Abstracts 
Toulouse School of Economics Contracting for experimentation and the value of bad news Abstract

TOBB University of Economics and Technology Welfare Comparison of Allocation Mechanisms under Incomplete Information [pdf] Abstract We study the problem of allocating n objects to n agents without monetary transfers in a setting where each agent's preference is privately known. We show that when each agent's ranking over objects is independent of other agents' rankings and each possible ranking is equally likely, the celebrated Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism is unambiguously welfare inferior to another allocation method, the Restricted Ranking mechanism, when the number of agents and objects is large. More precisely, every type of every agent has a higher interim utility under the Restricted Ranking mechanism. This result also has an implication about the welfare comparison of two widely used allocation methods for school choice, the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism and the Boston mechanism: When each school ranks students identically, the Boston mechanism is welfare superior to the DA mechanism in the same strong manner in large markets. 
Basque Country University Friday, July 24, 10:15, Session C A common axiom for classical division rules for claims problems [pdf] (joint work with J. Carlos Santos) Abstract
In this paper we propose a new axiom for claims problems, named claims separability. It is satisfied by the uniform gains rule, the uniform losses rule, the Talmud rule, Piniles' rule , the minimal overlap rule and the proportional rule. This new axiom is also satisfied by the rules in the TALfamily defined by MorenoTernero and Villar (2006), and the alternative extension of the Ibn Ezra rule introduced by Bergantiños and MendezNaya (2001) and characterized by Alcalde et al. (2005). Claims separability follows from the fact that if agent j claims more than agent i, then the claim of agent j is formed by the claim of agent i plus the remaining claim of agent j. Claims separability requires the allocation of agent j to be equal to the allocation of agent i plus the allocation of agent j in a remaining claims problem. 
Public University of Navarre, Spain. Friday, July 24, 10:45, Session F Strategyproof location of public facilities [pdf] (joint work with Jorge AlcaldeUnzu and Marc Vorsatz) Abstract Agents frequently have different opinions on the decision of where to locate a public facility: while some agents may prefer to have it closer to them, others may prefer to have it far away. To aggregate agents' preferences in these cases, we propose a new domain of preferences in which agents may have singlepeaked or singledipped preferences on the location of the facility, but such that the peak or dip is situated in the location of the agent. We characterize all strategyproof rules in this domain and we show that all these rules are also group strategyproof. We show that this family allows us to escape from the classical impossibility result of Gibbard and Satterthwaite with meaningful rules in almost all cases. Additionally, we characterize the subfamilies of rules that are also Pareto efficient in some focal cases. 
University College Dublin Monday, July 20, 14:45, Session A FosterHart Risk and the ToobigtoFail Banks [pdf] (joint work with Tiantian Li, Tetsuo Kurosaki, Young Shin Kim) Abstract
The measurement of financial risk relies on two factors: determination of riskiness by use of an appropriate risk measure; and the distribution according to which returns are governed. Wrong estimates of either, severely compromise the accuracy of computed risk. We identify the toobigtofail banks with the set of “Global Systemically Important Banks” (GSIBs) and analyze the equity risk of its equally weighted portfolio by means of the “FosterHart risk measure” — a new, reserve based measure of risk, extremely sensitive to tail events. We model banks’ stock returns as an ARMAGARCH process with multivariate “Normal Tempered Stable” (NTS) innovations, to capture the skewed and leptokurtotic nature of stock returns. Our union of the FosterHart risk modeling with fattailed statistical modeling bears fruit, as we are able to measure the equity risk posed by the GSIBs more accurately than is possible with current techniques. We also study the corresponding mean risk analysis problem and are able to 
University of Rochester Thursday, July 23, 15:45, Session A Intermediary Bargaining for PriceInsensitive Consumers [pdf] (joint work with Shiran Rachmilevitch) Abstract We show that under common assumptions, prices derived from standard bargaining models between insurers and hospitals are such that surplusmaximizing insurers pay more for every patientservice than the value of the service to the patient. We propose an alternative model, consistent with practitioner evidence. The equilibrium of our model and the corresponding equations for estimation are such that prices must be lower than the value of the service. We also show that a commonlyassumed pricemonotonicity property may be violated in a variety of standard models and propose a version of the property that is satisfied in our model 
Stanford University Wednesday, July 22, 10:15, Session D Short Lists In Centralized Clearinghouses [pdf] Abstract
Stable matching mechanisms are used to clear many twosided markets. In most settings, participants’ lists tend to be short (even if there are many potentially acceptable matches). This paper studies the consequences of this fact, and focuses on two broad questions. First, when lists are short, what is the quantity and quality of matches formed through the clearinghouse? Second, what are the effects of introducing an aftermarket which allows agents left unmatched by the clearinghouse to find one another? 
