INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORYOrganized by Michael Maschler
July 16 to July 20, 2001Stony Brook, New York
PROGRAM


MONDAY, JULY 16 

Earth and Space Sciences  Room 001  
9:1510:00 
P. Reny: Rationalizing mixed strategy as strictly optimal yet potentially randomized bahavior. 
10:0010:45 
H. Moulin: Random Assignment and Timesahring under dichotomous preferences. 
10:4511:15 
Coffee Break 
11:1512:00 
C. Freeman and A. Shmida: Plant sex: Futures, options, and iNformation. 
2:002:45 
T. J. de Jong: Games planst play. 
2:453:15 
Coffee Break 
1.A: Evolutionary Horesses Chair: J. Hofbauer 

3:153:40 
A. Shmida and C. Freeman: Sex types in plants  game within and between gender 
3:454:10 
C. Freeman, A. Shmida and K. J. Miglia: Sex: Futures, options and information 
4:154:40 
A. Possajennikov: Cooperative prisoners and aggressive chickens: Evolution of strategies and preferences. 
4:455:10 
J. Hofbauer and W. H. Sandholm: Default and Crashes in General Equilibrium 
1.B: Cost Sharing Chair: A. van den Nouweland 

3:153:40 
V. Kolpin and D. Aadland: Environmental determinants of cost sharing an application to irrigation. 
3:454:10 
G. Stamatopoulos: Strategyproof cost allocation schemes 
4:154:40 
Y. Yu: Multiple units public goods provision: Generalizing JacksonMoulin Mechanism 
4:455:10 
A.
van den Nouweland ,
S. Tijs
and M. H. Wooders: Axiomatization of ratio equilibria in public good economies. 
1.C: Coalition Formation Chair: M. A. Ball 

3:153:40 
M. A. Ball: A new solution for nperson games using coalitional theory. 
3:454:10 
G. Stamatopoulos: Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint 
4:154:40 
M.
Burgin
and L. Shapley Optimization principle for coalition 
4:455:10 
F.
Bloch and S. Rottier: Agenda Control in Coalition Formation. 
1.D: Markets/Pricing Chair: Markets/Pricing 

3:153:40 
M.
Blouin: Equilibrium in decentralized market with adverse selection. 
3:454:10 
A.
Bogomolnia and R. Deb: The priority rule: a solution to strategyproof allocation problem for indivisible goods in the presence of indifference. 
4:154:40 
S.
Giraud, and S. Weyers: Strategic market games with a finite horizon and incomplete markets. 
4:455:10 
J.
Bergin and L. Zhou: Optimal monopolistic nondiscriminatory pricing 
TUESDAY, JULY 17 

Earth and Space Sciences  Room 001  
9:1510:00 
V. Smith: Controlling Market Power and Price Spikes in Electricity Networks: Demandside Bidding. 
10:0010:45 
P.
Hammerstein: Evolution of cooperation in biological games and markets 
10:4511:15 
Coffee Break 
11:1512:00 
R. J. Aumann: Backward Induction without Counterfactuals. 
2:002:45 
S. Hart: Adaptive Strategies. 
2:453:15 
Coffee Break 
2.A: Evolutionary Processes Chair: O. Volij 

3:153:40 
A.
Heifetz and E. Segev: The evolutionary role of emotions in bargaining 
3:454:10 
J.S.
Garcia: On Evolutionary Bargaining. 
4:154:40 
A.
Poulsen: Preference evolution, reciprocity and efficiency. 
4:455:10 
O. Volij: 
2.B: Implementations Chair: S. McDonald 

3:153:40 
R. Beard and S. McDonald: Evolutionary Implementation. 
3:454:10 
E.
Miyagawa: Generalized implementation and a characterization of Walras equilibrium. 
4:154:40 
N.
Watanabe: A noncooperative bargaining foundation of nucleolus: The nucleolus equivalence. 
4:455:10 
R.
Beard and S. McDonald: Evolutionary Implementation. 
2.C: Coalition Formation Chair: S. Muto 

3:153:40 
E. Diamantoudi and L. Xue: Stability in coalition formation games with externalities 
3:454:10 
E.
Diamantoudi and L. Xue: Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games 
4:154:40 
J.F.
Nash: Agencies and coalitions, a method for reduction of formally cooperative games to formally noncooperative games and some computational research on a project of study based on this method. 
4:455:10 
R.
Ono and S. Muto Stability of Japan's coalition cabinet. 
2.D: Principal Agent Issues Chair: I. C. Park 

