

Schedule of Talks

Monday, July 13

8:45-9:45	<i>Breakfast</i>				
9:00-9:45	Yair Tauman (SUNY Stony Brook and Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC)) The Decision to Attack a Nuclear Facility: The Role of Intelligence				
9:45-10:30	Francis Bloch (Universite catholique de Louvain) Dynamic assignment of durable objects				
10:30-11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
	Session A: <i>Solution Concepts</i> Chair: <i>Charles Zheng</i>	Session B: <i>Fairness</i> Chair: <i>Artus Philipp Rosenbusch</i>	Session C: <i>Market Games</i> Chair: <i>Eiichiro Kazumori</i>	Session D: <i>Knowledge and Expectations</i> Chair: <i>Ziv Hellman</i>	
11:15-11:35	Noah Stein (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Games on Manifolds	Steven Brams (New York University) The Undercut Procedure: An Algorithm for the Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items			
11:40-12:00	José Manuel Zarzuelo (Basque Country University) The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel and the Core on NTU Games and Exchange Economies	Ahuva Mu'alem (California Institute of Technology) On Multi-Dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms	Massimo De Francesco (University of Siena) The Competitive Outcome in a Dynamic Entry and Price Game with Capacity Indivisibility	Itai Arieli (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Rationalizability in Continuous Games	
12:05-12:25	Charles Zheng (Iowa State University) The Equivalence between the Core and the Equilibria of a Noncooperative Game with Competing Contracts	Artus Philipp Rosenbusch (Darmstadt University of Technology) Satisfiable Fairness in Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility	Eiichiro Kazumori (University of Tokyo) Dynamic Limit Order Book Markets	Ziv Hellman (Hebrew University) How Common are Common Priors?	

12:25 - 14:00	<i>Lunch Break</i>				
14:00 - 14:45	Amparo Urbano (University of Valencia) Pragmatic Languages and Universal Grammars: An Equilibrium Approach				
	Session A: <i>Industrial Organization</i> Chair: <i>Andriy Zapechelnyuk</i>	Session B: <i>Bounded Rationality</i> Chair: <i>Penelope Hernandez</i>	Session C: <i>Voting</i> Chair: <i>Suntak Kim</i>	Session D: <i>Learning and Evolution</i> Chair: <i>Javier Rivas</i>	Session E: <i>Matching</i> Chair: <i>Brijesh Preston Pinto</i>
14:50 - 15:10	Chun-Hui Miao (University of South Carolina) Sequential Innovation and the Duration of Technology Licensing	Ying-Ju Chen (University of California, Berkeley) Contractual Traps	Yaron Azrieli (The Ohio State University) Characterization of Multidimensional Spatial Models of Elections with a Valence Dimension	Emerson Melo (California Institute of Technology) Congestion Pricing and Learning in Traffic Networks Games	Emiliya Lazarova (Queen's University Belfast) Coalitional Matchings
15:15 - 15:35	Evangelos Rouskas (Athens University of Economics and Business) Efficient Delay in Decision Making	Russell Golman (University of Michigan) Quantal Response Equilibria with Heterogeneous Agents	Sourav Bhattacharya (University of Pittsburgh) Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections	Marius-Ionut Ochea (University of Amsterdam) Evolution in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under Perturbed Best-Reply Dynamics	Ana Mauleon (Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis) Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching
15:40 - 16:00	Andriy Zapechelnyuk (University of Bonn) Bargaining Against a Status Quo: the Algebra of Strikes	Penelope Hernandez (University of Valencia) Bounded Memory Equilibrium	Suntak Kim (University of Pittsburgh) Divergence in Pre-Electoral Campaign Promises with Post-Electoral Policy Bargaining	Javier Rivas (University of Leicester) Cooperation, Imitation and Correlated Matching	Brijesh Preston Pinto (University of Southern California) Strongly Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences
16:00 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
16:30 - 17:15	Sergiu Hart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Dynamics and Equilibrium				

