International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 11-15, 2011

Schedule of Talks

Monday, July 11

9:00 - 9:45

Vijay Krishna  (Penn State University)
Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Mechanism Design

Session B: Experimental

Session C: Knowledge

 

10:15 - 10:45

Ichiro Obara  (University of California, Los Angeles)
Mechanism Design with Information Acquisition: Efficiency and Full Surplus Extraction  

Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen  (Peking University)
Pre-empting Inefficient contests with gender signaling  

Konrad Grabiszewski  (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)
"Knowing Whether," Meta-Knowledge, and Epistemic Bounded Rationality  

 

10:45 - 11:15

Jun Zhang  (Queen's University)
Optimal Mechanism Design with Speculation and Resale  

Hong (Hannah) Lin  (Peking University)
Separating Gratitude from Guilt in the Laboratory  

Ziv Hellman  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Countable Spaces and Common Priors  

 

11:15 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Auctions

Session B: Computation

Session C: Learning/Evolution

Session D: Information

11:30 - 12:00

Leandro Arozamena  (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)
Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism  

Mohammad T. Irfan  (Stony Brook University)
A Model of Strategic Behavior in Networks of Influence  

Christina Pawlowitsch  (Paris School of Economics)
Neutrality, drift, and the diversification of languages  

David Ong  (Peking University)
Mutual Certification of Experts in Credence Goods Markets  

12:00 - 12:30

Shmuel Zamir  (Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Strategic Use of Seller Information in Private-Value Auctions  

Erich Prisner  (Franklin College Switzerland)
Comparison of Distribution Procedures for Few Indivisible Goods among Two Players  

Michael Jacob Fox  (Georgia Institute of Technology)
Stochastic Stability in Language Evolution  

Maxim Ivanov  (McMaster University)
Dynamic Informational Control  

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Olivier Compte  (Paris School of Economics)
Plausible theories of behavior

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Learning/Evolution

Session B: Political Economy

Session C: Matching

Session D: Dynamic Games

Session E: Communication

15:15 - 15:45

Jason Marden  (University of Colorado at Boulder)
Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning  

Wioletta Dziuda  (Northwestern University)
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo  

Georgy Artemov  (University of Melbourne)
College admission problem with clear-in ranks  

Rida Laraki  (CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique)
A Continuous Time Approach for the Asymptotic Value in Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games  

Sho Miyamoto  (Washington University in St. Louis)
Obfuscating to Persuade  

15:45 - 16:15

Amparo Urbano  (University of Valencia)
High-Dimensional Connectivity and cooperation  

Selcuk Ozyurt  (Sabanci University)
Conflict Resolution: Role of Strategic Communication  

Jacob D. Leshno  (Harvard University)
The college admissions problem with a continuum of students  

Aaron Bodoh-Creed  (Cornell University)
Approximation of Large Dynamic Games  

Eduardo Perez  (Ecole Polytechnique)
Complexity Inflation in Persuasion  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Asher Wolinsky  (Northwestern University)
Search with adverse selection

 

Tuesday, July 12

9:00 - 9:45

Rakesh Vohra  (Northwestern University)
Price Discrimination Through Communication

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Information

Session B: Auctions

Session C: Learning/Evolution

Session D: Mechanism Design

10:15 - 10:45

Jeanne Hagenbach  (CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, France)
Full Disclosure in Organizations  

Chinmayi Krishnappa  (University of Texas at Austin)
A Sealed-Bid Unit-Demand Auction with Put Options  

Hanna Halaburda  (Harvard University)
Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games  

Estelle Midler  (Montpellier Supagro LAMETA)
Avoiding deforestation efficiently and fairly: a mechanism design perspective  

10:45 - 11:15

Tymofiy Mylovanov  (Penn State University)
Little White Lies–The Value of Inconsequential Chatter  

Nora Szech  (University of Bonn)
Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions  

Georgios Piliouras  (Georgia Tech)
Multiplicative updates outperform generic no-regret learning in congestion games  

Ram Orzach  (Oakland University)
Reverse Game Theory in Case Evaluation with Differential Information  

11:15 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Knowledge

Session B: Dynamic Games

Session C: Political Economy

Session D: Industrial Organization

11:30 - 12:00

Jonathan Weinstein  (Northwestern)
Provisional Probabilities and Paradigm Shifts  

Thomas Wiseman  (University of Texas at Austin)
A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games with Infrequent State Changes  

Chong Huang  (University of Pennsylvania)
Social Learning in Regime Change Games  

José Luis Ferreira  (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Capacity pre-commitment, price competition and forward markets  

12:00 - 12:30

Karl Schlag  (University of Vienna)
Should I Stay or Should I Go? Search without Priors  

Christiaan Matthijs Van Veelen  (CREED, University of Amsterdam)
In and out of equilibrium: evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting and population structure  

Galina Zudenkova  (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)
A Model of Party Discipline in Congress  

Ming-Hung Weng  (National Cheng Kung University)
Spatial Competition under Constrained Product Selection  

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Michael Ostrovsky  (Stanford University)
Recent Results on Matching in Trading Networks

