Abstracts 
Paris 1 Tuesday, July 18, 11:15, Session F qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise Abstract We view political activity as an interaction between forces seeking to achieve a political agenda. The viability of a situation depends on the compatibility of such agendas. However even in a conflictual situation a compromise may be possible. Mathematically a political structure is modeled as a simplicial complex and a viable configuration as a simplex. A represented compromise is a viable configuration obtained by the withdrawal of some agents in favor of some friendly representatives. A delegated compromise is a sophisticated version of a compromise obtained by the iteration of the withdrawal process. Existence of such solutions depend on the discrete topology of the simplicial complex. In particular we prove that the existence of a delegated compromise is equivalent to the strong contractibility of the simplicial complex. 
Sharif University How to Play With an Unreliable Biased Coin? Abstract In this talk, I revisit the problem of playing games with bounded entropy, Gossner and Viellie (2002), Neyman and Okada (2000). In the first part of the talk, I comment on the computational aspects of the problem and give some explicit bounds; the key tool here is an inequality on the set of distributions that secure a given payoff. In the second part of my talk, I give a high level and simplified overview of the information spectrum method in information theory and show that this method can be used to simplify the proof of Gossner and Vieille (which is based on the method of types). Finally, I assume the possibility of a partial "leakage" of the results of a player's coin flips to the other party, and solve the problem again. 
The University of Iowa Thursday, July 20, 16:10, Session A Nash equilibrium in games with strategic quasicomplementarities [pdf] (joint work with Luciano De Castro) Abstract This paper develops a new existence result for purestrategy Nash equilibrium. For a twoplayer game with scalar action sets, existence entails that one reaction curve be increasing and continuous and the other quasiincreasing (i.e, not have any downward jumps). The latter property amounts to strategic quasicomplementarities. The paper provides a number of ancillary results of independent interest, including sufficient conditions for a quasiincreasing argmax (or nonmonotone comparative statics), and new sufficient conditions for uniqueness of fixed points. For maximal accessibility of the results, the main results are presented in a Euclidean setting. We argue that all these results have broad and elementary applicability by providing simple illustrations with commonly used models in economic dynamics and industrial organization. 
Japan Fair Trade Commission Monday, July 17, 11:15, Session F Intellectual Property Rights and R&D Coordination [pdf] (joint work with Tina Kao)

IMPA and FGV/RJ Bankruptcy Equilibrium: Efficiency and Contagion

University of Leicester Tuesday, July 18, 11:35, Session C Endogenous information acquisition in an investment trading game [pdf] Abstract
In an investment trading game where the profitability of the new investment (the fundamental) is a random variable, entrepreneurs’ higherorder beliefs about the future asset price of the realized investment enter in their investment decisions. On the other hand, the financial market uses the aggregate investment as a signal of the underlying fundamental. If agents have dispersed information, endogenous strategic complementarity in actions emerges owing to the information spillover and generates inefficiency in the economy. We introduce endogenous information acquisition and study what information is acquired and how it affects the equilibrium outcome. 
Technion Wednesday, July 19, 15:30, Session C Bayesian learning in markets with common value [pdf] (joint work with Moran Koren Rann Smordinsky) Abstract
Two firms produce substitute goods with unknown quality. At each 
University of Melbourne Friday, July 21, 11:55, Session A Strategic "Mistakes": Implications for Market Design Research [pdf] (joint work with YeonKoo Che (Columbia), Yinghua He (Rice)) Abstract A field data from Australian college admissions shows that a nonnegligible fraction of applicants choose strategies (or rankordered lists) that are unambiguously dominated, but that the majority of these "mistakes" are payoff irrelevant. In keeping with this result, we develop a theory suggesting that the presence of such mistakes jeopardizes the identification method based on truthful reporting hypothesis under a (seemingly) strategyproof mechanism, but leaves the method based on weaker stability condition relatively unscathed. Monte Carlo simulation further confirms this point and quantifies the differences between these two methods in the structural estimation of preference parameters and in a hypothetical counterfactual analysis. 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem My Yair

Hebrew University of Jerusalem My Pradeep

NYU Tuesday, July 18, 15:50, Session Communication in Global Games of Regime Change Abstract Coordination games with strategic complementarities are used to model variety of environments including speculative currency attacks, debt crisis, selffulfilling bank runs and political protests. Interaction amongst involved parties and various kinds of information sharing could be a natural aspect of the real world. I study the effects of different communication protocols in these settings. This is a particularly interesting direction to examine, since replacing public information about payoffs with private information—as in global games—leads to a unique equilibrium selection (Carlsson and Van Damme (1993)). However, for a range of parameters the global games selects unique but an inefficient equilibrium. On the other hand, communication and information sharing forces may lead to more frequent payoffdominant equilibrium selection resulting in higher overall efficiency. I examine the consequences of communication both theoretically and experimentally. 
Technion Tuesday, July 18, 11:55, Session B Forecast Aggregation [pdf] (joint work with Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky) Abstract
Bayesian experts with a common prior that are exposed to different evidence possibly make contradicting probabilistic forecasts. 
Columbia Thursday, July 20, 12:15, Session E I Don't Know [pdf] (joint work with Andrew Little) Abstract
What should we infer when an expert says “I don’t know" — that the question is difficult or that the expert is unqualified? If the latter, unqualified (and qualified but uninformed) experts will be tempted to mask their uncertainty. We introduce a principal expert model with heterogeneity in both the competence of experts and the difficulty of the questions they are asked. Our main results examine how different incentives and information structures affect the possibility of admitting uncertainty. When ex perts care only about appearing competent, admission of uncertainty requires that the decisionmaker has some chance of learning both whether the expert was correct or not ("state validation") and whether the problem at hand was hard ("difficulty validation"). When experts also have a small preference for good decisions, state validation alone can never include the admission of uncertainty, while difficulty validation ensures that at least the competent but uninformed experts say “I don’t know”. The model matches anecdotal evidence about when admitting uncertainty is feasible and offers new perspectives on the management of experts. 
Rhodes College Monday, July 17, 15:50, Session D Patent Licensing and Technological Catchup in an Asymmetric Duopoly [pdf] Abstract We consider a model in which an outside inventor is the patentee of a costreducing technology that can be licensed to asymmetric Cournot duopolists. As in most of the literature, we model the interaction between the inventor and the firms as a game in extensive form. We show that this game has no subgameperfect equilibrium in which the least efficient duopolist becomes the sole licensee. Thus, in equilibrium, the technological distance between the firms, as measured by the difference in their costs, either increases or remains the same. 
Kennesaw State University Monday, July 17, 15:50, Session E A Model of a Multilateral Proxy War with Spillovers [pdf] (joint work with Aniruddha Bagchi, Joao Ricardo Faria and Timothy Mathews) Abstract Motivated by the civil war in Syria, this paper models a proxy war with three sponsors and three combatants as a dynamic game. Sponsors are leaders that provide resources to combatants. Sponsors 1 and 2 have strong aversion to sponsor 3's proxy, but not against each other. This is modeled as a spillover effect between 1 and 2. We identify and characterize three pure strategy equilibria. It is shown that the comparative statics of the spillover effect varies from one equilibrium to another. Two mixed strategy equilibria are also studied. In the first, sponsor 3 spends less than others, and his participation probability is positively related to the cost of sponsorship. In the second, sponsor 3 spends the same amount as others, but his participation is negatively related to this cost. Finally, we explain why tacit coordination between sponsors 1 and 2 is better for them than forming an alliance. 
Amherst College Monday, July 17, 11:35, Session A Efficient Multiunit Auctions for Normal Goods [pdf] Abstract
I study efficient multiunit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and nonquasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. Instead of assuming that bidders have quasilinear preferences, I assume that bidders have positive wealth effects. This nests cases where bidders are risk averse, face financial constraints, or have budgets. 
Laboratoire d'Econometrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique The Domination Paradox and a New Characterization of Mayority Judgement

Yale University Tuesday, July 18, 15:30, Session F Dynamic Influence: Persuasion and Incentives [pdf] Abstract I study a general model of dynamic information provision in a longrun relationship. The state of nature follows an exogenous Markov chain. A principal with commitment power observes the state realizations and sends signals to an agent in order to influence his actions, which are observed. I solve for the principal's value in the patient limit. Then I characterize when the principal can achieve her optimal value through persuasion alone, that is, without intertemporal incentives. Finally, I show that in the binary case, a simple strategy of backloading information is optimal. The model is applied to repeated lobbying of a politician. 
University of Alicante Friday, July 21, 11:35, Session E Guessing games in networks (joint work with Giovanni Ponti, and Marc Vorsatz )

Universitat Jaume I de Castellón (Spain) Thursday, July 20, 11:55, Session D Entry under an InformationGathering Monopoly [pdf] Abstract The effects of informationgathering activities on an entry model with asymmetric information are analyzed. The baseline game is a classical entry game where an incumbent monopoly faces potential entry by one firm without knowing with certainty whether this potential entrant is weak or strong. If the entrant decides to enter, the incumbent must compete with him and decide whether to accommodate or to fight. The paper extends this entry game and considers that the monopoly has access to an Intelligence System (IS) that generates a noisy signal about the entrant\'s type. We focus on the analysis of the effectiveness of monopoly’s action of credibly informing the entrant about her informationgathering activities as an entry deterrence strategy. The results suggest that such an action is effective regardless the precision of the IS only for relatively low entrant’s payoff from competing with the incumbent. For higher entrant’s payoffs, the effectiveness of this action requires a considerable accurate IS. 
University Paris Dauphine Monday, July 17, 16:10, Session A Constant payoff in zerosum stochastic games (joint work with Bruno Ziliotto) Abstract In any oneshot zerosum game, the payoff induced by a couple of optimal strategies is equal to the value of the game. For dynamic games, a natural refinement is that the average payoff, after any fraction of the game, is equal to the value of the game. In this paper we prove that this is the case for patient players in any finite zerosum stochastic games, as conjectured by Sorin, Venel and Vigeral 2010. 
Indian School of Business Tuesday, July 18, 12:15, Session C Diffusing Coordination Risk [pdf] (joint work with Zhen Zhou ) Abstract Agents face strategic uncertainty in a coordination problem that is akin to debt rollover or currency attacks. We model this as a global game of regime change. A principal wants her preferred regime (PPR) to succeed. She faces the coordination risk that a viable PPR may fail due to the strategic uncertainty. The principal diffuses this coordination risk by making a finite partition of the mass of agents. She abandons her preferred regime if it is no longer viable. We show that with a sufficiently diffused policy, the risk that agents may attack the PPR unravels from the end. 
Alicante University Tuesday, July 18, 11:15, Session D Oligopolistic Equilibrium and Financial Constraints [pdf] (joint work with Luis C. Corchón, Yosuke Yasuda) Abstract We model a dynamic duopoly in which firms can potentially drive their rivals from the market (bankrupt them). A consequence is that, for some range of parameters, the static Cournot equilibrium outcome cannot be sustained in an infinitely dynamic setting. In those cases, there is a Markov perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies in which one firm will eventually be driven from the market with probability one. We consider the consequences of potentially bankruptcy on the set of outcomes supportable via tacit collusion, showing the set can be different than in the absence of bankruptcy. We show that total payoff in the maximum collusive outcome is greater under bankruptcy consideration than in the absence of bankruptcy. 
Yale University Learning About Pricing Through Interviews

Paris 1 and Paris School of economics Thursday, July 20, 15:30, Session A A new refinement of Nash equilibrium concept in discontinuous games [pdf] Abstract
We introduce the new concept of prudent equilibrium to model strategic uncertainty, and prove it exists in large classes of discontinuous games. When the game is betterreply secure, we show that prudent equilibrium refines Nash equilibrium. In contrast with the current literature, we don't use probabilities to model players' strategies and 
Paris School of Economics Wednesday, July 19, 15:30, Session Bundling in simple games [pdf] (joint work with Kalyan Chatterjee) Abstract
We extend the BaronFerejohn bargaining protocol to model negotiations over multiple issues. The power structure is represented by simple games, with different winning coalitions over the different issues. We prove existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of efficient equilibria where all players make joint offers on the two issues. We also provide a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium where players' limit equilibrium payoffs in the bargaining game are equal to the limit equilibrium payoffs when players negotiate separately on the two issues. This last condition is satisfied whenever one of the two simple games admits veto players. 
U. of California, Berkeley Thursday, July 20, 11:55, Session E Costless Signaling with Costly Signals [pdf] (joint work with B.D. Bernheim) Abstract We study signaling environments with two common features: first, completeinformation bliss points are heterogeneous across different types of sender; second, many choices are observed by the receiver. We demonstrate under relatively weak conditions that the incompleteinformation signaling model has a fully separating equilibrium where the utility in the signaling equilibrium approaches that obtained in an analogous completeinformation model as the number of signals increases. In other words, as the number of signals grows, the ratio of the cost of signaling to the benefit approaches 0. As an application, our main result suggests that greater transparency of decision making can reduce or eliminate signaling costs. 
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley Tuesday, July 18, 11:35, Session E Collusion in Conflicts with Noise [pdf] (joint work with Shane Sanders and Nicholas Shunda) Abstract We analyze the determinants of collusion in a conflict environment with noise in the contest success function. We first consider an infinitely repeated contest with noise, and find that sustaining collusion via Nash reversion strategies is easier the more noise there is, more difficult the larger is the contest's prize value, and can be either easier or more difficult the more players there are involved in the contest. We then consider the prospect of parties allying with one another against another party in the conflict, and find that the amount of noise may make the alliance more or less successful. These results help to further explain why collusive efforts among rivals or allies are so fragile in conflicts, and reveal some of the technical details that determine their success. 
University of Texas, Austin Friday, July 21, 11:15, Session F Strategic Experimentation with Erlang Bandits [pdf] Abstract Risks related to events that arrive randomly play important role in many real life decisions, and models of learning and experimentation based on twoarmed Poisson bandits addressed several important aspects related to strategic and motivational learning in cases when events arrive at jump times of the standard Poisson process. At the same time, these models remain mostly abstract theoretical models with few direct economic applications. We suggest a new class of models of strategic experimentation which are almost as tractable as exponential models, but incorporate such realistic features as dependence of the expected rate of news arrival on the time elapsed since the start of an experiment and judgement about the quality of a ``risky" arm based on evidence of a series of trials as opposed to a single evidence of success or failure as in exponential models with conclusive experiments. We demonstrate that, unlike in the exponential models, players may stop experimentation before the first failure happens. Moreover, ceteris paribus, experimentation in a model with breakthroughs may last longer than experimentation in the corresponding model with failures. 
New York University Wednesday, July 19, 11:15, Session E Stabilizing Unstable Outcomes in Prediction Games [pdf] (joint work with D. Marc Kilgour) Abstract Assume in a 2person game that one player, Predictor (P), does not have a dominant strategy but can predict with probability p > 1/2 the strategy choice of an opponent, Predictee (Q). Q chooses a strategy that maximizes her expected payoff, given that she knows p—but not P’s prediction—and that P will act according to his prediction. In all 2 x 2 strict ordinal games in which there is a unique Paretoinferior Nash equilibrium (Class I) or no purestrategy equilibrium (Class II), and which also has a Paretooptimal nonNash “cooperative outcome,” P can induce this outcome if p is sufficiently high. This scenario helps to explain the observed outcomes of a Class I game modeling the 1962 Cuban missile crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a Class II game modeling the 2015 conflict between Iran and Israel over Iran’s possible development of nuclear weapons. 
The University of California, Santa Barbara Tuesday, July 18, 15:50, Session A Fundamental Limits of LocallyComputed Incentives in Network Routing [pdf] (joint work with Philip N. Brown, Jason R. Marden) Abstract We ask if it is possible to positively influence social behavior with no risk of unintentionally incentivizing pathological behavior. In network routing problems, if network traffic is composed of many individual agents (such as drivers in a city’s road network), it is known that selfinterested behavior among the agents can lead to suboptimal network congestion. To mitigate this, a system planner may charge monetary tolls for the use of network links in an effort to incentivize lowcongestion routing choices by the users. We study situations in which these tolls are computed locally on each edge, as in the classical case of marginalcost taxation, but that the users' sensitivity to tolls is not known. We seek locallycomputed tolls that are guaranteed not to incentivize worse network routing than in the uninfluenced case. Our results are twofold: first, we give a full characterization of all nonperverse locallycomputed tolls for parallel networks with arbitrary convex delay functions, and show that they are all a generalized version of traditional marginalcost tolls. Second, we exhibit a type of pathological network in which all locallycomputed tolling functions can cause perverse incentives for heterogeneous pricesensitive user populations. That is, in general networks, the only locallycomputed tolling functions that do not incentivize pathological behavior on some network are effectively zero tolls. Finally, we show that our results have interesting implications for the theory of altruistic behavior. 
New York University Monday, July 17, 11:35, Session F Standing on the Shoulders of Dwarfs: Dominant Firms and Innovation Incentives [pdf]

