International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 12-16, 2010

Schedule of Talks

Monday, July 12

9:00 - 9:45

Muhamet Yildiz  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Invariance to Representation of Information

9:45 - 10:00

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Computation

 

Session C: Bargaining

Session D: Auctions

10:00 - 10:30

Alex Fabrikant  (Princeton University)
On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games  

 

Duozhe Li  (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
One-to-Many Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol  

Ram Orzach  (Oakland University)
Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values  

10:30 - 11:00

Alberto Motta  (University of New South Wales)
Collusion and Selective Supervision  

 

Toshiji Miyakawa  (Osaka University of Economics)
Noncooperative Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution in n-Person Games with Incomplete Information  

Federico Weinschelbaum  (Universidad de San Andres)
On favoritism in auctions with entry  

11:00 - 11:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Cooperative Games

 

Session C: Social Political Models

Session D: Implementation

11:15 - 11:45

José Manuel Zarzuelo  (The Basque Country University)
The Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU solution  

 

Doru Cojoc  (Stanford University)
Running on Policies or on Values? The Choice of Rhetoric In Electoral Competitions  

Akira Yokotani  (University of Rochester)
Knowledge-Belief Space Approach to Robust Implementation  

11:45 - 12:15

Matías Alvarado  (Centre of Research and Advanced Studies, CINVESTAV)
Base Ball sacrifice play strategies: towards the Nash Equilibrium based strategies  

 

SangMok Lee  (California Institute of Technology)
Strategic Voting in a Jury Trial with Plea Bargaining  

Nicolas Alexandre Klein  
The Importance of Being Honest  

12:15 - 13:45

Lunch Break

13:45 - 14:30

Dov Samet  (Tel Aviv University)
What if Achilles and the tortoise were to bargain? An argument against interim agreements

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Networks

Session B: Auctions

Session C: Market Games

Session D: Learning Evolution

14:45 - 15:15

Norma Olaizola  (University of the Basque Country)
Information, stability and dynamics in networks under institutional constraints  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (SUNY)
A Strategic Theory of Markets  

Nicholas Ziros  (University of Cyprus)
Market Games and the Bargaining Set  

Bary S.R. Pradelski and Peyton Young  (University of Oxford)
Efficiency and Equilibrium in Trial and Error Learning

15:15 - 15:45

Vincent Vannetelbosch  (CORE)
A characterization of farsightedly stable networks  

Vijay Krishna  (Penn State University)
Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections  

Francesco Nava  (London School of Economics)
Quantity Competition in Networked Markets  

Zhengzheng Pan  (Virginia Tech)
Naive Learning and Game Play in a Dual Social Network Framework  

15:45 - 16:15

Alison Watts  (Southern Illinois University)
Fund-Raising Games Played on a Network  

 

Sertac Oruc  (TU Delft)
An electricity market incentive game based on time-of-use tariff  

Andriy Zapechelnyuk  (Queen Mary University of London)
Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

William Sandholm  (University of Wisconsin)
Evolutionary game theory: overview and recent results

 

Tuesday, July 13

9:00 - 9:45

Philip J. Reny  (University of Chicago)
Further Results on the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

9:45 - 10:00

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Industrial Organization

Session B: Voting

Session C: Repeated Games

Session D: Social Choice

10:00 - 10:30

Margarita Gladkova  (Graduate school of management, St. Petersburg state university)
Game-theoretical model of service quality indicators choice: mobile service market  

Santiago Oliveros  (Haas School of Business-University of California, Berkeley)
Combinatorial Voting  

Axel Bernergård  (Stockholm School of Economics)
Repeated Games with Time-Inconsistent Preferences  

Guillermo Flores  (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)
Game Theory and the Law: The Legal-Rules-Acceptability Theorem (A rationale for non-compliance with legal rules)  

10:30 - 11:00

Elina Zhukova  (Saint-Petersburg State University (Russia))
The quality-price competition models’ analysis: equilibrium solutions and cooperation  

Steven Brams  (New York University)
Satisfaction Approval Voting  

Kimmo Berg  (Aalto University School of Science and Technology)
Equilibrium Paths in Discounted Supergames  

 

11:00 - 11:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Learning Evolution

Session B: Repeated Games

Session C: Auctions

Session D: Auctions

11:15 - 11:45

Reinoud Joosten  (University of Twente)
Paul Samuelson's critique and equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory  

Tadashi Sekiguchi  (Kyoto University)
Finitely Repeated Games with Monitoring Options  

Omer Biran  (Université Paris-Dauphine)
Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities  

Nicholas Shunda  (University of Redlands)
All-Pay Auctions with Regret  

11:45 - 12:15

 

