International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 08 - 12, 2013

Schedule of Talks

Monday, July 8

9:00 - 9:45

Geoffroy De Clippel  (Brown University)
On the Selection of Arbitrators

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Cooperative Games

Session B: Bargaining

Session C: Coalition Formation

Session D: Cost Sharing

Session E: Industrial Organization

Session F: Learning/Evolution

10:15 - 10:45

Ziv Hellman  (Tel Aviv University)
Spectral Value for Coalitional Games  

Alfi Jiménez  (Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas)
The Dark Side of Clientelism  

Dominik Karos  (Saarland University)
Power and Bargaining  

Omer Edhan  (The University of Manchester)
Cost Sharing with Production Constraints  

CANCELLED

Georgy Loginov  (UW Madison )
Cyclical Behavior in Two-Speed Evolutionary Game Environments  

10:45 - 11:15

Chih-Ru Hsiao  (Soochow University)
A Geometric Interpretation of the Shapley value for TU Games  

Andrey Meshalkin  (Maastricht University)
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Majoritarian Bargaining  

Joosung Lee  (Penn State University)
Bargaining and Buyout  

Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan  (California Institute of Technology)
Potential games are necessary to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games  

Alex Barrachina  (University Carlos III de Madrid)
Entry with Two Correlated Signals  

Marius-Ionut Ochea  (University of Amsterdam)
Evolution of Reciprocity in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas  

11:15 - 11:45

Rosemarie Nagel  (UPF Barcelona, now visiting NYU)
The agencies method for coalition formation in experimental games  

Onur Cobanli  (Humboldt University Berlin)
Pipeline Power  

Karl Robert L. Jandoc  (University of Hawai'i)
Stable Coalitions with Power Accumulation  

Marc Schröder  (Maastricht University)
A non-cooperative analysis of the estate division problem  

Dávid Kopányi  (University of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute)
Price-Quantity Competition with Risk-averse Firms  

Jason Marden  (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Selecting Efficient Coarse Correlated Equilibria Through Distributed Learning  

11:45 - 12:00

Coffee Break

12:00 - 12:45

Ehud Kalai  (Northwestern University)
Compressed Equilibrium in Large Repeated Games of Incomplete Information

12:45 - 14:15

Lunch Break

14:15 - 15:00

Robert John Aumann  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Collectives as Individuals

15:00 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Cooperative Games

Session B: Auctions

Session C: Dynamic Games

Session D: Experimental Economics

Session E: Learning/Evolution

Session F: Bargaining

15:15 - 15:45

Elena Inarra  (University of the Basque Country)
The von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets for 2x2 games  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (SUNY at Buffalo)
Information Aggregation in Double Auction Markets with Interdependent Values  

Fei Li  (University of Pennsylvania)
Revenue Management without Commitment: Dynamic Pricing and Periodic Fire Sales  

Walter Yuan  (MobLab Inc)
Learning by Playing: Interactive games for game theory classroom  

Daniel Wood  (Clemson University)
Cognitive Biases in Stochastic Coordination Games and Their Evolution  

Cheng-Zhong Qin  (UC Santa Barbara)
A Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem  

15:45 - 16:15

Tomasz Michalak  (University of Oxford)
The Marginality Approach for the Shapley Value in Games with Externalities  

XiaoGang Che  (University of Alberta, Canada)
Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions  

Saeed Mohammadian Moghayer  (University of Amsterdam, and TNO Delft)
Stock-dependent discrete-time dynamic pollution games  

Nora Szech  (University of Bonn)
Morals and Markets  

 

Todd Stambaugh  (CUNY Graduate Center)
Coincidence of Two Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Sergiu Hart  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Two(!) Good To Be True

 

Tuesday, July 9

9:00 - 9:45

Olivier Gossner  (Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics)
The Appeal of Information Transactions

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Experimental Economics

Session B: Finance

Session C: Industrial Organization

Session D: Information and Networks

Session E: Matching

Session F: Mechanism Design

10:15 - 10:45

Daniel Cracau  (University of Magdeburg)
Firm behaviour in price-quantity oligopolies: An experimental study of the mixed strategy equilibrium  

CANCELLED

Felipe Zurita  (Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile)
Competitive pressure and incentives in the quality game: The reputational mechanism  

CANCELLED

Emiliya A Lazarova  (University of Birmingham)
Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty  

Yu Chen  (Indiana University)
Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?  

