Abstracts 
University of California Irvine Thursday, July 18, 15:55, Session F Equilibrium Miscoordination in Coordination Games Played on Metric Spaces [pdf] Abstract The effect of local interaction on the behavior of a population of agents playing coordination games is investigated by introducing metric games. A metric game features populations of agents randomly located on metric spaces. An agent plays a single strategy against the entire population, receiving a payoff negatively related to its distance from each opponent. Population size, the functional form of payoff decay in distance, and the dimensionality of the space determine whether miscoordinated equilibria are possible. 
International Monetary Fund Tuesday, July 17, 14:45, Session E Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Coordination Among Multiple Equilibria [pdf] Abstract The "leaning against the wind" tradeoff is usually framed in terms of lost output gap stabilization versus improved financial stability. But such reasoning only considers effects within given equilibria. This paper shows that when macroprudential tools face constraints, monetary and macroprudential authorities must navigate a multiple equilibrium landscape. Moreover, when real and financial shocks pull in opposite directions, the authorities prefer different equilibria. Surprisingly, the coordination among authorities becomes harder when the monetary authority explicitly weighs financial imbalances, as equilibrium outcomes (output and financial stabilization) diverge. With increased difficulty in navigating among equilibria, expected financial imbalances may rise under leaning. 
Stony Brook University Wednesday, July 18, 12:10, Session C High Risk and High Reward DecisionMaking for Climate Change Mitigation [pdf] (joint work with Talbot M. Andrews, Andrew W. Delton, Reuben Kline) Abstract
As the urgency of mitigating climate change rises, investment in low risk, incremental technologies may not be sufficient to prevent damage. To understand when people are willing to make risky investments in mitigation, we used a series of economic games wherein players must contribute enough as a group to avoid simulated climate change. Players could defect, make a certain contribution, or a risky contribution with a high potential gain. Using risk sensitive decision theory, a theory developed in evolutionary biology, we predicted that players would make riskier contributions when total mitigation costs rose. Across four studies (combined N = 2,010), this prediction was confirmed, even when people made costly decisions on behalf of others. We discuss implications for framing persuasive appeals about climate change. 
Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar Lancaster University Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session F Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and Public Good Provision [pdf] (joint work with Alexander Matros, Sonali SenGupta) Abstract This paper presents a model that links tax evasion, embezzlement, and the public good provision and suggests how they are interrelated. We characterize the conditions for three types of Nash equilibria: tax evasion, embezzlement, and efficient public good provision. 
Maastricht University Wednesday, July 18, 15:15, Session C Senderreceiver stopping games with finite horizon [pdf] (joint work with Aditya Aradhye, János Flesch, Mathias Staudigl, Dries Vermeulen) Abstract
We consider a senderreceiver stopping game with a finite horizon. At each stage, the sender observes the state of the world, which is modeled as a random variable that is uniformly distributed in a compact interval, and independent on different stages. After observing the state of the world, the sender sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either to quit or to continue. The receiver, after seeing the message, decides either to play quit  which ends of the game or to play continue  which takes the game to the next stage. Both players get a utility which is a function of the state of the world on the day the receiver quits. 
University of Wisconsin Friday, July 20, 10:35, Session C Myopia in dynamic spatial games [pdf] (joint work with Shane Auerbach and Rebekah Dix) Abstract We design an experiment to evaluate behavior in a dynamic spatial game representing the incentives faced by drivers for a ridesharing service while waiting to be matched with a rider. The design is unique in that it allows us to observe not only participants' choices, but also the considerations that went into those choices. The results of the experiment show that a large majority of player choices are consistent with myopic best responding. A myopic best response maximizes a player's flow payoff at the time of the decision but is not necessarily optimal as it ignores strategic considerations regarding the future choices of opponents. Given the observed prevalence of this behavior and the challenges of equilibrium analysis, which we detail, we argue in favor of computational models of spatial competition built upon myopic agents. Myopic behavior in our model results in quite efficient outcomes, suggesting that ridesharing companies may benefit from sharing with drivers the locations of other nearby drivers to allow them to compete spatially. 
University of Exeter Monday, July 16, 16:15, Session E Preordered Service in Contract Enforcement [pdf] (joint work with Miguel A. Fonseca) Abstract
To address delay and backlog at courts, we propose a procedural rule that we refer 
Amherst College Monday, July 16, 15:15, Session B Efficient Ex Post Implementable Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with NonQuasilinear Preferences [pdf] (joint work with Justin Burkett) Abstract
We study efficient auction design for a single indivisible object when bidders have interdependent values and nonquasilinear preferences. Instead of quasilinearity, we assume only that bidders have positive wealth effects. Our setting nests cases where bidders are ex ante asymmetric, face financial constraints, are risk averse, and/or face ensuing risk. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for when there exists an ex post implementable and (ex post Pareto) efficient mechanism. These conditions differ between the cases where the object is a good and when the object is a bad. 
Wednesday, July 18, 16:15, Session F Monopoly Pricing in MetaCycles [pdf] Abstract
If a constant influx of new consumers faces a durable monopoly seller every period, the initial Coase setup of consumers purchasing 
O.P. Jindal Global University Wednesday, July 18, 15:55, Session B Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically [pdf] Abstract We investigate a finitehorizon dynamic pricing problem of a seller where he cannot precommit to any future pricepath. Even when the buyers are exante symmetric (though nonanonymous) to the seller, the seller can charge different prices to different buyers. We show that this asymmetric treatment of symmetric buyers generates higher revenue than the optimal symmetric mechanism. We change the random tiebreaking allocation rule, used for symmetric mechanisms, to generate higher revenue for the seller. We show that the result holds even in static environment, though the marginal benefit of price discrimination increases with the time horizon of the game. 
Northwestern University / Duke University Thursday, July 18, 15:35, Session D Optimal Discovery and Influence Through Selective Sampling [pdf] Abstract
Most decisions– from a job seeker appraising a job offer to a policymaker assessing 
Indian School of Business Monday, July 16, 11:30, Session A Gambling over Public Opinion [pdf] (joint work with Joyee Deb) Abstract We consider bargaining environments where two agents make demands, following which public opinion forms. Agents then bargain again, and suffer costs of compromise if they scale back their initial demands. If public favors one agent's position, it is more costly for her to compromise. In a simple model with symmetric uncertainty about public opinion, we show that there is a unique equilibrium in which agents never make compatible demands in the first stage, rather take a gamble over public opinion. This implies inevitable welfare loss with at least one party making a costly compromise. We analyze how the extent of gambling varies with the distribution of public opinion. 
Aalto University School of Science Wednesday, July 18, 15:15, Session E Computing all the mixedstrategy equilibria in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma [pdf] Abstract
This is the first time the subgameperfect mixedstrategy payoff set is solved in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. The earlier papers have examined the problem either with pure strategies (Berg and Kitti 2012) or with correlated (pure) strategies (Judd et al. 2003, Abreu and Sannikov 2014). Here, we show that the set of mixedstrategy equilibria is dramatically different from both of these earlier models. The players may obtain higher payoffs in mixed strategies and there are more Pareto efficient payoffs. 
Ashoka University Thursday, July 18, 15:55, Session A Contracting for Innovation under Ambiguity [pdf] Abstract
Outsourcing of research is a large and growing trend in knowledge intensive industries such as biotech, software industries. The smaller researchoriented contractees specialize in handling research specific uncertainties and ambiguities, and the contracts are typically very short term. I model innovation as an ambiguous stochastic process, and assume that the commercial firms and research labs differ in their attitude towards ambiguity. I characterize the sequence of short term contracts between the ambiguity averse contractor and the ambiguity neutral contractee doing the research, and examine how the special features of the optimal contract facilitate ambiguity sharing. In this model, the commercial firm's ambiguity aversion acts as a commitment device and mitigates the dynamic moral hazard problem. This results in monotonically decreasing investment flow and prevents equilibrium delay. Also, experimentation stops earlier than the policymaker deems optimal, and there is a range of posterior beliefs for which the contracting parties choose to liquidate the project even after being granted a patent. I discuss the policy implications of these results, examining how patent law affects innovation produced in these research alliances. 
City University of New York, Baruch College Thursday, July 18, 16:15, Session D On Algorithms That Approach Correlated Equilibrium [pdf] Abstract The set of correlated equilibria is a closed convex set. Using this fact, I show that one may characterize a correlated equilibrium in strategicform games in terms of a weak notion of approachability. While Blackwell (1956) defined approachability at the level of individual play, to characterize correlated equilibrium, I use a related notion of approachability at the level of collective play. Approachability also lends itself to an algorithmic interpretation, and one can define stepbystep procedures that shrink the space of play to the approachable set. I use the topological notion of a retraction to obtain properties of such algorithms. This allows me to explore the generality of the link between approachability algorithms and correlated equilibrium. 
Paris 1 and Paris School of economics Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session F On the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in discontinuous perfect information games [pdf] (joint work with Wael Saker) Abstract We prove that for a large class of discontinuous perfect information games, called path secure games, a subgame perfect equilibrium exists. This is some counterpart of Reny's existence theorem (true for normal form games) for extensive form games. Roughly, a game is path secure if for every strategy profile which is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, there is a deviation of some player which improves strictly his payoff, even under perturbations of the paths involved 
TU Dortmund Thursday, July 18, 12:10, Session D Club Good Provision and Nested Contests [pdf] Abstract
In this paper, we analyze a framework of two clubs where relative aggregate club activity serves as a head start in a following contest. Following Nitzan (1991) a proportion of the head start is distributed on egalitarian grounds and the rest is distributed according to relative effort of club members. The effect on rent dissipation and club good provision is studied in a twostage game. In the first stage, club members choose the activity level in their club to maximize the sum of utility from club membership and expected utility from contest participation. Members of both clubs and nonmembers enter one of K>=2 different contests in stage two in which they compete simultaneously to win a rent. Individual spending as well as club activity determine the probability of receiving the rent or a proportion of the rent allocated to each contestant. We find that a player's activity level in the club increases due to the motivation of winning a contested rent in the second stage. If a club membership is relatively important, contest investment is completely substituted by club activity. Under equal distribution of the head start among club members, the club with the smallest number of members or with the highest diversity of club members is the most active. 
University of California Monday, July 16, 11:50, Session E BaseRate Neglect: Foundations and Implications [pdf] (joint work with Dan Benjamin, Aaron BodohCreed, and Matthew Rabin) Abstract We extend and clarify previous formalizations of "baserate neglect"in which we assume that when people update beliefs from new information that they tend to downweight prior informationand explore some general implications and economic applications. We show beliefs are too moderate on average, and in fact a person may weaken her beliefs in a hypothesis even following supportive evidence. Under a natural interpretation of how it extends to dynamic settings, when an infinite flow of informative signals arrive over time, a person's beliefs will bounce around reflecting the most recent signals without converging to certainty, with a range of beliefs that is independent of the true state. Turning to economic implications, we first consider what happens when an agent is learning a "model of the world." Under mild conditions, Bayesians will learn the true model of the world, while agents subject to baserate neglect never learn the truth and have a tendency to believe events are autocorrelated. In a persuasion setting, inducing belief updating creates a tendency towards mean reversion. Therefore, persuaders may not want to reveal even positive information when an audience has favorable current beliefs, and may share even negative information when current beliefs are unfavorable. Finally, in models where a longrun player facing a Bayesian audience is always able to build a good reputation for a long time before it eventually decays, if facing a baserateneglecting audience his reputation will fluctuate between good and bad in both the short run and the long run. 
University of Texas, Austin Thursday, July 18, 11:30, Session F Strategic experimentation with humped bandits [pdf] Abstract
Risks related to events that arrive randomly play important role in many real life decisions, and models of learning and experimentation based on twoarmed Poisson bandits addressed several important aspects related to strategic and motivational learning in cases when events arrive at jump times of the standard Poisson process. At the same time, these models fail to explain some interesting features of reality. We suggest a new class of models of strategic experimentation which are almost as tractable as exponential models, but incorporate such realistic features as dependence of the expected rate of news arrival on the time elapsed since the start of an experiment and judgement about the quality of a risky arm based on evidence of a series of trials as opposed to a single evidence of success or failure as in exponential models with conclusive experiments. We show that, unlike in the exponential models, players may stop experimentation before the first failure happens. We also demonstrate a crowding out effect in models with profitable breakthroughs. 
New York University Monday, July 16, 11:30, Session D Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in TwoPerson Games: Theory and Cases [pdf] (joint work with Mehmet S. Ismail) Abstract
We analyze the 78 2 x 2 distinct strict ordinal games, 57 of which are conflict games that contain no mutually best outcome. In 19 of the 57 games (33%), including Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken, a cooperative outcome—one that is at least nextbest for each player—is not a Nash equilibrium (NE). But this outcome is a nonmyopic equilibrium (NME) in 16 of the 19 games (84%) when the players start at this outcome and make farsighted calculations, based on backward induction; in the other three games, credible threats can induce cooperation. In two of the latter games, the NMEs are “boomerang NMEs,” whereby players have an incentive to move back and forth between two diagonally opposite NMEs, one of which is cooperative. In Prisoners’ Dilemma, the NE and one NME are not Paretooptimal, but we conjecture that in all twoperson games with strict preferences, there is at least one Paretooptimal NME. 
Yale University Thursday, July 18, 15:55, Session C Stability in matching markets with peer effects [pdf] Abstract The paper investigates conditions, which guarantee the existence of a stable outcome in a school matching in the presence of peer effects. We consider economy, where agents are characterized by their type (e.g. SAT score), and schools are characterized by their value (e.g. teaching quality) and capacity. Moreover, we divide agents and schools into groups, so that going to a school outside of one's group maybe associated with additional costs or even prohibited. A student receives utility from a school per se (its value minus costs of attending) and from one's peers, students who also go to that school. We find that sufficient condition for a stable matching to exist is that a directed graph, which governs the possibility to go from one group to another, should not have cycles (nor directed, nor undirected). We also construct an algorithm, which produces a stable matching. It runs in a finite time and takes no more than number of groups multiplied by total number of schools steps. Furthermore, we show that if the graph has a cycle, then there exist other economy parameters (types, costs and so on), so that no stable matching exists. In addition, in cases where a stable matching exists we investigate whether it is unique or not. 
University of Rome Tor Vergata Thursday, July 18, 15:15, Session A On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition [pdf] (joint work with Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser) Abstract We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him. Exclusive competition is at the centre stage of recent analyses of markets with private information. Economic models of exclusive competition restrict principals to use standard direct mechanisms, which induce truthful revelation of agents’ exogenous private information. This paper investigates the rationale for this restriction. We provide two results. First, we construct an economic example showing that direct mechanisms fail to completely characterize equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict to pure strategy equilibria. Second, we show that truthtelling strongly robust equilibrium outcomes survive against principals’ unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms. 