Stanford University Friday, July 24, 10:15, Session B Auctions, Adverse Selection, and Internet Display Advertising [pdf] (joint work with Paul Milgrom, Marissa Beck) Abstract We model an online display advertising environment with brand advertisers and betterinformed performance advertisers, and seek an auction mechanism that is strategyproof, anonymous and insulates brand advertisers from adverse selection. We find that the only such mechanism that is also falsename proof assigns the item to the highest bidding performance advertiser only when the ratio of the highest bid to the second highest bid is sufficiently large. For fattailed matchvalue distributions, this new mechanism captures most of the gains from good matching and improves match values substantially compared to the common practice of setting aside impressions in advance. 
University of Chicago Monday, July 20, 10:45, Session D Empirical Contest Models [pdf] (joint work with Jun Xiao)

University of Barcelona Wednesday, July 22, 10:45, Session D Generalized threesided assignment markets: core and competitive prices [pdf] (joint work with Francesc Llerena, Marina Nunez) Abstract
A class of threesided assignment markets is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual antimonotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized threesided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffvectors. 
Stanford University The Internet and the News Media Abstract The internet has changed the way people access information. Powerful new intermediaries, including news aggregators and social media, have affected consumer demand for news, which in turn affects media advertising markets as well as markets for media content. The talk will present empirical findings, including that aggregators and social media cause users to greatly diversify the set of outlets that they read, while decreasing loyalty to traditional outlets. Aggregators reduce search costs, increase traffic to smaller outlets but appear to compete with the largest outlets. Social media also changes the type of content read, including changes in perspective, tone, and political bias. The talk will further present a theoretical analysis of the impact of the increase in consumer multihoming on advertising markets. 
Ohio State University Tuesday, July 21, 14:45, Session F On the self(in)stability of weighted majority rules [pdf] (joint work with Semin Kim) Abstract
A voting rule $f$ is selfstable (Barbera and Jackson, 2004) if any alternative rule $g$ does not have sufficient support in the society to replace $f$, where the decision between $f$ and $g$ is based on the rule $f$ itself. While Barbera and Jackson focused on anonymous rules in which all agents have the same voting power, we consider here the larger class of weighted majority rules. Our main result is a characterization of selfstability in this setup, which shows that only few rules of a very particular form satisfy this criterion. This result provides a possible explanation for the tendency of societies to use more conservative rules when it comes to changing the voting rule. We discuss selfstability in this latter case, where a different rule $F$ may be used to decide between $f$ and $g$. 
Royal Holloway, U of London Wednesday, July 22, 11:15, Session D Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only. [pdf] Abstract
Fix a Pareto optimal, strategy proof and nonbossy deterministic matching mechanism and define a random matching mechanism by assigning agents to the roles in the mechanism via a uniform lottery. Given a profile of preferences, 
Virginia Tech Tuesday, July 21, 10:45, Session Stable cost sharing in production allocation games [pdf] (joint work with Christian Trudeau) Abstract
Suppose that a group of agents have demands for some good. Each one of them owns a 
Amherst College Friday, July 24, 10:45, Session B A DetailFree and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders [pdf] (joint work with Brian Baisa) Abstract
Consider an auction for a divisible good where bidders have private budgets. Recent work by Dobzinski, Lavi, and Nisan (2012) shows there is no individually rational dominant strategy mechanism that implements a Pareto efficient outcome and satisfies weak budget balance when bidders have private budgets. 