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Solution Concepts

Session B: Contracts

Session C: Dynamic Games

Session D: Mechanism Design

 

15:15 - 15:45

Dries Vermeulen  (University Maastricht)
Every simplicial set is a Nash component: an elementary proof  

Seungjin Han  (McMaster University)
Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection  

Chantal Marlats  (CORE, FNRS)
Strategic information transmission in exponential bandit problems  

Wouter Vergote  (CEREC, Facultés universitaire Saint-Louis and CORE, UClouvain)
Absolutely Stable Roommate Problems  

 

15:45 - 16:15

John Nash  (Princeton University)
Continued Work on the "Agencies Method" for Modeling Cooperation in Games Dependent on Coalition Formation Possibilities  

Takuya Nakaizumi  (UCSD and Kanto Gakuin University)
Rank Order Tournament of Multiple Venders In the Face of Hold Up Problem  

Philipp Strack  (University of Bonn)
Continuous Time Contests  

Eun Jeong Heo  (University of Rochester)
Probabilistic Assignment of Objects: Characterizing the Serial Rule  

 

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Dirk Bergemann  (Yale University)
Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

 

Wednesday, July 13

9:00 - 9:45

Nabil Al-Najjar  (Northwestern University)
Testing Bayesian Beliefs

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Decision Theory

Session B: Information

Session C: Learning/Evolution

Session D: Coalitions

10:15 - 10:45

Sean Horan  (Boston University)
Sequential Search and Choice from Lists  

Frank Rosar  (University of Bonn)
Imperfect private information and the design of information–generating mechanisms  

Christoph March  (Paris School of Economics)
Adaptive Social Learning  

Dinko Dimitrov  
Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players  

10:45 - 11:15

Burkhard C Schipper  (University of California, Davis)
Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior  

Vasiliki Skreta  (NYU, Stern)
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission  

Mathias Staudigl  (University of Bielefeld, IMW)
Stochastic stability in binary choice coordination games  

Dominik Karos  (Saarland University)
Coalition Formation in Simple Games  

11:15 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Dynamic Games

Session B: Auctions

Session C: Matching

Session D: Information

11:30 - 12:00

Johannes Horner  (Yale University)
A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring  

Theodore Turocy  (University of East Anglia)
Impulse Balance in Auctions: Some New Results  

Umut Dur  (University of Texas at Austin)
Dynamic School Choice Problem  

Jiwoong Lee  (Maastricht University)
A Characterization of Separating Equilibrium in Multidimensional Signaling Games  

12:00 - 12:30

Marie Laclau  (HEC Paris)
A Folk theorem for repeated games played on a network  

Luciano De Castro  (Northwestern University)
A New Class of Distributions to Study Games of Incomplete Information  

Onur Kesten  (Carnegie Mellon University)
From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on A Family of School Choice Mechanisms  

Yuichiro Kamada  (Harvard University)
Multi-Agent Search with Deadline  

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Olivier Tercieux  (Paris School of Economics)
Subgame perfect implementation under value perturbations

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Experiments

Session B: Auctions

Session C: Political Economy

Session D: Industrial Organization

Session E: Noncooperative Games

15:15 - 15:45

Ernest Lai  (Lehigh University)
An Experimental Implementation of Multidimensional Cheap Talk  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (SUNY)
A Strategic Theory of Markets  

Michael Mandler  (Royal Holloway College, University of London)
The fragility of information aggregation in large elections  

Thomas Gall  (Dept. of Economics, University of Bonn)
Rewarding Idleness  

Elnaz Bajoori  (Maastricht University)
Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces  

15:45 - 16:15

Barry Sopher  (Rutgers University)
Efficiency-Enhancing Partnership Protocols for Two-Person Games: Laboratory Analysis  

Jinpeng Ma  (Rutgers University)
Bubbles, Crashes, and Efficiency with Double Auction Mechanisms  

Santiago Oliveros  (Haas School of Business-University of California, Berkeley)
The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem  

Alexander Matros  (University of South Carolina)
Treasure game  

Dov Samet  (Tel Aviv University)
Matching  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Nicolas Vieille  (HEC Paris)
Recursive methods in stochastic games: The case of patient players

18:00 - 22:00

Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

 

Thursday, July 14

9:00 - 9:45

V Bhaskar  (University College London)
Incentives and the Shadow of the Future: Dynamic Moral Hazard with Learning

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Information

Session B: Computation

Session C: Networks

Session D: Industrial Organization

10:15 - 10:45

Alex Possajennikov  (University of Nottingham)
Belief Formation in a Signaling Game without Common Prior  

Debapriya Sen  (Ryerson University)
Potential games and path independence: an alternative algorithm  

Scott Moser  (University of Texas at Austin)
Stochastic Network Structure, Mobility and Efficiency  

Hsien-hung Chiu  (National Chi Nan University, Taiwan)
Simultaneously Signaling and Screening with Seller Financing  

10:45 - 11:15

Satoru Takahashi  (Princeton University)
On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games  

Ina Taneva  (University of Texas at Austin)
Finite Supermodular Design with Interdependent Valuations  

Norma Olaizola  (University of the Basque Country)
Network formation under institutional constraints  

