International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 15 - 19, 2012

Schedule of Talks

Sunday, July 15

9:00 - 9:45

Asu Ozdaglar  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Dynamics in Near-Potential Games

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Mechanism Design

Session B: Matching

Session C: Knowledge/Expectations

Session D: Networks

Session E: Reputation

Session F: Computation

10:15 - 10:45

Nick Bedard  (University of Western Ontario)
The Strategically Ignorant Principal  

Umut Dur  (University of Texas at Austin)
Tuition Exchange  

Adam Dominiak  (Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University)
"Agreeing to Disagree" Type Results under Ambiguity  

Penelope Hernandez  (University of Valencia)
Strategic sharing of a costly network  

Zehao Hu  (University of Pennsylvania)
Vanishing Beliefs But Persisting Reputation  

Dieter Balkenborg  (University of Exeter)
Polyhedra and Nash equilibrium components: An elementary construction.  

10:45 - 11:15

Jing Chen  (MIT)
Epistemic Implementation and The Arbitrary-Belief Auction  

Alexander Teytelboym  (University of Oxford)
Strong stability in contractual networks and matching markets  

Ziv Hellman  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Deludedly Agreeing to Agree  

Guillem Martinez  (University of Valencia)
Small world networks games  

Thomas Norman  (Magdalen College, Oxford)
Almost-Rational Learning of Nash Equilibrium without Absolute Continuity  

Pawel Dziewuski  (University of Oxford)
Equilibria in large games with strategic complementaries  

11:15 - 11:45

Ville Korpela  (University of Turku)
Bayesian Implementation in Societies with Strong Norm Agains Lying and Partially Honest Individuals  

Takeshi Suzuki  (Brown University)
Assignment Games with Path-Dependent Preferences  

Bassel Tarbush  (University of Oxford)
Agreeing to disagree: a syntactic approach  

Manuel Munoz-Herrera  (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
Productive Exchange Games in Networks  

Francesc Dilme  (University of Pennsylvania)
Reputations through Switching Costs  

Vianney Perchet  (Universite Paris 7)
Nash Equilibria with uncertainties; Generalization of Lemke Howson algorithm  

11:45 - 12:00

Coffee Break

12:00 - 12:45

Srihari Govindan  (University of Rochester)
Competition for a Majority

12:45 - 14:15

Lunch Break

14:15 - 15:00

Adam (Tauman) Kalai  (Microsoft Research)
Dueling Algorithms

15:00 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Voting

Session B: Solution Concepts

Session C: Incomplete Information

Session D: Contracts

Session E: Auctions

 

15:15 - 15:45

Peter Coughlin  (University of Maryland)
Probabilistic Voting Models  

Tai-Wei Hu  (Northwestern University)
Critical Comparisons between the Nash Noncooperative Theory and Rationalizability  

Fabien Gensbittel  (Toulouse School of Economics)
Repeated Games with Incremental Information on One Side.  

Yutaka Suzuki  (Hosei University)
Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework  

 

 

15:45 - 16:15

Yingni Guo  (Yale University)
Information Sharing and Voting  

Michael Trost  (Max Planck Institute of Economics)
An Epistemic Rationale for Order-Independence  

Xavier Venel  (University Toulouse 1 Capitole)
Stochastic games with a more informed controller.  

Martin Szydlowski  (Northwestern)
Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking  

Ina Taneva  (University of Texas at Austin)
Disclosure of Private Information in Auctions with Two-Dimensional Types  

 

16:15 - 16:45

Coffee Break

16:45 - 17:30

Jerome Renault  (University Toulouse 1)
Limit values for Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a distance for belief spaces

 

Monday, July 16

9:00 - 9:45

Abraham Neyman  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Stochastic games with short-stage duration

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Experimental Economics

Session B: Repeated Games

Session C: Cooperative Games

Session D: Industrial Organization

Session E: Theory

Session F: Applications

10:15 - 10:45

Alexander Matros  (Lancaster University)
All-Pay Auctions vs. Lotteries as Provisional Fixed-Prize Fundraising Mechanisms: Theory and Evidence  

Bo Chen  (Southern Methodist University)
A Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Unequal Discounting  

Usha Sridhar  (Ecometrix Research)
Pareto Optimal Allocation in Coalitional Games with Exponential Payoffs  

Pierre Fleckinger  (Paris School of Economics)
Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments  

Nicolas (Alexandre) Klein  (University of Bonn)
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games  

Raphael Boleslavsky  (University of Miami, School of Business)
Grade Inflation and Education Quality  

10:45 - 11:15

Leandro Chaves Rego  (Federal University of Pernambuco)
Mixed Equilibrium, Collaborative Dominance and Burning Money: an experimental study  

Jonathan Lhost  (University of Texas at Austin)
Worth the Wait? Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Search  

