International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 16 - 20, 2018

Schedule of Talks

Back

PDF version

Monday, July 16

9:30 - 10:15

Bernhard Von Stengel  (London School of Economics)
Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games

10:15 - 11:00

Nicolas Stier Moses  (Facebook Research)
Pacing Mechanisms For Ad Auctions

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Bargaining

LH2:Incomplete Information

101:Auctions

102:Social and Political Models

201:Knowledge and Expectations

Chapel: Fairness

11:30 - 11:50

Deepal Basak  (Indian School of Business)
Gambling over Public Opinion  

Cedric Wasser  (University of Bonn)
Buyer-Optimal Robust Information Structures  

Daniel Graydon Stephenson  (Chapman University)
Multi-battle rent seeking contests over complementary battlefields`  

Steven Brams  (New York University)
Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases  

Ziv Hellman  (Bar Ilan University)
No Trade and Yes Trade Theorems for Heterogeneous Priors  

Xingwei Hu  (IMF)
A Dichotomous Analysis of Unemployment Welfare  

11:50 - 12:10

Zizhen Ma  (University of Rochester)
Majority Bargaining and Reputation  

Alejandro Melo Ponce  (Stony Brook University)
Information Design in Contests  

PULKIT KUMAR NIGAM  (University of South Carolina)
Asymmetric Contests and the Effects of a Cap on Bids  

Haldun Evrenk  (Istanbul Sehir University)
War and Fiscal Centralization  

Aaron Bodoh-Creed  (University of California)
Base-Rate Neglect: Foundations and Implications  

Mehmet Ismail  (King's College London)
Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive  

12:10 - 12:30

Mantas Radzvilas  (Sidney M. Edelstein Center, Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Dynamic Offer Proportional Beliefs in Sequential Bargaining with Uncertain Offer-Relative Values of Outside Options  

Alfonso Montes  (Ecole Polytechnique)
A Purification Result for Games with Endogenous Information Structures  

Chih-Chun Yang  (Academia Sinica)
Rationality and Common Strong Belief of Rationality in Second-price Auction and English Auction  

Liuchun Deng  (Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH))
A Tale of Two Decentralizations: Volatility and Economic Regimes  

Jian Li  (McGill University )
Information order in monotone decision problems under ambiguity  

Alessandro Del Ponte  (Stony Brook University)
Spending Too Little in Hard Times  

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Xavier Venel  (Paris School of Economics and Universite Paris 1)
Uniform Value in Stochastic Games

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Industrial Organization

LH2:Mechanism Design

101:Experimental Economics

102:Learning and Evolution

201:Applications

Chapel: Coalitional Games

15:15 - 15:35

Yong Chao  (University of Louisville)
Nonlinear Pricing under Competition  

Brian Baisa  (Amherst College )
Efficient Ex Post Implementable Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferences  

Heinrich Harald Nax  (ETH Zurich)
Nash Equilibria of Dictator Games: a New Perspective  

Anastas Tenev  (Maastricht University)
Naive Imitation and Partial Cooperation in a Local Public Good Model  

Peter Coughlin  (University of Maryland)
What if a figure skating team event had been held at past Winter Olympic Games?  

Liang Dai  (Shanghai Jiao Tong University and SIIFE)
Organizations and Coordination in a Diverse Population  

15:35 - 15:55

Adriana Gama  (El Colegio de México)
On Cournot's theory of oligopoly with perfect complements  

Yi Chen  (Cornell University)
Dynamic Communication with Commitment  

Duk Gyoo Kim  (University of Mannheim)
Multilateral Bargaining with Proposer Selection Contest  

Soham Rajesh Phade  (UC Berkeley)
Learning in Games with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Preferences  

Miguel Vargas  (CIMAT)
Profit-Sharing and Efficient Time Allocation  

Elena Inarra  (University of the Basque Country)
Rationing rules and stable coalition structures  

15:55 - 16:15

Sang-Ha Yoon  (Stony brook University)
Firm Entry Decline and Market Structure  

Artur Gorokh  (Cornell University)
When Bribes are Harmless: The Power and Limits of Collusion-Resilient Mechanism Design  

Quyen Nguyen  (Utah State University)
Bayesian Persuasion: Evidence from the Laboratory  