10:45 - 11:15

J. Stephen Judd  (U. Penn CIS)
Conflict Begets Cooperation in Socialized KingPawn  

Maryam Sami  (Stony Brook University)
Financial Contagion and Reputational Concerns of Fund Managers in Diversified Funds  

Barna Bako  (MTA TKI)
Exclusive contracts with product differentiation in successive oligopolies  

Rupei Xu  (University of Minnesota--Twin Cities)
Altruism in Local and Global Network Topologies: A Game Theoretic Study of Resource Allocation in Social Networks  

Sofya Kiselgof  (NRU Higher School of Economics)
Matching with interval order preferences:stability and Pareto-efficiency  

Heng Liu  (University of Rochester)
Efficient mechanism design in interdependent-valuation environments  

11:15 - 11:45

Lu Dong  (University of Nottingham)
Trying to Overcome Coordination Failure in a Tough Environment  

Yan Liu  (Stony Brook University)
Bank Competition and Lending Policy over Business Cycles  

Robert Somogyi  (Ecole Polytechnique)
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with substantial product differentiation  

Amparo Urbano  (University of Valencia)
Local Coordination and Global Congestion in Random Networks  

Umut Dur  (University of Texas at Austin)
Sequential Assignment Problems and Two Applications  

Jung You  (Rice University)
Optimal VCG Mechanisms to Assign Multiple Bads  

11:45 - 12:00

Coffee Break

12:00 - 12:45

Nicolas Vieille  (HEC Paris)
Stochastic games: a quick overview

12:45 - 14:15

Lunch Break

 

MERTENS AFTERNOON
(In memory of Jean-Francois Mertens)

14:15 - 15:00

Francoise Forges  (Universite Paris Dauphine)
Bayesian repeated games

15:00 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Refinements

Session B: Incomplete Information

Session C: Knowledge Expectations

Session D: Stochastic games

Session E: Learning and Evolution

15:15 - 15:45

Matias Nunez  (CNRS-Cergy)
Hybrid Procedures  

Eran Shmaya  (Northwestern University)
Compressed equilibrium in large repeated games with incomplete information  

Alexander Funcke  (Stockholm University)
Making empathy obsolete: Enforcing equilibrium selection despite path-dependency  

Gijs Schoenmakers  (Maastricht University)
Algorithms for finding subgame perfect equilibria in recursive games with perfect information  

Steven Perkins  (University of Bristol)
Stochastic Fictitious Play with Continuous Action Sets  

15:45 - 16:15

Asha Sadanand  (University of Guelph)
Signalling Games with Multiple Senders  

Gregory Pavlov  (University of Western Ontario)
Correlated equilibria in zero-sum games with incomplete information  

Peio Zuazo-Garin  (University of the Basque Country)
Incomplete Imperfect Information and Backward Induction  

János Flesch  (Maastricht University)
Refinements of subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in games with perfect information  

Zibo Xu  (Stockholm School of Economics)
Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Sylvain Sorin  (Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6)
On Reversibility and Oscillations in Zero-sum Discounted Stochastic Games

18:00 - 22:00

Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

 

Wednesday, July 10

9:00 - 9:45

Tristan Tomala  (HEC Paris)
Approximate Implementation In Markovian Environments

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Bargaining

Session B: Mechanism Design

Session C: Solution Concepts

Session D: Voting

Session E: Auctions

Session F: Applications

10:15 - 10:45

Jin Yeub Kim  (The University of Chicago)
Endogenous Choice of a Mediator  

William Phan  (University of Rochester)
Economies with Replicable Objects  

Bruno Salcedo  (PennState)
Implementation without commitment in moral hazard environments  

Javier Rivas  (University of Leicester)
Deliberation, Leadership and Information Aggregation  

Songzi Du  (Simon Fraser University)
Ex Post Equilibria in Double Auctions of Divisible Assets  

Timothy Mathews  (Kennesaw State University)
A Sequential Choice Model of Family Business Succession  

10:45 - 11:15

Paolo Turrini  (Imperial College London)
Non-cooperative games with preplay negotiations  

Philip N. Brown  (The University of Colorado at Boulder)
Social Coordination in Unknown Price-Sensitive Populations  

CANCELLED

Yaron Azrieli  (The Ohio State University)
The optimal sovereignty partition  

Brian Baisa  (Yale)
Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences  

Georgy Lukyanov  (Toulouse School of Economics)
Coordination Frictions and Public Communication  

11:15 - 11:45

 

Guy Arie  (University of Rochester)
Dynamic Costs and Moral Hazard: A Duality Based Approach  