University of Rochester Friday, July 20, 11:15, Session B Constrainedefficient profit division in a dynamic partnership [pdf] Abstract Professional service partnerships that value collegiality often use the lockstep system to compensate their members. The lockstep system distributes profit based solely on seniority, hence it fails to reward and encourage high performance. When there are two members and each member has two productivity types, we propose a profit division mechanism that screens members and offers a bigger profit share to a member who has a higher type. The proposed mechanism satisfies constrained efficiency, periodic expost incentive compatibility, and periodically expost Pareto dominates the lockstep system. In addition, a hightype member collects all welfare gain from replacing the lockstep system with the constrained efficient mechanism. The corresponding profit division rule is implemented in Nash equilibrium by a voting mechanism, in which each member is given several menus of partnership arrangements and is asked to vote. We suggest that, in each period, each member receive a compensation package of nonequity income (fixed wage payment) and equity share (share of current net profit, which is current profit net of current wage payments). Since wage payments are drawn from profit and all resulting profit (or loss) is fully distributed, budget is always balanced. For an nmember static partnership, we propose a mechanism that satisfies constrained efficiency, Bayesian incentive compatibility, and Bayesian Pareto dominates the lockstep system. Our mechanisms also apply to partnerships outside professional service industries. 
The Ohio State University Wednesday, July 18, 11:30, Session A Going the Last Mile: Access Regulation and Vertical Integration [pdf] Abstract In many markets entry requires a significant infrastructure investment which can lead to inefficiently low competition and even monopolies in many cases. One solution adopted by many countries is to require the owner of this infrastructure to allow competitors to rent access at a regulated price. In this case the network owner becomes a wholesale provider of infrastructure services who is also participating in the retail market. Another solution is to separate the network owner into a wholesale firm and a vertically separate retail firm. This paper compares infrastructure quality investment incentives for the network owner under these two regimes. Retail prices will be higher under the vertically separated regime, meaning that quality investment will attract more consumers with a separated firm, but the ability to participate on the retail market in addition to the heavily regulated wholesale market means that a vertically integrated owner will have more incentive to invest when there is significant horizontal differentiation between retail firms. 
University of Louisville Monday, July 16, 15:15, Session A Nonlinear Pricing under Competition [pdf] (joint work with Yong Chao; Guofu Tan; Adam Wong) Abstract
Motivated by several recent antitrust cases, involving nonlinear pricing schedule (e.g. allunits discounts in China’s Tetra Pak case, loyalty rebates in Intel case), we study a strategic model of competition in intermediategoods markets. Our model is a threestage game with complete information in which a dominant firm offers a general tariff first and then a rival firm responds with a perunit price, followed by a buyer making her decision to purchase from one or both firms. We characterize subgame perfect equilibria of the game and study the implications of the equilibrium outcome. 
Grinnell College Cooperation, Competition and Linguistic Diversity [pdf] (joint work with Leanna Mitchell) Abstract We propose a theory that relates linguistic diversity to cooperative and competitive incentives in a game theoretic framework. In our model, autonomous groups interact periodically in games that represent either cooperation, competition, or no interaction. Language common to a pair of groups facilitates cooperation; whereas language unique to one group affords that group an advantage in competitions against other groups. The relative frequency of cooperation and conflict in a region provide incentives for each group to modify their own language, and therefore leads to changes in linguistic diversity over time. Our model predicts that higher frequency of cooperation relative to conflict reduces a region’s linguistic diversity. Thus, a main contribution of our paper is to model strategic incentives as a cause of linguistic divergence. 
Washington University in St. Louis Wednesday, July 18, 11:50, Session B Global Games with Interim Information Acquisition [pdf] Abstract
We study global games with interim information acquisition where players acquire 
Yale University Monday, July 16, 15:35, Session B Dynamic Communication with Commitment [pdf] Abstract
I study the optimal communication problem in a dynamic principalagent model. The agent observes the evolution of an imperfectly persistent state, and makes unverifiable reports of the state over time. The principal takes actions based solely on the agent's reports, with commitment to a dynamic contract in the absence of transfers. Interests are misaligned: while the agent always prefers higher levels of action to lower, the principal's ideal action is statedependent. 
University of Wyoming Wednesday, July 18, 15:55, Session A Dynamic Contracts of the Green Climate Fund with Renegotiation Shocks [pdf] Abstract This paper analyzes a dynamic relationship where the developed country cannot be forced to make contributions of funding to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the GCF offers longterm climate funding contracts that are repeatedly renegotiated. The consequences for renegotiation shocks and conflicts between the GCF and the developed country are discussed. 
Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology Thursday, July 18, 12:10, Session F To disconnect or not: a cybersecurity game [pdf] (joint work with YunSik Choi, Gene Moo Lee, Andrew B. Whinston) Abstract In the cybersecurity context, we describe a continuous time game between a profitmaximizing attacker and an uninformeddefender who stops the game based on the noisy observation of action by the counterpart. The equilibrium of the game characterizes the attacker's strategy of balancing the instantaneous profit and the duration of the game. In equilibrium, the defender disconnects the counterpart when the updated suspicion level is above certain threshold. Our analysis implies that strategic defense of the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is necessary for the viability of the Internetbased society. We provide sufficient conditions of the model parameters to attract ISPs to play the role of the defender. 
University of CaliforniaIrvine Wednesday, July 18, 15:35, Session C Hierarchical Models for the Evolution of Compositional Language [pdf] (joint work with Jeffrey Barrett and Brian Skyrms) Abstract We present three hierarchical models for the evolution of compositional language. Each has the basic structure of a twosender/one receiver Lewis signaling game augmented with executive agents who can learn to influence the behavior of the basic senders and receiver. With each game, we move from stronger to weaker modeling assumptions. The first game shows how the basic senders and receiver might evolve a compositional language when the two senders have preestablished representational roles. The second shows how the two senders might coevolve representational roles as they evolve a reliable compositional language. Both of these games impose an efficiency demand on the agents. The third game shows how costly signaling alone might lead rolefree agents to evolve a compositional language. 
Universidad Nacional de La Plata Tuesday, July 17, 15:35, Session A Can Consumer Complaints Reduce Product Reliability? Should We Worry? [pdf] Abstract
We analyze a monopolist’s pricing and product reliability decision in a model where consumers 
University of Maryland Monday, July 16, 15:15, Session E What if a figure skating team event had been held at past Winter Olympic Games? [pdf] (joint work with Diana Cheng) Abstract
When Aumann (2003) identified topics “that are involved in game theory” he stated “We have mathematics, computer science, economics … . We have sports”. 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University Monday, July 16, 15:15, Session F Organizations and Coordination in a Diverse Population [pdf] (joint work with Ming Yang) Abstract We study the role of organizations in coordinating actions of diverse individuals with strategic complementarity and incomplete information. An organization obligates its members to take collective actions and thus mitigates strategic uncertainty caused by informational frictions. But it also compels its members to take the collective action not in their favor and make them reluctant to join ex ante. In light of this tradeoff, we identify strategic complementarity and preference heterogeneity as the key determinants of whether organizations are desirable in the sense of welfare improvement, and whether they are sustainable in the sense of incentive compatibility for members to join ex ante. If preference heterogeneity dominates strategic complementarity, organizations could be desirable, but are not sustainable. Otherwise, organizations are desirable, but there is an upper bound for the size of sustainable organizations. The bound increases in the degree of strategic complementarity and decreases in the degree of preference heterogeneity. Finally, in all equilibria with organizations, welfare increases with size of organizations. 
Stony Brook University Friday, July 20, 11:15, Session C Spending Too Little in Hard Times [pdf] (joint work with Peter DeScioli) Abstract People’s decisions to consume and save resources are critical to their wellbeing. Previous experiments find that people typically spend too much because of how they discount the future. We propose that people’s motive to preserve their savings can instead cause them to spend too little in hard times. We design an economic game in which participants can store resources for the future to survive in a harsh environment. A player’s income is uncertain and consumption yields diminishing returns within each day, creating tradeoffs between spending and saving. We compare participants’ decisions to a heuristic that performed best in simulations. We find that participants spent too much after windfalls in income, consistent with previous research, but they also spent too little after downturns, supporting the resource preservation hypothesis. In Experiment 2, we find that by varying the income stream, the downturn effect can be isolated from the windfall effect. In Experiments 34, we find the same downturn effect in games with financial and political themes. 
Ghislain Herman Demeze Jouatsa University of Bielefeld Wednesday, July 18, 15:35, Session E A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games [pdf] Abstract I analyze the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. The same method can be used to fully characterize the limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any the finitely repeated game. 
Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) Monday, July 16, 12:10, Session D A Tale of Two Decentralizations: Volatility and Economic Regimes [pdf] (joint work with Bo, Shiyu, Sun, Yufeng, and Wang, Boqun) Abstract In this paper, we develop a formal model to study the relationship between decentralization and output volatility. We find that two types of decentralization have distinct effects on output volatility. When promotion is mainly based on political loyalty, decentralization leads to higher output volatility; when promotion is determined by economic performance, decentralization yields lower output volatility. A case study on two decentralization practices in China provides empirical support for our model. 
Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad Thursday, July 18, 11:30, Session D Social Punishment and Underreporting in HardtoProve Crimes (joint work with jeevant rampal) Abstract
This paper sets up a gametheoretic model to analyze crime that is 
University of Bonn Wednesday, July 18, 12:10, Session B Optimal Languages [pdf] Abstract This paper studies how languages are shaped by the cognitive costs that using them involves. We introduce a new continuous approach to characterize the optimal resolution of the tradeoff between the precision of a language and the complexity of the structures it uses, and its dependence on the information the language is used to describe. Notably, when the cost of communication is endogenized using information theory, all words in an optimal language are equally precise, and their precision is independent of the distribution of states. 
Saarland University Wednesday, July 18, 11:30, Session D Fair Competition Design [pdf] (joint work with Ritxar Arlegi) Abstract
We study the impact of two basic principles of fairness on the structure of different sport competition systems. The first principle requires that if all players are equally strong then each player should have the same probability of being the final winner, while the second one says that a better player should not have a lower probability of being the final winner than a weaker player. We apply these principles to a class of competition systems which includes, but is not limited to, the sport tournament systems mostly used in practice such as roundrobin tournaments and different kinds of knockout competitions, and completely characterize the competition structures satisfying them. In these characterizations a new competition structure that we call an antler turns out to play a referential role and allows us to single out balanced competitions and extended stepladder tournaments as having the most conspicuous structure from a theoretical point of view. We finally show that the class of fair competition systems becomes 
George Mason University Thursday, July 18, 15:15, Session E Revealed Markov Strategies [pdf] (joint work with Mikhail Freer) Abstract
Major problem with identification of strategies in the repeated games is the vastness of strategy space stemming from dependence on history (previous actions). 
Istanbul Sehir University Monday, July 16, 11:50, Session D War and Fiscal Centralization [pdf] (joint work with Erol Ozvar) Abstract
We study how war gives incentives to the ruler and the local power holders in a country to move towards a centralized fiscal state. The ruler's lack 
New York University Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session E Polarization and IssueSelection in Electoral Campaigns [pdf] (joint work with Tiberiu Dragu) Abstract The strategy of candidates regarding which policy issues to emphasize during electoral campaigns is an important aspect of electoral competition. In this paper, we advance research on electoral competition by developing a model of electoral competition through issue selection to investigate whether issues on which voters are more polarized or issues on which parties are more polarized are more likely to be advertised in electoral contests. We show that candidates have more incentives to advertise issues on which parties are more polarized rather than issues on which voters' policy positions are more polarized. The analysis provides a theoretical foundation for moving toward a more complete understanding of the content of campaign communication on ideological issues. 
Stony Brook University Friday, July 20, 10:15, Session E ZeroSum Stochastic Games with Perfect Information, Unbounded Payoffs and Weakly Continuous Transition Probabilities (joint work with Eugene A. Feinberg (Stony Brook University), Pavlo O. Kasyanov, Michael Z. Zgurovsky) Abstract
For twoperson games with perfect information, the second player knows the decision of the first player. Such games also describe turnbased games and robust optimization problems. Unlike the games with simultaneous decisions, in games with perfect information the players can achieve their goals by playing only pure policies. 
Stony Brook University Wednesday, July 18, 11:30, Session E Categorization in Social Networks and the Folly of Crowds [pdf] Abstract
In this paper I propose a theoretical social network model that mixes both Bayesian and 
El Colegio de Mexico Monday, July 16, 15:35, Session A On Cournot's theory of oligopoly with perfect complements [pdf] (joint work with Rabah Amir and Adriana Gama) Abstract
This paper provides a thorough characterization of the properties of Cournot's complementary monopoly model (or oligopoly with perfect complements) in a general setting, including existence, uniqueness and the comparative statics effects of entry. As such, this serves to unify various 
University of Leicester Friday, July 20, 11:35, Session C Experimental Evidence on the Use of Information in Kbeauty Contest Game [pdf] Abstract This paper tests the predictions of the Keynesian beauty contest game with private information. Players have two objectives in Kbeauty contest game, to be as close as possible to the fundamental and, at the same time, to coordinate (anticoordinate) with other players. We test in laboratory how subjects divide attention between public and private information when choosing an action under different strategic environments. We find that, when subjects want to coordinate they reduce weight put on private information, which is consistent with the results of previous experiments. We also test the theory in the anticoordination domain, and fail to find increase of the weights on private information. Even though, subjects do not learn to play bestresponse strategy in anticoordination game, under both environments they react to the correlation in private signals according to theoretical predictions. 
Shandong University, China Thursday, July 18, 15:35, Session E Equilibrium Characterization of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring [pdf] Abstract This paper examines sequential equilibria of repeated games with private monitoring for very general distribution of private signals. Assuming full dimensionality conditions, we characterize the set of equilibrium values for 2player games in which both actions and signals are finite. The folk theorem is partial and the equilibrium values are strictly bounded away from efficiency. The method is valid for Nplayer games, N>=3, but cumbersome in notation requiring highdimensional array operations. 
University of Bath Friday, July 20, 11:35, Session D Vying for Support: Lobbying a Legislator with Uncertain Preferences [pdf] (joint work with Nikolaos Kokonas, Javier Rivas) Abstract
We consider a dynamic model of lobbying with two opposing lobbyists vying for a 
Cornell University Monday, July 16, 16:15, Session B When Bribes are Harmless: The Power and Limits of CollusionResilient Mechanism Design [pdf] (joint work with Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer) Abstract
Collusion has long been the Achilles heel of mechanism design, as most results break down when participating agents can collude. 
Tokyo Institute of Technology Thursday, July 18, 16:15, Session F Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex Post Equilibria with Private Values [pdf] Abstract We consider the implementation problem under incomplete information and private values. We investigate double implementation of (singlevalued) mappings in dominant strategy equilibria and ex post equilibria. We call a mapping a "rule". We show that the notion of an ex post equilibrium is weaker than the notion of a dominant strategy equilibrium. Then, the implementation notion is not trivial even under private values. We define a new strategic axiom that is stronger than "strategyproofness". We call it "weak securestrategyproofness". We show that a rule is doubly implementable iff it is weakly securelystrategyproof. 