Yuichiro Kamada  (Harvard University)
Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games  

Rafael Tenorio  (DePaul University)
Listing attributes and seller competition in internet auctions  

Gabor Virag  (University of Rochester)
First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders  

12:15 - 13:45

Lunch Break

13:45 - 14:30

Wojciech Olszewski  (Northwestern University)
Attributes

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Repeated/Stochastic Games

Session B: Mechanism Design

Session C: Applications

Session D: Experimental Economics

14:45 - 15:15

Yuval Heller  (School of Mathemtical Sciences, Tel-Aviv University)
Sequential correlated equilibria in stopping games  

Anqi Li  (Stanford University)
Selling Storable Goods to a Dynamic Population of Buyers: A Mechanism Design Approach  

Regis Deloche  (Paris Descartes University)
On the Optimality of a Duty-to-Rescue Rule and the Bystander Effect  

Matthew Patrick Haney  (Johns Hopkins University)
T.V.’s “Jeopardy!” : A Rich Empirical Data Set for Behavioral Economics  

15:15 - 15:45

Yves Gueron  (University College London)
On the Folk Theorem with One-Dimensional Payoffs and Different Discount Factors  

Yutaka Suzuki  (Hosei University)
Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types, including Applications to Organizational Design  

Andreas Blume  (University of Pittsburgh)
Language Barriers  

Ernest Lai  (Lehigh University)
Authority and Communication in the Laboratory  

15:45 - 16:15

Xavier Venel  (University Toulouse 1 Capitole)
Commutative stochastic games  

Fabrizio Germano  (Northwestern University)
Dynamic Information Aggregation with Biased Experts  

Pinghan Liang  (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy  

Tyson Hartwig  (Rutgers-Camden)
An Experimental Investigation of Costly and Discrete Communication  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Sergiu Hart  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection

 

Wednesday, July 14

9:00 - 9:45

Larry Samuelson  (Yale University)
Common Learnning

9:45 - 10:00

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Industrial Organization

Session B: Solution Concepts

Session C: Voting

Session D: Information Networks

10:00 - 10:30

Massimo De Francesco  (University of Siena)
Bertrand-Edgeworth games under oligopoly with a complete characterization for the triopoly  

Yaron Azrieli  (The Ohio State University)
Pure equilibria in non-anonymous large games  

Yong Sui  (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)
A Contest Theoretical Study of Class Action  

Hideki Fujiyama  (Dokkyo University)
Network Centrality and Activities in Small Social Networking Sites (SNS)  

10:30 - 11:00

Pei-yu (Melody) Lo  (The University of Hong Kong)
Reputation and Competition for Information Intermediaries  

Chang-Koo(CK) Chi  (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Relational Executive Contact with Captital Investment  

Takuo Sugaya  (Princeton University)
Policy Announcement Game: Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Policies  

 

11:00 - 11:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Industrial Organization

Session B: Cooperative Games

Session C: Matching

Session D: Information Networks

11:15 - 11:45

Ming Gao  (London Business School)
Multiproduct Price Discrimination with Two-Part Tariffs  

Gabriel Julio Turbay  (Foundacion para la cooperacion internacional)
N-Person Cooperative Games Strategic-Equilibrium  

Flip Klijn  (Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC))
Farsighted House Allocation  

Britta Hoyer  (Utrecht University)
Strategic Network Disruption  

11:45 - 12:15

Jaesoo Kim  (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis)
Price Discrimination for Bayesian Buyers  

Lars Peter Raahave Østerdal  (University of Copenhagen)
Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results  

Shi Chen  (Pennsylvania State University)
A game theory model for predator-prey dynamics  

 

12:15 - 13:45

Lunch Break

13:45 - 14:30

Eran Shmaya  (Northwestern University)
Describable tests need not be manipulable

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Gooperative Games

Session B: Mechanism Design

Session C: Stochastic Models

Session D: Auctions

14:45 - 15:15

Silvia De la Sierra  (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)
Factors Contribution to Poverty Index : 2FGT  

Juan Carlos Carbajal  (University of Queensland (Australia))
Implementation and revenue equivalence without differentiability  

Salomon Antoine  (LAGA Université Paris 13)
Correlated Bandit Game  

Chien Liang Chen  (Shin Hsin University)
Bid or Wait ? Theory and Evidence of Auctions for Foreclosed  

15:15 - 15:45

Miklos Pinter  (Corvinus University of Budapest)
Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value - a new proof  

Vikram Manjunath  (University of Rochester)
When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds  

Jerome Renault  (TSE (GREMAQ), University Toulouse 1)
Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games  