University of Rome Tor Vergata Wednesday, July 19, 15:50, Session A Competing Mechanisms: Communication and Robustness [pdf] (joint work with Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser) Abstract We study competing mechanism games with principals simultaneously designing contracts to deal with agents. Following Epstein and Peters (1999), the traditional approach to characterize equilibrium mechanisms focuses on increasing the complexity of the agents' message spaces to incorporate all the relevant market information generated by the competing principals. Principals, instead, could not send any signal to agents. Along the lines of Myerson (1982), we extend the traditional approach to allow for principals' communication. We focus on complete information settings and show by means of three examples that the restriction to onesided communication mechanisms involves a loss of generality. 
University of Rochester Tuesday, July 18, 15:50, Session B Information Spillover in a Bayesian Repeated Setting: Lack of Information on two sides [pdf] Abstract In this paper we consider an infinitely repeated threeplayer Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zerosum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. In this game, under a correlated prior, the informed player faces the problem of how to optimally disclose information among the two other uninformed players in order to maximize his long term average payoffs. The objective is to understand the effects of the “information spillover” from one game to the other in the Nashequilibrium payoff set of the informed player. The main results are a sufficient condition under which the “best possible payoff” can always be obtained by the informed player, and an example under which the “best possible payoff” is not attainable. 
Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) Wednesday, July 19, 15:50, Session Public Good Agreements under the Weakestlink Technology [pdf] (joint work with Alejandro Caparros and Michael Finus) Abstract We analyze the formation of public good agreements under the weakestlink technology. Migration policies, money laundering measures, and biodiversity conservation are prime examples of this technology. Whereas for symmetric players, policy coordination is not necessary, for asymmetric players cooperation matters but fails, in the absence of transfers. In contrast, with a transfer scheme, asymmetry may not be an obstacle but an asset for cooperation, with even the grand coalition being stable. We characterize various types and degrees of asymmetry and relate them to the stability of agreements and associated gains from cooperation. Using the FisherPearson coefficient of skewness, we analyze the relationship between stability and the skewness of the distribution of autarky values. Skewness and stability increase together for moderately skewed distributions, whether positively or negatively skewed. The same is true in well defined cases for strongly skewed distributions. The model is based on the standard coalition formation game, although our analysis is more general than existing analyses for the summation technology. 
The Ohio State University Wednesday, July 19, 11:35, Session D Content streaming as a 3 sided market [pdf] Abstract Typical representations of media markets paint the media creators as a platform which uses media to bring consumers and advertisers together. Many online streaming platforms like YouTube or Twitch.tv do not produce their own content, but instead rely on 3rd parties to upload videos to their platform in exchange for a share of the revenue they bring in. I explore the implications of adding a third side to this market and the effects of introducing a premium subscription that allows consumers to avoid ads. I find that adding this subscription increases the provision of niche content but may reduce the welfare of consumers who enjoy content that is created without it due to a higher advertising level and concomitant high subscription price. The platform, content creators, and consumers with high nuisance costs or on newly served content markets are better off, but consumers with low nuisance costs are worse off. The impact on total welfare is ambiguous. 
CUNY Thursday, July 20, 11:35, Session B Dynamics of Some Iterated Games of Cooperation [pdf] (joint work with Haripriya Chakraborty, Rohit Parikh) Abstract
The dynamics of iterated games have been widely studied by game theorists to examine strategic cooperation. In this paper, we examine the dynamics of iterated games of Prisoner’s Dilemma, StagHunt, and some other games that might be useful in modeling social contracts. We use computer simulations to investigate the relative success of various strategies in each case. 
Yeshiva University Tuesday, July 18, 12:15, Session F Expert Captured Democracies (joint work with Parikshit Ghosh, and Jaideep Roy.)

University of South Carolina Tuesday, July 18, 16:10, Session Experimental Investigation on Competing Local Public Good Provision Mechanisms [pdf] (joint work with Yue Liu, Alexander Matros) Abstract Compared to voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), lottery usually generates a higher level of public good provision, which makes it a better choice when there’s only one public good provider. Does lottery still outweigh VCM for local public good providers competing for the same pool of participants? This study provides the first experimental evidence to answer this question. The experiment design is new in that a group of participants can choose between two competing mechanisms before they make public good contributions. Experiment results highly support the theoretical predictions. The main implication of this study is: (1) if two local public good providers compete for the same pool of participants, the richer provider has a dominant strategy to choose lottery; (2) there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which the best reply for the poor provider is to choose VCM. In addition, with data collected in the experiment, our study also contributes to a wide range of literature in public good provision. 
California State Univ., Long Beach Tuesday, July 18, 11:55, Session D stratigic partial outsourcing in the presence of bottleneck components [pdf] (joint work with YingJu Chen) Abstract We study the sourcing decision of a manufacturer for an intermediate good, with multiple sources available under different efficiency levels, in choosing between sole sourcing and multisourcing. In our model, the manufacturer can produce inhouse or outsourcing the intermediate good, and inhouse production is more efficient. There is no demand uncertainty or exante capacity constraint with inhouse production. We find that the manufacturer may establish only limited inhouse capacity to create expost capacity constraint, and eventually outsource to less efficient external providers. Such partial outsourcing is purely strategic and is due to the existence of bottleneck components, with which the manufacturer solely relies on key suppliers with great market power. Partial outsourcing enables the manufacturer to mitigate the pricing power of key suppliers, and is optimal to the manufacturer so long as the associated efficiency loss is not too pronounced. Moreover, an increase in outsourcing cost may lead the manufacturer to outsource a larger proportion and may boost the manufacturer's profitable. 
Stony Brook University The Query Complexity of Bayesian Auctions.

Stony Brook University Monday, July 17, 12:15, Session An Interactive AgentBased Model Abstract
We develop and examine a simple heterogeneous agent model, where the distribution of returns generated from the model have stylized facts in financial markets, such as fat tails and volatility clustering. Our results indicate that the risk tolerance of fundamentalists and the relative funding rate of positivefeedback traders versus fundamentalists are key factors determining the path of price fluctuations. Fundamentalists are more able to dominate the market when they are more willing than positivefeedback traders to take risks. In addition, more crises occur as positivefeedback traders face higher funding costs compared to fundamentalists. Our model suggests that fundamentalists cause heavy tails, and positivefeedback traders cause the formation of speculative bubbles. 
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Monday, July 17, 15:50, Session B On the Probabilistic Transmission of Continuous Cultural Traits [pdf] (joint work with Jiabin Wu) Abstract This paper proposes a framework that generalizes the discrete cultural transmission model of Bisin and Verdier (2001) to a continuous trait setting. We define the cultural distance between two agents as the distance of their traits in the trait space, and model an agent's cultural intolerance towards another agent as an increasing function of their cultural distance. This captures people's general tendencies of evaluating culturally more distant people with stronger biases. The resulting cultural evolutionary dynamic can be viewed as a continuous imitative dynamic (as studied in Cheung (2016)) in a population game in which a player's payoff is equal to the aggregate cultural intolerance he has towards other agents. We use cultural intolerance to define cultural substitutability in the continuous trait setting. We find that as in Bisin and Verdier (2001), cultural substitutability is the key to cultural heterogeneity. Furthermore, the curvature of the cultural intolerance function plays an important role in determining the longrun cultural phenomena. In particular, when the cultural intolerance function is convex, only the most extremely polarized state is a stable limit point. 
University of WisconsinMadison Friday, July 21, 13:15, Session E Compromise without Continuity: A Multidimensional Cheap Talk Model [pdf] Abstract As consumers choose among products, schools seek to admit students, firms hire applicants, or political bodies take advice, they often rely on comparative statements provided by a biased sender. I develop a cheap talk model for these situations and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for when communication can be influential and I characterize a natural class of equilibria where the sender is allowed to recommend a fixed number of propositions. While previous literature has relied on the continuity of actions to allow for compromise, I consider a model where actions are binary: salespeople are limited by price maintenance, admissions decisions are binary, etc. I consider the effect of asymmetric sender preferences, a sender favoring one proposition over another. Existing literature shows that, in similar games, a receiver can be made better off when the number of propositions becomes large. However, I show this result depends upon assumptions about receiver preferences and equilibrium selection. The power of commitment is shown to be valuable, as equilibria may be Pareto inefficient. 
Universidad Nacional de La Plata Thursday, July 20, 11:15, Session F Managing Strategic Buyers: Should a Seller Ban Resale? [pdf] (joint work with Juan Beccuti (University of Bern)) Abstract We study the seller's pricing strategy of one good (finite inventory) that can be sold in two bargaining periods (before a deadline) when she faces two strategic buyers with private valuations. In particular, we are interested in comparing the outcomes of this game in two environments: allowing versus forbidding a resale option. Without resale, the seller charges prices high in the first bargaining period to motivate high valuation consumers to buy, but prices are reduced if no buyer expresses their willingness to buy. Compared with this benchmark case, introducing the resale option generates two effects: there is an increase in consumers willingness to buy in the first period, motivating an increase in the price of the first period, but there is an increase in demand priceelasticity of the first period, motivating a decrease in the price of the first period. We show that the second effect dominates for a bunch of reasonable parameters, motivating a reduction in first period price and generating an increase in profits, aggregate consumer surplus, and, thus, in welfare. 
Univeridad Carlos III Monday, July 17, 11:15, Session E Contests with Voting [pdf] (joint work with Carmen Bevia) Abstract
In this paper we study contests that are settled by voting. Firstly, we study 
University of Iowa Wednesday, July 19, 12:15, Session D Intermediaries versus Trolls in Contests for Patents [pdf] Abstract Patents are increasingly perceived as ambiguous property rights, as their boundaries are often illdefined, thereby leading to potential inadvertent infringement and to an explosion in patent litigation. We study the emergence of nonpracticing entities in the market for patents. While patent trolls monetize their patents through the threat of litigation against alleged infringers, intermediaries instead protect their affiliated firms by buying patents that would otherwise fall in trolls’ hands. We develop a model of patent acquisition through a commonvalue auction incorporating both trolls and intermediaries. We find that firms can never win the auction when individually competing against the troll, while the seller’s revenue sharply increases in response to the troll’s participation in the auction. We then introduce an intermediary who, in exchange for an endogenous membership fee, participates in the auction on firms’ behalf by aggregating their bids. While the intermediary’s probability to outbid the troll in the auction is positive, his funding mechanism, as a subscription game, greatly hampers his performance in the auction and undermines the seller’s revenue. 
University of Maryland Wednesday, July 19, 11:55, Session B Using equations from power indices to analyzefigure skating teams [pdf] (joint work with Diana Cheng) Abstract Power indices were originally developed to measure voting power. However, Saari and Sieberg (Games and Economic Behavior 36:241–263, 2001) and Saari (Chaotic elections, American Mathematical Society, Providence, 2001a)) have suggested that the equations from power indices could potentially be used in some sports contexts as a way of evaluating athletes. This paper explores this idea in the context of figure skating. The International Skating Union developed team events in figure skating for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia and for other major competitions. In this paper, we show how the ShapleyShubik and Banzhaf indices can be used to analyze contributions of athletes to their countries' teams in figure skating team events. We illustrate this approach by analyzing the results from the 2014 Winter Olympic Games figure skating team event. We also discuss some ways in which the numbers assigned by the equations from power indices can be used in the figure skating context. 
Universite de Paris 1 Price Dynamics and Repeated games

Cornell University Friday, July 21, 13:35, Session C Network Effects in Information Acquisition [pdf] Abstract This paper studies endogenous information acquisition in network games. Players, connected via commonly known network, are uncertain about state of fundamentals. Before taking actions, they can acquire costly information to reduce this uncertainty. The basic idea is that network effects in action choice induce externalities in information acquisition: players’ information choice depends on neighbors’ information choice, which depends on neighbors’ neighbors’ information choice, and so forth. The analysis shows these externalities can be measured by Bonacich centralities and provide new sources of multiple equilibria. Cost of information is proportional to entropy reduction, as in rational inattention. A representation theorem provides foundation to this functional form in terms of primitive monotonicity properties of cost of information. 
King's College London Electoral Competition and Corruption: Theory and Evidence from India. [pdf] (joint work with F.Afridi and E. Solan) Abstract In developing countries with weak institutions, there is implicitly a large reliance on elections to instil norms of political accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show theoretically and empirically that electoral discipline is a weak instrument for improving accountability. Our theory model predicts that not only does corruption increase with competition under some conditions, but leakages from those components of public programs that citizens do not benefit privately from, are unresponsive to electoral competition. We then test the model's predictions using novel panel data from a unique setting  village level audits of implementation of one of India's largest rural public works program in the state of Andhra Pradesh during 2006 10 following elections to the village council headship in 2006. Our findings largely confirm the theoretical predictions. The results highlight not only that over reliance on the disciplining effects of political competition is misplaced but also emphasize the need for policy interventions that reduce pilferage in the public component of welfare programs, which entail larger welfare losses to citizens in low income democracies 
Saarland University Tuesday, July 18, 16:10, Session E Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems [pdf] (joint work with Dinko Dimitrov, Laura Kasper, Yonjie Yang) Abstract The selection of blocking pairs to be matched plays an important role in the study of mechanisms converting arbitrary matchings into stable ones. We assume that a resolving rule guides the selection and show that two axioms (independence and top optimality) transform such a rule into a gender consistent one. That is, the rule is forced by the axioms to follow a linear order over acceptable pairs which is consistent with the preferences of either all men or all women. As shown by Abeledo and Rothblum (1995), stable matchings can be reached when starting from an arbitrary individually rational matching and iteratively satisfying the pair selected by a gender consistent resolving rule. 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University Friday, July 21, 11:35, Session B Epistemic Foundations of Equilibria under Ambiguity [pdf] (joint work with Jürgen Eichberger) Abstract In this paper, we develop an interactive epistemology perspective justifying strategic ambiguity and various equilibrium concepts for games with nonadditive beliefs. To accommodate strategic ambiguity in games, we introduce an extended version of interactive belief systems in which some types might not know the action they play. Yet, each type knows his theory, i.e., his probability distribution over the entire state space. It is shown that player's beliefs about his opponents' behavior are nonadditive if he considers possible that his opponents are undetermined (i.e., his theory assigns a positive probability to opponents' types who do not know what actions they play). In this framework, we establish epistemic conditions under which beliefs constitute an equilibrium under ambiguity for games with two and more than two players, respectively. Our epistemic conditions for NashEquilibrium appear as a special case and thus generalize the celebrated results of Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). 
Toulouse School of Economics Tuesday, July 18, 16:10, Session F Strategic Experimentation with Asymmetric Information [pdf] Abstract
This paper studies strategic experimentation between two players, with one player initially better informed about the state of nature. They are otherwise symmetric, and observe past experimentation decisions and outcomes. I analyze an equilibrium in which a mutual encouragement effect arises: as the public information becomes discouraging, the informed player's high effort continuously brings in good news, encouraging the uninformed player to experiment; in return, the uninformed player's experimentation pattern yields an increasing reward, encouraging the informed player to experiment. Due to this effect, players' total effort can increase over time, and the uninformed player may grow increasingly optimistic, despite the discouraging public information. Moreover, creating information asymmetry improves ex ante total welfare when the informed player's initial signal is sufficiently precise. 
Courant Institute, NYU Friday, July 21, 13:35, Session A A PDE Approach to Mixed Strategies Prediction with Expert Advice [pdf] (joint work with Robert Kohn) Abstract This work investigates a discrete model problem from online machine learning using methods from PDEs and optimal control. The overall area is `prediction with expert advice'  a framework in which an agent tries to use `expert advice' to invest optimally (for the worst case scenario) against an adversarial market. A discrete time iterative process involves decision making at every step; the goal for mathematical analysis is to understand the optimal decision and its consequences over a long period of time. Our general approach is `numerical analysis in reverse'  interpreting the discrete formulation as a numerical scheme for an appropriate PDE. We prove that the solution to the discrete problem is asymptotically close to the unique solution of the PDE and thus use knowledge of the PDE solution to inform the optimal strategy of the original setup. 
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre Tuesday, July 18, 16:10, Session B Completely Mixed Strategies for Generalized Bimatrix and Switching Controller Stochastic Game [pdf] (joint work with S. K. Neogy, Debasish Ghorui) Abstract
In this paper, we revisit a result by Jurg et al. (Linear Algebra Appl 141:61– 
Stony Brook University Insurance Contracts With Competitive Pooling (joint work with John Geanakoplos)

ETH Zurich Thursday, July 20, 11:55, Session B Groups and scores: the decline of cooperation [pdf] (joint work with Heinrich H. Nax) Abstract
Cooperation between unrelated individuals in socialdilemmatype situations has been a focus of many studies in social and 
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Wednesday, July 19, 11:55, Session E Social Reform as path to political leadership: A dynamic model [pdf] (joint work with Manaswini Bhalla, Kalyan Chatterjee) Abstract
Leader wishes to confront/overthrow the present regime and every period chooses 
The University of Manchester Wednesday, July 19, 15:30, Session B Stationary Distributions of Evolutionary Dynamics  A Spectral Approach [pdf] Abstract
We consider the problem of computing the stationary distribution of stochastic evolution under noisy best response 
Wednesday, July 19, 12:15, Session C Information advantage in common value Tullock contests [pdf] (joint work with A. Aiche, O, Haimanko, D Moreno, A, Sela, B, Shitovitz)

University of Auckland Monday, July 17, 12:15, Session F Incentives to Innovate, R&D, and Market Entry