BenGurion University of the Negev Tuesday, July 17, 14:45, Session A The Banzhaf Value and General Semivalues for Differentiable Mixed Games [pdf] Abstract We consider semivalues on pM_{∞}  a vector space of games with a continuum of players (among which there may be atoms) that possess a robust differentiability feature. We introduce the notion of a derivative semivalue on pM_{∞}, and extend the standard Banzhaf value from the domain of finite games onto pM_{∞} as a certain particularly simple derivative semivalue. Our main result shows that any semivalue on pM_{∞} is a derivative semivalue. It is also shown that the Banzhaf value is the only semivalue on pM_{∞} that satisfies a version of the composition property of Owen and that, in addition, is nonzero for all nonzero monotonic finite games. 
Yeshiva University Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session B Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover [pdf] (joint work with Cyrus Aghamolla) Abstract This study investigates a communication game between a CEO and a board of directors where the CEO's career concerns can potentially impede valueincreasing informative communication. By adopting a policy of aggressive boards (excessive replacement), shareholders can facilitate communication between the CEO and the board. The results are in contrast to the multitude of models which find passive or managementfriendly boards to be optimal, and helps to explain empirical results concerning CEO turnover. Additionally, we find that shareholders prefer the board to be more aggressive when the board's advisory capacity is more salient, or when the CEO's ability is difficult to assess. 
RWTH Aachen University Thursday, July 18, 11:50, Session C The Performance of CoreSelecting Auctions: An Experiment [pdf] (joint work with Thomas Kittsteiner and Marion Ott) Abstract Combinatorial auctions, in particular coreselecting auctions, have increasingly attracted the attention of academics and practitioners. We experimentally analyze coreselecting auctions under incomplete information and find that they perform better than the Vickrey auction. The proportions of efficient allocations are similar in both types of auctions, but the proportions of stable (core) allocations and the revenue are higher in the coreselecting auctions. This is in particular true for an independent private values setting in which theory does not predict this better performance of the coreselecting auction. We trace the causes of the performance differences back to patterns in bids. The coreselecting auctions provide incentives for overbidding the own valuation and  under certain conditions  also for bidshading, which can hamper performance. In the experiment, bidders react in the predicted direction to these incentives, though less pronouncedly than predicted. 
Bar Ilan University Monday, July 16, 11:30, Session E No Trade and Yes Trade Theorems for Heterogeneous Priors (joint work with Alia Gizatulina) Abstract First we show that even under noncommon priors the classical no trade theorem obtains. However, speculative trade becomes mutually acceptable, if traders put at least slight probability on the trading partner being irrational. Our model, thus, provides a generalization of the result of Neeman (1996) for the case of heterogeneous priors. We also derive bounds on disagreements in the case of heterogeneous priors and pcommon beliefs. 
Collegio Carlo Alberto Wednesday, July 18, 15:15, Session B Robust pricing with refunds [pdf] (joint work with Keiichi Kawai) Abstract We analyze a bilateral trade model where the seller has to make a takeitorleaveit offer to the buyer in an environment where the seller does not know what the buyer has learned or will learn about the product fit. We show that a generous return policy reduces the significance of this type of uncertainty and helps the seller to regain market power. We characterize the bestguaranteed profit the seller can obtain by using a generous return policy. We then show that there are no other selling mechanisms that guarantee the seller higher profits. Our result provides a novel rationale behind generous return policies. 
University of Washington, Seattle Monday, July 16, 16:15, Session A Dynamic Price Competition for Supply [pdf] Abstract This paper develops a dynamic model of two intermediates competing for N suppliers, which is motivated by an observation of the fishing industry. Profits of intermediates are subject to i.i.d. shocks. Intermediates use retroactive payments to entice suppliers to sell to them in the upcoming period. We show that there exists a symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium in this stochastic game. Then we study the tradeoff between higher payments in the current period and higher supply in the next period. An intermediate's incentive to compete for more supply diminishes as the intermediate's market share increases. 
Yonsei University Core and Top Trading Cycles in a Market with Indivisible Goods and Externalities [pdf] (joint work with Jaeok Park) Abstract In this paper, we incorporate externalities into ShapleyScarf housing markets. Agents’ preferences are defined over allocations rather than houses, and we focus on preferences that are egocentric in the sense that agents primarily care about their own allotments. When preferences are egocentric, we can apply the top trading cycles (TTC) algorithm using the associated preferences over houses. We propose two solution concepts based on the core. We establish the existence of a solution by showing that the allocation generated by the TTC algorithm is a solution, and we present a further preference restriction under which a solution is unique. We also investigate the properties of the TTC algorithm as a mechanism. Our results extend the existing results on the TTC algorithm to the case of egocentric preferences, and they suggest that the TTC algorithm is useful and has desirable properties even in the presence of externalities. 
Stony Brook University Thursday, July 18, 12:10, Session E A Strategic Model of Network Formation with Endogenous Link Strength [pdf] Abstract This paper analyzes formation of networks when players choose how much time to invest in other players. As opposed to the distancebased utility weighted link formation game by Bloch and Dutta (2009) in which only the most reliable path is considered, this model assumes the information can be transferred using all possible paths in the network. We study the model under two different link strength functions. First, we assume the link strength is the arithmetic mean of agents investment levels, i.e., the investments are perfect substitutes. This specification allows players to form links unilaterally to other players. Second, we assume the link strength function is CobbDouglas in which players have to have bilateral agreement to form links with each other. We show that, when the investments are perfect substitutes, every player is connected to another either directly or indirectly with no more than two links under any Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we nd that the strict Nash equilibrium structure is a star network. On the other hand, using the CobbDouglas link strength function, we show that paired networks in which players are matched in pairs, are Nash equilibria. However, we also consider a sequential game in which players choose and announce their investments publicly according to a random ordering. We show that an Assortative Pair Equilibrium, in which players are assortatively matched in pairs according to their information levels, is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game for all possible orderings of the players. Therefore, we conclude that the Assortative Pair Equilibrium is the only strongly robust Nash equilibrium. Lastly, we nd that, for both link strength functions, Nash equilibria may not be strongly efficient. 
IMF Monday, July 16, 11:30, Session F A Dichotomous Analysis of Unemployment Welfare [pdf] Abstract
For an economy which could not accommodate full employment of its labor force, some are employed and others unemployed. In this paper, the bipartition of the labor force is assumed random and is characterized by a probability distribution with equal employment opportunity. We value each employed individual by his expected marginal contribution; we also value each unemployed individual by his expected potential marginal contribution if he were hired. The individual value is then aggregated to the national level. Both the individual value and the aggregate value are fully honored in our distribution of production to unemployment welfare and employment benefits. Using a balanced budget rule of taxation, we derive a fair and sustainable tax rate for any given unemployment rate. The tax rate minimizes both asymptotic mean and variance of the underlying posterior unemployment rate process; it is simple for practical use and robust to similar objectives. The rate and valuation approach could also be applied to areas other than the labor markets. This framework is open to alternative identification strategies and other forms of equal opportunity. 
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Thursday, July 18, 16:15, Session A Supervisory Efficiency, Collusion, and Contract Design [pdf] (joint work with Xiaogang Che, Yangguang Huang, Le Zhang) Abstract We analyze a principalsupervisortwoagent hierarchy with soft information. The supervisor may be inefficient such that a noisy signal on the agents' effort levels is observed. On one hand, the agents require risk premiums to work due to the noisy signal. On the other hand, the supervisor and the agents may collude against the principal. We identify a new tradeoff between inefficient supervision and supervisoragent collusion, showing that under certain conditions tolerating collusion to take place helps to ``correct'' wrong supervisory signals and thus benefits the principal. Furthermore, the characterization of the collusivesupervision contract shows that collusion should be allowed with one agent only. 
University of the Basque Country Monday, July 16, 15:35, Session F Rationing rules and stable coalition structures (joint work with Oihane Gallo) Abstract
This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. 
King's College London Monday, July 16, 11:50, Session F CatchUp: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive [pdf] (joint work with Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, and Walter Stromquist) Abstract
Service sports include twoplayer contests such as volleyball, badminton, and squash. We analyze four rules, including the Standard Rule (SR), in which a player continues to serve until he or she loses. The CatchUp Rule (CR) gives the serve to the player who has lost the previous point—as opposed to the player who won the previous point, as under SR. We also consider two Trailing Rules that make the server the player who trails in total score. Surprisingly, compared with SR, only CR gives the players the same probability of winning a game while increasing its expected length, thereby making it more competitive and exciting to watch. Unlike one of the Trailing Rules, CR is strategyproof. By contrast, the rules of tennis fix who serves and when; its tiebreaker, however, keeps play competitive by being fair—not favoring either the player who serves first or who serves second. 
Universidad de Santiago de Chile Tuesday, July 17, 14:45, Session D Social Movements in Democratic Regimes [pdf] (joint work with Pedro JaraMoroni AND Benjamín Matta) Abstract
We study how the threat of a social movement may influence the way in which a democratic government spends its budget. The democratic government has to choose a political program to maximize its expected payoff, which depends on (1) the political program itself and (2) the size of the social movement. Citizens have identical preferences and have to take a binary decision among joining the social movement or not. We show that there are equilibria in which all citizens join the social movement whenever the success of the social movement is beneficial; and there is a unique equilibrium strategy profile in which no citizen decides to join to the social movement. In the fist type of equilibria, the democratic government chooses the political program strategically, while in the second type of equilibrium the democratic government chooses its preferred political program. 
Kyung Hee University Tuesday, July 17, 15:35, Session E Why polls can be wrong but still informative [pdf] Abstract I introduce a polling stage to Feddersen and Pesendorfer's (1996) twocandidate election model in which some voters are uncertain about the state of the world. While Feddersen and Pesendorfer find that less informed, indifferent voters strictly prefer abstention, which they refer to as the swing voter's curse, I show that there exists an equilibrium in which everyone truthfully reveals his/her preference in the poll and participates in voting. Moreover, I find that even in the truthtelling equilibrium, the candidate who wins the poll may be defeated in the election. However, in a large election polls are still welfare improving. 
University of Pennsylvania Matching to Produce Information [pdf] (joint work with Carlos SeguraRodriguez and Peng Shao) Abstract
We study endogenous team formation inside research organizations through the lens of a 
Maastricht University Monday, July 16, 15:55, Session F Farsighted Rationality and the Equilibrium Stable Set [pdf] (joint work with Laura Kasper) Abstract We characterize a set of farsighted stable outcomes in abstract games. We use extended expectation functions to capture a coalition’s belief about sub sequent moves of other coalitions if it changes the status quo. We provide three stability and optimality axioms on coalition behavior and show that an expectation function satisfies these axioms if and only if it corresponds to an equilibrium of the abstract game that is stable with respect to coalitional de viations. 
Stony Brook University Friday, July 20, 10:35, Session D Political Turnover and Property Rights [pdf] Abstract This paper studies the welfare implications of political mechanisms that guarantee individual's property rights over private goods. I analyze a model with two parties that allocate a fixed budget to private transfers and a public good. Individuals differ on how much they value the public good, defining the level of disagreement in society. Each period of time a representative from one of the groups is chosen to propose an allocation while the other group has the power to accept or reject the proposal. Property rights are modeled in the spirit of legislative bargaining with an endogenous status quo, like in Baron (1996) and Kalandrakis (2004). I show three main results. First, when there is limited property rights, namely citizens have the right to claim only private transfers but not public goods, society may reach inefficient outcomes as politicians will overprovide public goods. Secondly, the lower the level of disagreement, the higher the inefficiency. This result contradicts the common suspicion that there will be fewer distortions when there is less disagreement in society. Lastly, I show that political turnover only leads to inefficiency in the case where disagreement is low. 
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology Wednesday, July 18, 15:15, Session F ON COMPARISON OF EXPERTS [pdf] (joint work with ITAY KAVALER, RANN SMORODINSKY ) Abstract A policy maker faces a sequence of unknown outcomes. At each stage two (selfproclaimed) experts provide probabilistic forecasts on the outcome in the next stage. A comparison test is a protocol for the policy maker to (eventually) decide which of the two experts is better informed. The protocol takes as input the sequence of pairs of forecasts and actual realizations and (weakly) ranks the two experts. We propose two natural properties that such a comparison test must adhere to and show that these essentially uniquely determine the comparison test. This test is a function of the derivative of the induced pair of measures at the realization. 
SUNY Thursday, July 18, 11:30, Session C On the Virtue of Being Regular and Predictable: A Structural Analysis of the Primary Dealer System in the United States Treasury Auctions Abstract
This paper analyzes the policy question of whether the US Treasury should maintain the current security distribution mechanism of the primary dealer system in the Treasury primary market to achieve the debt management objective of lowest funding cost over time in the current economic environment of increasing borrowing needs and the Federal Reserve monetary policy normalization. 
University of California, Riverside Thursday, July 18, 15:35, Session A Moral Hazard, Uncertain Technologies, and Linear Contracts [pdf] (joint work with Martin Dumav) Abstract We analyze a moral hazard problem where both contracting parties have imprecise information (nonprobabilistic uncertainty) about how actions translate to output. Agent has (weakly) more precise information than Principal, and both seek robust performance from a contract in relation to their respective worstcase scenarios. We show that linear contracts that align Principal’s and Agent’s pessimistic expectations are optimal. This result holds under very general conditions on the structure of information, including the case where Principal does not know exactly the extent of disagreement between her and Agent’s information. Methodologically, by using only the properties of the sets of expected payoffs to derive the results, we provide a way to characterize optimal contracts without requiring such knowledge on the part of Principal. Substantively, our results provide some insights into the formal link between robustness and simplicity of contracts, in particular that nonlinearity creates suboptimal divergence between the respective worstcases. 
University of Miami Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session A Competitive Advertising and Pricing [pdf] (joint work with Raphael Boleslavsky; Ilwoo Hwang) Abstract We consider an oligopoly market in which each firm decides not only its price but also how much information about its product to reveal to consumers. Utilizing a recently developed technique in information design, we fully characterize symmetric purestrategy market equilibria of this game. We illustrate how a firm's advertising strategy is shaped by its pricing decision and how the equilibrium advertising level depends on the underlying distribution of consumers' true values. A direct but important corollary of our analysis is that more intense competition (more firms in the market) induces each firm to reveal more product information. 
Korea Information Society Development Institute Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session D Mixing Propensity and Strategic Decision Making [pdf] (joint work with Duk Gyoo Kim ) Abstract
This paper examines a link between an individual’s strategic thinking in beauty contest games and (possibly nonrational) decisionmaking patterns in a nonstrategic setting. Experimental evidence shows that subjects’ strategic behavior, which used to be understood as a result of (possibly limited) cognitive iterations, is closely related to the nonstrategic decisionmaking patterns. We claim that such a relationship partially explains conﬂicts of the previous reports on the strategic behaviors observed in the laboratory. We require attention to this relationship in that the assumption that individuals are rational in the decisiontheoretic sense may create sizable misinterpretation of strategic behavior. 