Andreas Nohn  (Public Choice Research Centre, Turku, Finland)
Monotonicity of Power in Games with Restricted Communication  

Bruno Oliveira  (Universidade do Porto)
Strategic optimization in R&D Investment  

Utku Ozan Candogan  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games  

Shah Mahmood  (University College Londdon)
Two New Economic Models for Privacy  

11:15 - 11:45

Kim Kaivanto  (Lancaster University)
Community Level Natural Resource Management Institutions Work in (Game) Theory as Well as in Practice: Lottery Allocation of Fishing Sites Implements Correlated Equilibrium  

Marie Laclau  (HEC Paris)
Communication in Repeated Network Games with Private Monitoring  

 

 

Ryoji Sawa  (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
An Analysis of Stochastic Stability in Bargaining Games with Behavioral Agents  

 

11:45 - 12:00

Coffee Break

12:00 - 12:45

Sylvain Chassang  (Princeton University)
Dynamic allocation under limited liability

12:45 - 14:15

Lunch Break

14:15 - 15:00

Pierre Cardaliaguet  (Université de Paris Dauphine)
On Long Time Average of Mean Field Games

15:00 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Solution Concepts

Session B: Knowledge/Expectations

Session C: Networks

Session D: Auctions

Session E: Political Economy

Session F: Applications

15:15 - 15:45

Zsombor Zoltan Meder  (Maastricht University)
Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons  

Romeo Balanquit  (University of the Philippines)
Common Belief Revisited  

Amrita Dhillon  (University of Warwick)
Employee referral, social proximity and worker discipline  

Hanzhe Zhang  (University of Chicago)
Optimal Auction Design Under Competition  

Yun Wang  (University of Pittsburgh)
Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers  

Christina Pawlowitsch  (Paris School of Economics)
Meaning, free will, and the certification of types in a Biblical game  

15:45 - 16:15

Peter Streufert  (University of Western Ontario)
Specifying nodes as sets of actions  

Matthias Lang  (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)
The Fog of Fraud - Mitigating Fraud by Strategic Ambiguity  

 

 

Tânia Oliveira  (University of Porto)
Dynamics of Human Decisions  

Jiawen Li  (University of York)
A non-cooperative approach to the Talmud solution for bankruptcy problems  

16:15 - 16:45

Coffee Break

16:45 - 17:30

Ludovic Renou  (University of Leicester)
Repeated Nash Implementation

 

Tuesday, July 17

9:00 - 9:45

Eric Maskin  (Harvard University)
Evolution and Repeated Games

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Stochastic Games

Session B: Signaling

Session C: Mechanism Design

Session D: Matching

Session E: Learning/Evolution

Session F: Fairness

10:15 - 10:45

János Flesch  (Maastricht University)
Subgame-perfection in free transition games  

Aaron Bodoh-Creed  (Cornell University)
Conversations, Privacy, and Taboos  

Alejandro Francetich  (Stanford GSB)
Endogenous Informational Asymmetries in Dynamic Mechanisms  

Wonki Jo Cho  (University of Rochester)
Probabilistic Assignment: A Two-fold Axiomatic Approach  

Axel Bernergĺrd  (Stockholm School of Economics)
Finite-Population Mass-Action and Evolutionary Stability  

Steven Brams  (New York University)
N-Person Cake-Cutting: There May Be No Perfect Division  

10:45 - 11:15

Yehuda Levy  (Hebrew University)
A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium  

Fei Li  (University of Pennsylvania)
Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout  

Ilan Lobel  (New York University)
Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Sales and Inventory Information  

Peter Troyan  (Stanford University)
Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas  

Jun Honda  (University of Vienna)
Equilibrium selection for symmetric coordination games with an application to the minimum-effort game  

Karol Szwagrzak  (University of Rochester)
Efficient, fair, and group strategy-proof (re)allocation in networks  

11:15 - 11:45

Guillaume Vigeral  (Université Paris-Dauphine)
A zero-sum stochastic game with compact action sets and no asymptotic value  

Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer  (European University Institute)
A Model of Competitive Signaling  

Gwenaël Piaser  (IPAG Business School, Paris)
Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games  

John Nash  (Princeton University)
Plans and Work for Further Studies of Cooperative Games Using the 'Method of Acceptances'  

Bryan Bruns  (Independent Scholar)
Escaping Prisoner’s Dilemmas: From Discord to Harmony in the Landscape of 2x2 Games  

 

11:45 - 12:00

Coffee Break

12:00 - 12:45

Robert Kohn  (New York University)
Parabolic PDEs and Deterministic Games

12:45 - 14:15

Lunch Break

14:15 - 18:00

Celebration of Michel Balinski's 78 years
(Program)

18:30 - 22:00

Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

 

Wednesday, July 18

9:00 - 15:00

Celebration of Michel Balinski's 78 years
(Program)