Stony Brook University Wednesday, July 19, 11:15, Session On the Existence and Continuity of Equilibria for TwoPerson ZeroSum Stochastic Games under Uncertainty [pdf] (joint work with Pavlo O. Kasyanov, Michael Z. Zgurovsky ) Abstract
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of values and solutions for twoperson 
IAST Toulouse Thursday, July 20, 11:15, Session C Price dynamics on a riskaverse market with asymmetric information [pdf] (joint work with Bernard De Meyer) Abstract A market with asymmetric information can be viewed as a repeated exchange game between the informed sector and the uninformed one. In a market with riskneutral agents, De Meyer [2010] proves that the price process should be a particular kind of Brownian martingale called CMMV. This type of dynamics is due to the strategic use of their private information by the informed agents. In the current paper, we consider the more realistic case where agents on the market are riskaverse. This case is much more complex to analyze as it leads to a nonzerosum game. Our main result is that the price process is still a CMMV under a martingale equivalent measure. This paper provides thus a theoretical justification for the use of the CMMV class of dynamics in financial analysis. This class contains as a particular case the Black and Scholes dynamics. 
UW Bothell Thursday, July 20, 12:15, Session A Profiting From Experts’ “Tyranny” in Partnerships [pdf] Abstract
A savvy business partner may be able to contribute more to a partnership. But a savvy partner also has a better grasp on information about market conditions that determine the termination value of the partnership, thus commanding higher rents if the joint venture is dissolved. Hence, having an expert for a business partner may leave one vulnerable to their “expertise tyranny.” This paper presents the optimal mechanism for sourcing a business partner from amongst two potential candidates, an expert and an amateur. The expert’s informational advantage and command of higher information rents makes the optimal auction actually biased in their favor: 
George Mason University Wednesday, July 19, 12:15, Session ON GENERALIZED NASH RATIONALIZATION OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE FUNCTIONS [pdf] (joint work with Mikhail Freer) Abstract This paper analyzes collective outcomes in games from a revealed preference perspective. A collective choice function is rationalizable if there are such “rational” individual preferences, that the observed choices are the only equilibria. We consider a generalized concept of Nash equilibrium, which should be robust to deviation by not only individuals but some exogenously given coalitions as well. The paper provides sufficient conditions as well as necessary conditions for the collective choice function to be rationalizable given some notion of rationality. In addition, we show that the conditions coincide and become a criteria if we relax the definition of equilibrium to the standard definition of Nash. 
Columbia University Monday, July 17, 16:10, Session Noisy Beliefs Equilibrium [pdf] Abstract
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) relaxes the rationality requirement of Nash equilibrium by “adding noise to actions”. We introduce noisy beliefs equilibrium (NBE), which instead relaxes the belief consistency requirement of Nash by “adding noise to beliefs”. In other words, in an NBE of a game, players best respond to their beliefs, and their beliefs are a noisy version of the true distribution of actions. We establish existence and basic properties of general NBE, and show that within the 2x2 games commonly played in the lab, NBE is able to explain the same deviations from Nash as QRE as well as the fact of high dispersion in elicited beliefs. We also show that unlike QRE, NBE predictions are invariant to changes in the payoﬀ magnitude of games, which is consistent with experimental evidence. Hence, NBE performs just as well as QRE insample and much better outofsample across these games. We develop a oneparameter speciﬁcation of NBE based on the logit transform and apply it to experimental data from existing studies. Unlike the rationality parameter lambda of logit QRE, estimates of the noise parameter sigma of NBE are invariant to the arbitrary “exchange rate” between utility and money. We adjust these exchange rates across 5 studies to build a dataset of 21 comparable 2x2 games. We ﬁnd that the value sigma=1 ﬁts the pooled data from these games much better than the bestﬁt QRE, resulting in 54% of the QRE prediction error. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Learning in signaling games (joint work with Kevin He)

University of Leicester Monday, July 17, 11:35, Session D Corruption and Leniency: Should criminals be forgiven? [pdf] (joint work with Sneha Gaddam) Abstract
We build a game theoretical model to evaluate Leniency Programmes (LPs): forgiving selfreporting criminals. We consider a society of heterogeneous criminals and heterogeneous bureaucrats. Social welfare goes up immediately in the short run after LP is introduced when the supply of the bureaucrats is fixed. Introduction of LP affects a major source of income (bribe) of a proportion of corruptible bureaucrats. As a result, in the intermediate run the size and composition of the bureaucrats vary leading to a low welfare situation. This effect may cause policy makers to pessimistically withdraw LPs. Our analysis contributes at this junction by showing that in the long run welfare is higher after the introduction of the LP than without LP. We point out that time horizon is crucial while evaluating LPs. 
Florida International University Wednesday, July 19, 11:15, Session F What is the Right Solution Concept for NoLimit Poker? [pdf] Abstract We analyze one of the simplest nolimit poker games, which has been previously studied. We show that the game has infinitely many Nash equilibria, all of which are extensiveform perfect, extensiveform proper, and normalform perfect, but only one of which is normalform proper; however, we argue that one of the equilibria is more intuitively compelling than the others, which differs from the unique normalform proper equilibrium. This suggests that a new refinement concept is needed to more appropriately model nolimit poker. 
INRIA and Ecole polytechnique Monday, July 17, 15:50, Session A Nonarchimedean convexity and zerosum stochastic mean payoff games [pdf] (joint work with Stephane Gaubert) Abstract
Semidefinite programming consists in minimizing a linear form over a 
Yale University Monetary Equilibrium in a Finite Horizon Model

Shanghai Univ of Finance and Economics Friday, July 21, 11:35, Session D Competing Mechanisms: Oneshot versus Repeated Games [pdf] (joint work with Seungjin Han) Abstract This paper studies games where multiple principals compete by simultaneously offering mechanisms to multiple agents in both oneshot and repeated settings. There are no exogenous restrictions on the complexity of mechanisms. We offer two types of results. First, we show when and how the lower bounds of equilibrium payoffs can be simplified and expressed in terms of model primitives such as actions and direct mechanisms. Second, we show how the repeated game makes it possible to support payoffs above a minmax value using tractable mechanisms akin to direct mechanisms: specifically, on path each agent reports only her type; following a deviation by a principal, she also reports the action that she predicts will be taken by the deviating principal absent further deviations by agents. Thus simple equilibrium mechanisms can be constructed to support payoff points in the repeated game. 
University of Bath Wednesday, July 19, 11:35, Session E Incumbent Competition and Pandering [pdf] Abstract Consider two politicians who can decide whether to follow what they believe the public wants or the socially optimal choice. Laws are passed when the politicians reach a unanimous decision. The public only rewards a politician when a law is passed, or when the politician is the only one whose action coincides with the public decision. Pandering politicians are punished by the public. We focus on the case where the median voter position is unclear. For noncritical issues, very high popularity rewards on policy implementation provide politicians incentives to misbehave and implement any policy regardless of public opinion and welfare. For critical issues, only socially optimal policies are implemented in the face of high pandering costs relative to rewards. The degree of certainty politicians have on the socially optimal choice does not affect the final policy implemented, only the type of divergence in positions observed. Contrary to what one might expect, some dissent in public opinion can lead politicians to consider the socially optimal choice more. The model provides important insights on how key issues are approached by political systems with two main parties. The two politician approach on pandering in legislation has not yet been looked at thoroughly in the literature. Voters may be able to induce politicians to vote for the socially optimal choice regardless of popular choice if key conditions given the type of issue are met. 
CNRS Ecole Polytechnique Paris On the Value of Small and Large Information: an Instrumental Approach (joint work with Michel de Lara)

Univ. of British Columbia Friday, July 21, 13:55, Session F Incentives and Emission Responsibility Allocation in Supply Chains (joint work with Sanjith Gopalakrishnan, Daniel Granot, Frieda Granot, Greys Sosic, and Hailong Cuiz) Abstract
In view of the urgency and challenges of mitigating climate change, it should be noted that 
Wednesday, July 19, 11:15, Session A Whom to Educate? Financial Fraud and Investor Awareness [pdf] (joint work with Zhengqing Gui, Yangguang Huang, Xiaojian Zhao) Abstract We study how investors are exploited by fraudulent financial products using a model with boundedly rational investors. These investors purchase financial products that are inconsistent with their risk attitudes, and their behaviors, in turn, provide the incentive for firms to conduct financial fraud. With this insight, we conduct an experiment in Shenzhen, China measuring investor's risk attitude and the effect of an eyeopening financial education program. We find our education program significantly reduces an investor's tendency to invest in fraudulent products, especially for those who are riskaverse. Therefore, compared to assigning the education program randomly, targeting on riskaverse investors will be more effective in fighting financial frauds. 
Penn State University Monday, July 17, 11:55, Session A Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling [pdf] (joint work with Hu Fu, Jason Hartline, Robert Kleinberg) Abstract Cremer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the distribution can extract the full social surplus. We study whether this phenomenon persists when the auctioneer has only incomplete knowledge of the distribution, represented by a nite family of candidate distributions, and has sample access to the real distribution. We show that the naive approach which uses samples to distinguish candidate distributions may fail, whereas an extended version of the CremerMcLean auction simultaneously extracts full social surplus under each candidate distribution. With an algebraic argument, we give a tight bound on the number of samples needed by this auction, which is the dierence between the number of candidate distributions and the dimension of the linear space they span. 
BenGurion University The Axiom of Equivalence to Individual Power and the Banzhaf Index [pdf] (joint work with Ori Haimanko) Abstract I introduce a new axiom for power indices on the domain of finite simple games that requires the total power of any given pair i,j of players in any given game v to be equivalent to some individual power, i.e., equal to the power of some single player k in some game w. I show that the Banzhaf power index is uniquely characterized by this new "equivalence to individual power" axiom in conjunction with the standard semivalue axioms: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, positivity (which is strengthened to avoid zeroingout of the index on some games), and dummy. 
Columbia University Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification [pdf] (joint work with Pierre Yared) Abstract
A principal faces an agent who is better informed but biased towards higher actions. She chooses whether to audit the agent’s information and his permissible actions. We show that if the audit cost is small enough, a threshold with an escape clause (TEC) is optimal: the agent can select any action below a threshold, or request audit and the efficient action if the threshold is sufficiently binding. For higher audit costs, the principal may instead prefer requiring audit only for intermediate actions. However, if she cannot commit to inefficient allocations following the audit decision 
New York University Tuesday, July 18, 11:55, Session Coalitional Strategic Games [pdf] Abstract
In pursuit of games played by groups of individuals (each group itself being a player), we develop a theory of strategic games in which each player is rational in the sense of expected utility theory except that her preferences may fail to be transitive. To this end, we use the coalitional expected utility representation by Hara, Ok, and Riella (2015), and define, and then characterize, the set of Nash equilibria in terms of this representation. In particular, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium. For instance, it turns out that an equilibrium is sure to exist if each player possesses two pure strategies (and may have cyclic preferences across pure and mixed strategy profiles), without any further qualifications. We also study rationalizability in such games (without transitivity), as well as some equilibrium refinements, and compare our findings with those of standard game theory. Our investigation is meant to be a step toward understanding the nature of strategic interaction across groups of individuals, and clarifying the role of transitivity in game theory. 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem Blotto, Lotto ... All Pay!

Yeshiva University Tuesday, July 18, 15:50, Session F Dynamic informational freeriding [pdf] (joint work with Cyrus Aghamolla (University of Minnesota)) Abstract This study investigates informational freeriding where agents choose both the timing of their actions as well as their information endowments. Each agent's information precision is private but actions are publicly observed. In equilibrium, we find that agents' effort choices are heterogeneous, where some agents contribute significantly while others freeride, even though agents are exante identical. We find that the nonfreeriding optimal effort is approximately possible in equilibrium. We also capture the dynamics of information arrival from multiple sources. The dynamics starts with the attrition phase where the information arrival gradually decelerates. Once a threshold is reached, the process enters the inflationary phase and the arrival rate improves over time. Our findings also help to explain observed empirical patterns, such as delay between actions and the clustering of actions in time. These results largely differ from previous freeriding models. 
University of Pennsylvania Wednesday, July 19, 12:15, Session A Bounded Learning and Rationality: a Framework and a Robustness Result [pdf] (joint work with J. Aislinn Bohren) Abstract This paper explores model misspecification in an observational learning framework. Individuals learn from diverse sources of information, including private and public signals and the actions of others. They may not know the true model that generates these signals, or how other individuals' actions reflect their private information. An agent's type specifies her model of the world; misspecified types have incorrect beliefs about the signal distribution and how other agents draw inference. We establish that the correctly specified model is robust in that agents with approximately correct models almost surely learn the true state asymptotically. We develop a simple criterion to identify what asymptotic learning outcomes arise when misspecification is more severe. We show that depending on the nature of the misspecification, learning may be correct, incorrect or beliefs may not converge, and different types may asymptotically disagree, despite observing the same information. This framework captures behavioral biases such as confirmation bias, underweighting or overweighting information, partisan bias and correlation neglect, as well as models of inference such as levelk and cognitive hierarchy. 
Bar Ilan University Wednesday, July 19, 16:10, Session B When is Social Learning PathDependent? [pdf] (joint work with Erik Mohlin) Abstract In various environments new agents may base their decisions on observations of actions taken by a few other agents in the past. In this paper we analyze a broad class of such social learning processes, and study under what circumstances they are pathdependent. Our main result shows that a population converges to the same behavior independently of the initial state, provided that the expected number of actions observed by each agent is less than one. Moreover, in any environment in which the expected number of observed actions is more than one, there is a learning rule for which the initial state has a lasting impact on future behavior. 
Bar Ilan University Tuesday, July 18, 11:55, Session C Measurable Selection for Purely Atomic Games [pdf] (joint work with Yehuda John Levy) Abstract A general selection theorem is presented constructing a measurable mapping from a state space to a parameter space under the assumption that the state space can be decomposed as a collection of countable equivalence classes under a smooth equivalence relation. It is then shown how this selection theorem can be used as a general purpose tool for proving the existence of measurable equilibria in broad classes of several branches of games, including Bayesian games with atomic knowledge spaces, stochastic games with countable orbits, and graphical games of countable degree  examples of a subclass of games with uncountable state spaces that we term purely atomic games. 
ERICES University of Valencia Friday, July 21, 11:55, Session E Freedom of Association, Social Cohesion and Welfare (joint work with Sanjeev Goyal, Guillem MartinezCanovas, Frederic Moisan, Manuel MunozHerrera, and Angel Sanchez)

Cambridge University Wednesday, July 19, 11:55, Session C Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence [pdf] Abstract A decision maker (DM) consults an advisor before deciding whether or not to switch from the status quo. Both agree that switching is optimal if and only if some hypothesis is true. But the advisor may be biased in how he trades off falsely accepting against falsely rejecting the hypothesis. Over two periods, the advisor can sequentially run costly tests, where each test yields a noisy binary outcome. I contrast the setting in which the DM observes all outcomes with a setting in which testing itself is hidden and the advisor can selectively disclose outcomes. I fully characterise under which conditions the DM is strictly better off with hidden testing than with observable testing. The reasons why hidden testing can be beneficial depend on the direction of the advisor’s bias. Finally, I study what my findings imply about the bias of the ideal advisor. 
University of Auckland Tuesday, July 18, 11:15, Session Backward Induction in Games without Perfect Recall [pdf] (joint work with Dmitriy Kvasov) Abstract
The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction, namely subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and quasiperfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), are explicitly restricted their analysis to games with perfect recall. In spite of this, the concepts are well defined, exactly as they defined them, even in games without perfect recall. There is now a small literature examining the behaviour of these concepts in games without perfect recall. 
Collegio Carlo Alberto Thursday, July 20, 15:30, Session F Dynamic commonvalue contests [pdf] Abstract In this paper, I study dynamic commonvalue contests. Agents arrive over time and expend efforts to compete for prizes that are allocated proportionally according to efforts exerted. This model can be applied to a number of examples, including rentseeking, lobbying, advertising, and R&D competitions. I provide a full characterization of equilibria in dynamic commonvalue contests and use it to study their properties, including comparative statics, earliermover advantage, and large contests. I show that information about other players' efforts plays an important role in determining the total effort and that the total effort is strictly increasing with the information that becomes available. 
University of Washington, Seattle Wednesday, July 19, 15:50, Session E Airport Slots Allocation in Ground Delay Programs [pdf] (joint work with Alexander Rodivilov) Abstract
This paper proposes a new mechanism to allocate landing slots in Ground Delay 
West Texas A&M University Thursday, July 20, 11:15, Session B Rationalizability and Learning in Games with Strategic Heterogeneity [pdf] (joint work with AnneChristine Barthel) Abstract It is shown that in games of strategic heterogenity (GSH), where both strategic complements and substitutes are present, there exist upper and lower serial undominated strategies which provide a bound for all other rationalizable strategies. We establish a connection between learning in a repeated setting and the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies which provides necessary and sufficient conditions for dominance solvability and stability of equilibria. These results not only extend monotonicity analysis to a wider class of games, but generalize many results in the literature on games of strategic complements and substitutes. Lastly, we provide conditions under which games that do not exhibit monotone best responses can be analyzed as a GSH. Multiple examples are given. 
Yale University Keeping Your Story Straight: Truthtelling and Liespotting