University of Mannheim Monday, July 16, 15:35, Session C Multilateral Bargaining with Proposer Selection Contest [pdf] (joint work with SangHyun Kim) Abstract This paper experimentally investigates the competition to be selected as the proposer of the subsequent ultimatum bargaining game. The experimental environment varies in three dimensions: voting rule, reservation payoffs, and the information of how much resource each subject spent in the competition. In all treatments, many proposers put quite a generous allocation to the vote, and the average amount of resources spent in the competition was significantly lower than the theoretical benchmark. More importantly, we find that the levels of spending and inequality significantly differed across treatments: Given the simple majority voting rule, the surplus was distributed most efficiently and most equally when the reservation payoffs were heterogeneous and subjects were informed of who had spent how much in the competition. Furthermore, the analysis shows that in the public information treatments, the nonproposer who had spent more was more likely to be selected as a coalition partner or to be offered a greater share. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating which formal rules are more effective in establishing more efficient informal norms. 
University of Bonn Friday, July 20, 10:35, Session B Costly Verification and Correlated Information [pdf] (joint work with Deniz Kattwinkel) Abstract
A principal has to take a binary decision. She relies on information privately held by an agent who always prefers one of the two actions. The principal cannot use monetary transfers to incentivise truthful reports but has the possibility to reveal the agent's information at a cost. Additionally, the principal privately observes a signal which is correlated with the agent's type. 
Humboldt University of Berlin Thursday, July 18, 12:10, Session C Favoritism in Auctions: A Mechanism Design Approach [pdf] Abstract
The auction designer has one favorite among bidders and maximizes his utility by 
Columbia University Tuesday, July 17, 14:45, Session B Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information [pdf] Abstract
We study a model of communication and Bayesian persuasion between a sender who is 
Princeton university Thursday, July 18, 11:50, Session B Persuasion with Unknown Beliefs [pdf] (joint work with Svetlana Kosterina) Abstract A sender designs a signal structure to persuade a receiver to choose one action over another. The sender is maximally ignorant about the receiver's prior on the states where the sender and the receiver disagree about the best action and has additional information about the receiver's prior on other states. I characterize the optimal signal structures in this environment. The lack of knowledge of the receiver's prior causes the persuasion mechanism to never completely give up: the optimal signal recommends the high action with a strictly positive probability in all states. I show that the probability that the high action is recommended is continuous in the state and the optimal signal may reveal the state with some probability. Finally, I show that the solution to the problem of persuasion with unknown beliefs is the same as the solution to the problem of persuading all members of a large group with heterogeneous priors. 
Technical University Dortmund Monday, July 16, 15:55, Session E Information Design in MultiTask Contests  Whom to Inform When the Importance of Tasks Is Uncertain [pdf] Abstract
In many contests competitors invest effort in different tasks. 
METUAnkara Wednesday, July 18, 16:15, Session A OtherRegarding Preferences in Organizational Hierarchies [pdf] (joint work with Kemal Saygili) Abstract
In this paper, we provide new theoretical insights about the role of collusion in organizational 
DIAT Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session E SOLF: Software Development Lifecycle model based on Golf [pdf] Abstract
Golf is ball game where players are challenged to complete the game with fewer number of strokes in varying terrains. The holes of golf course are similar to milestones in a software development project. The Golf game has interesting take away for software engineering. In this paper, we propose SOLF: Software Development Lifecycle model based on Golf. The SOLF is well suited for individualized software development or research projects. It is flexible and easy to adopt to different scenerios. While most of the Software Engineering models focus on software development in groups, SOLF addresses software development and research projects for smaller team sizes and individuals. 
Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business Tuesday, July 17, 14:45, Session F Optimal Income Taxation with Endogenous Prices [pdf] (joint work with Robertas Zubrickas) Abstract We consider a Mirrleesian model of optimal income taxation with endogenous product prices. Given endogenous prices, any redistribution of income in the economy affects social welfare not only directly, but also through its influence on the level of product prices. To correct for this price externality, the optimal income tax schedule includes a new Pigouvian term. For competitive markets with increasing market supply, the Pigouvian term is positive for normal goods, negative for inferior goods, increasing for luxury goods, and decreasing for necessity goods. Using a calibrated model of the U.S. housing market, we quantify the price effect showing that it increases optimal marginal income tax by 45% for most income levels. We also analyze the Pigouvian term for oligopolistic markets, where the price effect on optimal income taxation persists even with the introduction of commodity and profit taxation. Our simulations of the U.S. housing market also show that optimal marginal income tax should be lower for more concentrated markets. 
BenGurion University of the Negev Wednesday, July 18, 15:55, Session F Reputation and Cycles [pdf] (joint work with Ehud Lehrer) Abstract
A decision maker repeatedly exerts effort to produce output. 
University of Heidelberg Wednesday, July 18, 15:35, Session F Measuring skill and chance in games [pdf] (joint work with Peter Duersch, Joerg Oechssler) Abstract Online and offline gaming has become a multibillion dollar industry. However, games of chance are prohibited or tightly regulated in many jurisdictions. Thus, the question whether a game predominantly depends on skill or chance has important legal and regulatory implications. In this paper, we suggest a new criterion for distinguishing games of skill from games of chance: All players are ranked according to a ''bestfit'' Elo algorithm. The wider the distribution of player ratings are in a game, the more important is the role of skill. Most importantly, we provide a new benchmark (''50%chess'') that allows to decide whether games predominantly depend on chance, as this criterion is often used by courts. We apply the method to large datasets of various twoplayer games (e.g. chess, poke, backgammon). Our findings indicate that most popular online games, including poke, are below the threshold of 50% skill and thus depend predominantly on chance. In fact, poke contains about as much skill as chess when 3 out of 4 chess games are replaced by a coin flip. 
BenGurion University of the Negev Thursday, July 18, 11:50, Session A Fees versus Royalties: The Case of a Product Improvement [pdf] (joint work with Hodaya Lampert) Abstract We examine the effect of the chosen licensing method for a product improvement in the downstream market. We analyze four licensing methods: fixed fee, fixed fee with an auction, perunit royalties and perunit royalties with an auction. All four methods are analyzed for two cases: when the licensees can produce only the improved product and when the licensees can continue producing the old product as well. It is assumed that in addition to having the right to produce the patented product, the licensee becomes a Stackelberg leader in the downstream market. It was found that in the case of a fixed fee the patent owner sells an exclusive license to a single producer. In contrast, in the case of perunit royalty the patent owner sells licenses to about half of the producers if the producers are not allowed to produce the old product, and to all of them if they are allowed. The patent owner and the consumer prefer the fixed fee method over the royalty (whether or not the licenses are auctioned). 
The Ohio State University Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session C Misbehavior in CommonValue Auctions (joint work with James Peck) Abstract We study optimal misbehavior by (rings of) bidders or by an auctioneer (shill bidding) in several auction formats in a pure commonvalue environment. Specifically, we consider the dynamic English auction and the static Sophi auction. These auctions are strategically equivalent without misbehavior. In each case we first characterize the optimal misbehavior strategy of the rings or the auctioneer and evaluate the gains to such misbehavior relative to the standard case. We then compare/rank those formats by their immunity to such misbehavior. The recent theoretical and experimental literature documented and explained the observation that often dynamic auctions outperform their "equivalent" static (one shot) strategic implementation. Our main result is that the static version is more immune to several forms of misbehavior, which might explain why it still flourishes. 
Mississippi State University Friday, July 20, 11:15, Session D Centralized Policymaking and Informational Lobbying [pdf] Abstract I analyze the tradeoffbetween centralized and decentralized policymaking when special interest groups can influence policy outcomes through informational and monetary lobbying. The analysis highlights two channels through which centralized policymaking affects social welfare. Centralized policymaking may change the informativeness of the evidence produced by special interest groups and influence the quality of policymaking. I refer to this effect as the information production effect of centralized policymaking. This effect is most relevant when interest groups are only willing to pay small political contributions to policymakers. When interest groups' willingness to pay is large, centralized policymaking has a political capture effect. It affects the ability of interest groups to use political contributions to capture policymakers. I derive conditions under which centralized policymaking leads to higher social welfare than decentralized policymaking. 
McGill University Monday, July 16, 12:10, Session E Information order in monotone decision problems under ambiguity (joint work with Junjie Zhou) Abstract
We examine the robustness of Lehmann’s ranking of information (Lehmann, 
Virginia Tech Wednesday, July 18, 11:50, Session C Promises and Punishment [pdf] (joint work with Martin Dufwenberg, Flora Li, and Alec Smith) Abstract We study the effect of communication on trust and costly punishment in an experiment where participants play a threestage investment game. In a withinsubject treatment we allow communication in the form of a single preplay message from the second mover to the first mover. We measure beliefs and our design permits the observation of both promises and deception. We also test for a novel behavioral mechanism, frustrationdependent anger. We find that communication changes beliefs and raises expectations about payoffs. Promises are the main factor influencing beliefs, and bro ken promises lead to significantly higher levels of punishment. Overall we find that the anticipation of beliefdependent costly punishment leads to increased levels of efficiency and cooperation, and that this effect is stronger when communication is possible. The results are consistent with the idea that costly punishment results from beliefdependent anger and frustration. 
University of Arizona Thursday, July 18, 11:50, Session F Regret Games [pdf] (joint work with Martin Dufwenberg) Abstract
Several application papers have called for a systematic theory investigating the role of regret aver sion in interacting behaviors. In this paper, we theorize about how anticipated regret affects players’ behaviors in games. The regret is captured by the gap between the payoff a player actually gets and his counterfactual expected payoff from the best strategy among foregone actions. Ex post beliefs determines the degree of a player’s regret, the former is affected by a player’s information across end nodes. We also find novel aspects regarding how players interpret chance moves, mixed strategies, and playing orders. 
University of Chicago Tuesday, July 17, 15:35, Session D Attention Management [pdf] (joint work with Laurent Mathevet, Dong Wei) Abstract A wellintentioned principal discloses information to a rationally inattentive agent. Processing information is costly to the agent, but the principal does not internalize this cost. Whatever information the principal makes available to the agent (her disclosure policy), the agent may choose to pay attention to strictly less information. We first find that, in binarystate environments, due to the one dimensionality of information, it is always optimal for the principal to fully reveal the state. We then study a general model with quadratic payoffs in which we can explicitly characterize the information policies to which the agent willingly pays full attention. In a leading example with three states, optimal disclosure involves distortion at intermediate costs of attention. As the cost increases, optimal information abruptly changes from downplaying the state to exaggerating the state. 
Stony Brook University Thursday, July 18, 11:30, Session A Optimal Licensing in Markets with Quality Innovation [pdf] (joint work with Yair Tauman) Abstract We study a research lab’s optimal licensing of a qualityimproving innovation. Prior to the quality innovation, firms produce homogeneous goods with a low quality and compete in quantity. Consumers are heterogeneous in their tastes for quality and each has a unit demand. In equilibrium, consumers purchase in the market when their taste parameters are above a threshold an exit the market, otherwise. A research lab develops a qualityimproving innovation which upgrades the goods’ quality to a higher level. The lab wishes to maximize its revenue by licensing the technology to the firms through auction. We characterize the optimal number of licenses the lab should auction off and analyze how the lab’s optimal licensing strategy affects the market structure, firms profit and consumer surplus. 
UW Madison Wednesday, July 18, 15:15, Session D Ordinal Imitative Dynamics [pdf] Abstract The paper introduces an imitative evolutionary dynamic with the least information requirements. Agents in a large population are matched to play a symmetric game. An agent who receives a revision opportunity observes one opponent from the population at random and switches to that opponent’s strategy whenever the opponent’s realized payoff is higher than that of the player. This imitative rule imitate the better realization (IBR) generates an ordinal mean dynamics which is polynomial in strategy utilization frequencies. In twostrategy games and in games with only two distinct payoffs the dynamics is equivalent to the replicator dynamics. In the RockPaperScissors games both dynamics exhibit one of the three possible behaviors: global convergence to the rest point, global convergence to the boundary, or closed orbits around the rest point, but these behaviors need to be the same. In other cases, for instance in Zeeman’s game, the number of interior rest points the two dynamics possess is different. It is also demonstrated that although the dynamics does not possess any of the standard ’cardinal’ properties such as Nash stationarity or payoff monotonicity, it still eliminates strictly dominated strategies. 
École Polytechnique Tuesday, July 17, 15:35, Session B Collateral and Reputation in a Model of Strategic Defaults [pdf] Abstract This paper builds a finitehorizon model to study the role of physical collateral in a model of strategic defaults, when the borrower can develop reputation for being honest. Asset ownership increases attractiveness of the reputational channel: the borrower who would prefer to remain in autarky in the absence of the asset applies for collateralized debt. Pledging the asset as collateral facilitates reputation building, which is especially successful at the times of asset price drops, because these are the times when default is most tempting. The model sheds some light on the comovement of defaults and the household's financial and nonfinancial income. 
National University of Singapore Monday, July 16, 16:15, Session F Bayesian Coalitional Rationality [pdf] (joint work with Yongchuan Qiao, ChihChun Yang) Abstract We offer an epistemic definition of "Bayesian coalitional rationality" (i.e., Bayesian crationality) in strategic environments by a mode of behavior that no group of players wishes to change. In an epistemic framework in which each player is endowed with a CPS belief at a state, we characterize the gametheoretic solution concept of "Bayesian coalitional rationalizability" (i.e., Bayesian crationalizability) by means of common knowledge of Bayesian crationality. We also formulate and show Bayesian crationalizability is outcome equivalent to a coalitional version of a posteriori equilibrium. Our analysis provides the epistemic foundation of the solution concept of Bayesian crationalizability. 
University of Rochester Monday, July 16, 11:50, Session A Majority Bargaining and Reputation [pdf] Abstract I analyze the interaction of nonunanimity and reputation in a simple environment. Three agents bargain over the division of one dollar with majority rule and a BaronFerejohn protocol with uniform recognition probabilities. Each agent could be a semirational obstinate type committed to claim a certain share of the dollar. In sharp contrast to bilateral bargaining with reputational concerns, assuming common conflicting claims and a common discount factor, I show that when rational types are sufficiently patient, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the bargaining process is asymptotically efficient in the sense that it reaches a potential agreement in finitely many periods with probability one. Moreover, in this equilibrium, the rational type with the weakest reputation of obstinacy obtains the largest share of the dollar. 
Maastricht University Friday, July 20, 10:35, Session E Subgame maxmin strategies in zerosum stochastic games with tolerance levels [pdf] (joint work with János Flesch, P. JeanJacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski) Abstract
We study subgame phimaxmin strategies in twoplayer zerosum stochastic games with finite action spaces and a countable state space. Here phi denotes the tolerance function, a function which assigns a nonnegative tolerated error level to every subgame. Subgame phimaxmin strategies are strategies of the maximizing player that guarantee the lower value in every subgame within the subgamedependent tolerance level as given by phi. 