Marilda Sotomayor  (Universidade de Săo Paulo)
Modeling Cooperative Decision Situations: The Deviation Function Form and The Equilibrium Concept  

SunTak Kim  (National Taiwan University)
Information Acquisition and Voting Mechanisms  

Alexander Matros  (University of South Carolina)
Common Value Mechanisms with Private Information  

Timothy Lambie-Hanson  (Suffolk University)
Shared Risk in n-player Games  

11:45 - 12:00

Coffee Break

12:00 - 12:45

Philip J. Reny  (University of Chicago)
Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions

12:45 - 14:15

Lunch Break

14:15 - 15:00

Al Roth  (Stanford University)
Kidney Exchange: Where We've Been and Where We May Be Headed

15:00 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Bounded Rationality

Session B: Contracts

Session C: Dynamic Games

Session D: Experimental Economics

Session E: Learning and Evolution

Session F: Computation

15:15 - 15:45

Adrian Marple  (Stanford University)
Equilibria in Finite Games with Imperfect Recall  

Renato Gomes  (Toulouse School of Economics)
Experimentation and Project Selection: Screening and Learning  

Yingni Guo  (Yale University)
Optimal Delegation Contract with Experimentation  

Frederic Moisan  (University of Toulouse)
The Behavioral Effects of Social Ties: an Experimental Study  

Yi Zhang  (Singapore Management University)
Robust Information Cascade with Endogenous Ordering  

Marek Jerzy Szopa  (University of Silesia)
Nash Equilibria of the Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma  

15:45 - 16:15

Kota Murayama  (Hitotsubashi University)
Robust Predictions under Finite Depth of Reasoning  

Evangelia Chalioti  (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Team members' ability matters for career concerns  

Marco Scarsini  (SUTD)
Dynamic Congestion Games: The Price of Seasonality  

Yun Wang  (University of Pittsburgh)
An Experimental Investigation on Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games  

Ed Hopkins  (Edinburgh University)
Inequality and Risk Taking Behavior  

Yuke Li  (Yale University)
A Computational Model of Conflict and Cooperation  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 19:45

Roundtable Discussion: The Present and Future of Game Theory
(Program)

 

Thursday, July 11

9:00 - 9:45

Eilon Solan  (Tel Aviv University)
Stopping games

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Experimental Economics

Session B: Mechanism Design

Session C: Voting

Session D: Auctions

Session E: Applications

10:15 - 10:45

Melayne McInnes  (University of South Carolina)
Lake Wobegon: Experimental Tests of Learning and the “Better than Average Effect”  

Andreas Reischmann  (AWI, Heidelberg University)
A conditional contribution mechanism for the provision of public goods  

Boris Ginzburg  (University College London)
Collective Preference for Ignorance  

Frank Rosar  (University of Bonn)
Optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries  

Guocheng Wang  (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
Game Modeling and Strategic Behavior Analysis of Stakeholders in Public Goods Provision  

10:45 - 11:15

Ernest Lai  (Lehigh University)
Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response  

Ryan Tierney  (University of Rochester)
Strategy-proofness and Asymptotic Efficiency in Exchange Economies  

Ling Yang  (University of Pittsburgh)
Partisan Voting and Uncertainty  

Ram Orzach  (Oakland University)
Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information  

Bernhard Ganglmair  (University of Texas at Dallas)
Framing Games: Evidence-Based Decision Making in an Adversarial Setting  

11:15 - 11:45

Heinrich Harald Nax  (PSE, Ecole Normale Superieure)
Learning in a Black Box  

Abhinav Anand  (Stony Brook University)
Quotas versus Handicaps: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Armative Action Policies in India  

Zhengjia Jiang  
The Lobbying Game with Asymmetric Information  

Sergio Parreiras  (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
A Tortoise And A Hare Race, Part I: Finite Horizon  

Steven Brams  (New York University)
Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes  

11:45 - 12:00

Coffee Break

12:00 - 12:45

Amrita Dhillon  (University of Warwick)
Status incentives and corruption

12:45 - 14:15

Lunch Break

 

MERTENS AFTERNOON
(In memory of Jean-Francois Mertens)

14:15 - 15:00

Abraham Neyman  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Robust equilibria of continuous-time stochastic games

15:00 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Solution Concepts

Session B: Incomplete Information

Session C: Knowledge and Expectations

Session D: Learning and Evolution

Session E: Repeated Games

15:15 - 15:45

Joseph M. Abdou  (Paris 1 and PSE)
The structure of board games  

Andrei Barbos  (University of South Florida)
Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation  