Antonio Carlos Mercer  (Pontifical Catholic University of Parana)
Analyzing selfish and altruistic behaviors in an ultimatum game with asymmetric information  

Michael Kramm  (Technical University Dortmund)
Information Design in Multi-Task Contests - Whom to Inform When the Importance of Tasks Is Uncertain  

Dominik Karos  (Maastricht University)
Farsighted Rationality and the Equilibrium Stable Set  

16:15 - 16:35

Ken C. Ho  (University of Washington, Seattle)
Dynamic Price Competition for Supply  

Siyu Ma  (Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya )
Patent Licensing of a Differentiated Product Innovation with a Hotelling- Cournot Setting  

Foteini Tzachrista  (University of South Carolina)
Sequential Contests: Theory and Experimental Evidence  

 

Jan Auerbach  (University of Exeter)
Preordered Service in Contract Enforcement  

Xiao Luo  (National University of Singapore)
Bayesian Coalitional Rationality  

16:35 - 17:00

Coffee Break

17:00 - 17:45

Michal Feldman  (Tel-Aviv University)
Interdependent Values without Single Crossing

 

Tuesday, July 17

9:30 - 10:15

Vasiliki Skreta  (UT Austin and University College London)
Sequentially Rational Mechanism Design

10:15 - 11:00

Jose Rafael Correa  (Universidad de Chile)
Posted Price Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Industrial Organization

LH2:Auctions

102:Bounded Rationality

201:Voting

Chapel: Dynamic Games

11:30 - 11:50

Kyungmin Kim  (University of Miami)
Competitive Advertising and Pricing  

Dan Levin  (The Ohio State University)
Misbehavior in Common-Value Auctions  

Hee Chun Kim  (Korea Information Society Development Institute)
Mixing Propensity and Strategic Decision Making  

Jinhee Jo  (Kyung Hee University)
Why polls can be wrong but still informative  

Philippe Bich  (Paris 1 and Paris School of economics)
On the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in discontinuous perfect information games  

11:50 - 12:10

Joaquin Coleff  (Universidad Nacional de La Plata)
Can Consumer Complaints Reduce Product Reliability? Should We Worry?  

Andre Speit  (University of Bonn)
Common-Value Auctions With an Uncertain Number of Bidders  

Laurent Mathevet  (New York University)
AttentionManagement  

Jamie Tucker-Foltz  (Amherst College)
A Cut-And-Choose Mechanism to Prevent Gerrymandering  

Tarun Sabarwal  (University of Kansas)
Strategic Complements in Two Stage, 2x2 Games  

12:10 - 12:30

Yangguang Huang  (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
Supervisory Efficiency, Collusion, and Contract Design  

David Wettstein  (Ben-Gurion University)
Two-Stage Contests with Preferences over Style  

Jeevant Rampal  (Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad)
Limited Foresight Equilibirum  

 

 

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Renato Paes Leme  (Google Research)
Contextual Search via Intrinsic Volumes

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Cooperative Games

LH2:Incomplete Information

101:Matching and Search

102:Social and Political Models

201:Applications

Chapel: Other

15:15 - 15:35

Ori Haimanko  (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
Composition Independence in Compound Games: a Characterization of the Banzhaf Power Index and the Banzhaf Value  

Andrew Kosenko  (University of Pittsburgh)
Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information  

Mark Whitmeyer  (University of Texas at Austin)
Information Provision in a Sequential Search Setting  

Pedro Jara-Moroni  (Universidad de Santiago de Chile)
Social Movements in Democratic Regimes  

Itai Agur  (International Monetary Fund)
Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Coordination Among Multiple Equilibria  

Alexey Kushnir  (Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business)
Optimal Income Taxation with Endogenous Prices  

15:35 - 15:55

Satoshi Masuya  (Daito Bunka University)
An Extension of the Shapley Value for Partially Defined Cooperative Games  

Miklos Pinter  (University of Pécs)
Which belief hierarchies are important?  

Ashwin Kambhampati  (University of Pennsylvania)
Matching to Produce Information  

Kirill Rivkin  
Historical dynamics and country size in geopolitical model.  