Centre for European Economic Research Wednesday, July 18, 11:50, Session F Strategies under distributional and strategic uncertainty [pdf] Abstract I investigate the decision problem which arises in a game of incomplete information under two different types of uncertainty  uncertainty about other players' type distributions and about other players' strategies. I propose a new solution concept which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not best replies. Second, I apply the maximin expected utility criterion. Using this solution concept, one can derive predictions about outcomes and recommendations for players facing uncertainty. A bidder following this solution concept in a firstprice auction expects all other bidders to bid their highest rationalizable bid given their valuation. As a consequence, the bidder never expects to win against an equal or higher type and resorts to win against lower types with certainty. 
Daito Bunka University Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session A An Extension of the Shapley Value for Partially Defined Cooperative Games [pdf] (joint work with M. Josune Albizuri, Satoshi Masuya, Jose M. Zarzuelo) Abstract
The classical approach to cooperative games assumes that the worth of every coalition is known. However, in the real world problems there may be situations in which the amount of information is limited and consequently the worths of some coalitions are unknown. The games corresponding to those problems are called partially defined cooperative games and surprisingly have not received yet enough attention. 
University of South Carolina Friday, July 20, 10:15, Session C Experimental Test of “Better than Average” Effect and Excess Entry. [pdf] (joint work with Melayne McInnes, ChunHui Miao) Abstract We suggest a new game which helps to analyze the better than average effect. Our game is an example of a market where total profit is positive if at least two participants enter to compete. Even through the game is dominance solvable, subjects do not learn to stay away completely from the competition after several plays in the experiment. 
University of Vienna Thursday, July 18, 15:15, Session D Informational Cycles in Search Markets [pdf] Abstract
I show in a stationary environment that market participants' equilibrium beliefs can create fluctuations in the volume of trading. I study a sequential search model where buyers face an unknown distribution of offers. Each buyer learns about the distribution by observing whether a randomly chosen buyer traded yesterday. A cyclical equilibrium exists where the informational content of observing a trade fluctuates: a trade is good news about the distribution in every other period and bad news in the remaining periods. This leads to fluctuations in the volume of trading. The cyclical equilibrium can be more efficient than steadystate equilibria. 
Higher School of Economics Wednesday, July 18, 11:50, Session E Cognitive Hierarchical Model in Networks [pdf] (joint work with Emiliano Catonini) Abstract We adapt the cognitive hierarchical (CH) model to the belief formation process in a network game. In contrast to the classical CH model, we do not require the belief distribution f about the levels of thinking to be consistent with the realized distribution. In particular, we assume everybody is of level infinity. We show that for any epsilon>0 arbitrary close to 0 we can construct an example with sufficiently connected network (so that there is a path from any player to any player) such that even if distribution f places probability 1epsilon to the event that everybody is of level infinity, the beliefs do not converge and therefore players permanently disagree. The most surprising part of our predictions is that we show that players, while being all of level infinity, do not learn that they are so sophisticated, despite that they all have a very strong prior for this event. This is in line with the famous Rubinstein’s Email game where the prediction under “almost common knowledge” is very different from the equilibrium prediction that assumes common knowledge. 
Stony Brook University Monday, July 16, 11:50, Session B Information Design in Contests [pdf] Abstract
I analyze the optimal information disclosure problem under the commitment of a ``contest designer'' in a class of binary action contests with incomplete information about the abilities of the players. The class of contests analyzed here is parameterized by the value of a common prize, the cost of exerting effort, and the firstorder beliefs that the players hold about their rival’s ability. The contest designer wants to induce the players to exert the maximum amount of effort in the contest. To do this, he can design an information disclosure rule, which formally is a stochastic communication mechanism, to which he will commit and then use to communicate with the players. I characterize the optimal information disclosure rule for all contests in the class considered. I find that the optimal information disclosure rule involves asymmetric, correlated and partial revelation of information to the players. This partial revelation scheme must always disclose any information privately. Public information is never optimal. Furthermore, the optimal information disclosure rule alters not only the firstorder beliefs of the players but also the higherorder hierarchies in a nontrivial way. The main tool to obtain this characterization is the concept of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium recently introduced in the literature. 
Pontifical Catholic University of Parana Monday, July 16, 16:15, Session D Analyzing selfish and altruistic behaviors in an ultimatum game with asymmetric information [pdf] (joint work with João Basilio Pereima and Angela Cristiane Santos Póvoa) Abstract In this paper we developed an agentbased simulation where agents play repeatedly the ultimatum game. While classical economic models assume that people are fully rational and selfish, experiments on the ultimatum game show that players’ behavior is far from rational and often point to different conclusions. In the ultimatum game, two players have to agree on the division of a sum of money. The proposer suggests how to split it and the responder can either accept or reject the offer, in which case both players get nothing. The rational solution would be that responders accept even the smallest of offers. Instead, experiments show a preference for fairness: low offers are often rejected and proposers make offers that are larger than the minimum, and even fair offers, to avoid rejection. Here we test two types of behaviors: altruistic and selfish and how these patterns of behavior function when there is the advantage of informational asymmetry. On the whole, results show that fairness can emerge in an unfavorable setting depending on the updated rules adopted by responders. 
Dortmund University Wednesday, July 18, 15:55, Session E Repeated Contests With Draws [pdf] (joint work with Jörg Franke) Abstract We consider a simple contest game with draws where sometimesnone of the contestants is selected as winner. If such a draw occurs, then the contest is repeated in the next period unless either one of thecontestants wins the prize, or until a final last period is reached. Thisstructure of repeated contests with draws introduces a dynamic element into the model. We are interested in the strategic implications ofthese dynamics with respect to intertemporal effort decisions by thecontestants as well as total rent dissipation. Potential applicationsthat share similar dynamic features include, for instance, innovationcontests, patent races, primaries where electoral contests are sequentially repeated unless one candidate obtains a majority of delegates,lobbying in legislative process involving several political bodies, orseveral sports tournaments involving tiebreaks or penalty shootouts. 
University of South Carolina Tuesday, July 17, 14:45, Session C Excessive Search [pdf] Abstract
Lang and Rosenthal (1991) extend the textbook Bertrand competition model by introducing an entry cost and assuming that sellers' entry decisions are unobserved by other sellers prior to entry. Their model naturally generates equilibrium prices above the marginal cost. It is particularly relevant to markets in which contractors compete by submitting price quotes, based on a customer's individual need. For this reason, they call it "the contractors' game". 
University of Arizona Thursday, July 18, 15:55, Session B Screening for Experiments [pdf] Abstract
I study a problem in which the principal is a decision maker and the agent is an "experimenter." Neither the agent nor the principal can directly observe the true state, but the agent can conduct an experiment that reveals information about the true state. The agent has private information about which experiments are feasible, his type. I characterize the optimal decision rules to which the principal commits. The main factor which shapes the optimal decision rules is a tradeoff between pursuing the quality of experiment and making the ex post optimal decisions based on the experimental results. Under certain 
La Sapienza University of Rome Unconventional policies in the EMU: a policy game approach [pdf] (joint work with Giovanni Di Bartolomeo) Abstract
How does the availability of fiscal and unconventional monetary measures modify the composition of the optimal policy mix, in a monetary union, when ZLB is binding? How do strategic interactions among independent policy authorities affect it? In order to answer to these questions, we have built a simply threeperiod generalized New Keynesian model. We have relaxed some features of standard DSGE, so that it can be more tractable to describe strategic interactions, between different policymakers, in many economic situations. On the other hand, we have assumed that nonmoney assets are not perfect substitutes. Following Friedman (2013), private agents' choice is responsive to a sort of long run interest rate: short and medium term policy rate and risky ratio of financial markets determine it. 
Ecole Polytechnique Monday, July 16, 12:10, Session B A Purification Result for Games with Endogenous Information Structures [pdf] Abstract This paper studies finite games of incomplete information where information structures are chosen endogenously. Players choose to learn about an unknown payoff relevant parameter by running costly experiments. Additionally, players can learn about other (payoff irrelevant) random phenomenon, assumed exogenous. Hence, players are able to correlate their signals beyond what the payoffrelevant state allows. For such games, I show that an equilibrium in pure strategies always exists. First, I show that the recommendation principle holds, but it is not enough to guarantee pure strategy equilibrium. Indeed, equilibrium in a game may be only sustained by a recommendation of mixed strategies. Second, I show how a pure strategy equilibrium can be obtained from any equilibrium where recommendations are mixed strategies. Using the purification result I show that equilibrium always exists. Finally, I use this framework to analyze games where players are rational inattentive. I show how to recover equilibrium posteriors using the conditions for optimal rational inattentive behavior. 
Collegio Carlo Alberto Thursday, July 18, 15:55, Session D Observational Learning in Large Anonymous Games [pdf] Abstract I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning, an agent’s payoff depends both on the state and on the actions of others. Agents want both to learn the state and to anticipate others’ play. As the sample of previous actions provides information on both dimensions, standard informational externalities are confounded with coordination motives. I show that in spite of these confounding factors, when signals are of unbounded strength there is learning in a strong sense: agents’ actions are expost optimal given both the state of the world and others’ actions. With bounded signals, actions approach expost optimality as the signal structure becomes more informative. 
Harvard University Thursday, July 18, 16:15, Session B Informational Robustness in Intertemporal Pricing [pdf] (joint work with Jonathan Libgober) Abstract
Consumers may be unsure of their willingnesstopay for a product if they are unfamiliar with some of its features or have never made a similar purchase before. How does this possibility influence optimal pricing? To answer this question, we introduce a dynamic pricing model where buyers have the ability to learn about their value for a product over time. A seller commits to a pricing strategy, while buyers arrive exogenously and decide when to make a onetime purchase. The seller does not know how each buyer learns about his value for the product, and seeks to maximize profits against the worstcase information arrival processes. With only a single quality level and no known informational externalities, a constant price path delivers the optimal profit, which is also the optimal profit in an environment where buyers cannot delay. We then demonstrate that introductory pricing can be beneficial when the seller knows information is conveyed across buyers, and that intertemporal incentives arise when there are gradations in quality. 
US Army Thursday, July 18, 12:10, Session B Game of Timing with Detection Uncertainty [pdf] (joint work with David Bednarz, Paul Muench, Nicholas Krupansky) Abstract
In this paper, we generalize the result of a twoperson (Blue and Red) game of timing where Blue has detection 
Tokyo University of Science Generalized Potentials, Value, and Core [pdf] (joint work with Takaaki Abe) Abstract
Our objective is to analyze the relationship between the Shapley value and the core from the perspective of the potential of a game. 
ETH Zurich Monday, July 16, 15:15, Session C Nash Equilibria of Dictator Games: a New Perspective [pdf] (joint work with Philip Grech) Abstract
Situations where one gives up own material payo in order to increase someone 
Utah State University Monday, July 16, 15:55, Session C Bayesian Persuasion: Evidence from the Laboratory [pdf] Abstract This paper presents one of the first experimental tests of Kamenica and Gentzkow's (2011) model of persuasion and a novel experimental framework that can be adapted to analyze emerging theories on information design. It is a study of the strategy adopted by a persuader to manipulate the information environment so as to influence a receiver's belief and therefore actions. Results show that the theory succeeds in describing aggregate behavior of experienced senders. Given sufficient experience and feedback about past performance, the majority of senders select the optimal signal described by theory. Analysis of individual behavior, however, reveals systematic deviations from the theory by some senders. 
University of South Carolina Monday, July 16, 11:50, Session C Asymmetric Contests and the Effects of a Cap on Bids [pdf] (joint work with Alexander Matros) Abstract We study asymmetric allpay auction contest where the prize has the same value for all players, but players might have different cost functions. We provide sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the conventional mixedstrategy equilibrium when the cost functions are rightcontinuous. Further we show how a cap on bids can increase the expected revenue, and provide conditions where a cap could be implemented in a way that far from ‘leveling the field’, a cap with a soft penalty can skew the contest in favor of the less efficient player by reversing the dominance. 
Nazarbayev University Tuesday, July 17, 15:55, Session A Buyer Power and Information Disclosure [pdf] (joint work with In Kim) Abstract We study how buyer power affects producers’ incentives to share information with retailers. Adopting the Bayesian persuasion framework, we show that full information disclosure is optimal only when buyer power is sufficiently low. Using the presence of retail price recommendations as the proxy for information sharing between producers and retailers, we empirically examine the implication of our model. Consistent with the theory, we find that producers of products whose sales rely more on powerful retailers are less likely to use retail price recommendations. 
University of California, Los Angeles Friday, July 20, 10:15, Session A Controlling Cultivation of Taste Abstract For a certain type of products, we often have no idea how much we like the product and our taste needs to be developed over time. Furthermore the rate at which our taste changes often depends on our consumption history. Examples of such goods include new techgadgets and any addictive good. I derive an optimal dynamic pricing scheme for a monopolistic producer (with commitment power) when consumers overestimate the stability of their tastes but the producer knows the true stochastic process that drives taste changes. 
University of the Basque Country Wednesday, July 18, 12:10, Session E Effiency in a generalized connections model [pdf] (joint work with Federico Valenciano) Abstract We consider a natural generalization of the Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model, where the quality of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a nondecreasing function of this amount. The revenue from investments in links is the information that the nodes receive through the network. It is proved that still in this general setting the only efficient networks, in the sense of maximizing the aggregate profit, are the empty network the allencompassing star and the complete network. Nevetheless, it is also shown that if investment is constrained by a budget, other structures may be efficient. 
Rice University Friday, July 20, 11:35, Session A Online News and Editorial Standards [pdf] Abstract The internet enables a media firm to post information received from leads at any time. To examine the effect that this has on the probability of posting incorrect news, I compare a scenario in which a firm can post and update news at any time on a continuum to a scenario in which news can only be posted at a fixed time. I determine the editorial standard, which is a cutoff that determines how certain a firm must be in order to initially post an article. When changing a story is costless, if the firm can post at any time, it will post with weakly less information than it would with a predetermined posting time. If changing a story is costly, then the firm's editorial standard is weakly higher when it can post at any time than when there is just one posting time, and this editorial standard decreases over time. A lower editorial standard implies that the firm will be more likely to post incorrect news, so this implies that a firm may be more cautious with releasing internet news. However, if the firm has a strong prior about the event, it may post earlier with less information when it can post at any time. 
TOBB University of Economics and Technology Thursday, July 18, 15:55, Session E When is it possible to prevent deception by reputation? [pdf] Abstract This paper studies whether it is possible for a regulatory body to sustain proper behavior of agents permanently by means of establishing a reputation for being diligent (in auditing). In our repeated incompleteinformation model that possesses a particular payoff and imperfect public monitoring structure, the regulator is supposed to detect deviations from the proper behavior (regulatorpreferred action) through costly monitoring, and thus, committing to be diligent in doing so emerges as an issue. We find that a patient regulator who faces a sequence of myopic agents guarantees herself the maximum payoff at any Nash equilibrium (and in particular, there is a unique Markov equilibrium with a continuous and nondecreasing value function for the regulator at which the reputation for being diligent persists whenever it reaches to a level with the associated value function attaining its maximum value), implying that agents take the regulatorpreferred action on average indefinitely in any Nash equilibrium. However, when the regulator faces the same longlived agent, we show that there is no Nash equilibrium on which the agent chooses the regulatorpreferred action indefinitely (on a set of histories with positive measure). Thus, the current paper points out the significance of the longevity of the strategic interaction as well as the payoff and signalling structure on the value and permanency of reputations. 