Tuesday, July 14

8:45 - 9:00	<i>Breakfast</i>				
9:00 - 9:45	Olivier Gossner (Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics) A Reasoning Approach to Knowledge, introspection and unawareness				
9:45 - 10:30	Herve Moulin (Rice University) Pricing Traffic in a Spanning Network				
10:30 - 11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
	Session A: <i>Auctions</i> Chair: <i>Gagan Pratap Ghosh</i>	Session B: <i>Mechanism Design</i> Chair: <i>Rodrigo Velez</i>	Session C: <i>Learning and Evolution</i> Chair: <i>Fernando M. Louge</i>	Session D: <i>Repeated Games</i> Chair: <i>Marco Scarsini</i>	
11:15 - 11:35	Chia-Hui Chen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Name Your Own Price at Priceline.com:	Gwenael Piaser (Université du Luxembourg) Moral Hazard: Deterministic Indirect Mechanisms and Efficiency		Nicolas (Alexandre) Klein (University of Munich) Free-Riding And Delegation In Research Teams	
11:40 - 12:00	Emel Filiz Ozbay (University of Maryland) Multi-unit Auctions with Resale	Sergei Severinov (University of British Columbia and Essex University) Multidimensional Screening with One-Dimensional Allocation Space	Reinoud Joosten (University of Twente) Generalized Projection Dynamics in Evolutionary Game Theory	Antonio Miguel Osorio-Costa (University Carlos III Madrid) Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time	
12:05 - 12:25	Gagan Pratap Ghosh (University of Iowa) Efficiency in a Class of Multi-Unit Auctions	Rodrigo Velez (University of Rochester) Are Incentives against Justice	Fernando M. Louge (University of Wisconsin - Madison) Evolution with Private Information: Caution, Contrarianism and Herding	Marco Scarsini (Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali) Repeated Congestion Games with Local Information	

12:25 - 14:00	Lunch Break				
14:00 - 14:45	Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton University) Measurable Ambiguity				
	Session A: <i>Mechanism Design</i> Chair: <i>Rida Laraki</i>	Session B: <i>Learning and Evolution</i> Chair: <i>Hsiao-Chi Chen</i>	Session C: <i>Signaling</i> Chair: <i>David Ong</i>	Session D: <i>Bargaining</i> Chair: <i>Tanguy Isaac</i>	Session E: <i>Contracts</i> Chair: <i>Bo Chen</i>
14:50 - 15:10	Daniele Condorelli (UCL and Northwestern University) Value, Willingness to Pay and the Allocation of Scarce Resources	Christopher Byrne (Penn State University) Size Dependence in an Evolutionary Game Model of Self-Deception	Rabah Amir (Université catholique de Louvain) Network Effects, Market Structure and Industry Performance	Toshiji Miyakawa (Osaka University of Economics) On the Bilateral Contracting Process in Economies with Externalities	Helena Aten (Georgetown University) Competing Informed Principals and Representative Democracy
15:15 - 15:35	Siddhartha Sahi (Rutgers University) The Allocation of a Prize	Christina Achampong (Penn State University) The Effect of Belief on Performance and of Encounter History on Beliefs in Hawk-Dove Competitions	Wooyoung Lim (University of Pittsburgh) Communication in Bargaining over Decision Rights	Uri Weiss (The Center for The Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University) The Robber Asks to be Punished	Kristina Buzard (University of California, San Diego) Contracting Problems and the Technology of Trade: A Robustness Result with Application to Hold-Up
15:40 - 16:00	Rida Laraki (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Ecole Polytechnique) Majority Judgment Strategic Analysis	Hsiao-Chi Chen (National Taipei University) Imitation, Local Interaction, and Coordination	David Ong (University of California) Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and Guilt	Tanguy Isaac (Université Catholique de Louvain) Information Revelation in Markets with Pairwise Meetings : Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis	Bo Chen (Southern Methodist University) Optimal Time-Contingent Contract Design
16:00 - 16:30	Coffee Break				
16:30 - 17:15	Peyton Young (University of Oxford) Gaming Performance Fees by Portfolio Managers: An Application of Game Theory to Finance				
18:00 - 22:00	Reception Dinner (Jasmine)				