Nuh Aygun Dalkiran  (Bilkent University)
Common Knowledge and State-dependent Equilibria  

Yehuda Levy  (Hebrew University)
Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring  

Yu Awaya  (Penn State University)
Communication in a Dynamic Prisoner's Dilemma with Incomplete Information  

15:45 - 16:15

Vladyslav Nora  (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE)
Saddle Functions and Robust Sets of Equilibria  

Shih En Lu  (Simon Fraser University)
Almost Fully Revealing Cheap Talk with Imperfectly Informed Senders  

Ben Wang  (National University of Singapore)
An Epistemic Characterization of RSCE  

Seung Han Yoo  (Korea University)
Learning a Population Distribution  

Ting Liu  (Stony Brook University)
Reputation building in credence good markets  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Shmuel Zamir  (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Representations of constitutions under incomplete information

 

Friday, July 12

9:00 - 9:45

Drew Fudenberg  (Harvard University)
Recursive Stochastic Choice

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Mechanism Design

Session B: Mechanism Design

Session C: Social and Political Models

Session D: Fairness

Session E: Signalling

10:15 - 10:45

Greg Plaxton  (University of Texas at Austin)
A Simple Family of Top Trading Cycles Mechanisms for Housing Markets with Indifferences  

Daniel Ferguson Garrett  (Toulouse School of Economics)
Competitive Screening and Search  

Bernhard Von Stengel  (London School of Economics)
Game Theory Explorer - Software for the Applied Game Theorist  

Lorini Emiliano  (IRIT-CNRS)
When the Group Matters: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Team Reasoning and Social Ties  

Bernhard Ganglmair  (University of Texas at Dallas)
Conversation with Secrets  

10:45 - 11:15

Christoph Mueller  (Carnegie Mellon University)
Robust Implementation in Weakly Rationalizable Strategies  

Sina Litterscheid  (University of Bonn)
Sequential, multidimensional Screening  

Yi Zhang  (Singapore Management University)
Anonymous Matching and Group Reputation  

Stefania Minardi  (HEC Paris)
Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish  

Sander Heinsalu  (Yale)
Continuous time noisy signalling  

11:15 - 11:45

Rahul Deb  (University of Toronto)
Implementation with Securities  

Brandon Jonathan Campbell  (Texas A&M University)
Theory on the Design of Experiments.  

Ethem Akyol  (The Pennsylvania State University)
Welfare Comparison of School Choice Mechanisms under Incomplete Information  

Alan Daniel Miller  (University of Haifa)
A Behavioral Arrow Theorem  

Maria Goltsman  (University of Western Ontario)
On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games  

11:45 - 12:00

Coffee Break

12:00 - 12:45

Johannes Horner  (Yale University)
Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

12:45 - 14:15

Lunch Break

14:15 - 15:00

Rida Laraki  (CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique)
Higher Order Game Dynamics

15:00 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Contracts

Session B: Repeated Games

Session C: Matching

Session D: Auctions

Session E: Bounded Rationality

Session F: Signalling

15:15 - 15:45

Martin Pollrich  (Humboldt University Berlin)
On the benefits of mediation in contracting problems with limited commitment  

Tadashi Sekiguchi  (Kyoto University)
Multimarket Contact under Demand Fluctuations: A Limit Result  

Ahmad Peivandi Karizbodaghi  (Northwestern University)
Random allocation of bundles  

Hanzhe Zhang  (University of Chicago)
Reserve Price Auctions in a Dynamic Heterogeneous Goods Market  

Tatiana Kornienko  (University of Edinburgh)
A Cognitive Basis for Adaptive Utility  

Farishta Satari  (CUNY Graduate Center)
Cheap Talk in the Presence of an Audience  

15:45 - 16:15

Noam Tanner  (Yale University)
Optimal Delegation Under Uncertain Bias  

Juan Ignacio Block  (Washington University in St. Louis)
Codes of Conduct and Bad Reputation  

Peter Troyan  (Stanford University)
Implementing Diversity in School Choice  

Elon Kohlberg  (Harvard University)
Shapley Value of Stochastic Games  

Zsombor Zoltan Meder  (Maastricht University)
Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency  

Jae Kang  (University of Pittsburgh)
Multiple Experts Informing a Constrained Decision-maker  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Larry Samuelson  (Yale University)
Investment and Matching