City University of New York Friday, July 20, 10:15, Session D Campaigning Strategies [pdf] Abstract
In previous work we considered a candidate for an election who is trying to decide what to say next to the voters. She knows the voters' priorities and she knows of course what she has already said earlier in the course of the campaign. She is now considering what to say, knowing that some voters will be pleased by a certain statements and others will be displeased. She herself has some priorities as to what she is able to say. Thus her problem is to choose the right thing to say. 
Colby College The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict: Comment [pdf]

University of Western Ontario Wednesday, July 18, 15:35, Session B Selling multiple units of a customizable good [pdf] Abstract A seller has two units of a good that can be customized into one of two possible versions/products. Consumers are privately informed about their valuations for each product, and the valuations are continuously distributed. First, I consider the case when it costs more to the seller to produce the second unit than the first. I show that the optimal mechanism contains only contracts that in expectation provide either 0, or 1, or 2 units, but may include lotteries over different products. Using this result, I simplify the twodimensional mechanism problem design problem so that it can be solved by standard optimal control methods. There is no distortion for consumers whose valuation for their favorite product is high, both in absolute terms and relative to the other product. Such consumers are buying two units of their favorite product with certainty. Consumers with low values are excluded from purchasing. Solved examples suggest that the optimal mechanism typically contains only a few point contracts. Consumers with values in the intermediate range usually get a lottery over different products. I compare the optimal mechanism with the mechanism that optimally sells each unit independently and show that the solutions coincide only when the fully optimal mechanism is deterministic. Next I consider the case when the cost of the second unit is not higher than the cost of the first. Many of the qualitative properties of the solution are similar to the previous case, but the key difference is that the optimal mechanisms only contain contracts that in expectation provide either 0 or 2 units. 
University PanthéonAssas, Paris II Thursday, July 18, 15:15, Session F Equilibrium refinement in signaling games as truth conditions of counterfactuals [pdf] Abstract Equilibrium refinement based on restrictions on beliefs ``off the equilibrium path'' can be related to Lewis's (1973) account of counterfactuals. In signaling games with two states of the world, two signals, and two actions in response to signals, ``forward induction'' (Govindan and Wilson 2009), which for this class of games coincides with ``divinity'' (Banks and Sobel 1987), is equivalent to Lewis's accessibility condition relying on the similarity between the actual world and other possible worlds. The formal results are illustrated in a gametheoretic model of communicative implicatures driven by politeness. 
UC Berkeley Monday, July 16, 15:55, Session D Learning in Games with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Preferences [pdf] (joint work with Soham R. Phade, Venkat Anantharam) Abstract We consider repeated games where players behave according to cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We show that a natural analog for the notion of correlated equilibrium in the CPT case, as defined by Keskin, is not enough to guarantee the convergence of the empirical distribution of action play when players have calibrated strategies and behave according to CPT. We define the notion of a mediated CPT calibrated equilibrium via an extension of the game to a socalled mediated game. We then show, along the lines of Foster and Vohra's result, that under calibrated learning the empirical distribution of play converges to the set of all mediated CPT correlated equilibria. We also show that, in general, the set of CPT correlated equilibria is not approachable in the Blackwell approachability sense. 
IPAG Business School Friday, July 20, 10:15, Session B Common Agency Games with Common Value Exclusion, Convexity and Existence [pdf] Abstract We consider the model common agency proposed by Biais Martimort and Rochet (2000, 2013). We show that in this setting there is no symmetric equilibrium as the one characterized in those articles. We argue that the equilibrium price schedules cannot be simultaneously convex and continuous. In particular in the monopoly case, under some classical assumptions, some agents will be excluded from trade. In the other that a price schedule at any symmetric equilibrium must be must be convex and concave. We conclude that a symmetric equilibrium cannot exist and discuss the implications of our result and the links with the existing literature. 
University of Pécs Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session B Which belief hierarchies are important? [pdf] Abstract
The purely measurable universal type space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998) does not contain all hierarchies of beliefs (Heifetz and Samet, 1999). We consider this universal type space from viewpoint of Nash equilibrium. 
Sidney M. Edelstein Center, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Monday, July 16, 12:10, Session A Dynamic Offer Proportional Beliefs in Sequential Bargaining with Uncertain OfferRelative Values of Outside Options [pdf] Abstract
In strategic bargaining games, a rational player is motivated to offer the opponent the smallest resource share which the opponent would be motivated to accept. In many real world bargaining problems, an identification of such an offer may be challenging due to uncertainty about opponent’s valuation of outside option(s), which, for example, may arise due to players having no information about the context of the game which determines how opponent identifies and evaluates the outside option(s), or due to possibility of opponent being motivated by contextdependent psychological or prosocial motivations, such as fairness norms or reciprocal emotional responses, in which case the value of the outside option(s) gets affected by the size and opponent’s perceived intention behind player’s offer. 
Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad Tuesday, July 17, 15:55, Session D Limited Foresight Equilibirum Abstract
This paper defines the Limited Foresight Equilibrium (LFE). Foresight is defined as the number of subsequent stages of a sequential game that a player can observe from a given move. In the context of a finite sequential game with perfect information, we model a scenario where players can possess various levels of limited foresight and each player is uncertain about her opponents' foresightlevels. The LFE provides an equilibrium assessment for this model. We show the existence of LFE. In LFE, limited foresight players' perception of the game changes as they move through the stages of the game; their strategies evolve and they update their beliefs about the opponents' foresights within the play of the game. If a player has greater foresight, then her LFE beliefs about the opponents' foresights are more accurate. If a limitedforesight player finds herself at an unexpected position, she discovers that she is playing against some higher foresight opponent. Players' LFE strategies take reputations about their foresight into account. In applications, LFE is shown to rationalize experimental findings on the Bargaining game and the Centipede game. The LFE's novel predictions are corroborated by data from a modified Race game. 
Kansas State University Wednesday, July 18, 12:10, Session A Dumping on Free Trade, Optimal Antidumping Duties, and Price Undertakings: Welfare Implications in a TwoMarket Equilibrium Analysis [pdf] (joint work with YangMing Chang ) Abstract
In this paper, we develop a twomarket equilibrium model of trade to show that dumping is welfare deteriorating to an exporting country when its firm dumps a lowquality product at a price below that in its local market and is charged with an antidumping (AD) duty by an importing country. An optimal AD policy is shown to be Pareto superior to an importing country when its firm sells a competing product of higher quality. Our twomarket analysis allows for preference heterogeneity in consumer choices, as well as the endogenous decisions of product quality by duopolistic firms in the home and foreign countries (which are a DC and an LDC due to their income differentials). We find that it is welfare improving for an LDC to restrain its exporting firm not to dump its product and pay an AD duty, but to set the price of the product to be identical that in its local market. The latter option is a price undertaking from which the LDC welfare is higher than its welfare in the case of dumping and an AD fine. From the perspective of global welfare, defined as the aggregation of social welfare of the DC and LDC trading partners, we show the Pareto superiority of the AD policy. 
Lancaster University Wednesday, July 18, 12:10, Session D Robust Comparative Statics in Contests (joint work with Adriana Gama) Abstract We drive several robust comparative statics results in a contest under minimal restrictions on the primitives. Some of our findings extend existing results, while others clarify the relevance of structure commonly imposed in the literature. Contrasting prior results, we show, via an example, that equilibrium payoffs may be (strictly) decreasing in the value of the prize. We also obtain a condition under which equilibrium aggregate activity decreases in the number of players. Finally, we shed light on equilibrium existence and uniqueness. Differentiating this study from past work on contests is our reliance on latticetheoretic techniques, which allows for a more general approach. 
University of Leicester Wednesday, July 18, 16:15, Session C Broken Tyres and Flat Engines: Signalling Expertise in Markets for Credence Goods [pdf] (joint work with Matteo Foschi; Maria Kozlovskaya) Abstract We study overtreatment in credence goods markets by building a model with heterogeneously informed customers who are allowed to signal their knowledge to a seller. A customer (he) has a problem that needs to be treated. The problem can be diagnosed at no cost and treated by the expert (she). Problems can be of different nature and severity. Treating a severe problem also treats less severe problems. The customer can be of different types: perfectly informed (can fully identify the problem), partially informed (can identify some problems, but not others), or uninformed/clueless (cannot identify any problems). The expert can perfectly diagnose the customer’s problem and has a prior over the customer’s types. She makes an offer to fix a particular problem at a price that follows an exogenously given list. If the customer accepts, the transaction takes place. If he rejects, he has at his disposal an "honest" expert who always treats the exact problem from which the customer suffers but asks for a higher price (cost of honesty). Before observing the offer, we allow the customer to send a (costless) message to the expert about what he thinks the problem is. We consider three different signalling structures: i) no language (a benchmark, where the customer cannot send any message), ii) hard evidence (where the customer can choose to disclose or hide information he has but cannot try to fake expertise), and iii) cheap talk (where all messages can be sent by all types). Our results show that, under ii) and iii), full efficiency (i.e. no overtreatment) can be achieved in pooling equilibria where informed customers choose to conceal all of their information. Under ii), they can also choose to partially reveal their information, in which case the uninformed customers are the only ones who may be overtreated. Interestingly, in all other cases, partially informed customers are at least weakly better off hiding their information. 
Fair Outcomes, Inc. Friday, July 20, 11:35, Session B A Simple System for Managing & Resolving Monetary Claims [pdf] Abstract
This paper describes a commitment mechanism that is currently being used to manage and resolve legal claims for monetary damages in the real world. The paper compares the mechanism with more conventional approaches, such as litigation and mediation, by analyzing those conventional approaches as bargaining mechanisms and contrasting the properties of the various mechanisms at issue. Unlike mechanisms such as litigation, mediation, negotiation, and traditional sealedbid arrangements, the new mechanism has features that negate incentives and excuses for either party to try to use it to bluff or posture (or to try to posture through a refusal to use it). These features allow the mechanism to be initiated and used unilaterally by one party without the other side’s cooperation or consent, and without the assistance of a court or sovereign power. Selfinterest obliges the initiating party to confidentially commit to a settlement that is reasonable and focal at the outset of the process, and selfinterest obliges the other side to do so prior to a fixed deadline. 
University of Rochester Wednesday, July 18, 15:55, Session C Competing Auctions with Informed Sellers [pdf] (joint work with Zizhen Ma) Abstract We study competing auctions where each seller has private information about the quality of his object and chooses the reserve price of a secondprice auction. Buyers observe the reserve prices and decide which auction to participate in. For a class of primitives, we show that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists for any finite market. In equilibrium, higher quality is signaled through higher reserve price at the expense of trade opportunities. Interestingly, the interaction of adverse selection and search friction entails distortion at the lower end of the market: in a directed search environment, we show that there is no separating limit equilibrium in which the lowestquality seller sets reserve price equal to his opportunity cost. This finding in the directed search environment carries over to large finite markets. 
Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session D Historical dynamics and country size in geopolitical model. [pdf] (joint work with Kirill A. Rivkin) Abstract In the present paper we propose that geopolitical model (related to such concepts as defensive or offensive realism) can offer substantial qualitative and quantitative insights into human history, provided a few straightforward modifications: efficiency decreasing as a function of size, subdiscretization into provinces (approximated in the present work as Voronoi cells), separate military and treasury resources, and most importantly – separatism, or ability of individual provinces to break off and form a new, independent state. While solving a typical geopolitical model is known to produce a static equilibrium arrangement of countries’ boundaries, in this case the model exhibits complex dynamic behavior, whose nature is largely determined by the parameter determining the probability of separatist “uprising”. As such, the model it offers significant insights regarding the conditions accompanying the rise and decay of states and can qualitatively and quantitatively reproduce a number of observations, including a size distribution of the existing countries. 
School of Business, Stevens Institute of Technology Wednesday, July 18, 15:15, Session A Learning from Failures [pdf] (joint work with Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarree) Abstract Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. These situations are conveniently modeled as twoarmed bandit problems highlighting a tradeoff between learning (experimentation) and production (exploitation). We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his efficiency in experimentation. Private information in the experimentation stage can generate asymmetric information between the principal and agent about the expected profitability of production. The degree of asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the timing of payments, the length of experimentation, and the output to screen the agents. Asymmetric learning by agents with different efficiency imply that both upward and downward incentive constraints can be binding, and that agents are rewarded for early success when efficient and for late success when inefficient. Rewarding failure can be optimal to screen agents if the length of the experimentation period is short. This result is robust to the introduction of ex post moral hazard. We also show that overexperimentation and overproduction can be optimal to screen the agent. 
University of Minnesota Thursday, July 18, 11:30, Session B Critical Types in Dynamic Games [pdf] Abstract
Which simplifying assumptions about beliefs provide robust predictions in dynamic games? In static games, Ely and Peski (2011) introduced critical types as precisely those assumptions on beliefs that are vulnerable to misspecification. They showed that critical types are rare (nongeneric). This paper extends their construction to extensive form games and overturns some of their results. I identify critical types as those hierarchies of beliefs at which a slight perturbation on the assumptions about arbitrarily highorder beliefs rule out some sequentially rationalizable (ISR) outcome of that type. 
University of Kansas Tuesday, July 17, 15:35, Session F Strategic Complements in Two Stage, 2x2 Games [pdf] (joint work with Yue Feng and Tarun Sabarwal) Abstract Echenique (2004) concludes that extensive form games with strategic complementarities are a very restrictive class of games. In the context of two stage, 2×2 games, we find that the restrictiveness imposed by quasisupermodularity and single crossing property is particularly severe, in the sense that the set of games in which payoffs satisfy these conditions has measure zero. In contrast, the set of such games that exhibit strategic complements (in the sense of increasing best responses) has infinite measure. Our characterization allows one to write uncountably many examples of two stage, 2x2 games with strategic complements. The results show a need to go beyond a direct application of quasisupermodularity and single crossing property to define strategic complements in extensive form games. 
University of Guelph Wednesday, July 18, 12:10, Session F Ideal Reactive Equilibrium [pdf] Abstract Refinements of Nash equilibrium have followed the strategy of extending the idea of subgame perfection to incomplete information games. This has been achieved by appropriately restricting beliefs at unreached information sets. Each new refinement gives stricter and more mathematically complicated limitations on permitted beliefs. A simpler approach is taken here, where the whole idea of beliefs is dispensed with, and new equilibrium concept, based on some earlier work on thought process dynamics, called the Ideal Reactive Equilibrium, is developed. 
Hosei University Coalitional Preferences in Large Economies with an InfiniteDimensional Commodity Spaces [pdf] (joint work with M. Ali Khan) Abstract
In two, by now classical papers, Robert Aumann (1964, 1966) demonstrated the existence of a {\it competitive equilibrium} and the equivalence of {\it core} and {\it competitive} allocations in the setting of a finitedimensional commodity space and a nonnegligble continuum of agents modelled as a nonatomic finite measure space. Aumann's {\it individualized} nonconvex setting is now generally regarded as the canonical prototype of perfect competition. An alternative formulation based on coalitional preferences and endowments was presented by Vind (1964), and he used it in the context of a finitedimensional commodity space to establish a core equivalence theorem. The equivalence of these two formulations was grounded and fully resolved in Debreu (1967). The work has now received extension and elaboration in ArmstrongRichter (1986), Zame (1986) and Cheng (1991). 