IMF Thursday, July 20, 15:30, Session Asymmetry in the Shapley Value with Applications to Variable Selection [pdf] Abstract
An econometric or statistical model may undergo a marginal gain when a new variable is admitted, and marginal loss if an existing variable is removed. The value of a variable to the model is quantified by its expected marginal gain and marginal loss. Under a prior belief that all candidate variables should be treated fairly, we derive a few formulas which evaluate the overall performance of each variable. One formula is identical to that for the Shapley value. However, it is not symmetric with respect to marginal gain and marginal loss; moreover, the Shapley value favors the latter. Thus we propose a unbiased solution. Two empirical studies are included: the first being a multicriteria model selection for a dynamic panel regression; the second being an analysis of effect on hourly wage given by additional years of schooling. 
ESMT Berlin Friday, July 21, 13:35, Session D Beyond yea or nay: decisiveness and power indices of an assembly if voters support different proposals [pdf] (joint work with André Casajus) Abstract
We study the power in assemblies. While the literature often considers the case where one proposal is to be supported or not, we allow the voters to have multiple proposals in mind. This invokes the consideration of partitions of the voter set where each component consists of those voters that agree on a proposal. 
IST Austria Monday, July 17, 15:30, Session A Extremal cases of poor approximation of undiscounted recursive games by discounted and timebounded ones [pdf] Abstract
A seminal result of Mertens and Neyman states that the value of a finite but 
Universidad de Santiago de Chile Wednesday, July 19, 11:55, Session F Global Games with Strategic Substitutes [pdf] (joint work with Rodrigo Harrison) Abstract We study global games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a class of binary action, Nplayer games with strategic substitutes, we prove that under commonly known payoff asymmetry, as incomplete information vanishes, the global games approach selects a unique equilibrium. We provide simple examples that illustrate our result and the connection with dominance solvability. Our work extends the global game literature, which has been developed so far for games with strategic complementarities, to new applications in industrial organization, collective action problems, finance, etc. 
Ariel University, Israel Wednesday, July 19, 11:35, Session B Cheating in Ranking Systems [pdf] (joint work with Lihi Dery, and Dror Hermel)

The Bank of Korea Friday, July 21, 13:15, Session D Interim SelfStable Decision Rules [pdf] (joint work with Semin Kim) Abstract This study identifies a set of interim selfstable decision rules. In our model, individual voters encounter two separate decisions sequentially: (1) a decision on the change of a voting rule they are going to use later and (2) a decision on the final voting outcome under the voting rule which has been decided from the prior procedure. A given decision rule is selfstable if any other possible rule does not get enough votes to replace the given rule under the given rule itself. We fully characterize the set of interim selfstable decision rules among weighted majority rules with given weights. 
Royal Holloway, University of London Wednesday, July 19, 16:10, Session E Top Trading Cycles in Endogenous Information Acquisition [pdf] (joint work with Annika Johnson) Abstract Consider a housing problem in which each agent arrives at the market with an endowment but is unsure of the value of others' objects and is unwilling to exchange without learning more. In the prominent application of kidney exchange, for example, testing is required before transplant. An individually rational, Pareto optimal and strategyproof exchange requires Gale's Top Trading Cycles but the ability to investigate others' endowment must also be introduced. For the instance in which each agent has only the resources to learn about one other object, I show how the agents' decisions over what to learn about impact the nature of the cycles that could form. Large cycles are risky so no cycle containing more than two agents can exist in equilibrium. Any set of cycles which is stable will also yield the maximum exante welfare in equilibrium. Furthermore, when objects are exante nonidentical, the unique set of cycles which maximise exante welfare in equilibrium is identical to the unique set of stable cycles. 
Northwestern University Large Dynamic Interaction (joint work with Eran Shmaya )

Weizmann Institute of Science Thursday, July 20, 11:15, Session (quasi) analyticity relevant to financial markets? (joint work with R. Raimondo) Abstract We continue the study of dynamic completeness of financial markets in the case where assets prices are not considered as given but are obtained as equilibrium prices of an economy containing both assets and consumption goods. Time analyticity of solutions of the heat equation , where the state of the world is described by Brownian motion, played a crucial role in demonstrating such completeness, so as to make pricing of derivatives possible. Observe that what is really relevant is quasianalyticity. We obtain quasianalyticity (in both state and time) for parabolic equations (both homogeneous and inhomogeneous) with quasianalytic coefficients, under sufficiently general growth conditions to cover standard financial applications where the state of the world is described by a general stochastic process 
Maastricht University Thursday, July 20, 12:15, Session F A Generalization of the Egalitarian and the KalaiSmorodinski Bargaining Solution [pdf] (joint work with Dominik Karos, Shiran Rachmilevitch) Abstract We characterize the class of weakly efficient nperson bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players' ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the KalaiSmorodinsky bargaining solutions. For 2player problems we characterize a larger class of solutions. None of these results assumes a Pareto axiom. In the 2player case, adding strong Pareto efficiency to a subset of our axioms pins down the KalaiSmorodinsky solution. 
Maastricht University, Saarland University Monday, July 17, 16:10, Session F On Condorcet Consistency and two instances of participation failure [pdf] (joint work with Hans Peters, Dries Vermeulen) Abstract
In this paper we examine two voting paradoxes. The first one arises if alternative $x$ has been elected by a given electorate then, ceteris paribus, another alternative, y, may be elected if additional voters join the electorate whose favorite alternative is x. The second occurs if alternative y has not been elected by a given electorate then, ceteris paribus, y may be elected if additional voters join the electorate whose least preferred alternative is y. Following Felsenthal and Tideman (2013) and Felsenthal and Nurmi (2016), we refer to the first as PTOP and to the latter as PBOT paradox. 
Institute for Applied System Analysis, Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute Wednesday, July 19, 11:35, Session Continuity of Equilibria for TwoPerson ZeroSum Games with Noncompact Action Sets and Unbounded Payoffs [pdf] (joint work with Eugene A. Feinberg, Michael Z. Zgurovsky) Abstract The paper extends Berge’s maximum theorem for possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded cost functions to minimax problems and studies applications of these extensions to twoplayer zero sum games with possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded payoffs. It provides the results on the existence of values and solutions for such games and on the continuity properties of the values and solution multifunctions. 
SUNY Monday, July 17, 11:15, Session A Uniform Price Double Auction Markets with Interdependent Values: An Asymptotic Approximation Approach [pdf] Abstract This paper studies multiple units demand and supply uniform price double auctions in the general symmetric interdependent value environment. The innovation of this paper is the asymptotic approximation approach that establishes the single crossing condition in the limit market and then uses it to characterize an equilibrium in finite markets. The main results are: (1) Every trembling hand perfect equilibrium strategy in finite markets converges to the price taking behavior as the number of market participants increases and the bid grid size goes to zero. (2) We derive asymptotic bounds of equilibrium bids in finite markets. (3) Every trembling hand perfect equilibrium in finite markets aggregates information as the market becomes large and the bid grid size goes to zero. (4) We derive the limit distribution of equilibrium prices. A theoretical significance of these results is that they strengthen the role of uniform price auctions as a foundation of the market mechanism. A practical significance of these results is that they provide a framework for the structural estimation and counterfactual analysis of policy questions in emission trading, electricity, equity, and Treasury markets. 
University of Mannheim Wednesday, July 19, 15:50, Session F Gizmos [pdf] Abstract I analyze a problem of a monopolist seller facing consumers who are unsure about their needs. In particular, when they have to make a decision for the first time, consumers are not sure whether they value a fancy version of a product or whether a standard version suffices. They learn only when they have the product. As consumers learn and if they have to replace the product they have, their new decision can be an upgrade or a downgrade over the initial one. I show that consumers' adoption strategy takes a simple form. It follows a cutoff rule which depends on the prices posted by the seller. I find that the seller always finds it optimal to sell both versions of the product. 
ETH Zurich Friday, July 21, 11:35, Session F Groundwater usage: Game theory and empirics [pdf] (joint work with Heinrich H. Nax) Abstract Groundwater, despite its fundamental role in the global economy, is depleting worldwide in nearly every aquifer basin, mostly driven by excessive irrigation. This paper oers a gametheoretic and datadriven analysis of the strategic behavior determining human groundwaterusage. Our empirical analysis is based on a unique, largescale dataset of individuallevel irrigation usage from within North America's largest groundwater system, the High Plains Aquifer, with nearly 100,000 observations spanning 20072014. Game theory predicts overusage, especially in response to others' conservation, and tragedy of the commons as an inevitable consequence. Contrary to theory, we measure that only 1% of the population exhibits this kind of 'unconditional' overusage behavior. Instead, conditional reciprocityconditional overusage in response to neighbors' overusageis a better explanation of individual decisionmaking, and this form of behavior can be rationalized as driven by uncertainty. We estimate this reciprocal behavior accounts for 25% (in high rainfall seasons) to 70% (in low rainfall seasons) of groundwater overusage in 20072014, and our counterfactual analysis predicts that this behavior will accelerate resource depletion. We conclude by discussing policy options that leverage our measured reciprocity dynamics to reduce groundwater usage. 
Harvard University Cooperative Strategic Games (joint work with Abraham Neyman)

University of Huddersfield Monday, July 17, 15:30, Session C VickreyClarkeGroves Mechanism and Preference for Reciprocity [pdf] (joint work with Maria Kozlovskaya and Antonio Nicolo) Abstract This paper applies psychological game theory to mechanism design. We study an environment where agents care about reciprocity, and show that the VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism is not incentive compatible under such preferences. However, incentive compatibility is restored if the mechanism is implemented sequentially. We consider a 2player sequential pivot mechanism with reciprocityconcerned players and prove that true reporting is the only equilibrium in this case. 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Tuesday, July 18, 11:35, Session A Discrepancies in scoring auctions for the energy sector [pdf] Abstract Scoring auctions are an appropriate purchasing mechanism if the buyer values the auctioned good in more attributes than just the price. In contrast to ordinary procurement auctions, such auctions facilitate a range of different allocation and payment rules. However, exactly as in ordinary procurement auctions there exist incentive compatible scoring auctions where truthful revelation of costs and quality is an optimal bidding strategy. Such scoring auctions are of special interest in the energy sector. There are different energy markets where electricity generators compete and an independent system operator is eager to know the true generation costs. In this special case, the marginal electricity generation costs are interpreted as quality whereas the standby costs of a power plant are the fixed costs in terms of a scoring auction. We formally analyze two different models that apply scoring auctions to the energy sector. We prove that these approaches can under some assumptions lead to the desired results. In general, scoring auctions can be implemented explicitly or implicitly but both result in the same outcome. This result contradicts with the opinion of some authors in that research area who claim that their model is superior to another. We prove this equivalence and give an outlook on the implications. Furthermore, we give a brief prospect on where and how explicit and implicit scoring auctions can also be applied. 
Penn State University Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games [pdf] (joint work with Yu Awaya) Abstract We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of εcoarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (εCCE) of the underlying oneshot game. The value of ε depends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with "cheap talk" that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside the set εCCE. Thus, in our model, communication is necessary for cooperation. 
Max Planck Institute, Bonn Wednesday, July 19, 11:55, Session A An Equilibrium Model with Computationally Constrained Agents [pdf] Abstract
We study an economy in which firms cannot compute exact solutions to the equations 
CNRS Acyclic Gambling Games [pdf] (joint work with Jerome Renault) Abstract We consider 2player zerosum stochastic games where each player controls his own state variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology comes from gambling problems where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino. Under natural assumptions (such as continuous running payoff and non expansive transitions), we consider for each discount factor the value of the discounted stochastic game and investigate its limit when the discount factor goes to 0. We show that under a strong acyclicity condition, the limit exists and is characterized as the unique solution of a system of functional equations: the limit is the unique continuous excessive and depressive function such that each player, if his opponent does not move, can reach the zone when the current payoff is at least as good than the limit value, without degrading the limit value. The approach generalizes and provides a new viewpoint on the MertensZamir system coming from the study of zerosum repeated games with lack of information on both sides. A counterexample shows that under a slightly weaker notion of acyclicity, convergence of discounted values may fail. 
Virginia Tech Wednesday, July 19, 11:35, Session F Testing Behavioral Hypotheses in Signaling Games [pdf] (joint work with Adam Dominiak) Abstract In this paper, we apply Ortoleva's (2012) idea of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) as a refinement tool for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in signaling games. HTE is a solution concept that admits updating of beliefs on outofequilibrium paths by selecting most likely hypotheses (i.e., receiver's beliefs about sender's strategic behavior). When hypotheses are about mixed strategies, it shows that each PBE can be supported by an HTE, yet without refining the outofequilibrium beliefs. However, if hypotheses are about pure strategies, HTE might not exist; but if it does, it refines the posterior beliefs of a given PBE. It is demonstrated that the Hypothesis Testing refinement is unrelated to the wellknown Intuitive Criterion, unless the set of types who could benefit from sending an outofequilibrium message is a singleton. Moreover, we suggest a strengthening of the HTE notion under which the posterior beliefs are immune against Mailath's (1988) critic and show that the HTE can much better explain the experimental findings of Brandits and Holt (1992) than Intuitive Criterion. 
National & Kapodistrian University of Athens Tuesday, July 18, 12:15, Session On the commitment value and commitment optimal strategies in bimatrix games [pdf] (joint work with Costis Melolidakis) Abstract Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having observed the irrevocable commitment of the leader. Based on a result by von Stengel and Zamir, "Leadership games with convex strategy sets" (2010), the notions of commitment value and commitment optimal strategies for each player are discussed as a possible solution concept. It is shown that in nondegenerate bimatrix games (a) pure commitment optimal strategies together with the follower's best response constitute Nash equilibria, and (b) strategies that participate in a completely mixed Nash equilibrium are strictly worse than commitment optimal strategies, provided they are not matrix game optimal. For various classes of bimatrix games that generalize zero sum games, the relationship between the maximin value of the leader's payoff matrix, the Nash equilibrium payoff and the commitment optimal value is discussed. For the Traveler's Dilemma, the commitment optimal strategy and commitment value for the leader are evaluated and seem more acceptable as a solution than the unique Nash equilibrium. Finally, the relationship between commitment optimal strategies and Nash equilibria in 2x2 bimatrix games is thoroughly examined and in addition, necessary and sufficient conditions for the follower to be worse off at the equilibrium of the leadership game than at any Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game are provided. 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Sequential Persuasion [pdf] (joint work with Peter Norman) Abstract
This paper considers a general class of multisender Bayesian persuasion games in 
Stony Brook University Tuesday, July 18, 15:50, Session D Better Expertise with Safer Choices: Delaying Incentive in Patent Purchases [pdf] Abstract
While companies continue to take over, their timing in patent acquisition differ. This paper examines firm's incentive in strategically selecting purchase time for outsourced drug patents. Under the theoretical framework, each drug patent has to pass n testing phases before its approval, and the buyer firm can choose to acquire patent at any stage (with k stages left, et al.) and pays a market price that is a decreasing function function of the number of phases left. The trial costs are identical across different phases. After purchase, the buyer firm needs to pay for the remaining phase tests in order to make the drug patent marketable. Firms are heterogeneous in trial success rates, and choose their optimal timing of acquisition to maximize profit. Specifically, the number of success trials observed in a unit of time follows Poisson distribution, and the buyer firm needs to pass at least k trials if the patent was acquired with k stages left. Firms with larger scale and R&D expertise have higher success rates for each test phase, and thus, greater number of expected success trials. 
University of Zurich Monday, July 17, 16:10, Session C Delegating Performance Evaluation [pdf] (joint work with Igor Letina, Nick Netzer) Abstract We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of the bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer’s potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by a modified allpay auction, and it can also be implemented by a nested Tullock contest. Our analysis has implications for applications as diverse as the design of worker compensation, the awarding of research grants, and the allocation of foreign aid. 
Wuhan University Thursday, July 20, 11:15, Session D Bank Capital, Competition and RiskTaking (joint work with Yan Liu, Leyi Liu) Abstract Extensive theoretic and empiric works demonstrate that bank capital and competition are the two main mechanisms affecting bank's risktaking behavior. Recent empirical results show that the joint effect of capital and competition is likely to be heterogenous. However, there is little understanding in theory about the interaction of bank capital and competition, and their joint impact on bank risktaking. In this paper, we construct a flexible theoretic framework to study bank risktaking with endogenous bank capital decision under imperfect competition. We first uncover two main channels governing the interaction of capital decision and competition. In the shortrun, capital and competition display a complementarity effect: more competition requires banks to choose more capital in order to retain charter value. In the longrun, there is a substitution effect between capital and competition: more competition reduces banks' incentive to hold more capital since the charter value becomes lower. Accordingly, bank's endogenous default risk depends on the relative strength of the two effects. The benchmark theoretic results also extend to environments with capital requirement, alternative market structure, and endogenous competition in a dynamic setup. 
Stony Brook University Monday, July 17, 11:15, Session D Trust Building in Credence Goods Markets [pdf] (joint work with Yukfai Fong, Xiaoxuan Meng) Abstract
This paper studies trust building in credence goods markets and its impact on longlived sellers' conduct and market efficiency. In markets for professional services such as health care services, legal services, consulting and car mechanic services, clients often lack the expertise to assess the necessity of services recommended and provided by expert sellers both before and after consumption. Therefore, clients bear the risk of taking unnecessarily expensive treatments for their problems. Goods or services with this feature are termed ``credence goods''. 
South University of science & technology Wednesday, July 19, 15:30, Session E A Matching Theory of Organization and Network [pdf] (joint work with Andy Luchuan Liu) Abstract To explore the formation of organization and network with their various structures, a general theory of matching evolves from the classic paradigm of Gale and Shapley in the following directions: constructing its connectivity in which two or more matched teams could have some common elements through matching with their functions rather than partitions of agents; Incorporating the directionality of hierarchy through matching with the orders of functions; Introducing the paradigm of organizational rationality consisting of its selffulfilling and preference system into the theory of matching. The static notion of matching is not universal since there does not always exist a stable one. The property of universal stability is constructed within a matching evolution organized with a series of matching between organizations matched in its subgames and free agents no matter if the game is stable in its static matching. 
Waseda University Friday, July 21, 13:15, Session A Randomness, Predictability, and Complexity in Repeated Interactions [pdf] (joint work with Zsombor Zoltan Meder) Abstract Nash equilibrium often requires players to adopt a mixed strategy, i.e., a randomized choice between pure strategies. Typically, the player is asked to use some randomizing device, and the story usually ends here. In this paper, we will argue that: (1) Game theory needs to give an account of what counts as a random sequence (of behavior); (2) from a gametheoretic perspective, a plausible account of randnomness is given by algorithmic complexity theory, and, in particular, the complexity measure proposed by Kolmogorov; (3) in certain contexts, strategic reasoning amounts to modelling the opponent\'s mind as a Turing machine; (4) this account of random behavior also highlights some interesting aspects on the nature of strategic thinking. Namely, it indicates that it is an art, in the sense that it cannot be reduced to following an algorithm. 
University of Glasgow Friday, July 21, 11:35, Session A Temporary implementation [pdf] (joint work with Takashi Hayashi) Abstract The paper examines problems of implementing social choice objectives in a dynamic environment, in which society can only decide and execute a policy variable at hand period by period. The social objective that society wants to achieve is represented by a social choice function (SCF) that maps each state of the world into a dynamic process mapping every history into a social outcome. This social process is temporarily implementable if there exists a process of oneperiod game forms (with observed actions and simultaneous moves) each of which generates a social outcome only at one given period after a given history, such that at each state of the world there is a subgameperfect Nash equilibrium in which the social objective is fulfilled at every period, after every history, as a unique equilibrium outcome process. The paper identifies necessary conditions for SCFs to be temporarily implemented, the folding condition and temporary Maskin monotonicity, and shows that they are also sufficient under auxiliary conditions when there are three or more individuals. Finally, it provides an account of welfare implications of temporary implementability in the contexts of sequential trading and sequential voting. 
University of Valencia Thursday, July 20, 15:50, Session C Network performance under attacks. [pdf] (joint work with Amparo Urbano and Ivan Arribas.) Abstract
Infrastructure, information transmission and traffic networks play an important role in current Economy. Communication networks, transports and interbank connections are only a few examples of this vital and crucial role. For this reason, there is nowadays much interest in the robustness of realnetworks and the aim of this paper is to understand which topological features are desirable in communication networks in order to prevent node failures produced by targeted attacks. 
Sam Houston State University Tuesday, July 18, 11:15, Session E A Model of (Counter)Terrorism with Location Choice [pdf] (joint work with Yang Jiao and Zijun Luo) Abstract We incorporate features of family transfer models into the study of terrorism. Our model allows for interactions among two terrorist groups and the central command they both belong to. Together they plan three attackstwo at the base locations of the groups and a final attack whose location is chosen by the central command. The central command is assumed to be in possession of no ``soldiers,'' and the two groups decide their resource allocations between own local attack and the final attack. We find their incentives to allocate resources between the attacks to be depending upon whether the two local attacks occur simultaneously or sequentially as well as the relative values the two groups attached to their locations. 
Stony Brook University Wednesday, July 19, 11:55, Session D Cournot and Bertrand Oligopoly Competitions in Payment Card Industry [pdf] Abstract
This paper provides a modified model for a twosided payment card market. Participating the payment card platform for the firms requires a merchant fee in terms of a predetermined percentage of the product price. Using a card gives a cashback reward to consumers. Considering a market segmentation on consumers' side a fixed proportion of cash only users and the rest card holders, our model derives the optimal merchant fee to charge, the market equilibria, and welfare for different types of firm competitions. By comparing the results before and after the implementation of the card platform, we find a redistribution of social welfare there is a transformation of consumer surplus from cash users to card holders. Our analyses also show that quantity competition on the firms' side results in a lower profit for the card platform than price competition. Cournot equilibrium converges to Bertrand when the number of firms goes to infinity. 
University of Rochester Monday, July 17, 16:10, Session D Competing Auctions with Informed Sellers [pdf] (joint work with Nicolas Riquelme) Abstract We study a game of competing secondprice auctions with reserve price between two sellers, each of whom has private information about the quality of his object and can choose the reserve price of a secondprice auction. Buyers observe the reserve prices and decide which auction to participate in. We provide sufficient conditions under which the set of types of a buyer that would participate in an auction and have positive winning probability is connected. Under these conditions, we characterize the unique equilibrium of a participation game and provide comparative statics analysis. Although there are endogeneity of buyers' participation decision and the signaling feature of sellers' reserve price choices, perfect Bayesian equilibria exist when each seller has only finitely many feasible reserve prices. When a buyer's valuation of an object is additively separable in his type and the seller's information, we show that perfect Bayesian equilibria exist with a continuum of feasible reserve price. 
Harvard University Markov Equilibrium