Wednesday, July 15

8:45 - 9:00	<i>Breakfast</i>				
9:00 - 9:45	Amy Greenwald (Brown University) An Algorithm to Compute the Stochastically Stable Distribution of a Perturbed Markov Matrix				
9:45 - 10:30	Barry O'Neill (University of California, Los Angeles) Vagueness in Communication				
10:30 - 11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
	Session A: <i>Solution Concepts</i> Chair: <i>Elena Inarra</i>	Session B: <i>Mechanism Design</i> Chair: <i>Victor Naroditskiy</i>	Session C: <i>Signaling</i> Chair: <i>Younghwan In</i>	Session D: <i>Bargaining</i> Chair: <i>Ching-jen Sun</i>	Session E: <i>Networks</i> Chair: <i>Sunghoon Hong</i>
11:15 - 11:35	Paulo Barelli (University of Rochester) On the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous and Qualitative Games			Matthew Elliott (Stanford University) Inefficiencies in Trade Networks	
11:40 - 12:00	Grandjean Gilles (University of Louvain (UCL)) Strongly Rational Sets for Normal Form Games	Ruben Juarez (University of Hawaii) Monotonic Solutions to the Experts Aggregation Problem	Wolf Gick (Harvard University) Like-Biased Experts And Noisy Signals	Asha Sadanand (University of Guelph) Outside Options and Investment	Miguel A Duran (University of Malaga) The Economics of Favoritism
12:05 - 12:25	Elena Inarra (University of the Basque Country) Deriving Nash Equilibria as the Supercore for a Relational System	Victor Naroditskiy (Brown University) Destroy to Save	Younghwan In (National University of Singapore) Signaling Private Choices	Ching-jen Sun (Deakin University) Interim Outcomes and Bargaining Solutions	Sunghoon Hong (Vanderbilt University) Enhancing Transportation Security against Terrorist Attacks

12:25 - 14:00	Lunch Break				
14:00 - 14:45	Kfir Eliaz (Brown University) Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects				
	Session A: <i>Incomplete Information</i> Chair: <i>Fristan Tomala</i>	Session B: <i>Bargaining</i> Chair: <i>Daniel Quint</i>	Session C: <i>Networks</i> Chair: <i>Vincent Vannetelbosch</i>	Session D: <i>Cooperative Games</i> Chair: <i>Omer Edhan</i>	Session E: <i>Auctions</i> Chair: <i>Cornelia F.A. Van Wesenbeeck</i>
14:50 - 15:10	Scott Woodrofe Cunningham (Delft University of Technology) Strategic Transmission of Information and the Framing of Environmental Regulation	Louis Boguchwal (University of St Andrews) A System for Modeling Strategy Change, Demonstrated with the Ultimatum Game	Maximilian Mihm (Cornell University) What Goes Around Comes Around: A theory of strategic indirect reciprocity in networks	Josune Albizuri (Basque Country University) Values and Coalition Configurations	Itai Sher (University of Minnesota) Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism
15:15 - 15:35	Yehuda Levy (Hebrew University) Stochastic Games with Information Lag	Wioletta Dziuda (Northwestern University) Dynamic Policy-Making with Endogenous Default	Roland Pongou (Brown University) A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS		Yong Sui (Shanghai Jiao Tong University) All-pay Auctions with Private Values and Resale
15:40 - 16:00	Tristan Tomala (HEC Paris) Existence of Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-own Payoffs	Daniel Quint (University of Wisconsin) Bargaining with Endogenous Information	Vincent Vannetelbosch (CORE) Connections among Farsighted Agents	Omer Edhan (The Hebrew University) Continuous Values of Exact Market Games	Cornelia F.A. Van Wesenbeeck (VU University Amsterdam) The Primal Auction: a New Design for Multi-commodity Double Auctions
16:00 - 16:30	Coffee Break				
16:30 - 17:15	Jeffrey Ely (Northwestern University) Sunk-cost Bias: A Memory Kludge				

