Workshop on Game Theory in Trade and Development

Stony Brook, NY, July 19-20, 2011

Schedule of Talks

Tuesday, July 19

9:30 - 10:30

Kyle Bagwell  (Stanford University)
International negotiations on international trade and related issues

10:30 - 11:00

Coffee Break

11:00 - 12:00

Roger Myerson  (University of Chicago)
The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State

12:00 - 13:15

Lunch Break

13:15 - 13:55

Renee Bowen  (Stanford University)
Limits of the WTO as a self-enforcing institution

13:55 - 14:35

James Lake  (Johns Hopkins University)
Preferential trade agreements as building or stumbling blocs? The importance of commitment

14:35 - 15:15

Mostafa Beshkar  (University of New Hampshire)
Third-Party-Assisted Renegotiation of Trade Agreements

15:15 - 15:40

Coffee Break

15:40 - 16:20

Kamal Saggi  (Vanderbilt University)
Equilibrium parallel import policies and international market structure

16:20 - 17:00

Rahul Deb  (University of Toronto)
Relational Contract Farming: Theory and Case Evidence

18:00 - 21:30

Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

 

Wednesday, July 20

9:30 - 10:30

Avinash Dixit  (Princeton University)
Trade and investment in LDCs and transition economies with poor governance

10:30 - 11:00

Coffee Break

11:00 - 12:00

Timothy Besley  (London School of Economics)
Accountability and Incentives in Public Service Provision in Poor Countries

12:00 - 13:15

Lunch Break

13:15 - 13:55

Raja Kali  (University of Arkansas)
Political Connections, Entrepreneurship, and Social Network Investment

13:55 - 14:35

Juan Escobar  (University of Chile)
Self Governance in Networked Relationships

14:35 - 15:15

Farzad Saidi  (New York University)
Networks, Finance, and Development: Evidence from Hunter-Gatherers

15:15 - 15:40

Coffee Break

15:40 - 16:20

Haldun Evrenk  (Suffolk University)
Party-bosses vs. party-primaries: quality of legislature under di erent selectorates

16:20 - 17:00

Toan Phan  (Northwestern University)
Asymmetric Information and The Sustainability of Sovereign Debt