Kennesaw State University Tuesday, July 18, 11:55, Session E Simple Analytics of the Impact of Terror Generation on AttackerDefender Interactions [pdf] (joint work with Aniruddha Bagchi & Joao Ricardo Faria) Abstract A simple AttackerDefender interaction is analyzed, in which a single terrorist (denoted T) will potentially attack a single target in the homeland of a government/state (denoted G). This interaction is modelled as a oneshot sequential move game in which G first chooses how heavily to defend the target, after which T chooses whether or not to stage an attack. T’s benefit from a successful attack is allowed to be increasing in the amount of resources that G allocates to defense. In the context of terrorism, this has multiple reasonable interpretations, including situations in which: (i) citizens of the target country are terrified to a greater degree when a more heavily fortified target is successfully attacked or (ii) successfully attacking a more heavily fortified target allows the terrorists to recruit more effectively. The amount by which T’s benefit from a successful attack exceeds its baseline due to increased defensive efforts by G can be thought of as a terror effect. This specification differentiates terrorism from traditional conflict in an important way. For the specified model, the amount of defensive efforts by G necessary to prevent T from staging an attack is increasing in the magnitude of the terror effect. Moreover, if G inaccurately under perceives the magnitude of the terror effect, then G may choose either less than or (somewhat surprisingly) more than the optimal level of defense (with the realized outcome depending upon model parameters). The results highlight the importance for correctly understanding the payoffs and motives of terrorists in order to be able to optimally allocate defensive resources. 
University of South Carolina Tuesday, July 18, 15:30, Session C Competition for Public Good Provision [pdf] (joint work with Liwen Chen and Yue Liu) Abstract
The public good literature claims that lotteries are theoretically and empirically superior to VCM in funding public goods. In reality, however, the two mechanisms coexist. Why is that? One possible explanation is that the current research assumes that players are eligible to participate only in one mechanism. 
Caltech (June 2017), HSE (Sept 2017) Thursday, July 20, 15:30, Session B Dynamic Choice of Information Sources [pdf] Abstract
I characterize the unique optimal learning strategy when there are two information sources, 
Singapore University of Technology and Design Randomness, Predictability, and Complexity in Repeated Interactions [pdf] (joint work with Shuige Liu, Zsombor Zoltan Meder) Abstract
Nash equilibrium often requires players to adopt a mixed strategy, i.e., a randomized choice between pure strategies. Typically, the player is asked to use some \\emph{randomizing device}, and the story usually ends here. In this paper, we will argue that: (1) Game theory needs to give an account of what counts as a random sequence (of behavior); (2) from a gametheoretic perspective, a plausible account of randnomness is given by algorithmic complexity theory, and, in particular, the complexity measure proposed by Kolmogorov; (3) in certain contexts, strategic reasoning amounts to modelling the opponent\'s mind as a Turing machine; (4) this account of random behavior also highlights some interesting aspects on the nature of strategic thinking. Namely, it indicates that it is an \\emph{art}, in the sense that it cannot be reduced to following an algorithm. 
Stony Brook University Wednesday, July 19, 11:35, Session C Information Design in Contests [pdf] Abstract
In this paper I analyze the extent to which a “contest designer” can influence players’ behavior by 
Hebrew University Wednesday, July 19, 11:35, Session A The Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property: A Rational Inattention Foundation [pdf] Abstract
A commonly assumed feature of games with complementarities is that players 
University of Valencia Tuesday, July 18, 15:30, Session D “I just met you but… why should I support a starving songwriter to record an album? A theoretical approach trough the preordering crowdfunding scheme.” [pdf] (joint work with MesaVázquez, Ernesto & Urbano, Amparo)

BarIlan University Wednesday, July 19, 11:55, Session Polyequilibrium [pdf] Abstract
Polyequilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium that is applicable to any strategic game, 
University of Haifa Monday, July 17, 15:50, Session F Benchmarking [pdf] (joint work with Chris Chambers) Abstract We introduce a theory of ranking in the presence of objectively incomparable marginal contributions (apples and oranges). Our theory recommends benchmarking, a method under which an individual is deemed more accomplished than another if and only if she has achieved more benchmarks, or important accomplishments. We show that benchmark rules are characterized by four axioms: transitivity, monotonicity, incomparability of marginal gains, and incomparability of marginal losses. 
University of Arizona Friday, July 21, 11:35, Session C Screening for Experiments [pdf] Abstract I study a problem in which the principal is a decision maker and the agent is an "experimenter". Neither the agent nor the principal can directly observe the true state, but the agent can conduct an experiment that reveals information about the unknown true state. The agent also has private information about which experiments are feasible, his type. While the principal can observe both the experiment conducted by the agent and the experimental outcomes, she cannot observe the type of the agent. I characterize the principal's optimal decision rule which is contingent on an experiment and the experimental results. The main factor which shapes an optimal decision rule is a tradeoff between assigning the best experiment to each type and making the ex post optimal decisions based on the experimental outcomes. Under certain conditions, there is no such a tradeoff, and there is an optimal decision rule by which the principal can achieve the firstbest outcome despite the information asymmetry. When there is such a tradeoff, I characterize two types of optimal decision rules: (1) decision rule that assigns the best experiment to each type at the costs of giving up the ex post optimal decisions and (2) decision rule that achieves the ex post optimal decisions at the costs of giving up the best experiments. I provide sufficient conditions for each decision rule to be optimal; which one is optimal depends on the structure of the set of feasible experiments for each type. 
Kanagawa University Friday, July 21, 13:35, Session E Unique Persuasion Equilibrium [pdf] Abstract This paper discusses equilibrium selection in persuasion games. In particular, we provide formal justification for the convention in the literature that focusing on the fully revealing equilibrium when there exist multiple equilibria. As a selection criterion, we suggest the notion of prudent rationalizable equilibrium that is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium constructed by prudent rationalizable strategies, a version of extensiveform iterated admissibility proposed by Heifetz et al. (2011). First, we show that the prudent rationalizable equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, it uniquely selects the fully revealing equilibrium whenever it exists. Second, with providing a necessary and sufficient condition for the unique selection by the prudent rationalizable equilibrium, we show that this selection criterion could successfully work even in environments where the fully revealing equilibrium does not exist. 
Kobe University Thursday, July 20, 11:15, Session E Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player [pdf] (joint work with Hitoshi Sadakane) Abstract We study strategic information transmission between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker in a situation where the decision maker can privately acquire imperfect information about states of nature. The information acquisitions are costly, and the precision of information depends on how much time the decision maker spends on the activities. It is shown that, in equilibrium, the decision maker's information acquisitions can enhance communication, compared with the situation where she cannot gather information. What is more interesting is that the information structure is endogenized, namely, it is determined which information she acquires in the equilibrium. 
University of Tokyo Monday, July 17, 15:30, Session F Binary Collective Choice with Multiple Premises [pdf] Abstract Imagine a group of individuals facing with a complicated yesno question whose truth value is logically driven from multiple premises. Their purpose is to make a correct group judgment on the question based on their individual judgments. There are two types of ways to aggregate individual judgments: ``the premise driven way'' (PDW) and ``the conclusion driven way'' (CDW). We analyze which way is superior to the other to find a correct answer. In our analysis, we introduce a Boolean algebraic approach to formulate a general class of such judgment aggregation problems. We find that if a group faces with a conjunctive decision problem, then PDW is more likely to avoid ``false acquittance'', while CDW is more likely to avoid ``false conviction''. In a disjunctive case, the converse of this result holds. However, as the size of a group goes to infinity, PDW ensures that the probability that the voting outcome is correct converges to one, while CDW does not. 
Collegio Carlo Alberto Thursday, July 20, 11:35, Session A Cooperation in Social Dilemmas through Position Uncertainty [pdf] (joint work with Andrea Gallice) Abstract We propose a simple mechanism that sustains full cooperation in oneshot social dilemmas among a finite number of selfinterested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Since agents realize that their own action may be observed, they have an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors to also do so. Full contribution can then emerge in equilibrium. Our mechanism also leads to full cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma. 
University of Chicago Local Agency Costs of Political Centralization [pdf]

ETH Zurich Tuesday, July 18, 11:35, Session B Information arrival and equilibrium play: evidence from market experiments [pdf] (joint work with Peiran Jiao) Abstract
We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment to understand how arrival of different types of information changes aggregate outcomes and the decisionmaking process of subjects involved in a repeated game. We studied individual behavior and convergence properties of market competition in Cournot oligopolies. Our treatments started in lowinformation environments; more information 
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre Wednesday, July 19, 12:15, Session F On discounted AR–AT semiMarkov games and its complementarity formulations [pdf] (joint work with P. Mondal, S. Sinha, A. K. Das) Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a class of twoperson finite discounted AR– 
University of Glasgow Thursday, July 20, 15:30, Session C Monetizing Attention on Social Media [pdf] Abstract Abstract Using network connecting information to discriminate prices across users or consumers is possible as social media discloses more precise individuals' networking information. This paper concerns how the social media (Facebook) owner could use network information to do “price discrimination” across her users. In our model, users have multiple interdependent activities (creating and browsing) on friendbased social media, and social media monetizes users' attention by sending different advertisement densities to them based on their network position. In particular, for users' behaviors, both interpersonal local browsing externality and intrapersonal of crossactivity externalities are taken into consideration. The striking results show that the network information is usable for the monopoly to discriminate prices across users when multiple interdependent activities are introduced, even though users' best replies are linear. This paper also tries to explain social media's benefits from her services, such as recommending friends and events notification for users, by comparative static studies and welfare analysis. Moreover, this paper is the first to show some results of the network with mix externalities. 
Universidad de Lima Thursday, July 20, 11:35, Session F The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands [pdf] Abstract We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits, however, instead of alternating offers, we consider simultaneous payoff demands. Each player is selected with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. A coalition can form if and only if payoff demands are feasible, as in the Nash demand game. In the limit, for almost all sharing rules (used for refining purposes), if there exists a grand coalition stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, then the expected payoffs are in the core. If the expected payoffs are in the interior of the core, then such an equilibrium exists. If the Nash bargaining solution is the sharing rule, such an equilibrium exists regardless of the discount factor if and only if the per capita worth of the grand coalition is greater than or equal to that of any coalition; when this rule is applied to Shapley and Shubik's production economy with identical workers, the coalitional Nash bargaining solution obtains; this is also the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if we don't use a sharing rule but we add uncertainty, the noise vanishes, and the discount factor is close to 1. 
University of South Carolina Tuesday, July 18, 11:55, Session A Asymmetric Contests [pdf] (joint work with Alexander Matros) Abstract We study asymmetric allpay auctions where the prize has the same value for all players, but players might have different cost functions. We prove existence and uniqueness of the mixedstrategy equilibrium when the cost functions are rightcontinuous. 
THEMA, Université CergyPontoise, France Thursday, July 20, 15:50, Session B Heterogenous Heuristics in 3x3 Bimatrix Population Games [pdf] Abstract We investigate populationlevel evolutionary dynamics resulting from individuallevel, adaptive play both under homogenous ( "selfplay ") and heterogenous ( "mixed play ") scenarios. In a class of bimatrix 3x3 normal form games (Sparrow and van Strien, 2008), that includes RockPaperScissors as a special case, rich limit behavior unfolds as game and heuristics parameters vary. In particular, a sequence of perioddoubling bifurcations of limit cycles emerges under the perturbed bestreply dynamics and chaotic dynamics on the Hannan set appear under the noregret dynamics. 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Monday, July 17, 12:15, Session A "Bid More, Pay Less"  Overbidding and the Bidder's Curse in Teleshopping Auctions [pdf] Abstract
This paper provides an empirical and theoretic analysis of the 123.tv multiunit teleshopping auctions. 123.tv offers two sales channels for customers: They either bid in the teleshopping auctions (offline via telephone, online via website or App) or purchase in the online shop for a fixed price. Our theoretic analysis yields that rational customers do not overbid the online shop price, since they risk paying an auction price above the fixed price (Bidder’s Curse). Yet, recent scientific work indicates that the Bidder’s Curse occurs in singleunit auctions. Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to examine the Bidder’s Curse in the 123.tv multiunit teleshopping auctions. The applied data set consists of nearly 700,000 bids of 123.tv. We find that in 26% customers overbid the online shop price. This finding is in line with recent work for overbidding and therefore the Bidder’s Curse in singleunit auctions. However, the Bidder’s Curse only occurs in 5% of the 123.tv auctions. Moreover, the most frequent 123.tv customers do not experience a learning effect, but overbid greater and more often. We argue that these findings are due to the 123.tv multiunit auctions in combination with uniform pricing: Here, overbidding does not mandatorily result in the Bidder’s Curse, since the auction price is set by the lowest accepted bid until the supply is exhausted. In other words, overbidding is less risky in multiunit auctions with uniform pricing than in singleunit auctions. Moreover, we find that offlinebidders overbid greater and more often than onlinebidders. In line with current scientific work, we reason that this is linked to different search costs of these bidders. 
University of the Basque Country Friday, July 21, 11:15, Session E A Marginalist Connections Model of Network Formation (joint work with Federico Valenciano)