Cheng-Kuang Wu  (Zhejiang Industry & Trade Vocational College, China)
A Game Theory Approach for Assessing Threat Value and Deploying MAS Resources against Multiple Coordinated Attacks  

Sonali Sen Gupta  (Lancaster University)
Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and Public Good Provision  

15:55 - 16:15

Satoshi Nakada  (Tokyo University of Science)
Generalized Potentials, Value, and Core  

Daehong Min  (Korea Information Society Development Institute (KISDI))
Screening for Experiments  

Miho Maylyn Hong  (Yonsei University)
Core and Top Trading Cycles in a Market with Indivisible Goods and Externalities  

Manuela Mischitelli  (La Sapienza University of Rome)
Unconventional policies in the EMU: a policy game approach  

Haiyun (Kevin) Chen  (Grinnell College)
Cooperation, Competition and Linguistic Diversity  

Youngseok Park  (Colby College)
The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict: Comment  

16:15 - 16:35

Nobusumi Sagara  (Hosei University)
Coalitional Preferences in Large Economies with an Infinite-Dimensional Commodity Spaces  

Rafael Veiel  (Ecole Polytechnique )
Strategic Type Spaces  

Ming Yang  (Duke University)
The Coordination of Intermediation  

Yiman Sun  (University of Texas at Austin)
A Dynamic Model of Censorship  

Tadashi Hashimoto  (Yeshiva University)
Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover  

Zhe Yang  (University of Alabama)
Free Riders and Public Good Provision in Morgan's Lottery  

16:35 - 17:00

Coffee Break

17:00 - 17:45

Federico Echenique  (California Institute of Technology)
Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with endowments

 

Wednesday, July 18

9:30 - 10:15

Alexander Wolitzky  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games

10:15 - 11:00

Ozan Candogan  (The University of Chicago)
Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Industrial Organization

LH2:Incomplete Information

101:Experimental Economics

102:Social Choice

201:Information and Networks

Chapel: Solution Concepts

11:30 - 11:50

Benjamin Casner  (The Ohio State University)
Going the Last Mile: Access Regulation and Vertical Integration  

Raghul Srinivasan Venkatesh  (Aix-Marseille University)
Communication and Commitment with Resource Constraints  

Flora Li  (Virginia Tech)
Promises and Punishment  

Dinko Dimitrov  (Saarland University)
Fair Competition Design  

Marcos Fernandes  (Stony Brook University)
Categorization in Social Networks and the Folly of Crowds  

Oscar Volij  (Ben Gurion University and Iowa State University)
The Measurement of Income Segregation  

11:50 - 12:10

Estefania Vergara  (Stony Brook University)
Disappearance of the multiple equilibria problem in entry models  

Meichen Chen  (Washington University in St. Louis)
Global Games with Interim Information Acquisition  

Talbot M Andrews  (Stony Brook University)
High Risk and High Reward Decision-Making for Climate Change Mitigation  

ZEHRA VALENCIA  (University of South Carolina)
New Type of Contests  

Tatiana Mayskaya  (Higher School of Economics)
Cognitive Hierarchical Model in Networks  

Helene Mass  (Centre for European Economic Research)
Strategies under distributional and strategic uncertainty  

12:10 - 12:30

Mian Farrukh Raza  (Kansas State University)
Dumping on Free Trade, Optimal Antidumping Duties, and Price Undertakings: Welfare Implications in a Two-Market Equilibrium Analysis  

Francesc Dilme  (University of Bonn)
Skewed Communication  

 

David Rietzke  (Lancaster University)
Robust Comparative Statics in Contests  

Norma Olaizola  (University of the Basque Country)
Effiency in a generalized connections model  

Asha Sadanand  (University of Guelph)
Ideal Reactive Equilibrium  

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Anna Karlin  (University of Washington)
Simple Pricing Schemes for Consumers with Evolving Values

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Contracts

LH2:Mechanism Design

101:Signalling

102:Learning and Evolution

201:Repeated Games

Chapel: Other

15:15 - 15:35

Alexander Rodivilov  (School of Business, Stevens Institute of Technology)
Learning from Failures  

Toomas Hinnosaar  (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
Robust pricing with refunds  