Thursday, July 16

8:45 - 9:00	<i>Breakfast</i>				
9:00 - 9:45	Jacob Goeree (California Institute of Technology) Threshold versus Exposure in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions				
9:45 - 10:30	Francoise Forges (Dauphine Paris) Core-stable bidding rings				
10:30 - 11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
	Session A: <i>Repeated Games</i> Chair: <i>Takako Fujiwara-Greve</i>	Session B: <i>Networks</i> Chair: <i>Dinko Dimitrov</i>	Session C: <i>Cooperative Games</i> Chair: <i>Nichalin Suakkaphong</i>	Session D: <i>Experimental Economics</i> Chair: <i>Ping Zhang</i>	Session E: <i>Miscellaneous</i> Chair: <i>Xiaofei Huang</i>
11:15 - 11:35			Mahmoud Farrokhi Kashani (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) Coalition Formation in the Airport Problem	Georgy Artemov (University of Melbourne) Finitely Repeated Bilateral Trade	Xiaojian Zhao (University of Mannheim) Strategic Mis-selling and Pre-Contractual Cognition
11:40 - 12:00	Salomon Antoine (LAGA Université Paris 13) Large Bandit Games	Kris De Jaegher (Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics) All Purpose Minimal Sufficient Networks in the Threshold Game	Jason Marden (California Institute of Technology) Distributed Welfare Games	Alexander Matros (University of Pittsburgh) Raising Revenue With Raffles: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment	Attila Ambrus (Harvard University) Hierarchical cheap talk
12:05 - 12:25	Takako Fujiwara-Greve (Keio University) Cooperation in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Outside Options	Dinko Dimitrov (University of Munich) How to Connect under Incomplete Information	Nichalin Suakkaphong (University of Arizona) Competition and Cooperation in Decentralized Distribution	Ping Zhang (University of Nottingham) Collusion in Share Auctions: Mechanism Design and Communication among Bidders	

12:25 - 14:00	<i>Lunch Break</i>				
14:00 - 14:45	Michihiro Kandori (University of Tokyo) Revision Games				
	Session A: <i>Applications</i> Chair: <i>Abmet Sabin</i>	Session B: <i>Learning and Evolution</i> Chair: <i>Burkhard C. Schipper</i>	Session C: <i>Incomplete Information</i> Chair: <i>Akira Yokotani</i>	Session D: <i>Social and Political</i> Chair: <i>Yukio Koriyama</i>	Session E: <i>Auctions</i> Chair: <i>Zhen Xu</i>
14:50 - 15:10	Andrey Garnaev (Saint Petersburg State University) Jamming in Wireless Networks with Cooperative Jammers	Emin Dokumaci (University of Wisconsin-Madison) Schelling Redux: An Evolutionary Dynamic Model of Residential Segregation	Min Kim (University of Southern California) Information Asymmetry and Incentives for Active Management	Brent Hickman (University of Iowa) Effort, Achievement Gaps, and Affirmative Action: A New Look at College Admissions	Ram Orzach (Oakland University) Revenue Comparison in Common-Value Auctions: Two Examples
15:15 - 15:35	Shi-Miin Liu (National Taipei University) Commitment or No-Commitment to Monitoring in Emission Tax Systems?	Marek Kaminski (University of California, Irvine) Generalized Backward Induction	Eduardo Perez (Stanford University) Competing with Equivocal Information: The Importance of Weak Candidates	Matias Iaryczower (California Institute of Technology) Choosing Records: Flip-Flops and Cronies	Brennan Platt (Brigham Young University) Pay-to-Bid Auctions
15:40 - 16:00	Ahmet Sahin (Kahramanmaraş Sutcu Imam University) An Application of Game Theory to Producers in Competition with Production and Market Price Risks: The Case of Turkey	Burkhard C Schipper (University of California, Davis) Unbeatable Imitation	Akira Yokotani (University of Rochester) The Sequential Belief Representation of Harsanyi Type Spaces with Redundancy	Yukio Koriyama (Ecole Polytechnique) Freedom to Not Join: A Voluntary Participation Game of a Discrete Public Good	Zhen Xu (Stony Brook University) The Contrary Effects of Listing Fee
16:00 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
16:30 - 17:40	Round Table with participation of Robert Aumann/Sergiu Hart/Ehud Kalai/ Eric Maskin/John Nash (moderator) and Peyton Young Provost Kaler will give a brief greeting before the round table begins				

