Workshop on Strategic Aspects of Terrorism, Security, and Espionage
Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, July 16-18, 2014
Organizers: Drs. Boaz Ganor, Timothy Mathews, and Yair Tauman

Wednesday, July 16, 2014:

9:00am-9:50am: Registration and coffee/refreshments

9:50am-10:00am: Opening Remarks (Yair Tauman and/or Timothy Mathews)

10:00am-11:15am: Session I – “Coalition Formation and Bargaining” (3 presentations, 25 minutes each)
   (i.a) Transnational Terrorism: Externalities and Coalition Formation (Andre Rossi de Oliveira, Emilison C.D. Silva, & Joao Ricardo Faria)
   (i.b) Stag Hunt Contests and the Alliance Formation Puzzle (James Boudreau & Shane Sanders)
   (i.c) An Economic Theory of Bargaining and Fighting with Endogenous Destruction (Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo)

11:15am-12:00pm: Computational Game Theory for Security: Key Algorithmic Principles, Deployed Applications and Research Challenges (Milind Tambe)

12:00pm-1:30pm: lunch break

1:30pm-2:20pm: Session II – “Foreign Policy and Aid” (2 presentations, 25 minutes each)
   (ii.a) Aid as a Foreign Policy Instrument to Tackle Terror (Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Jaideep Roy)
   (ii.b) Can Delegated Deterrence Succeed?: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation in Counterterror (Catherine Langlois)

2:20pm-3:10pm: Session III – “Experimental Studies” (2 presentations, 25 minutes each)
   (iii.a) An Experimental Study of Dark Network Formation and Disruption (Mark Bloxsom, Ronald Breiger, Michael McBride, & Brint Milward)
   (iii.b) An Experiment on Deception, Credibility, and Trust (David Ettinger)

3:10pm-3:40pm: coffee break
Thursday, July 17, 2014:

9:00am-9:30am: Counterterrorism Dilemmas and Challenges (Boaz Ganor)

9:30am-10:45am: Session IV – “Contest Models” (3 presentations, 25 minutes each)
   (iv.a) Generalizations on the Colonel Blotto Game: What’s Possible with Existing Solutions? (Brian Roberson & Dan Kovenock)
   (iv.b) Do Humanitarian Interventions Help Humanity? A Contest-Theoretic Analysis of Morally Hazardous Rebels in Civil Conflict (Shane Sanders & Vincent Auger)
   (iv.c) Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-battle Contests (Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, David Rojo Arjona, & Nathaniel T. Wilcox)

10:45am-11:15am: coffee break

11:15am-12:30pm: Session V – “Espionage and Intelligence” (3 presentations, 25 minutes each)
   (v.a) The Decision to Attack a Nuclear Facility: The Role of Intelligence (Yair Tauman)
   (v.b) Economic Espionage (Konrad Grabiszewski & Dylan Minor)
   (v.c) Entry with Two Correlated Signals (Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman, & Amparo Urbano)

12:30pm-2:00pm: lunch break

2:00pm-2:45pm: Econometric Studies of the Impact of Terrorism (Rafi Melnick)

2:45pm-4:00pm: Session VI – “Empirical Studies” (3 presentations, 25 minutes each)
   (vi.a) Lone Wolf Terrorism and Economic Analysis (Peter Phillips)
   (vi.b) Youth Unemployment and Terrorism in the MENAP Region (Aniruddha Bagchi & Jomon Paul)
   (vi.c) Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa (Michael Koenig, Dominic Rohner, Mathias Thoenig, & Fabrizio Zilibotti)

4:00pm-4:30pm: coffee break

6:00pm: Reception Dinner

Friday, July 18, 2014:

9:30am-10:20am: Session VII – “Special Topics 1” (2 presentations, 25 minutes each)
   (vii.a) The Social Evolution of Terror and Genocide Across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory (Charles Anderton)
   (vii.b) Game-Theoretic Approach to Feedback-Driven Multi-Stage Moving Target Defense (Quanyan Zhu & Tamer Basar)

10:20am-10:50am: coffee break

10:50am-11:40am: Session VIII – “Special Topics 2” (2 presentations, 25 minutes each)
   (viii.a) Counterterrorism Analysis Using Cooperative Game Theory (Sung Chan Choi)
   (viii.b) Modeling Hostage-Taking: On Reputation and Strategic Rationality of Terrorists (Heinrich Nax)