Maastricht University Friday, July 20, 11:15, Session E Dynamic Matrix Games [pdf] (joint work with Jeroen Kuipers, Gijs Schoenmakers & Katerina Stankova) Abstract We introduce a discrete time zerosum game, which consists of playing a finite sequence of matrix games, and where the players' actions at a given stage determine the matrices to be played at future stages. The game always has a value, but the computation of the value and optimal strategies is timeconsuming when the number of stages in the game is large. We therefore also propose an auxiliary game as a tool to approximate optimal strategies for the original game. An example shows that the auxiliary game may not have a value and experiments confirm that the auxiliary game is not necessarily useful for approximation. We then provide conditions under which a good approximation can be guaranteed. Experiments show that good approximations are also obtained when a game satisfies the conditions only in the limit. 
SaintLouis University  Brussels and CORE, University of Louvain Thursday, July 18, 11:30, Session E Who matters in coordination problems on networks? [pdf] (joint work with Ana Mauleon, Akylai Taalaibekova and Vincent Vannetelbosch) Abstract
This paper studies a model of social interaction in a fixed network where agents play a coordination game  a game where it is optimal for a player to choose an action like most of her friends. The different actions correspond to two different projects the player can invest into. A project is successful once a certain amount of players have chosen it. All players have a certain type: A player can be either an extremist for one of the two projects or she can be a moderate. Extremists players only obtain utility from one project, while moderate players are ex ante indifferent between the two projects. In addition, the players may also differ in their level of farsightedness: Some players cannot foresee the reactions that their actions cause while others anticipate all induced changes. 
Penn State University Thursday, July 18, 15:35, Session C Need vs. Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets [pdf] (joint work with Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm) Abstract
We study college admissions markets, where each college oers 
University of Redlands Monday, July 16, 15:15, Session D Evolutionary Stability of Inequity Aversion in Contests [pdf] (joint work with Nicholas Shunda) Abstract An extensive economics literature investigates the implications of social preferences in the form of inequity aversion, where decisionmakers evaluate their outcomes relative to other players’ outcomes. Inequity averse decisionmakers experience disutility whenever their payoffs are greater than others’ payoffs (advantageous inequity) and whenever their payoffs are less than others’ payoffs (disadvantageous inequity). If preferences were the outcome of a process of evolution and natural selection where interactions in contests determine fitness, would inequity aversion proliferate? This paper develops a simple contest theory model with potentially inequity averse players following the classic Fehr and Schmidt (1999, Quarterly Journal of Economics) model of inequity aversion. Each round, players from a finite population match pairwise to interact in a contest. Players optimize given their preferences (which might not be the same as their fitness) and their Nash equilibrium contest expenditures determine their fitness (i.e., material payoffs). Evolutionarily stable preferences are determined on the basis of relative fitness maximization using the Schaffer (1988, Journal of Theoretical Biology) evolutionary stability definition. The paper shows that there exists a continuum of evolutionarily stable inequity averse preferences in contests with the following properties: 1) disutility from disadvantageous inequity always outweighs disutility from advantageous inequity; 2) players caring only about disadvantageous inequity can be evolutionarily stable while players caring only about advantageous inequity cannot; and 3) disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversion are complements in the sense that an increase in advantageous inequity aversion balances an increase in disadvantageous inequity aversion. 
University of Warsaw, Poland Tuesday, July 17, 15:55, Session F Discontinuous Nash Equilibria in a Finite Horizon LinearQuadratic Dynamic Game with Linear Constraints (joint work with Agnieszka WiszniewskaMatyszkiel) Abstract
Dynamic games are the only appropriate tool to model decision making by independent but coupled agents in an external environment changing in response to their decisions. 
University of Bonn Thursday, July 18, 15:35, Session B Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes [pdf] Abstract A monopolist seller owns an object that has several attributes. A buyer is privately informed about his tastes and uncertain about the attributes. The seller can disclose attribute information to the buyer in a form of a statistical experiment. The seller offers a menu of call options varying in upfront payments, experiments, and strike prices. I study revenuemaximizing menus and show that optimal experiments belong to a simple class of linear disclosures. I fully characterize an optimal menu for a class of singleminded buyers. Surprisingly, the menu is nondiscriminatory and can be implemented by a single partial disclosure followed by a posted price. 
NRU Higher School of Economics Thursday, July 18, 15:15, Session B Pure Information Design in Classical Auctions [pdf] (joint work with Eyal Winter) Abstract
We consider an information design problem in the situations when 
University of Bonn Tuesday, July 17, 15:35, Session C CommonValue Auctions With an Uncertain Number of Bidders [pdf] (joint work with Stephan Lauermann) Abstract This paper studies a commonvalue, firstprice auction in which bidders are uncertain about the number of their competitors. This uncertainty affects the nature of the inference from winning (”winner’s curse”). In particular, the expected value condi tional on winning is usually not monotone and features a stronger winner’s curse at intermediate bids. As a result, equilibrium strategies contain pooling bids at which payoffs are discontinuous. Because of this discontinuity, no equilibrium exists unless the expected number of bidders is sufficiently small. Discretizing the bidding space ensures the existence of an equilibrium which we characterize. In the limit of an ever finer discretization, the outcome is related to an extended auction on the continuous bidding space, in which bidders submit messages that indicate their eagerness to win. 
Northwestern University Thursday, July 18, 11:50, Session E Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship [pdf] (joint work with Aleksei Smirnov) Abstract Not infrequently sellers have power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of censorship policies in markets where some share of consumers is unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such "naive" consumers is sufficiently small then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about the product quality. Moreover, in any equilibrium the lowtype seller is more likely to conceal reviews than the hightype seller. 
Chapman University Monday, July 16, 11:30, Session C Multibattle rent seeking contests over complementary battlefields` [pdf] (joint work with Daniel Stephenson) Abstract This paper investigates multibattle rent seeking contests where n agents compete over m complementary battlefields. Each agent i is endowed with a unidimensional stock w_i of competitive resources which they allocate over m battlefields. In each battlefield b, agents compete over a distinct divisible prize with relative value v_b. Agent i's share of prize b is given by a Tullock success function with precision parameter a. Each prize serves as a constant elasticity input to agent i's payoff with complementarity c. This conflict is shown to possess a unique Nash equilibrium under which agents allocate rent seeking resources to each battlefield in proportion to it's relative value. The ratio between the equilibrium payoffs received by any two agents is shown to exhibit constant elasticity with respect to the ratio between their initial endowments. These results are shown to have important implications for firms that compete over multiple complementary rents. 
University of Texas at Austin A Dynamic Model of Censorship [pdf] Abstract I analyze a dynamic game of censorship between two forwardlooking players. A ruler is either good or bad, and wants to stay in power. An observer prefers a good ruler to a bad ruler, and can revolt against the ruler. Two stochastic signals are informative about the type of the ruler. However, the ruler can incur a cost to censor a piece of bad news from the observer. I show that in the equilibrium, both players use a cutoff strategy with respect to the public belief about the ruler being good. Moreover, the public belief cannot be promoted without good news when the censoring cost is not too high. I also show that besides the observer and the good ruler, the bad ruler also suffers from censorship when the actual censoring period is short. In addition, censorship reduces the observer’s incentive to explore the type of the ruler, which makes the observer revolt against the ruler at a higher public belief when the bad news comes faster than the good news. 
Carnegie Mellon University Wednesday, July 18, 15:35, Session D On bestresponse dynamics in potential games (joint work with Ryan Murray, Soummya Kar) Abstract
The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous) bestresponse dynamics. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, bestresponse dynamics are poorly understood in many games of interest due to the discontinuous, setvalued nature of the bestresponse map. For example, in the class of potential games, it has been speculated that BR dynamics generally converge to pure Nash equilibria and that the rate of convergence of BR dynamics is exponential. However, rigorous results along these lines have been lacking. The paper elucidates several key properties of bestresponse dynamics in potential games. First it is shown that almost every potential game is regular in the sense introduced by Harsanyi. A game is said to be regular if all equilibria in the game are regular. Regular equilibria have been studied extensively in the equilibrium refinement literature; such equilibria are simple to analyze and highly robust. After establishing the generic regularity of potential games, it is shown that in any regular potential game (and hence, almost every potential game) and for almost every initial condition, the bestresponse dynamics (i) have a unique solution, (ii) converge to purestrategy Nash equilibria, and (iii) converge at an exponential rate. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Thursday, July 18, 11:50, Session D Screening Bias with Discretion [pdf] Abstract A principal is uncertain of an agent's preferences and cannot provide monetary transfers. The principal, however, does control the discretion granted to the agent. In this paper, we provide a simple characterization of when it is optimal for the principal to screen by offering different terms of discretion to the agent. When the principal's utility is sufficiently concave, it is optimal for the principal to pool and to offer all agents the same discretion. Thus, for any number of agents and any distribution over agent preferences, the optimal contract is simple: the principal sets a cap and forbids actions above this cap (interval delegation). For less concave preferences, it is optimal for the principal to screen. The principal benefits by providing agents a choice between capstyle discretion and discretion that allows for more extreme actions but prohibits intermediate actions by inserting a gap in the delegation set. Moreover, we provide new intuition for the optimality of interval delegation: the payoff distributions generated by nonconvex sets are meanpreserving spreads of those generated by convex sets. 
University of Glasgow Friday, July 20, 11:15, Session A Selfenforcement via strategic investment [pdf] (joint work with Herve Moulin, Anju Seth, Bart Taub) Abstract
We investigate how, beginning with a situation with two players in which noncooperation is the only equilibrium, cooperation can be achieved via costly investment. We find that cooperation is an allornothing outcome, and, if achieved, is undiluted. The cost of investment is unrelated to the degree of cooperation that is ultimately achieved, unless the cost is too high, in which case investment cannot in any degree overcome the disincentive to cooperate. Moreover, the positive externalities that players have on each other in the course of play are ultimately irrelevant to the outcome, although they do affect investment. 
Maastricht University Monday, July 16, 15:35, Session D Naive Imitation and Partial Cooperation in a Local Public Good Model [pdf] (joint work with P. JeanJacques Herings, Ronald Peeters, Frank Thuijsman) Abstract
This paper analyses a local interaction model in which agents play bilateral prisoners’ dilemmas with their immediate neighbours on a circle. The agents can use one of three possible strategies: they can be altruists (A) who cooperate in all interactions, egoists (E) who defect in all interactions, or employ a partial strategy (P) which allows the agents to act differently with each of their neighbours, i.e. be altruistic to one of them and egoistic to the other. P acts altruistically towards either the lefthand or the righthand neighbour with probability 1/2 each. Agents apply a naive imitation decision rule – after the first period they use the strategy which has the highest average payoff from the ones they have observed in their local neighbourhood. 
University of York Statistical Decision Games [pdf] (joint work with Marco Scarsini)

University of Southern Denmark Thursday, July 18, 16:15, Session C Incentives in a Jobmarket Clearinghouse [pdf] Abstract
We characterize the set of pairwise strategyproof and nondiscriminatory rules for allocating heterogeneous objects or positions, and monetary transfers, when there is unitdemand. We name the resulting class Endogenous Null MinPrice rules. Unlike previous studies, we do not require full distribution of the objects or any restriction on the transfer associated with the null. We thus provide novel solutions to the onetoone matching with transfers problem: Endogenous Null MinPrice rules allow firms to demand reservation profits, and allow for unemployed workers to receive subsidies. Moreover, these subsidies can increase in the number of agents allocated jobs (not all need be filled). 
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Monday, July 16, 12:10, Session F A cooperative game model on the interplays of selfinterest, trust and fairness in a sharing economy [pdf] Abstract
Many real life situations involve independent players forming a coalition to take joint actions and 
University of Virginia Thursday, July 18, 15:15, Session C School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and the Curse of Acceptance [pdf] (joint work with Andrew Kloosterman) Abstract An implicit assumption in most of the matching literature is that all participants know their preferences. If there is variance in the effort agents spend researching options, some will know their preferences, while others may not. When this is true, (expost) stable outcomes need not exist and informed agents gain at the expense of less informed agents, outcomes we attribute to a curse of acceptance for the less informed students. However, when all agents have a secure school, we recover positive results: equilibrium strategies are simple, the outcome is expost stable, and less informed students are protected from the curse of acceptance, which makes them better off. Our results have potential policy implications for the current debate in school choice over how priority design affects outcomes. 
Amherst College Tuesday, July 17, 15:55, Session E A CutAndChoose Mechanism to Prevent Gerrymandering [pdf] (joint work with Jamie TuckerFoltz) Abstract We present a novel mechanism to endogenously choose a fair division of a state into electoral districts in a twoparty setting. We do not rely on any spatial or geometric properties of the distribution of voters, but instead assume that any possible partition of the population is geometrically feasible. One party divides the map, then the other party observes the division and chooses the value for a parameter that determines the exact mechanics of the election. Despite the inherent asymmetry, we prove that the mechanism always yields a completely fair outcome, up to a small rounding factor. We also develop a graphical representation of the game to motivate its analysis. 
University of South Carolina Monday, July 16, 16:15, Session C Sequential Contests: Theory and Experimental Evidence [pdf] (joint work with Alexander Matros Foteini Tzachrista) Abstract
We investigate g theoretically and experimentally twoplayer sequential contests with public and private information about the prize values. 
University of South Carolina Wednesday, July 18, 11:50, Session D New Type of Contests [pdf] (joint work with Alexander Matros) Abstract This paper proposes a new type of model to study nplayer contests. Each participant has to select his eﬀort and prize in the contest. We are able to characterize a unique symmetric equilibrium and its properties. 
CIMAT Monday, July 16, 15:35, Session E ProfitSharing and Efficient Time Allocation [pdf] (joint work with Ruben Juareza and Kohei Nitta) Abstract
Agents are endowed with time, which in turn is invested in projects that generate proﬁt. A mechanism divides the proﬁt generated between these agents, depending on the allocation of time as well as the amount of proﬁt made by every project. We study mechanisms that incentivize agents to contribute their time to a level that results inthemaximalaggregateproﬁtattheNashequilibrium,regardlessoftheproductionfunctions involved (efﬁciency). Our main ﬁnding involves the characterization of all mechanisms that satisfy efﬁciency. Furthermore, within this class, we characterize the class of mechanisms that are monotone in the payoffs of the agents with respect to technological improvements in the generationofproﬁt,theadditionoftimetoagents,andmechanismsthatareresistanttogroup manipulations. The class of efﬁcient mechanisms depends on the type of available projects and their interconnectedness. It expands earlier proﬁt/costsharing mechanisms that are independent of proﬁt generation. 