University of Groningen Wednesday, July 19, 15:50, Session C Shared Information Sources in Exchanges [pdf] (joint work with Mariann Ollar) Abstract
In financial and commodity exchanges, traders gain information from shared information sources, such as commonly accessed forecasts and standardized reports, which induce interdependence in forecast errors. In a linear normal model with noisy signals about values, I show that the presence of noniid. errors can improve trade stability when it counters order shading, and error interdependence can improve price informativeness when it is stronger than value interdependence. These imply that from an informationbased market design perspective, fewer sources can prevent market collapse, and segmentation of trading can improve price informativeness. Pairwise tradettotrader interdependence of both values and errors is crucial for successful designs. 
Stony Brook University Tuesday, July 18, 11:35, Session D Competition with endogenous and exogenous switching costs [pdf] Abstract
This paper presents a general theoretical framework for a dynamic competition game in the presence of two types of switching costs: endogenous, which are set by providers, and exogenous that are specific to consumers. In a twoperiod game, the two providers compete in prices and switching fees, and can price discriminate between old (loyal) and new (switchers) consumers.\\ 
Oakland University Thursday, July 20, 11:55, Session A Supersizing: The Illusion of a Bargain and the RighttoSplit [pdf] (joint work with Miron Stano) Abstract
The supersizing phenomenon where menu prices for large fast food portions appear to be well below their marginal production costs is of considerable scholarly and policy interest. This article develops sufficient conditions, for a subset of cases where the singlecrossing condition is violated, under which a firm can separate two different rational consumer types while maximizing and capturing the total surplus associated with marginalcost pricing. Menu prices can be very easily determined for these cases unlike the complex solutions found under more general conditions. For our subset, the separating equilibrium creates an apparent supersizing discount even though the firm does not actually sell the additional quantity below marginal cost. With public health interest in reducing portion sizes, we introduce the righttosplit as a policy alternative that breaks the separating equilibrium and leads to smaller quantities. 
UC Berkeley Learning dynamics and Nash equilibria

Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Monday, July 17, 16:10, Session B A note on Evolution of Preferences [pdf] Abstract This note checks the robustness of a surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007). The result states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe a signal that fully reveals the opponent's preferences, even if the frequency of the signal is very low. I show that when the signal a player receives on her opponent's preferences is almost uninformative, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable, no matter the frequency of the signal. 
Bar Ilan University Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions [pdf] (joint work with Ziv Hellman) Abstract
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be formed. Within this context we define a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting ‘graph value’ (and ‘Svalue’ in the general case) is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players. 
Bar Ilan University Toward a Theory of Repeated Games With Bounded Memory (joint work with Gilad Bavly) Abstract A survey of repeated games with bounded memory. Special focus will be given to a recent result (P. and Bavly) on the minmax level of threeplayer games with bounded recall. A pair of players who can recall k stages of history cannot implement a correlated punishment against a third player who can recall m>>k stages of history. 
University of Pécs Thursday, July 20, 16:10, Session The core and balancedness of TU games with infinitely many players [pdf] (joint work with David Bartl) Abstract Transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players are considered. We generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and present a generalized BondarevaShapley Theorem for games without and with restricted cooperation. Our generalized BondarevaShapley Theorem extends previous results by Bondareva (1963), Shapley (1967), Schmeidler (1967), Faigle (1989), and Kannai (1969, 1992) among others. 
The University of Bath Tuesday, July 18, 11:35, Session F Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion [pdf] (joint work with Jaideep Roy and Saptarshi P Ghosh) Abstract We analyze the ‘optimal’ size of nondeliberating majoritarian committees with no conflict of interest among its members when committees can be persuaded by a biased and informed expert. We find that when this bias is small, the optimal size is one; when it is intermediate, the optimal size increases monotonically in the precision of members’ private information; when it is large this relation is nonmonotonic. However the optimal committeesize never exceeds five. We also show that biased persuasion typically hurts a larger committee more severely. These results provide important implications on issues like universal enfranchisement, role of expert commentary in a democracy or size of governing boards in firms. 
ETH Zurich Monday, July 17, 15:50, Session Micro influence and macro dynamics of opinions [pdf] (joint work with Bernhard Clemm von Hohenberg, Michael Maes) Abstract
There is ongoing debate about the effects of social influence on the micro level and resulting opinion polarization on the macro level. We propose a general model that captures prominent, competing microlevel theories of social influence. Conducting an online labinthefield experiment, we observe that individual opinions shift linearly towards the mean of the distribution of other opinions. With this finding, we predict the macrolevel opinion dynamics resulting from social influence. We test our predictions using data from a second labinthefield experiment and find that social influence reduces opinion polarization. We corroborate these findings with additional field data. 
University of Mannheim Wednesday, July 19, 15:50, Session D Online search tracking and consumer privacy [pdf] Abstract Tracking technologies enable sellers to observe a consumer's browsing history on the internet. Consumers are heterogeneous regarding how selective their taste is. In a framework in which consumers search sequentially for prices and match utilities, tracking enables sellers to learn about a consumer's conditional willingness to pay. I find a unique equilibrium exhibiting an increasing price path. Moreover, I endogenize the consumer's choice to disable tracking. Interestingly, the entire browsing history is disclosed in equilibrium despite sellers engaging in price discrimination. While consumers are always made better off compared to no tracking, the effect on profits depends on search costs. 
UC Santa Barbara Characterization and Implementation of Nash Solutions to NonConvex Problems (joint work with Guofu Tan and Adam Wong)

Tuesday, July 18, 12:15, Session B An evolutionary analysis of a volunteer game in endogenous social networks [pdf] Abstract
This paper studies a volunteer game in endogenous social networks. I incorporate psychological benefits of volunteering such as great feeling due to altruism, people’s gratitude or social recognition that increases with the number of benefiters. I also consider the fact that switching social contacts is costly. The bestresponse dynamics yields a wide multiplicity of 
Bates College Tuesday, July 18, 11:15, Session B On the dynamic stability of a price dispersion model using gradient dynamics [pdf] (joint work with Dongwook Lee) Abstract This paper studies the evolutionary stability of the unique Nash equilibrium of a price dispersion model (Burdett and Judd, 1983) using gradient dynamics. The numerical solution to the partial differential equation that governs the evolution of prices shows that the stationary equilibrium is not the Nash Equilibrium and differs from the cyclical behavior predicted by another family of dynamics like replicator and logit in a continuous action space. 
Columbia Monday, July 17, 11:35, Session C Evidence and Skepticism in Verifiable Disclosure Games [pdf] Abstract
A shared feature of communication games with verifiable evidence is that the receiver will be "skeptical" following any nondisclosure: he will tend to believe that the message comes from an informed sender who is withholding unfavorable evidence. It then follows that when the receiver is more skeptical he will choose a less preferable action for the sender. This paper seeks to characterize when a change in the distribution of evidence induces any receiver to be more skeptical. We introduce the "more evidence" relation between type distributions: a distribution has more evidence than another if types with larger available sets are more probable in a monotone likelihood ratio sense. We show that when the sender has more evidence, the equilibrium action following any message is less favorable for the sender, i.e. the receiver becomes more skeptical following any message. We also show that the more evidence relation is necessary for this kind of increased skepticism in the receiver: if the sender does not have more evidence, there exists a receiver who treats the sender (strictly) more favorably following some message. Our approach also admits a full characterization of receiver optimal equilibria in a general class of verifiable disclosure games. 
University Toulouse 1 The Large Space of Information Structures (joint work with Fabien Gensbittel and Marcin Peski )

Utah State University Monday, July 17, 11:35, Session E Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: Experimental evidence [pdf] (joint work with Diego Aycinena, Rimvydas Baltaduonis) Abstract We experimentally examine the role of valuation structure in perfectly discriminating contests with incomplete information. In particular we consider pure common value, pure private value and a case where there is both private and common value components. We find that, regardless of valuation structure, bidding is well above Nash predictions. Aggregate bids with pure common values are higher than in valuation structures with a private value component. Excess bidding is not explained by risk attitudes, participant competitiveness, nor math or verbal scores on SAT equivalents. However we do find that men bid more aggressively, and that this is partly explained by the 2D4D ratio. 
Phillips Exeter Academy Friday, July 21, 13:15, Session B Game Theory and Baseball’s Steroids Decade: solving history using mathematical models [docx] (joint work with Brian Rhee) Abstract Game theory models can shed light on history, such as the steroids decade in Major League Baseball. The shockingly prevalent use of anabolic steroids by MLB players in the 2000’s—as much as 40% according to pitcher David Well—begs the question, was it mathematically inevitable? Game theory recognizes that even when a group of players want a winwin situation with the highest possible payoff for every player, the actual outcome may have lower payoffs for all players. This paradox arises from the fact that players are rational and selfish; achieving the winwin situation may require cooperation, but players only optimize for their own payoff, resulting in an inferior outcome for everyone. In this paper, two applications of game theory are discussed in analyzing the use of anabolic steroids in Major League Baseball and the acts of betrayal and perjury that followed. This study analyzes whether games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt are suitable in modeling real life scenarios of the steroid decade in Major League Baseball. We use the Prisoner’s Dilemma to mathematically confirm why so many players abused steroids despite it making everyone worseoff; because so many players chose to take steroids, we might say that the absolute benefit the drug was not actually realized. Players were instead faced with the legal and physical costs of taking steroids, leaving the group with lower payoffs than if none of them had taken steroids. To analyze the situation that followed, we use the game of Stag Hunt to mathematically explain why some players kept their secret while others ratted out the group. Both game theory models are appropriate, even necessary, for us to look back on and grasp the innerworkings of the steroids decade in Major League Baseball. The mathematical benchmark of the research opens the way for future derivative works to be performed and compared. 
University of Rochester Monday, July 17, 15:50, Session C Common Agency with Informed Principals: Revelation Principle [pdf] Abstract This paper studies games where a group of privately informed principals design mechanisms to make a common agent to choose among allocations with each principal. The agent at the moment of taking a decision has observed his private information and may have information (endogenous) about all principals feasible allocations and types. Thus, principals may be interested in screening all this information. In this paper, we provide sufficient conditions on the agent’s payoff such that any equilibrium in this general setup will have an output equivalent equilibrium only using direct mechanisms. Depending on the conditions, we propose two different notions of a direct mechanism and discuss its applicability with some examples. 
HEC Paris Monday, July 17, 11:35, Session Information Free Mechanisms for Regulating Bank Risk: Market Discipline and Its Effect on Systemic Risk [pdf] Abstract This paper studies a robust mechanism design problem for regulating banks. We assume that the regulator has no information regarding the riskiness of the banks assets and analyze the ability of market discipline, via mandatory subordinated debt issuance, to create incentives for banks to take less risk. We show that in a model where small banks issue subordinated debt to larger banks (a key assumption in mandatory subordinated debt proposals) and Nash bargain over the interest rate, that the smaller bank will choose a higher level of correlation between its assets and the large bank's, leading to a higher joint probability of failure and systemic risk concerns. Furthermore, under some conditions, the mandatory subordinated debt proposal may increase the banks preferred risk of failure. 
Purdue University Monday, July 17, 11:55, Session E The Attack and Defense of WeakestLink Networks (joint work with Dan Kovenock and Roman Sheremeta) Abstract
In a twoplayer game of attack and defense of a weakestlink network of targets, the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is to defend all targets. We experimentally test two theoretical models that differ with regards to the contest success function (CSF) that is used to model the conflict at each target (more specifically, the lottery and auction CSFs), and which result in qualitatively different patterns of equilibrium behavior. We find some support for the comparative statics predictions of both models. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, under both the lottery and auction CSF, as the attacker’s valuation increases, the average resource expenditure, the probability of winning, and the average payoff increase for the attacker and decrease for the defender. Also, consistent with equilibrium behavior under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerrilla warfare” strategy, which involves randomly attacking at most a single target and allocating a random level of force to that target. However, under the lottery CSF, instead of using the theoretical prediction of a “complete coverage” strategy, which involves attacking all targets, we find that attackers use the “guerrilla warfare” strategy and attack only one target. 
University of Washington Friday, July 21, 11:15, Session D Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production [pdf] (joint work with Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarree) Abstract Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. These situations are conveniently modeled as twoarmed bandit problems highlighting a tradeoff between learning (experimentation) and production (exploitation). We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his skill or efficiency in experimentation. Private information in the experimentation stage can generate asymmetric information between the principal and agent about the expected profitability of production. The degree of asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the timing of payments, the length of experimentation, and the output to screen the agent. To induce revelation during the experimentation, the principal utilizes the stochastic structure of asymmetric learning by agents with different skills. Both upward and downward incentive constraints can be binding. The relative probabilities of success and failure between agents of different skills imply that agents are rewarded for success or failure at the boundaries of the experimentation stages: an efficient agent is rewarded for early success and an inefficient agent for late success. When the experimentation stage is short, we show that rewarding failure may be optimal. The optimal contract may also feature excessive experimentation, and over or underproduction. 
University of Bonn Monday, July 17, 11:55, Session D Authority and motivation in situations of open conflict [pdf] (joint work with Stefanie Brilon) Abstract We study the interplay between the authority to select a project and the motivation to work on it in a principalagent problem with nontransferable utility and two distinct features. First, the project’s success depends on effort by both players. Second, it is common knowledge that, conditional on success, the two players prefer different projects to be selected whereas a player’s motivation to work on the other player’s preferred project is his private information. Our main result provides a rationale for delegation when effort by both players is essential for success. 
Hamilton College Thursday, July 20, 11:35, Session C Pecuniary externalities in centralized and decentralized market formats: An experiment [pdf] (joint work with Manizha Sharifova and Jean Paul Rabanal) Abstract We test in a controlled laboratory environment whether traders in a decentralized market internalize the impact of their actions on market prices better than in a centralized market. In the model, traders choose a production level, constrained by the production possibilities frontier. Subsequently, each trader receives a random shock that makes production of only one type of good profitable. In this environment, pecuniary externalities arise because traders value the scarce good more than is socially optimal and thus do not internalize the impact of their production decisions on market prices. We find that decentralized markets are able to slightly mitigate the extent of pecuniary externalities, but not eliminate them. 
Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University Thursday, July 20, 11:35, Session E Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer [pdf] (joint work with Hitoshi Sadakane) Abstract
We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert voluntarily whenever she receives a message. Our results are that under some conditions (i) the decision maker can obtain more detailed information from the expert than that in the Crawford and Sobel model and (ii) there exists an equilibrium whose outcome Pareto dominates all the equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford and Sobel model. Moreover, we find the upper bound of the receiver's equilibrium payoff, and 
University of Guelph Thursday, July 20, 11:35, Session D Heterogeneous vs Homogeneous: Optimal team choice [pdf] (joint work with Esmond Lun) Abstract This paper looks at a firm’s choice about team composition when worker types, who differ in efficiency levels, cost of effort and reservation levels, choose their effort levels optimally given the incentives provided by the firm. The production technology the firm employs requires a team of two workers, and it gives the probability of success based on the workers’ effort choices. We also examine how varying the characteristics of the team success probability affects optimal team composition. We find that under some scenarios if the cost of effort and reservation levels are sufficiently low, hiring only high efficiency types is optimal, resulting in homogeneous teams. As both these costs increase, the firm uses its resources to incentivize one high efficiency worker and fill the other position with a less expensive low efficiency worker resulting in heterogeneous teams. 
Rutgers University Money: an emergent phenomenon