3:153:40 
G.
Celik: Mechanism design in the presence of supervision 
3:454:10 
R.
Deneckere and S. Severinov: Communication costs and the revelation principle 
4:154:40 
F.
L. Laux: Contracting for expertise: The singleagent case. 
4:455:10 
I.U.
Park: Repeated moral hazard with renegotiation and free access to credit markets 
2.E: Auctions Chair: A. Gavious 

3:153:40 
C. L. Chen: A scheme for solving problems on collusion in oneshot auctions 
3:454:10 
E. Einy, O. Haimanko, R.
Orzach and A. Sela: Information advantage and dominant strategies in secondprice auctions 
4:154:40 
T.
Mathews: Buyout options in internet auction markets 
4:455:10 
A.
Gavious and A. Sela: Auctions with reservation prices 
Reception Dinner, Three Village Inn  
WEDNESDAY, JULY 18 

Earth and Space Sciences  Room 001  
9:1510:00 
S.H.
Tijs: Cooperative Game Theory in Action and Interaction. 
10:0010:45 
A.
Neyman: Zero Sum TwoPerson Repeated Games with Public Uncertain Duration Process. 
10:4511:15 
Coffee Break 
11:1512:00 
L.
Petrosjan: Timeconsistency Problem in Dynamic and Multystage Games. 
2:002:45 
E.
Kalai: InformationProof Equilibria in Large Games. 
2:453:15 
Coffee Break 
3.A: Auctions Chair: D. Wettstein 

3:153:40 
M.
Sotomayor: A simultaneous ascending bid auction for multiple items and demands 
3:454:10 
M.
Peters and S. Severinov: Internet auctions with many traders 
4:154:40 
S.
Izmalkov English Auctions with reentry 
4:455:10 
D.
PerezCastrillo and D. Wettstein: Choosing wisely: A multibidding approach. 
3.B: Stochastic/Repeated Processes Chair: F. Thuijsman 

3:153:40 
J.
Flesch, F. Thuijsman and O.J. Vrieze: nperson switching control stochastic games. 
3:454:10 
R.
Laraki: The splitting game and applications 
4:154:40 
K.H. Schlag: How to choose  A boundedly rational approach to repeated decision making. 
4:455:10 
G.
Schoenmakers, J. Flesh and F. Thuijsman: Auctions with reservation prices 
3.C: Coalition Formation Chair: N. Olaizalo 

3:153:40 
R.
Garrat and C.Z. Qin: On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals in threeplayer games. 
3:454:10 
A.
Gomes: Externalities and renegotiatios in threeplayer coalitional bargaining 
4:154:40 
A.
Gomes: Multilateral negotiations and formation of coalitions 
4:455:10 
J.
Kuipers and N.Olaizola: Protocols in sequential formation of coalitions 
3.D: Cooperative Games Chair: F. Patrone 

3:153:40 
T. Solymosi and T.E.S.
Raghavan: Assignment games with stable core. 
3:454:10 
T.
Solymosi: The bargaining set of fourperson balanced games 
4:154:40 
V. Fragnelli, F.
Patrone and A. Torre: Tikhonov wellposedness for the nucleolus. 
4:455:10 
A.
Gavious and A. Sela: Auctions with reservation prices 
3.E: Equilibirum Analysis Chair: P.Dubey 

3:153:40 
J.
Berg and A. McLennan: An asymptotic growth rate of the mean number of equilibria of a two player game 
3:454:10 
W.T.
Juang: A folk theorem on equilibrium selection in knowledgeable games. 
4:154:40 
R. Orzach, P.B.
Overgaard and Y. Tauman: 
4:455:10 
P.
Dubey and O. Haimanko: Unilateral deviations with perfect information 
THURSDAY, JULY 19 

Earth and Space Sciences  Room 001  
9:1510:00 
B.
Peleg
and H. Keiding:
Stable representations of constitutions: A survey 
10:0010:45 
R.
Serrano: The Evolution of Exchange. 
10:4511:15 
Coffee Break 
11:1512:00 
L.S. Shapley: On the rate of convergence of the strong epsiloncore. 
2:002:45 
M.
Shubik: InformationProof Equilibria in Large Games. 
2:453:15 
Coffee Break 
4.A: Incomplete Information Chair: R. McLean 

3:153:40 
G.
Stamatopoulos: Refinements of equilibria in games with incomplete information. 
3:454:10 
J. Thijssen, K. Huisman and
P.M. Kort: Strategic investment under uncertainty and information spillovers 
4:154:40 
L.
Renou: Financial architectures: the role of higher order beliefs. 
4:455:10 
R. McLean, I. Obara and A.
Postlewaite: Informational smallness and private monitoring 
4.B: Value
Theory Chair: Chair: F. Valenciano 