Ecole Polytechnique Strategic Type Spaces [pdf] (joint work with Olivier Gossner) Abstract
We provide a representation of the universal type space of rationalizable beliefs in a given game of incomplete information, which we call the strategic type space of this game. Strategic types provide minimal representations of all strategically relevant information that (i) allow to derive the set of interim rationalizable actions in this game (ii) exhibit a player's infinite regress of beliefs and higher order beliefs, and (iii) capture payoff relevant correlations among redundant additions to a player's information. We exhibit a network structure between rationalizable strategies, and define a ''strategic type'' as a consistent sequence of trees along this network. Our network structure also gives simple conditions for the strategic relevance of higher order beliefs and shows that hierarchies of beliefs exhibit ''information bottlenecks''. Finally, we embed the strategic type spaces of all finite games into a universal type space, which for the two player case reduces to the type space in Ely and Peski (2004). 
New York University Friday, July 20, 10:35, Session A Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry [pdf] Abstract
I study the impact of consumer reviews on the incentives for firms to enter and participate in the marketplace. Firms produce goods of heterogeneous, unknown quality, which is gradually revealed through usergenerated feedback, and face both entry and exit decisions. Consumers' equilibrium choices induce low entry rates as well as negative selection effects  highquality firms exit too early. In the unique steadystate equilibrium, both firms' entry and exit decisions do not achieve the firstbest consumer welfare  the designer's objective. The model also offers some novel positive predictions that echo existing empirical findings. 
AixMarseille University Wednesday, July 18, 11:30, Session B Communication and Commitment with Resource Constraints [pdf] Abstract I study strategic information transmission between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver when (i) both players take actions that are substitutable and, (ii) players face resource constraints. When actions are simultaneous and in the absence of resource constraints, there is completely truthful information revelation and both players achieve full efficiency. The presence of resource constraints restricts communication, resulting in partial revelation of information. The most informative equilibrium is exante pareto dominant for both Sender and Receiver, and expost efficient only for the sender. When the Receiver is allowed to commit to an action expost communication (sequential protocol), welfare of both players is higher compared to the simultaneous protocol. Finally, I characterize the optimal (exante) commitment mechanism for the Receiver. It exhibits two key features: maximal resource extraction from the Sender and capping of contributions by the Receiver. The full commitment protocol improves information revelation and provides higher welfare for both players. This provides a novel rationale for the existence of commitment protocols within crossfunctional teams involved in new product development in organizations. 
Stony Brook University Wednesday, July 18, 11:50, Session A Learning from disruption: the taxicab market case [pdf] Abstract
Uber joined the NYC taxicab market with 3 advantages: a dynamic pricing scheme, a rating 
Ben Gurion University and Iowa State University Wednesday, July 18, 11:30, Session F The Measurement of Income Segregation [pdf] (joint work with Casilda Lasso de la Vega and Oscar Volij ) Abstract
We examine the problem of measuring the extent to which students with different income levels attend separate schools. 
Shandong University Wednesday, July 18, 15:35, Session A Complementarity Induction in Multidimensional Contests [pdf] (joint work with Jingfeng LU (National University of Singapore); Bo Shen (Wuhan University)) Abstract In this paper, we study effortmaximizing design of multidimensional contests, where players compete by exerting efforts in multiple dimensions. We consider a general prize allocation rule where prizes are allocated contingent on rankorder winning outcomes on all dimensions. We find that it is optimal for the designer to only make a reward to the player who wins in all dimensions and the prize is retained otherwise. Intuitively, the dominance of the multidimensional prize is due to complementarity among effort making across dimensions, which is purely induced by the winning rule of the contest. Our paper provides a rationale for prize retention in many realworld situations when no one stands out without controversy. We also provide reasons why the above result may not hold in the real world. 
Yale University Thursday, July 18, 15:35, Session F Second Order Secret Love [pdf] Abstract This paper studies externalities when people's happiness depends on the others'payoffs in a predetermined, private informed, lexicographic order. By generalizing Barelli and Meneghel's work to vectorvalued payoff functions, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of pure equilibrium in a game with lexicographic externalities. In addition, we discuss the effciency of equilibrium in a public bads model and the epsilonvariations of our formalization. 
Zhejiang University Wednesday, July 18, 16:15, Session D Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from Experimental Economics [pdf] (joint work with Nan Zhou, Li Zhang, Shijian Li, Zhijian Wang) Abstract Algorithmic collusion is an emerging concept in current artificial intelligence age. Whether algorithmic collusion is a creditable threat remains as an argument. In this paper, we propose an algorithm which can extort its human rival to collude in a Cournot duopoly competing market. In experiments, we show that, the algorithm can successfully extorted its human rival and gets higher profit in long run, meanwhile the human rival will fully collude with the algorithm. As a result, the social welfare declines rapidly and stably. Both in theory and in experiment, our work confirms that, algorithmic collusion can be a creditable threat. In application, we hope, the frameworks, the algorithm design as well as the experiment environment illustrated in this work, can be an incubator or a test bed for researchers and policymakers to handle the emerging algorithmic collusion. 
University of Bonn Monday, July 16, 11:30, Session B BuyerOptimal Robust Information Structures [pdf] (joint work with Stefan Terstiege) Abstract We study buyeroptimal information structures under monopoly pricing. The information structure determines how well the buyer learns his valuation and affects, via the induced distribution of posterior valuations, the price charged by the seller. Motivated by the regulation of product information, we assume that the seller can disclose more if the learning is imperfect. Robust information structures prevent such disclosure, which is a constraint in the design problem. Our main result identifies a twoparameter class of information structures that implements every implementable buyer payoff. An upper bound on the buyer payoff where the social surplus is maximized and the seller obtains just her perfectinformation payoff is attainable with some, but not all priors. Generally, optimal information structures may result in an inefficient allocation. 
BenGurion University Tuesday, July 17, 15:55, Session C TwoStage Contests with Preferences over Style [pdf] (joint work with Todd R. Kaplan)

University of Texas at Austin Tuesday, July 17, 15:15, Session C Information Provision in a Sequential Search Setting [pdf] Abstract Consider a variation on the classic Weitzman search problem, in which firms can choose how much information about their product to reveal to a consumer who decides to search them. In this zerosum game, exante identical firms commit to a signal distribution as a function of quality before they learn their (random) quality; a firm’s goal is to maximize the chance that its product is the one selected by the searcher. If there are no search frictions, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies; and for any finite number of firms, the signals are not fully informative. If there are search frictions, then if the expected value of the prize is sufficiently high, there is a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies, but if it is too low, there is no such pure strategy equilibrium. Remarkably, it is always beneficial to the searcher to have a slight search cost: a small search cost leads to the Perfect Competition level of information provision, but frictionless search leads to less information revelation in equilibrium. This result is in sharp contrast to the famous Diamond paradox 
Zhejiang Industry & Trade Vocational College, China A Game Theory Approach for Assessing Threat Value and Deploying MAS Resources against Multiple Coordinated Attacks [pdf] (joint work with Dachrahn Wu; YiMing Chen ) Abstract In the event of a terrorist or a network attack, multiagent systems can encounter scalability problems because of the generation of a growing number of agents resulting in a failure to meet the requirements for emergency response. This study proposes a twostage model, applying a divideandconquer strategy to solve this problem. First, the interactive factors between an external attack and a response agent are modeled as a noncooperative game, after which the external threat value is derived from the Nash equilibrium. Second, the threat values of all response agents are utilized for computation of the Shapely value for each agent. Then, the deployment of agent resources is carried out based on their expected marginal contribution. The model is applied in a case study designed to optimize the deployment of security forces for emergency response after the Paris terror attacks. The experimental results show the approach proposed in this study is more efficient than the proportional division of security forces for dealing with multiple firearms assault events. 
University of Oregon Wednesday, July 18, 11:30, Session C Compromise and Coordination: An Experimental Study (joint work with Simin He ) Abstract This paper experimentally studies the role of a compromise option in a repeated battleofthesexes game. We ﬁnd that in a randommatching environment, compromise serves as an eﬀective focal point and facilitates coordination, but fails to improve eﬃciency. However, in a ﬁxedpartnership environment, compromise deters subjects from learning to play alternation, a more eﬃcient but also more complex strategy. As a result, compromise hurts eﬃciency in the longrun by allowing subjects to coordinate on the less eﬃcient outcome. We explore various behavioral mechanisms and suggest that people may fail to use an equal and eﬃcient strategy if such a strategy is complex. 
Chinese University of Hong Kong Monday, July 16, 15:55, Session B Getting Information from the Enemies [pdf] (joint work with Tangren Feng) Abstract A decision maker DM needs to make a binary choice that affects himself and a group of experts. DM is uninformed of the payoffrelevant state s whereas the experts are imperfectly informed. Conditional on s the experts receive identical payoffs from the chosen option, which may differ from the payoff that DM receives. We show that DM can profitably extract information from the experts using a notransfer mechanism even when their preferences are diametrically opposed, i.e. in every state the preferred option of the experts differ from that of DM. Moreover, this mechanism is implementable using cheap talk with an intermediator. 
Academia Sinica Monday, July 16, 12:10, Session C Rationality and Common Strong Belief of Rationality in Secondprice Auction and English Auction [pdf] (joint work with WeiTorng Juang, ChihChun Yang and KuoChih Yuan) Abstract Within private value framework, "truthtelling bidding" (i.e., bidding up to own valuation) in English auction and overbidding in second price auction (SPA) are well documented behaviors in experiments. These findings reject the hypothesis of strategic equivalence between SPA and English auction under weakly dominant strategy theory. We hence develop a theory for an experimental environment where the private values are drawn from a commonly known fullsupport distribution. We show that in English auction, truthtelling is the unique bidding behavior in "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" (RCSBR). In contrast, in SPA, every bidding strategy is consistent with RCSBR. 
Washington University in St Louis Thursday, July 18, 16:15, Session E Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring [pdf] Abstract
I study a canonical model of reputation between a longrun player and a sequence of shortrun 
University of Alabama Free Riders and Public Good Provision in Morgan's Lottery (joint work with Paan Jindapon) Abstract We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a game where heterogeneous riskaverse players contribute to a public good via lottery purchases. Contrasting models with risk neutrality, we show that an equilibrium with a strictly positive amount of the public good may not exist without a sufficient number of less riskaverse participants. We show that more riskaverse players purchase less lotteries and are more likely to free ride in equilibrium. As a result, it is possible for free riders to gain a larger benefit from the public good than those who contribute. We also show that there exists an upper bound for the amount of the public good provided in equilibrium even though the number of players approaches infinity. We also derive a lottery prize that maximizes the equilibrium amount of the public good and find that such a prize always results in overprovision of the public good. 
University of Chicago Wednesday, July 18, 16:15, Session B Selling Advertisement: Nonlinear Pricing on Information Structure [pdf] Abstract
We study an optimal pricing problem for an intermediary through which transactions between a monopoly and the consumers take place and consumers receive in formation about the commodity. The intermediary can provide information to the consumers and charge the monopoly accordingly. We characterize the optimal menus and show that a menu consisting of (garbled) upper censorship that displays negative targeting feature is optimal and that surplus reduces comparing to a benchmark where 
Duke University Tuesday, July 17, 15:55, Session B The Coordination of Intermediation [pdf] (joint work with Yao Zeng) Abstract
We study the coordination of intermediation in a dynamic intermediated asset market, where dealers’ participation and inventory holdings are endogenous. We show that an interdealer market may endogenously emerge, which leads to coordination motives in dealers’ inventory holding decisions. In an equilibrium where the interdealer market is active (inactive), dealers 
Stony brook University Monday, July 16, 15:55, Session A Firm Entry Decline and Market Structure Abstract The Business Dynamics Statistics data shows that firm entry rate in the United States has declined from 17.1% in 1977 to 10.2% in 2015. This phenomenon has created concerns regarding job creation, firm churning, resource reallocation and aggregate productivity. Using the Economic Census, it is documented that big firms’ productivity increase has a correlation with the firm entry decline in the US economy. Based on the empirical investigation, this research tries to understand if increasing market concentration (through the productivity increase of large, dominant firms) may cause the entry decline. To quantitatively evaluate the effect, I do this using a firm dynamics model which introduces ”dominant firm vs. competitive fringe” framework into the general equilibrium version of Hopenhayn (1992). I find that an increase in dominant firm’s productivity can explain entry decline of fringe firms. 
Stony Brook University Thursday, July 18, 12:10, Session A R&D Race, Patent Licensing and the Social Value of Innovation [pdf] (joint work with Yair Tauman) Abstract By studying an R&D race and the subsequent patent licensing behavior, this paper shows how intense competition among firms for licenses together with intense competition among innovators for patent right can make the expected value of a costreducing innovation to society being negative. We also explain how the preinnovation productmarket structure affects the expected social value of the costreducing innovation. We find that if prior to the innovation, the product market is highly competitive, its expected social value will be nonnegative and if furthermore the preinnovation product market is perfectly competitive, the expected social value of the innovation tends to be zero. Moreover, this paper shows how reducing competition in the R&D race by restricting innovators' entry can, in some cases, increase social welfare, while, in others, decrease social welfare. 
Columbia University Wednesday, July 18, 15:55, Session D Time preference and dynamic learning [pdf] Abstract
In this paper, I first showed that an indirect information measure is supported by expected learning cost minimization if and only if it satisfies: 1. monotonicity in Blackwell order, 2. subadditivity in compound experiment and 3. linearity in mixing with no information. Then I studied a dynamic information acquisition problem with flexible design of information dynamics, costly waiting and costly information. When flow information measure satisfies the three conditions, dynamic problem can be solved in two steps: solving a static rational inattention problem, and implementing optimal learning dynamics. Optimal solution involves stationary Poisson direct signals: ar 
Boston University Friday, July 20, 11:35, Session E Learning in Parrondo’s Paradox [pdf] (joint work with Xiao Zhou, Xiao Wang, Peter Chin) Abstract The Parrondo's Paradox describes the situation where combining two individuallylosing games could yield, counterintuitively, a winning expectation. While the optimal combination strategy could be found by dynamic programming when perfect information is available, finding the optimal strategy is still largely an unsolved problem when the games and the current state are unknown. In this paper, we propose an supervised leaning framework that maps playing history directly to the decision space using multiple layer perceptron(MLP). And our results show that it learned to combine two individuallylosing games to have a positive expectation 6 times better than random alternating. 
Higher School of Economics Wednesday, July 18, 16:15, Session E On the equivalence of mixed and behavior strategies in finitely additive decision problems [pdf] (joint work with János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen) Abstract
We consider decision problems with arbitrary action spaces, deterministic transitions and infinite time horizon. We assume that the decision maker has perfect recall. In the usual setup when probability measures are countably additive, a fundamental theorem (a general version of Kuhn's theorem, cf. in Aumann (1964)) implies under fairly general conditions that for every mixed strategy of the decision maker there exists an equivalent behavior strategy, i.e., they induce the same probability measure on the set of plays. In this paper we examine to which extent this remains valid when probability measures are only assumed to be finitely additive. 