Aditya Aradhye  (Maastricht University)
Sender-receiver stopping games with finite horizon  

 

Kimmo Berg  (Aalto University School of Science)
Computing all the mixed-strategy equilibria in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma  

Itay Kavaler  (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology)
ON COMPARISON OF EXPERTS  

15:35 - 15:55

Eloisa Campioni  (University of Rome Tor Vergata)
On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition  

Xiaosheng Mu  (Harvard University)
Informational Robustness in Intertemporal Pricing  

Calvin Thomas Cochran  (University of California-Irvine)
Hierarchical Models for the Evolution of Compositional Language  

Brian Swenson  (Carnegie Mellon University)
On best-response dynamics in potential games  

Ghislain Herman Demeze Jouatsa  (University of Bielefeld)
A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games  

Marco Lambrecht  (University of Heidelberg)
Measuring skill and chance in games  

15:55 - 16:15

Byeong-Hak Choe  (University of Wyoming)
Climate Finance under Conflicts and Renegotiations: A Dynamic Contract Approach  

Kai Hao Yang  (University of Chicago)
Selling Advertisement: Non-linear Pricing on Information Structure  

Nicolas Riquelme  (University of Rochester)
Competing Auctions with Informed Sellers  

Weijie Zhong  (Columbia University)
Time preference and dynamic learning  

Lars Peter Metzger  (Dortmund University)
Repeated Contests With Draws  

David Lagziel  (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
Reputation and Cycles  

16:15 - 16:35

 

Omer Tamuz  (California Institute of Technology)
Stochastic Dominance Under Independent Noise  

Alexandros Rigos  (Lund University)
Broken Tyres and Flat Engines: Signalling Expertise in Markets for Credence Goods  

Zhijian Wang  (Zhejiang University)
Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from Experimental Economics  

Anna Zseleva  (Higher School of Economics)
On the equivalence of mixed and behavior strategies in finitely additive decision problems  

Sneha Bakshi  
Monopoly Pricing in Meta-Cycles  

16:35 - 17:00

Coffee Break

17:00 - 17:45

Yaron Azrieli  (Ohio State University)
Monitoring Experts

18:30 - 22:00

Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

 

Thursday, July 19

9:30 - 10:15

Omer Tamuz  (California Institute of Technology)
Social Learning Equilibria

10:15 - 11:00

Ben Golub  (Harvard University)
Social Learning in a Dynamic Environment

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Industrial Organization

LH2:Incomplete Information

101:Auctions

102:Social and Political Models

201:Information and Networks

Chapel: Dynamic Games

11:30 - 11:50

Ting Liu  (Stony Brook University)
Optimal Licensing in Markets with Quality Innovation  

David Ruiz  (University of Minnesota)
Critical Types in Dynamic Games  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (The University of Massachusetts)
On the Virtue of Being Regular and Predictable: A Structural Analysis of the Primary Dealer System in the United States Treasury Auctions  

Noam Tanner  (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston)
Screening Bias with Discretion  

Simon Schopohl  (Saint-Louis University - Brussels and CORE, University of Louvain)
Who matters in coordination problems on networks?  

Svetlana Boyarchenko  (University of Texas, Austin)
Strategic experimentation with humped bandits  

11:50 - 12:10

Hodaya Lampert  (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
Fees versus Royalties: The Case of a Product Improvement  

Svetlana Kosterina  (Princeton university)
Persuasion with Unknown Beliefs  

Alexander Heczko  (RWTH Aachen University)
The Performance of Core-Selecting Auctions: An Experiment  

Friederike Bloennigen  (TU Dortmund)
Club Good Provision and Nested Contests  

Egor Starkov  (Northwestern University)
Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship  

Senran Lin  (University of Arizona)
Regret Games  

12:10 - 12:30

Anzhou Zhang  (Stony Brook University)
R&D Race, Patent Licensing and the Social Value of Innovation  

Paul Muench  (US Army)
Game of Timing with Detection Uncertainty  

George Loginov  (UW Madison )
Ordinal Imitative Dynamics  

 

Basak Horowitz  (Stony Brook University)
A Strategic Model of Network Formation with Endogenous Link Strength  

Jin Hyuk Choi  (Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology)
To disconnect or not: a cybersecurity game  