15:00 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Repeated Games

Session B: Voting

Session C: Networks

Session D: Incomplete Information

Session E: Auctions

Session F: Political Economy

15:15 - 15:45

Juan Ignacio Block  (Washington University in St. Louis)
Codes of Conduct, Private Information, and Repeated Games  

Zhengjia Jiang  
A Complete Geometric Representation of Four-Player Weighted Voting Systems  

Norma Olaizola  (University of the Basque Country)
One-way flow network formation under constraints  

Jeanne Hagenbach  (CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, France)
Certifiable Pre-Play Communication  

Yumiko Baba  (Aoyamagakuin University)
Four Unit-Price Auction Procedures  

Cheng Li  (University of Miami)
Profiling, Screening and Criminal Recruitment  

15:45 - 16:15

Johannes Horner  (Yale University)
How fast do equilibrium payoffs converge in repeated games?  

Alessandra Casella  (Columbia University)
Vote trading with and without party leaders  

Federico Valenciano  (University of the Basque Country)
Asymmetric flow networks  

Elena Inarra  (University of the Basque Country)
On Payoff Irrelevant Beliefs and Discrimination  

Brian Baisa  (Yale)
Rank Dependent Preferences and Auctions  

 

16:15 - 16:45

Coffee Break

16:45 - 17:30

Jose Rafael Correa  (Universidad de Chile)
Preannounced Pricing Policies with Strategic Consumers

 

Thursday, July 19

9:00 - 9:45

William Sudderth  (University of Minnesota)
Perfect Information Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Stochastic Games

Session B: Learning/Evolution

Session C: Networks

Session D: Bargaining

Session E: Auctions and Discontinuous Games

Session F: Theory

10:15 - 10:45

Kimmo Berg  (Aalto University School of Science)
Characterization of Equilibrium Paths in Discounted Stochastic Games  

Heinrich Harald Nax  (JHU)
The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets  

Emerson Melo  (California Institute of Technology)
Price competition, free entry, and welfare in congested markets  

Ilwoo Hwang  (University of Pennsylvania)
Bargaining with Investment on the Outside Option  

Rupei Xu  (University of Minnesota--Twin Cities)
Strategyproof Cost Sharing Auction Game Mechanism for Public Service Facilities  

Jie Zheng  (Tsinghua University)
The Robustness of Bubbles in a Finite Horizon Model of Incomplete Information  

10:45 - 11:15

Svetlana Boyarchenko  (University of Texas, Austin)
Preemption games under Levy uncertainty  

Daniel Wood  (Clemson University)
Stable Conventions in Hawk-Dove Games with Many Players  

Brian Rogers  (Northwestern)
Cooperation in Anonymous Dynamic Social Networks  

Leyla Derin Karakas  (Johns Hopkins University)
Bargaining Under Institutional Challenges  

Sofia Moroni  (Yale University)
Online Auctions with a Deadline  

Michael Richter  (New York University)
Choice Theory via Equivalence  

11:15 - 11:45

Sergei Levendorskii  (University of Leicester)
Stopping time games under Knightian uncertainty  

 

Evan D Sadler  (NYU Stern School of Business)
Social Learning with Network Uncertainty  

Martina Nikolaeva Gogova  (EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und Recht)
Incentive Contracts and Institutional Labor Market Design  

Rida Laraki  (CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique)
A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Existence in Discontinuous Strategic Games  

Alberto Pinto  (University of Porto)
On the convergence to Walrasian prices in random matching Edgeworthian economies  

11:45 - 12:00

Coffee Break

12:00 - 12:45

Karl Schlag  (University of Vienna)
Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments

12:45 - 14:15

Lunch Break

14:15 - 15:00

Marco Scarsini  (LUISS)
Existence of equilibria in countable games: an algebraic approach

15:00 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Repeated Games

Session B: Finance

Session C: Cooperative Games

Session D: Voting

 

 

15:15 - 15:45

Asaf Plan  (University of Arizona)
Returns to scale in the generation map of repeated games  

Maryam Sami  (Stony Brook University)
Reputational Concerns and Financial Contagion  

José Manuel Zarzuelo  (The Basque Country University)
Extending the Nash Solution to Choice Problems with Reference Points  

Semin Kim  (The Ohio State University)
Ordinal versus Cardinal Voting Rules: A Mechanism Design Approach  

 

 

15:45 - 16:15

 

Priyanka Sharma  (Texas A&M University)
Is more information always better?: A case in credit markets  

Josune Albizuri  (Basque Country University)
Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete version  

Jean Guillaume Forand  (University of Waterloo)
Useless Prevention vs. Costly Remediation  

 

 

16:15 - 16:45

Coffee Break

16:45 - 17:30

Bernard DeMeyer  (Université de Paris 1)
Risk aversion and price dynamics on the stock market