Constrained Buyers
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| Repeated Games Chair: Clara Ponsati | |
| 10:30-10:55 | M. Adler: What Makes Good Neighbors |
| 11:00-11:25 | T.C. O'Connel and R.E. Stearns: On Finite Strategy Sets for Finitely Repeated Zero-Sum Games |