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

14:00 - 14:45

Leeat Yariv  (Princeton University)
Testing the Waters: Behavior across Participant Pools

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

LH2:Mechanism Design

101:Matching and Search

102:Learning and Evolution

201:Repeated Games

Chapel: Solution Concepts

15:15 - 15:35

Constantine Sorokin  (NRU Higher School of Economics)
Pure Information Design in Classical Auctions  

Ryan Tierney  (University of Southern Denmark)
Incentives in a Job-market Clearinghouse  

Eeva Mauring  (University of Vienna)
Informational Cycles in Search Markets  

Arthur Dolgopolov  (George Mason University)
Revealed Markov Strategies  

Makoto Hagiwara  (Tokyo Institute of Technology)
Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex Post Equilibria with Private Values  

15:35 - 15:55

Alex Smolin  (University of Bonn)
Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes  

Ran Shorrer  (Penn State University)
Need vs. Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets  

Arjada Bardhi  (Northwestern University / Duke University)
Optimal Discovery and Influence Through Selective Sampling  

Lei Gao  (Shandong University, China)
Equilibrium Characterization of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring  

Xinyang Wang  (Yale University)
Second Order Secret Love  

15:55 - 16:15

 

Anna Bykhovskaya  (Yale University)
Stability in matching markets with peer effects  

Ignacio Monzon  (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
Observational Learning in Large Anonymous Games  

Ayca Ozdogan  (TOBB University of Economics and Technology)
When is it possible to prevent deception by reputation?  

Nikhil Addleman  (University of California Irvine)
Equilibrium Miscoordination in Coordination Games Played on Metric Spaces  

16:15 - 16:35

 

 

Ayan Bhattacharya  (City University of New York, Baruch College)
On Algorithms That Approach Correlated Equilibrium  

Geyu Yang  (Washington University in St Louis)
Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring  

 

16:35 - 17:00

Coffee Break

17:00 - 17:45

Simone Cerreia Vioglio  (Universita Bocconi)
Absolute and Relative Ambiguity Aversion: A Preferential Approach

 

Friday, July 20

 

LH1:Industrial Organization

LH2:Mechanism Design

101:Experimental Economics

102:Social and Political Models

Chapel: Stochastic Games

9:30 - 9:50

Ichiro Obara  (University of California, Los Angeles)
Controlling Cultivation of Taste  

Jan Knoepfle  (University of Bonn)
Costly Verification and Correlated Information  

Alexander Matros  (University of South Carolina)
Experimental Test of “Better than Average” Effect and Excess Entry.  

Rohit Parikh  (City University of New York)
Campaigning Strategies  

Eugene Feinberg  (Stony Brook University)
Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Perfect Information, Unbounded Payoffs and Weakly Continuous Transition Probabilities  

9:50 - 10:10

Nikhil Vellodi  (New York University)
Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry  

Vi Thi Lan Cao  (University of Rochester)
Constrained-efficient profit division in a dynamic partnership  

Shane Auerbach  (University of Wisconsin)
Myopia in dynamic spatial games  

Laura Karpuska  (Stony Brook University)
Political Turnover and Property Rights  

Jasmine Maes  (Maastricht University)
Subgame maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with tolerance levels  

10:10 - 10:30

Bart Taub  (University of Glasgow)
Self-enforcement via strategic investment  

James F. Ring  (Fair Outcomes, Inc.)
A Simple System for Managing & Resolving Monetary Claims  

Zahra Gambarova  (University of Leicester)
Experimental Evidence on the Use of Information in K-beauty Contest Game  

Anne Marie Go  (University of Bath)
Vying for Support: Lobbying a Legislator with Uncertain Preferences  

Gijs Schoenmakers  (Maastricht University)
Dynamic Matrix Games  

10:30 - 10:50

Atara Oliver  (Rice University)
Online News and Editorial Standards  

 

 

 

Xiao Zhou  (Boston University)
Learning in Parrondo’s Paradox  

10:50 - 11:20

Coffee Break

11:20 - 12:05

Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi  (Universita degli Studi di Milano)
Dynamic Pricing with Finitely Many Unknown Valuations

 

Adjourn

 

Back