Tel Aviv University A Comment on Marriage With a Sluggish Spouse

University of Valencia Wednesday, July 19, 16:10, Session D Privacy Concerns (joint work with Amparo Urbano) Abstract This paper presents a model of signal extraction of consumer behavior and learning. There is a monopolist selling a good in two purchasing channels  traditional market or Internet . Consumers buying in the online market have a privacy concern, that is unknown to them when they make their purchase in the first period. On the other hand, the monopolist receives a noise signal about the consumers’ average privacy, which allows her to adjust the price in both sale channels. The prices designed by the monopolist in the second period will serve as a signal to the consumers about the use of their privacy, and this, together with their experience from the first period, will determine their demand. The paper shows how a monopolist uses prices to signal the consumers’ private information. This strategy allows her to price discriminate between the two different purchase channels and obtain the consumers’ maximum willingness to pay. 
Syracuse University Monday, July 17, 16:10, Session E When Alliance Makes Contest (Pareto) Efficient: Stag Hunt Contest Alliance, the Alliance Formation Puzzle, and War’s Inefficiency Puzzle [pdf] (joint work with James Boudreau, Lucas Rentschler) Abstract
This study introduces the concept of a stag hunt contest alliance to a Tullock contest game, presents (properties of) the contest success functional (CSF) form for this alliance, and demonstrates that the alliance formation puzzle is solved if alliances form under a stag hunt CSF technology. A stag hunt contest alliance may form as a Nash equilibrium within the standard, threeparty alliance formation puzzle setting. In a stag hunt contest alliance, efforts from respective groups within an alliance interact as complements (rather than as substitutes) within the CSF, as they are coordinated and targeted toward nonallied parties. Within a threeparty contest (i.e., the standard alliance formation puzzle setting), we find conditions by which alliance formation improves expected payoff of each allied party and condition under which alliance formation improves expected payoff of all three parties (relative to unallied, threeparty contest). Conditions for alliance formation are found to exist whether or not a grand coalitional settlement is assumed to be possible. That is, contest with stag hunt alliance may take place even when costless settlement is possible! This result has direct bearing upon “war’s inefficiency puzzle” (Fearon 1998). If a subgroup of parties benefit from conflict with stag hunt alliance, even above costless settlement, then conflict, as chosen, is not inefficient in the Paretian sense. 
University of Wisconsin Monday, July 17, 12:15, Session B Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics and Cooperation in the Centipede Game (joint work with Segismundo S. Izquierdo and Luis R. Izquierdo) Abstract We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent randomly selects a set of strategies according to a given testset rule, plays each strategy in this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest, breaking ties according to a given tiebreaking rule. In the Centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. Play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing each strategy being dependent on the specification of the dynamics, but largely independent of the length of the game. The emergence of cooperative play is robust to allowing agents to test candidate strategies many times, and to introducing substantial proportions of agents who always stop immediately. Since best experienced payoff dynamics are defined by random sampling procedures, they are represented by systems of polynomial differential equations, allowing us to establish key properties of the dynamics using tools from computational algebra. 
University of Oxford Thursday, July 20, 16:10, Session F Optimally Stubborn [pdf] Abstract I consider a bargaining game with two types of players – rational and stubborn. Rational players choose demands at each point in time. Stubborn players are restricted to choose a bargaining strategy from a proper subset of strategies available to rational players. In the simplest case, stubborn players are restricted to choose from the set of “insistent” strategies that always make the same demand and never accept anything less. However, their initial choice of demand is unrestricted. I characterize the equilibria in this game, showing how the flexibility of the stubborn type changes equilibrium predictions. 
LUISS Thursday, July 20, 16:10, Session C On the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy [pdf] (joint work with Riccardo Colini Baldeschi, Roberto Cominetti, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Marco Scarsini) Abstract This paper examines the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the total traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origindestination pairs. We first show that the price of anarchy may remain bounded away from 1, even in simple threelink parallel networks with convex cost functions. On the other hand, empirical studies show that the price of anarchy is close to 1 in highly congested realworld networks, thus begging the question: under what assumptions can this behavior be justified analytically? To that end, we prove a general result showing that for a large class of cost functions (defined in terms of regular variation and including all polynomials), the price of anarchy converges to 1 in the high congestion limit. In particular, specializing to networks with polynomial costs, we show that this convergence follows a power law whose degree can be computed explicitly. 
University of Vienna Tuesday, July 18, 11:15, Session A Robust Bidding in FirstPrice Auctions: How to Bid without Knowing what Others are Doing [pdf] (joint work with Bernhard Kasberger) Abstract
Bidding optimally in firstprice auctions is complicated. In the classical framework, optimal bidding relies on detailed beliefs about other bidders' value distributions and bidding functions. This paper shows how to bid with minimal information. A bidding rule 
University of Bath Tuesday, July 18, 11:55, Session F Who Runs? Honesty and SelfSelection into Politics [pdf] (joint work with Sebastian Fehrler, Urs Fischbacher) Abstract
We examine the incentives to selfselect into politics and how they depend on the 
Universität Bielefeld, Université Paris 1 Wednesday, July 19, 16:10, Session C Information Transmission in Hierarchies [pdf] Abstract We analyze a game in which players with unique information are arranged in a hierarchy. In the lowest layer each player can decide in each of several rounds either to pass the information to his successor or to hold. While passing generates an immediate payoff according to the value of information, the player can also get an additional reward if he is the last player to pass. Facing this problem while discounting over time determines the player’s behavior. Once a successor has collected all information from his workers he starts to play the same game with his successor. We state conditions for different Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria and analyse the time it takes each hierarchy to centralize the information. This allows us to compare different structures and state which structure centralizes fastest depending on the information distribution and other parameters. We show that the time the centralization takes is mostly affected by the least informed players. 
Bar Ilan University, Israel Dierentiation Games [pdf] (joint work with Gilad Bavly and Amnon Schreiber) Abstract We consider a class of games in which players with private information are motivated to dier in their actions. Two related questions are studied: (1) the existence of a \collisionfree" equilibrium, in which no two players choose the same action; (2) the maximal social welfare. We give exact answers for some specic information structures, and a lower bound for the general case. 
Kyoto University Tuesday, July 18, 15:30, Session B Multimarket Contact under Imperfect Observability and Impatience [pdf] Abstract
We study a model of infinitely repeated games where two or more identical prisoners' dilemmas with imperfect public 
Kansas State University Monday, July 17, 15:30, Session E A GameTheoretic Analysis of international Trade and Political Conflict over External Territories [pdf] (joint work with YangMing Chang and Manaf Sellak) Abstract For two large open countries having disputes over external territories rich in resources, we develop a conflicttheoretic model of trade when they may engage in armed confrontation for resource appropriation. The impact of a country's arming on domestic welfare is shown to contain three effects. The first is a termsoftrade effect associated with its final good export, which is welfareimproving as arming causes export price and revenue to go up. The second is a termsoftrade effect associated with its demand for import from the adversary, which is welfarereducing due to a higher import price. The third is an output distortion effect, which is welfarereducing since arming decreases domestic production. We show that greater trade openness (through lower trade barriers) reduces the intensity of conflict when the contending countries are symmetric in all dimensions. This finding is consistent with the "liberal peace" hypothesis. We further analyze how the equilibrium is affected by differences in national endowments. The resulting asymmetric equilibrium reveals that arming by the moreendowed country exceeds that by the lessendowed country and the two adversaries respond to lower trade barriers differently: the moreendowed country decreases arming, whereas the lessendowed country may increase arming. Under endowment asymmetry, conflict intensity may increase despite greater trade openness. 
Penn State University Friday, July 21, 11:15, Session A Obvious mistakes in a strategically simple collegeadmissions environment [pdf] (joint work with Sandor Sovago) Abstract
Around the world, a growing number of students are assigned to schools through centralized clearinghouses that employ strategically simple mechanisms. Using administrative data, we provide direct field evidence that, in spite of the fact that the Hungarian college admissions process uses a strategically simple mechanism, a large fraction of the applicants employ a dominated strategy. These applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the option for a tuition waiver worth thousands of dollars, even though this behavior has no benefit. In many cases applicants would have received the tuition waiver had they asked for it. Obvious mistakes are more common among lowachieving and high socioeconomic status students. Our differenceindifferences design exploits exogenous variation in program selectivity, created by a reform that reduced the number of funded positions in certain fields of study. Our estimates indicate that a rise in program selectivity substantially increases the likelihood of obvious mistakes, especially among high socioeconomic status applicants and lowachieving applicants. Costly mistakes transfer tuition waivers from high to low socioeconomic status applicants and increase the number of students attending college. Taken together, our findings suggest that students facing lower expected cost of making an obvious mistake are more likely to err. 
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile Wednesday, July 19, 16:10, Session F A Supernatural Reputation [pdf] Abstract I study how someone can successfully sustain the reputation of having a special and secret ability to predict the future. Rational agents believe that psychics, financial experts or political advisers have a special ability to predict the future even when they do not, because, in their eyes, the data that would be generated by someone with such abilities is the same as the one generated by someone who only pretends to have a special predicting ability. Experts have an incentive to pretend to have secret special predicting skills as this increases the number of people who are willing to pay for their advice. Furthermore, I argue that an expert who claims to have supernatural powers may actually be better for society than an honest expert, who recognizes that he has no special skill but simply access to better data. 
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile Tuesday, July 18, 15:50, Session C Should the government provide public goods if it cannot commit? [pdf] Abstract I compare two different systems of provision of binary public goods: a centralized system, ruled by a benevolent and inequality averse dictator who has limited commitment power; and a decentralized system, based on voluntary contributions, where agents can communicate but cannot write contracts. I show that any allocation which is implementable in a centralized system and is expost individually rational, is also implementable in the decentralized system. This suggests that when the public good provision problem is merely an informational one, as is the case with binary public goods, a decentralized system performs better. 
Stony Brook University Tuesday, July 18, 15:30, Session A Rational Proofs with NonCooperative Provers [pdf] (joint work with Jing Chen, Samuel McCauley) Abstract
Interactiveproof based approaches are widely used in computation outsourcing and delegation, so as to guarantee the correctness of the computation performed. The verifier models a computationally constrained client and the provers model powerful service providers. Existing interactiveproof models with multiple provers are such that, the provers’ interests either perfectly align (e.g., MIP) or directly conflict (e.g., refereed games) with each other. However, the area of computation outsourcing and delegation naturally allows for situations where different service providers have interests that do not fall in the above two cases, and they act independently of each other. 
Newcastle University Monday, July 17, 15:30, Session D Research among Copycats: R&D, Spillovers, and Feedback Strategies [pdf] (joint work with Florian Wagener) Abstract We study a stochastic dynamic game of process innovation in which firms can initiate and terminate R&D efforts and production at different times. We discern the impact of knowledge spillovers on the investments in existing markets, as well as on the likely structure of newly forming markets, for all possible asymmetries between firms. While an increase in spillovers may improve the likelihood of a competitive market, it may at the same time reduce the level to which a technology is developed. We show that the relation between spillovers, R&D efforts, and surpluses depends on relative as well as absolute efficiency of firms. High spillovers are not necessarily procompetitive as they can make it harder for the laggard to catch up with the technology leader. 
Universite Pierre et Marie Curie  Paris 6 Asymptotic Analysis of Repeated Games: Vanishing Stage Weight vs. Vanishing Stage Duration

EPGE, FGVRJ, Brazil Connecting the Cooperative and Competitive Structures of the MultiplePartners Assignment Game

VU Amsterdam Obvious mistakes in a strategically simple collegeadmissions environment [pdf] (joint work with Ran I. Shorrer) Abstract
Around the world, a growing number of students are assigned to schools through centralized clearinghouses that employ strategically simple mechanisms. Using administrative data, we provide direct field evidence that, in spite of the fact that the Hungarian college admissions process uses a strategically simple mechanism, a large fraction of the applicants employ a dominated strategy. These applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the option for a tuition waiver worth thousands of dollars, even though this behavior has no benefit. In many cases applicants would have received the tuition waiver had they asked for it. Obvious mistakes are more common among lowachieving and high socioeconomic status students. Our differenceindifferences design exploits exogenous variation in program selectivity, created by a reform that reduced the number of funded positions in certain fields of study. Our estimates indicate that a rise in program selectivity substantially increases the likelihood of obvious mistakes, especially among high socioeconomic status applicants and lowachieving applicants. Costly mistakes transfer tuition waivers from high to low socioeconomic status applicants and increase the number of students attending college. Taken together, our findings suggest that students facing lower expected cost of making an obvious mistake are more likely to err. 
University of Texas at Austin Friday, July 21, 11:55, Session D Experimentation with an Informed Principal [pdf] (joint work with Yiman Sun) Abstract This paper studies the agency problem in the presence of an informed principal in a learning environment. A principal hires an agent to experiment on a project. The principal has private information about the quality of her project, while the agent has private information about his own actions. They also face symmetric uncertainty about the project’s viability. I examine the best equilibrium for the high type principal, which is either a fully separating equilibrium or a fully pooling one. Both equilibria feature inefficiently early termination of the project. The difference is that, in the separating equilibrium, the high type principal shares the surplus with the agent, and in the pooling equilibrium, the surplus is retained by the principal. I also study the optimal mechanism designed by a mediator, and show that the high type can approximately obtain her full information surplus in the optimal mechanism. 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Tuesday, July 18, 16:10, Session C Guilt in Voting and Public Good Games [pdf] (joint work with Dominik Rothenhäusler, Nikolaus Schweizer) Abstract
This paper analyzes how moral costs affect individual support of 
Kyoto University Friday, July 21, 13:15, Session F Analysis of the core under inequalityaverse utility functions [pdf] Abstract In this paper, we analyze the core concepts with the people who are influenced by other people, using the cooperative games and social preferences. The social preferences we use in this paper are inequalityaverse utility functions proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and social utility functions proposed by Charness and Rabin (2002). First, we define and characterize the FS core and the CR core, which are the same as the standard core except that the utility functions are the FehrSchmidt or the CharnessRabin type. We show that the FS core shrinks if the people become more envious, but that the FS core may bulge or shrink if the people become more compassionate. We also show that the CR core may bulge or shrink if the people become to consider the social welfare, but that the CR core shrinks if the people become to consider the minimum share. Moreover, we analyze the alphacore and the betacore of the cooperative games, as well as a new core concept that takes account of networks among the players. We show that the FS core is the smallest among these cores and that the alphacore and the betacore coincide and are the largest among these cores under the FehrSchmidt functions. 
California State University Dominguez Hills Monday, July 17, 11:15, Session C Data Preservation in Base Stationless Sensor Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach [pdf] (joint work with Yutian Chen, Bin Tang, and Andre Chen) Abstract
We aim to preserve the large amount of data generated inside base stationless sensor networks with minimum energy cost, while 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Friday, July 21, 11:15, Session C The Role of Concavity in Screening Without Transfers Abstract We study a principalagent relationship without monetary transfers where the principal is uncertain of the agent’s preferences. We provide a simple characterization when it is optimal for the principal to screen. We show that when the principal’s utility is concave enough, it is optimal for the principal to pool and not to elicit any information regarding agent bias. Thus, for this class of preferences, for any number of agents and any distribution over agent preferences, the optimal contract is simple: the principal sets a maximal action and allows the agent to choose any action below the maximum. For preferences that are not concave enough (though they may still be concave), it is optimal for the principal to screen. Moreover, the elementary proof presented in this paper provides new intuition for the optimality of interval delegation (and when it is suboptimal): the payoff distributions generated by nonconvex sets are meanpreserving spreads of those generated by convex sets. We also provide comparative statics of the optimal contract. 
Cornell University Learning in repeated games

Stony Brook University and IDC Coordination Games With Unknown Outside Options (joint work with Artyom Jelnov, and Chang Zhao)

Microsoft The Evolution of Proofs in Computer Science

Universidad de Chile Tuesday, July 18, 15:50, Session E Takeitorleaveit contracts in manytomany matching markets [pdf] (joint work with Antonio Romero Medina) Abstract
We study a class of sequential nonrevelation mechanisms where hospitals 
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Thursday, July 20, 15:50, Session On stability of coalitions when externalities and stochasticity coexist [pdf] (joint work with R K Amit) Abstract
We consider a class of cooperative games with transferable utilities where the payoff to a coalition is a 
Hebrew University Generalized Thirdprice Auctions (joint work with Yair Tauman)