Friday, July 17

8:45 - 9:00	<i>Breakfast</i>				
9:00 - 9:45	Shmuel Zamir (Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case				
9:45 - 10:30	Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) Repeated Unknown Games				
10:30- 11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
	Session A: <i>Social and Political</i> Chair: <i>Guillermo Flores</i>	Session B: <i>Contests</i> Chair: <i>Subhasish Modak Chowdhury</i>	Session C: <i>Solution Concepts</i> Chair: <i>SangMok Lee</i>	Session D: <i>Stochastic Games</i> Chair: <i>Eran Shmaya</i>	Session E: <i>Experimental Economics</i> Chair: <i>Karl Schlag</i>
11:15 - 11:35	David Laurens Bijl (Delft University of Technology) A Model of Consensus in the European Commission	Magnus Hoffmann (University of Magdeburg) Do I Want It All? A Simple Model of Satiation in Contests	Konrad Grabiszewski (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México) Procedural Type Spaces	Nagarajan Krishnamurthy (Chennai Mathematical Institute, India) Orderfield Property of Stochastic Games via Dependency Graphs	
11:40 - 12:00	Micael Ehn (Mälardalen University) Why Social Stratification is to be Expected	Dylan Minor (University of California, Berkeley) When Second Best is Best: on the Optimality of Offering a Larger Second Prize	Kamalakar Karlapalem (International Institute of Information Technology, Hyderabad, India) Games with Minimalistic Agents	Rida Laraki (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Ecole Polytechnique) Explicit Formulas for Repeated Games with Absorbing States	Dorothea Herreiner (Loyola Marymount University) Do Intentions Matter for Empowerment? Procedural Justice in Simple Bargaining Games
12:05 - 12:25	Guillermo Flores (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú) Corruption Efficiency: Corruptible Bureaucratic Systems and Implementation of Governmental Solutions	Subhasish Modak Chowdhury (Purdue University) The All-pay Auction with Non-monotonic Payoff	SangMok Lee (California Institute of Technology) The Testable Implications of Zero-sum Games	Eran Shmaya (Kellogg School of Management) The Determinacy of Infinite Games with Eventual Perfect Monitoring	Karl Schlag (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) Can Sanctions Induce Pessimism? An Experiment

12:25 - 14:00	<i>Lunch Break</i>				
14:00 - 14:45	Ehud Kalai (Northwestern University) A cooperative/competitive solution to a class of strategic games				
	Session A: <i>Social Choice</i> Chair: <i>Jung You</i>	Session B: <i>Repeated Games</i> Chair: <i>John Smith</i>	Session C: <i>Miscellaneous</i> Chair: <i>Duygu Yengin</i>		
14:50 - 15:10	Geoffroy De Clippel (Brown University) Egalitarianism and Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information	Yakov Babichenko (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality.) Completely Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium	Adam (Tauman) Kalai (Microsoft Research) Bargaining in Strategic Games with Private Information		
15:15 - 15:35	Jung You (Rice University) Envy-free and Incentive Compatible division of a commodity	Nobue Suzuki (Komazawa University) Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Shared Belief	Laurent Mathevet (University of Texas at Austin) Designing Stable Mechanisms in Economic Environments		
15:40 - 16:00		John Smith (Rutgers-Camden) Not So Cheap Talk: A Model of Advice with Communication Costs	Duygu Yengin (University of Adelaide) Appointment Games in Fixed-Route Traveling Salesman Problems and The Shapley Value		
16:00 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
16:30 - 17:15	Bernhard Von Stengel (London School of Economics) Pathways to Equilibria, Pretty Pictures and Diagrams (PPAD)				