3:153:40 
E.
Algaba, J.M. Bilbao, R. van den Brink and A. JimenezLosada: Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids. 
3:454:10 
I. Dragan: On semivalues and TU games on matroids 
4:154:40 
M. Haines and M.A. Jones: 
4:455:10 
A. Laruelle and F.
Valenciano: A probabilistic refoundation of power measures. 
4.C
Applications Chair: V. Milliou 

3:153:40 
M. Morelli and M. Montero: The stable demand set: General characterization and application to majority games. 
3:454:10 
K. Kultti and H. Vartiainen:
Stable bargaining procedures 
4:154:40 
R. Branzei,
S. Tijs and J. Timmer: 
4:455:10 
V.
Milliou Vertical Integration and R&D Spillovers: Is there a need for 'firewalls'? 
4.D
Voting and elections Chair: M. Kaminsky 

3:153:40 
P.
Coughlin: Electoral competition: Basic features and an extensive form? 
3:454:10 
J.
Miekisz: Stochastic stability in spatial threeplayer games. 
4:154:40 
M.
Montero: The Nucleolus as a Consistent Power Index in Noncooperative Majority Games. 
4:455:10 
M.M.
Kaminski: General equilibrium model of party competition. 
4.E: Cooperative
Games Chair: H. Keiding 

3:153:40 
S. Pechersky: On 'proportional' excess function for NTUgames: Axiomatic approach. 
3:454:10 
G. Ferrari, S. Moretti and
F. Patrone: On some game theoretical issues arising from waste management.. 
4:154:40 
S. Tarashina: 
4:455:10 
H. Keiding and B.Peleg: Continuous representations of topological effectivity functions. 
5:30 – 7:00 
Roundtable: How applicable is Game Theory? R.
J. Aumann 
FRIDAY, JULY 20 

Earth and Space Sciences  Room 001  
9:1510:00 
G.J.
Mailath: Coordination in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring. 
10:0010:45 
J.F.
Mertens: TBA. 
10:4511:15 
Coffee Break 
11:1512:00 
B.
Sudderth: Nperson Stochastic Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs. 
2:002:45 
S.
Brams: Games that end in a Bang or a Whimper. 
2:453:15 
Coffee Break 
5.A
Experiments Chair: R.J. Cosana 

3:153:40 
O.
Armantier: 
3:454:10 
M. CostaGomes and G.
Weizsacker: 
4:154:40 
B.P. Garza, F.J.
Jimenez, A.V. Fernandez and R.J. Cosano: 
4:455:10 
B.P.
Garza, F.J. Jimenez, A.V. Fernandez and R.J. Cosano: Measuring competition among students through experimental beauty contest games: An overview of results. 
5.B
Duopoly Chair: A. T. Yim 

3:153:40 
Q.
Liu and K. Serfes: Endogenous acquisition of information on consumer willingness to pay in a product differentiated duopoly. 
3:454:10 
I.
Linnosmaa: Corporate structure in duopoly firms. 
4:154:40 
O.
Haimanko and R. Steinberg: Price symmetry in a duopoly with congestion. 
4:455:10 
A.T.
Yim: Politically more viable tax audit strategy. 
5.C.:Applications Chair: P. Schweinzer 

3:153:40 
S.J.
Brams and D. King: Efficient fair division: Help the worst off or avoid envy? 
3:454:10 
K.H.
Pham Do, H. Folmer and H. Norde: Game Theory and fisheries management 
4:154:40 
F.S.
Sanchez: About inheritance distribution. 
4:455:10 
P.
Schweinzer: Bilateral uncertainty in a model of jobmarket screening with intermediaries.. 
5.D: Consistency Chair: W. Thompson 

3:153:40 
X.
Luo: Agreeing to disagree type results: a decisiontheoretic foundation. 
3:454:10 
C.H.
Yeh Reductionconsistency in collective choice problems. 
4:154:40 
W.
Thompson Consistency of solutions to claim problems, and bargaining solutions. 
5.E:Applications/extensive
and normal form games Chair: T.Q.Pan 

3:153:40 
F.
Echenique A characterization of strategic complementarities. 
3:454:10 
M.D.
Ryall Causal assessment in finite extensiveform games. 
4:154:40 
T.Q.
Pan A logistic method to games equilibriums solving. 
4:455:10 
O.Gossner The value of information in zerosum games. 


Last updated on July 17, 2002 by Hakan Timbil.  