Abhimanyu Khan  (Maastricht University)
Evolution of behaviour when duopolists choose prices and quantities  

11:15 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Auctions

Session B: Dynamic Games

Session C: Learning/Evolution

Session D: Coalitions

11:30 - 12:00

Selin Damla Ahipasaoglu  (London School of Economics)
Analytical Results on a Decentralized Combinatorial Auction  

David Rahman  (University of Minnesota)
A Folk Theorem with Private Strategies  

Yakov Babichenko  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality.)
Average Testing and the Efficient Boundary  

Anindya Bhattacharya  (University of York)
Allocative Efficiency and an Incentive Scheme for Research  

12:00 - 12:30

David Wettstein  ( Ben-Gurion University)
Innovation Contests  

Takuo Sugaya  (Princeton University)
Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring  

Elena Inarra  (University of the Basque Country)
Artificial Distinction and Real Discrimination  

Rene Saran  (Maastricht University)
Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem  

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Alessandro Pavan  (Northwestern University)
Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Axiomatic Foundations

Session B: Matching

Session C: Information

Session D: Mechanism Design

 

15:15 - 15:45

Sergiu Hart  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
A Wealth-Requirement Axiomatization of Riskiness  

Daniel Monte  (Simon Fraser University)
The Daycare Assignment Problem  

Liad Wagman  (Illinois Institute of Technology)
Information Acquisition in Competitive Mortgage Markets  

Karol Szwagrzak  (University of Rochester)
The replacement principle and the egalitarian rule  

 

15:45 - 16:15

Ezra Einy  (Ben Gurion University)
Characterizatin of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom  

Azar Abizada  (University of Rochester)
Pairwise stability in graduate college admission problem with budget constraints when students are picky.  

Maria Goltsman  (University of Western Ontario)
Communication in Cournot Oligopoly  

Michele Lombardi  (Maastricht University)
Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results  

 

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Eddie Dekel  (Northwestern University and Tel Aviv University)
Optimal allocations with costly state verification and without transfers

 

Friday, July 15

9:00 - 9:45

Pierpaolo Battigalli  (Università Bocconi)
Strategies and Interactive Beliefs in Dynamic Games

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Contracts

Session B: Auctions

Session C: Computation

Session D: Dynamic Games

10:15 - 10:45

Wolf Gick  (Harvard University)
A General Theory of Delegated Contracting And Internal Control  

Xu Tan  (Stanford University)
Two-Dimensional Values and Information Sharing in Auctions  

Na Li  (California Institute of Technology)
Designing Games for Distributed Optimization  

Sevket Alper Koc  (Kocaeli University, Turkey)
Development, Women’s Resources and Domestic Violence  

10:45 - 11:15

Antonio Miguel Osorio-Costa  (University Carlos III Madrid)
Repeated Interaction and the Revelation of the Monitor's Type: A Principal-Monitor-Agent Problem.  

Gregory Pavlov  (University of Western Ontario)
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions  

Hau Chan  (Stony Brook University)
Interdependent Defense Games: Modeling Interdependent Security under Deliberate  

Caroline D Thomas  (UCL)
Experimentation with Congestion  

11:15 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Networks

Session B: Noncooperative Games

Session C: Industrial Organization

Session D: Noncooperative Games

11:30 - 12:00

Joan De Marti  (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Network Games with Incomplete Information  

Rene Saran  (Maastricht University)
Strategic Party Formation on a Circle  

Eray Cumbul  (University of Rochester)
An Algorithmic Approach to Find Iterated Nash Equilibria in Extended Cournot and Bertrand Games with Potential Entrants  

Maria Montero  (University of Nottingham)
The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis  

12:00 - 12:30

Guillermo Owen  (Naval Postgraduate School)
A game-theoretic approach to network configurations  

Noah Stein  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Exchangeable Equilibria  

Filippo Balestrieri  (Hewlett-Packard Laboratories)
Informed seller in a Hotelling market  

Maxim Nikitin  (Higher School of Economics)
Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Liability and Litigation under Self-Serving Bias  

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Ariel Rubinstein  (Tel Aviv University and New York University)
Colonel Blotto's Top secret Files: Multi-Dimensional Iterative Reasoning in Action

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Knowledge

Session B: Political Economy

Session C: Learning/Evolution

Session D: Dynamic Games

15:15 - 15:45

Antonio Jimenez  (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas)
Strategic Interactions in Information Decisions with a Finite Set of Players  

Steven Brams  (New York University)
Narrowing the Field in Elections: The Next-Two Rule  

Bryan Bruns  (Independent Scholar)
Visualizing the Topology of 2x2 Games: From Prisoner's Dilemma to Win-win  

James Alaric Best  (University of Edinburgh)
How Many Chiefs? The Role of Leadership in Social Dilemmas  

15:45 - 16:15

Rohit Parikh  (City University of New York)
The Power of Knowledge in Games  

SunTak Kim  (University of Pittsburgh)
Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study  

Erik Mohlin  (University College London)
Evolution of Theories of Mind  

Yuhta Ishii  (Harvard University)
The Effect of Correlated Inertia on Coordination  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Stephen Morris  (Princeton University)
Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information