University of Valencia Wednesday, July 19, 11:15, Session D Multiproduct trading of indivisible goods with many sellers and buyers [pdf] (joint work with Ivan Arribas) Abstract This paper analyzes oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a finite set of heterogeneous buyers, extending the analysis of Arribas and Urbano (2017 (a) and (b)). We show the existence of efficient subgame perfect equilibrium by formulating the problem as the linear programming relaxation of the standard Package Assignment model. We prove that a set of modified versions of the dual programming problem characterizes the efficient (nonlinear) equilibrium prices. We study the conditions for the existence of efficient equilibrium in terms of the consumers’ value functions. 
University of South Carolina Friday, July 21, 13:35, Session B Contests with Entry Fees (joint work with Alexander Matros) Abstract
We study Tullock's (1980) nplayer contest with entry fees. We characterize a unique symmetric equilibrium for any number of players, n, and any cost, c. This unique symmetric equilibrium might be in mixed strategies. We demonstrate that total equilibrium spending is singlepeaked in c. We also show that total equilibrium spending satisfies singlecrossing property for any two different number of players. It turns out that, if n is given, the contest designer can choose the optimal c which maximizes her expected payoff; on the other hand, if c is given, she can choose the optimal n which maximizes her expected payoff. 
VU University Amsterdam Friday, July 21, 13:35, Session F Centrality measures as utility functions for positions in networks [pdf] (joint work with Agnieszka Rusinowska) Abstract
The study of network centrality originates from the social network literature where different types of network centrality are distinguished, such as degree, closeness, betweenness, etc. Various centrality measures are developed measuring these types of centrality. More recently, these centrality measures are used to measure centrality in economic networks. However, there is no utility foundation of network centrality. Since economic decision making is based on preferences of economic decision makers, a utility foundation is fundamental for the application of centrality measures in economic models. We develop such a utility foundation for network centrality by considering network centrality measures as von NeumannMorgenstern utility functions reflecting preferences over positions in networks. In this way, we can evaluate different positions in different networks and address questions as: does an agent prefer to be the top of a small organization or a middle manager in a large organization? 
Stellenbosch University Monday, July 17, 11:15, Session B Using Minigames to Explain Imperfect Outcomes in the Ultimatum Game [pdf] Abstract In evolutionary game theory, “minigames” with reduced strategy sets are sometimes analysed in lieu of more complex models with many strategies. Are these simplified versions up to the task of explaining pertinent dynamic features of the larger models? This paper looks at the ultimatum game, in which it is known that a noisy evolutionary model leads to stable dynamic equilibriums that are far away from the game’s unique subgame perfect solution. It is argued that a naive approach is unsatisfactory and that the minigame analysis is more useful when related to the full game explicitly. A constellation of embedded minigames is identified in the full game, one for each imperfect equilibrium of the full game, with each playing out on its own conditional frequency space. It is shown that the conditional frequency dynamics applicable to these minigames have the same form as a full game’s dynamics with a reduced strategy set. While the minigames thus identified are still not twodimensional, it is shown that two critical variables in each can be treated separately from the others, and these indeed behave like the variables in a twodimensional standalone minigame. A graphical analysis based on selectionmutation equilibrium loci allows a clear understanding of why stable imperfect equilibriums exist and which factors tend to stabilize particular equilibriums. For example, loweroffer equilibriums are easier to stabilize, because a) proposers have more to lose by deviating from them and b) responder mutation aims at a higher target for the relevant conditional frequency. 
New York University Tuesday, July 18, 11:35, Session Backward Discounting [pdf] (joint work with Debraj Ray, Ruqu Wang) Abstract
We study a model in which lifetime individual utility is derived from both present and past consumption streams. 
SaintLouis University Brussels Tuesday, July 18, 12:15, Session D Price Discrimination and Dispersion under Asymmetric Profiling of Consumers. [pdf] (joint work with Paul Belleflamme and Wynne Lam) Abstract
Two duopolists compete in price on the market for a homogeneous product. They can use a `profiling technology' that allows them to identify the 
Radboud University Tuesday, July 18, 15:30, Session Professional norms as incentives: experiments with professionals and students [pdf] (joint work with JanDirk Kamman, Max Boodie) Abstract
Do professional norms affect behavior and even override monetary incentives? We 
Zhejiang University Thursday, July 20, 16:10, Session B Testability of evolutionary game dynamics based on experimental economics data (joint work with Yijia Wang, Xiaojie Chen and Zhijian Wang) Abstract Understanding the dynamic processes of a real game system requires an appropriate dynamics model, and rigorously testing a dynamics model is nontrivial. In our methodological research, we develop an approach to testing the validity of game dynamics models that considers the dynamic patterns of angular momentum and speed as measurement variables. Using RockPaperScissors (RPS) games as an example, we illustrate the geometric patterns in the experiment data. We then derive the related theoretical patterns from a series of typical dynamics models. By testing the goodnessoffit between the experimental and theoretical patterns, we show that the validity of these models can be evaluated quantitatively. Our approach establishes a link between dynamics models and experimental systems, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the most effective and rigorous strategy for ascertaining the testability of evolutionary game dynamics models. 
Hofstra Northwell School of Medicine Friday, July 21, 11:15, Session B Identify the Leadership in Decision Making  a Practical Stackelberg Model Approach [pdf] Abstract In the era of big data, with vast information about markets, households, and individuals, it is important to be able to use the actual data to figure out the leaderfollower roles. Stackelberg model is one useful tool to identify the true leader of duopoly decision making. In this study, we elaborate the theoretical Stackelberg model, derive the likelihood function, and show some practical examples of using actual data to apply the model. We also compare the results of Stackelberg model with the BivariateProbit model for various subsamples defined by cluster analysis to allow for heterogeneity in decisionmaking. 
University of Texas Monday, July 17, 11:55, Session B Confounded Observational Learning with Common Values [pdf] Abstract We modify the standard herding model so that a fraction of players are naive and rely exclusively on private information. The rest players are rational and uncertain about proportion of naive players. We find that learning could be confounded in the long run, despite private signal strength could be unbounded. 
Keio University Monday, July 17, 11:55, Session F Bargaining Outcomes in Patent Licencing: our reply to questions we received from Pro. Yair Tauman [pdf] (joint work with Shin Kishimoto, Toshiyuki Hirai, and Shigeo Muto)

National Cheng Kung University Monday, July 17, 15:30, Session Behavioral Monotonicity and Value Encoding in a Bayesian Game – Observations from an fMRI Experiment [pdf] (joint work with JenTang Cheng and YiReng Hsu)

BenGurion University Wednesday, July 19, 16:10, Session Values for Environments with Externalities  The Average Approach, Strong Symmetry and Equal Treatment [pdf] (joint work with Ines MachoStadler, and David PerezCastrillo)

University of Texas at Austin Monday, July 17, 11:15, Session Relative Performance Concerns Among Investment Managers [pdf] Abstract
This paper examines the strategic interaction of n portfolio managers with 
Federal Trade Commission Thursday, July 20, 11:55, Session C Experimental Tests of Hotelling’s Rule about NonRenewable Resource Prices [pdf] (joint work with Scott Templeton) Abstract A fundamental idea in natural resources economics, known as Hotelling’s rule, is that the price of scarce, exhaustible resources rise over time, with the exact path determined by the interest rate (Hotelling 1931). We run a basic laboratory test of this theory, looking at how closely Hotelling’s rule predicts the behavior of quantitatively sophisticated sellers selling a scarce resource in a dynamic oligopolistic market. We find that Hotelling’s rule accurately predicts average behavior in these markets, but that it is not a good predictor of behavior at the indiviual level. Individuals are reasonably good at optimizing across time, but about half make strategic mistakes that limit the applicability of Hotelling’s rule. These mistakes correspond to several ruleofthumb strategies that are suboptimal in our environment. 
Vanderbilt University Thursday, July 20, 15:50, Session A Own Experience Bias, Prejudice and Discrimination (joint work with Edward Cartwright)

University of Arizona Monday, July 17, 11:55, Session C Coordinated Sequential Bayesian Persuasion in a MultiSender Case [pdf] Abstract
This paper studies an extended Bayesian Persuasion model where there are multiple senders ``persuading'' one receiver sequentially and the subsequent players can always observe previous signals and messages. Senders have access to a costless signal space as rich as in KG (2011)(2016a) and the information structure corresponds to the coordinated signals defined in Li and Norman (2015). I give the existence proof and the characterization of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium through a backward recursive method suggested by Harris (1985). SPE summarize the multiplicity of possible strategic interactions among players and identify the range of equilibrium payoffs for senders through persuasion. 
Singapore University of Technology and Design Monday, July 17, 11:35, Session B Stochastic stability in finite extensiveform games of perfect information [pdf] Abstract We consider a basic stochastic evolutionary model with rare mutation and a bestreply/betterreply selection mechanism. We call a population state stochastically stable if its longterm relative frequency of occurrence is bounded away from zero as the mutation rate decreases to zero. We prove that in any finite extensiveform game of perfect information, the discretetime bestreply dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium almost surely. Moreover, only Nash equilibria can be stochastically stable under the bestreply evolutionary dynamic. We present a `centipedetrust game', where we show that both the backwardinduction equilibrium component and the Paretodominant equilibrium component are stochastically stable, even when the populations increase to infinity. For finite extensiveform games of perfect information, we give a sufficient condition for stochastic stability of the backwardinduction equilibrium and the set of nonbackwardinduction equilibria, respectively, and show how much extra payoff is needed to turn an equilibrium stochastically stable. 
The University of Chicago Wednesday, July 19, 15:30, Session A Monopolistic Pricing with Third Party Information Response [pdf] Abstract
This paper studies the robustness of mechanism design with respect to endogenous information manipulation by a third party, who chooses the information structure of the players in the mechanism. In addition, the third party's choice of information structure is unobservable to the mechanism designer. 
University of Chicago Thursday, July 20, 11:55, Session F Information, Bargaining Power and Efficiency: Reexamining the Role of Incomplete Information in Crisis Bargaining [pdf] Abstract In this article, we showed that in general, without fully specifying the underlying game form a priori, the possibility and likelihood of inefficient breakdowns in crisis bargaining depend neither only on whether incomplete information is in presence, nor only on the nature of private information. Instead, it is the alignment between bargaining power and the underlying information structure that determine the possibilities and likelihoods of inefficient breakdowns. Moreover, introduction of additional private information does not necessarily lead to extra loss of efficiency. Several implications can be drawn from these results. First, probability of inefficient breakdown is higher when the allocation of bargaining power is less wellaligned with the underlying information structure. Second, regarding to international security, reducing incomplete information is not the only way to reduce probability of war. Instead, reallocating bargaining power properly would also be effective in reducing probability of wars. Finally, these results also provide a formal justification for the Power Transition Theory as the statusquo power can be interpreted as the party with more bargaining power when the information structure shifts due to power transition. 
Washington University in St Louis Friday, July 21, 13:15, Session C Opinion Manipulation and Disagreement in Social Networks [pdf] Abstract Abstract I study a bounded rationality model of opinion formation in which there are two different types of agents: naive agents and sophisticated agents. All agents update opinions by taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. Naive agents truthfully report their opinions, but sophisticated agents can strategically report opinions to manipulate naive agents. I show that the limiting opinions are completely determined by sophisticated agents' bias and the structure of the network; and generically, there is no consensus. I analyze how disagreement is affected by the lying cost, diverging interests and the spectral gap of the social network. I also show that naive agents don't have any social influence and sophisticated agents' social influence can be decomposed into two separate factors: direct influence and indirect influence. 
University of Texas at Austin Wednesday, July 19, 15:50, Session B Bifurcation Mechanism Design  From Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments [pdf] (joint work with Ger Yang, Georgios Piliouras, David Basanta) Abstract Small changes to the parameters of a system can lead to abrupt qualitative changes of its behavior, a phenomenon known as bifurcation. Such instabilities are typically considered problematic, however, we show that their power can be leveraged to design novel types of mechanisms. Hysteresis mechanisms use transient changes of system parameters to induce a permanent improvement to its performance via optimal equilibrium selection. Optimal control mechanisms induce convergence to states whose performance is better than even the best equilibrium. We apply these mechanisms in two different settings that illustrate the versatility of bifurcation mechanism design. In the first one we explore how introducing flat taxation can improve social welfare, despite decreasing agent "rationality", by destabilizing inefficient equilibria. From there we move on to consider a well known game of tumor metabolism and use our approach to derive novel cancer treatment strategies. 
The Ohio State University Wednesday, July 19, 15:30, Session D Quality Disclosure on Online Marketplaces [pdf] Abstract We analyze duopoly firms' quality disclosure incentive when they sell a horizontally and vertically differentiated product in an online marketplace. Vertical characteristic of a product, say quality, is common to all consumers but is privately known to its producer while horizontal characteristic of both products is known to all consumers. We assume that the online marketplace can observe the realized quality of both products that are sold through it and can send unverifiable messages regarding the product information to consumers with no costs. We show that there exists a set of equilibria where both firms use a cutoff strategy for quality disclosure decision and the online platform employs a communication rule sending informative messages that consumers use to learn about which product's quality is higher. Indeed, sending ``comparative messages" in equilibrium is payoffdominant for the platform among all possible informative equilibria in the interim subgame where no firm discloses quality. We also show that firms which are on an informative platform withhold information more than when they are on a ``noninformative platform". Comparative statics and welfare comparison between ``comparative platform" and ``noninformative platform" are provided. 
LSE and University of Oxford Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence to Nash Equilibrium [pdf] (joint work with Itai Arieli and Peyton Young) Abstract
We study how long it takes for large populations of interacting agents to come close 
LSE and University of Oxford Contagion in Financial Networks Abstract The recent financial crisis highlighted the increasingly complex web of interconnections between financial institutions, including banks, hedge funds, insurance companies, and asset managers. This lecture will show how concepts from network games can be adapted to model the transmission and amplification of shocks to the financial system. We formulate criteria for identifying key vulnerabilities in the system that are distinct from traditional notions such as eigenvector centrality in the social networks literature. The theory will be illustrated with detailed data on derivatives exposures, which was a major source of contagion in the last crisis. 
University of New South Wales Wednesday, July 19, 11:15, Session B Optimal Retirement Policies with TimeInconsistent Agents [pdf] Abstract This paper develops a general theory for the design of retirement policies, like social security and retirement accounts, within a Mirrlees taxation framework with timeinconsistent agents. The paper shows how the design of offequilibrium path policies utilize the time inconsistency of agents to improve welfare. Despite the presence of asymmetric information, the full information efficient outcome is implementable, regardless of the degree of sophistication or temptation. In particular, in an environment with both timeconsistent and timeinconsistent agents, welfare increases monotonically with the population of timeinconsistent agents. For implementation, the paper focuses on the design of social security and retirement accounts. The optimal policy has social security benefits decreasing in progressivity with the initial withdrawal age. It also allows early withdrawals from retirement accounts only when there are large income discrepancies. These proposals out perform traditional policies, like linear savings subsidies or mandatory savings, by raising welfare above the constrained efficient optimum. 
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem On the Strategic Use of Seller Information in PrivateValue FirstPrice Auctions

Ohio State University Thursday, July 20, 11:15, Session A Partition Obvious Preference and Mechanism Design: Theory and Experiment [pdf] (joint work with Dan Levin) Abstract
Substantial experimental evidence shows that decision makers often fail to choose 
California Institute of Technology Tuesday, July 18, 15:30, Session E Efficient and fair assignment mechanism is strongly group manipulable [pdf] Abstract This paper studies the allocation of indivisible objects to agents without using monetary transfers. Fairness often motivates social planners to use random assignments. However, I show that if a mechanism satisfies a minimum efficiency requirement (expost efficiency) and some mild fairness requirements, it must be manipulable by a group of agents in a strong sense: by misreporting preferences each agent of the group can obtain a lottery that strictly firstorder stochastically dominates the lottery he would obtain in the truthtelling case. My result holds as long as there are at least three agents and at least three objects, no matter outside option exists or not. Nonmanipulability results exist when there are only two objects and outside option does not exist. 
Tel Aviv University Thursday, July 20, 12:15, Session B Optimal Dynamic Inspection (joint work with Eilon Solan) Abstract Consider a discounted repeated inspection game with two agents and one principal. Both agents may profit by violating certain rules, while the principal can inspect on at most one agent in each period, inflicting a punishment on an agent who is caught violating the rules. Suppose the principal, whose sole aim is to deter the violation behavior, has Stackelberg leader advantage. We attempt to characterize the principal's optimal inspection strategy. 
Columbia University Thursday, July 20, 15:50, Session F Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition [pdf] Abstract In this paper, I studied an information acquisition problem: a decision maker(DM) acquires information about payoff relevant states to facilitate decision making. The DM can choose any dynamic signal process as information source, subject to a cost on its informativeness in unit time. In the continuous time limit, I showed that optimal signal structure almost always forms a Poisson process except for nongeneric cases. By further assuming informativeness measure being posterior separable, I fully characterized optimal learning dynamics: the DM will seek for an informative evidence arriving as a Poisson process that Confirms prior belief and lead to Immediate action with Increasing precision and Decreasing intensity over time. 
Northwestern University Wednesday, July 19, 15:30, Session F The Last Step to the Throne, the Relationship between Monarchs and Crown Princes (joint work with Congyi Zhou) Abstract In this article, we model the relationship between an incumbent autocrat (a monarch) and his appointed successor (a crown prince) through a dynamic game. The monarch prefers to cultivating a successor in advance to prepare a smooth powerful transition, however he is also afraid of being oust by his successor. Meanwhile, the crown prince worries about being replaced by the monarch. This mutual fear may lead to the conflict between two parties. We find the probability of conflict will increase when the monarch lives longer or the number of potential successor increases, whereas, it can also be reduced by providing an institutionalized succession procedure. Finally, we use the data from the ancient China to test the model and find consistent evidences for the prediction from the model. 
Universite Paris Dauphine Some Mathematical Applications of Game Theory

Temple University Monday, July 17, 15:30, Session B Gains in evolutionary dynamics: unifying rational framework for dynamic stability [pdf] Abstract In this paper, we investigate gains from strategy revisions in deterministic evolutionary dynamics. To clarify the gain from revision, we propose a framework to reconstruct an evolutionary dynamic from optimal decision with stochastic (possibly restricted) available action set and switching cost. Many of major nonimitative dynamics can be constructed in this framework. We formally define net gains from revisions and obtain several general properties of the gain function, which leads to Nash stability of contractive gamesgeneralization of concave potential gamesand local asymptotic stability of a regular evolutionary stable state. The unifying framework allows us to apply the Nash stability to mixture of heterogeneous populations, whether heterogeneity is observable or unobservable or whether heterogeneity is in payoffs or in revision protocols. This extends the known positive results on evolutionary implementation of social optimum through Pigouvian pricing to the presence of heterogeneity and nonaggregate payoff perturbations. While the analysis here is confined to general strategicform games, we finally discuss that the idea of reconstructing evolutionary dynamics from optimization with switching costs and focusing on net revision gains for stability is promising for further applications to more complex situations. 