Brennan Platt  (Brigham Young University)
Auctions for Priority Access  

15:45 - 16:15

Jean-François Caulier  (Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis, Bruxelles, Belgium)
Caolitional Network Games  

Aaron Bodoh-Creed  (Stanford University)
The Simple Behavior of Large Mechanisms  

Takashi Shimizu  (Kansai University)
Cheap Talk with an Exit Option: A Model of Exit and Voice  

Guido Maretto  (ECARES - Universitè Libre de Bruxelles)
Contracts with Aftermarkets - Hidden Actions  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Johannes Horner  (Yale University)
Selling information

18:00 - 22:00

Reception Dinner (Jasmine/

 

Thursday, July 15

9:00 - 9:45

Olivier Gossner  (Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics)
The robustness of incomplete codes of law

9:45 - 10:00

Coffee Break

10:00 - 10:30

Alfredo Di Tillio  (Bocconi University)
Reasoning about Conditional Probability and Counterfactuals

10:30 - 11:00

Eduardo Faingold  (Yale University)
The strategic impact of higher-order beliefs

11:00 - 11:15

Coffee Break

11:15 - 11:45

Marco Scarsini  (LUISS)
On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games

11:45 - 12:15

Todd Kaplan  (University of Haifa)
Bidding Behaviour in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions

12:15 - 13:45

Lunch Break

13:45 - 14:30

Robert John Aumann  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
My Shmuel

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break

14:45 - 15:30

Abraham Neyman  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
The Rate of Convergence in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

15:30 - 16:15

Shmuel Zamir  (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Al Roth  (Harvard University)
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets

18:00 - 21:30

Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

 

Friday, July 16

9:00 - 9:45

Philippe Jehiel  (University College London and PSE)
On Transparency in Organizations

9:45 - 10:00

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Learning Evolution

Session B: Incomplete Information

Session C: Bargaining

Session D: Networks

10:00 - 10:30

Fernando Louge  (Bielefeld University)
On The Stability of CSS under the Replicator Dynamic  

Ming Yang  (Princeton University)
Games with Rational Inattention--Coordination with Endogenous Information  

Daniele Condorelli  (University of Essex)
Dynamic Bilateral Trading in Networks  

Elias Tsakas  (Maastricht University)
On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol  

10:30 - 11:00

 

In-Uck Park  (University of Bristol, UK)
Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication  

Selcuk Ozyurt  (Sabanci University)
Searching a Bargain: Play it Cool or Haggle  

Matthew P. Johnson  (City University of New York)
The Bridge Policy Problem  

11:00 - 11:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Learning Evolution

Session B: Incomplete Information

Session C: Repeated Games

Session D: Coalition Formation

11:15 - 11:45

Russell Golman  (Carnegie Mellon University)
Why Learning Doesn't Add Up: Equilibrium Selection with a Composition of Learning Rules  

Ori Haimanko  (Ben-Gurion University)
Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change  

Alexander Wolitzky  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Repeated Public Good Provision  

Vincent Vannetelbosch  (CORE)
Coalition formation among farsighted agents  

11:45 - 12:15

 

Ziv Hellman  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Almost Common Priors  

Ayca Ozdogan  (University of Minnesota)
Reputation Effects in Two-Sided Incomplete-Information Games  

Ana Mauleon  (Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis)
Contractually Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities  

12:15 - 13:45

Lunch Break

13:45 - 14:30

Michael Kearns  (University of Pennsylvania)
Behavioral Game Theory in Social Networks

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Contracts

Session B: Mechanism Design

Session C: Bargaining

Session D: Solution Concepts

14:45 - 15:15

Hassan Faghani Dermi  (Washington University in St.Louis)
Cognition Investment, Accuracy Significance and Contracts' Incompleteness  

Maria Polukarov  (University of Southampton)
Linear Mechanisms for Single-Parameter Domains: Characterization, Existence, and Construction  

Rohan Dutta  (Washington University in St. Louis)
Bargaining with Revoking Costs  

William Geller  (Indiana U-Purdue U Indianapolis)
Robust equlibria and epsilon-dominance  

15:15 - 15:45

Wolf Gick  (Harvard University)
Auditing the Intermediary  

Guilherme Freitas  (Caltech)
Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences  

Stephan Lauermann  (University of Michigan)
Adverse Selection with Search  

Sambuddha Ghosh  (Boston University)
Games with Real Talk  

15:45 - 16:15

 

 

 

Noah Stein  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
A fixed point free proof of Nash's Theorem via exchangeable equilibria  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

M. Utku Ünver  (Boston College)
A Theory of House Allocation and Exchange Mechanisms