MTA TKI Monday, July 20, 10:15, Session D Strategic segmentation: creating monopolies can increase welfare [pdf] Abstract
In this article we show that a wellestablished firm might benefit from excluding some consumers 
University of Texas at Dallas Tuesday, July 21, 11:15, Session Cost Enabled Choice of Pricing Rule when Buyers' Information is Private [pdf] Abstract
The prices a consumer knows are her private information and determine her acceptance/rejection decision to a seller's price. Posted prices (with an implicit take it or leave it oer) may not then be a seller's best strategy. Inviting every buyer to reveal her private information is attractive, especially for a low cost seller, as it helps to tailor the price to the consumer and reduces the proportion of rejections. This paper seeks to explore endogenous choices of pricing rules between heterogeneous cost sellers in such a market. I restrict the investigation to the comparison of posted price (take it or leave it) with two alternative rules or interactions that have comparable transaction simplicity. The price matching interaction proves to be desirable, solving important informational issues and adverse selection present in the other two. But the highest cost sellers are unable to adopt this interaction in a market with free entry and through their rejection of matching, fall back to posted price (take it or leave it). In any endogenous equilibrium therefore there would be a mixture of sellers using posted price (take it or leave it) and price matching, with price matching possible only below a threshold cost (relative to the market). The adoption of price matching by a seller increases the price it posts. However, the 
University of Bath, England Wednesday, July 22, 14:45, Session D NonClassical Approaches to the BrandenburgerKeisler Paradox [pdf] Abstract In this paper, we consider a wellknown epistemic game theoretical paradox, called the BrandenburgerKeisler Paradox, and provide various alternative models in which the paradoxical statement becomes satisfiable. For this task, first, we resort to various nonclassical logical frameworks, and reformulate the paradoxical statement in them. We discuss the paradox in nonwellfounded set theory and in paraconsistent (inconsistencyfriendly) logic. By constructing models which satisfy the paradoxical sentence, we provide a richer toolkit which can be used in epistemic game theoretical formalisms, and suggest that the choice of classical and traditional models in epistemic game theory seems rather arbitrary. Second, we suggest a different formulation of the paradox which requires models with higher cardinality. We achieve this by constructing a Yablolike version of the paradox which turns out $>\omega$categorical. 
Technical University of Berlin Tuesday, July 21, 15:15, Session F The Borda Count and dominance solvable voting games [pdf] Abstract We analyse dominance solvability (by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) of voting games with three candidates and provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the Borda Count to yield a unique winner. We find that Borda is the unique scoring rule that is dominance solvable both (i) under unanimous agreement on a best candidate and (ii) under unanimous agreement on a worst candidate and in the absence of a tie. Turning to generalized scoring rules, we find that Approval Voting violates a desirable monotonicity property: a candidate that is the unique dominance solvable winner for some preference profile, may lose the election once she gains further popularity. In contrast, a candidate that is the unique dominance solvable winner under Borda, will always remain so as her popularity increases. 
Federal Reserve Board Thursday, July 23, 10:15, Session D Deadlines and Matching [pdf] (joint work with Garth Baughman (UPenn)) Abstract Deadlines and fixed end dates are pervasive in matching markets such as school choice or the market for new graduates. Finite time introduces fundamental nonstationarity and complexity in behavior, driving significant departures from the steadystate equilibria usually studied in the search and matching literature. I consider a twosided matching market with search frictions where heterogeneous agents attempt to form bilateral matches before a deadline. I give conditions for existence and uniqueness, and show that all equilibria exhibit an "anticipation effect" where less attractive agents become increasingly choosy, preferring to wait for the opportunity to match with attractive agents who, in turn, become increasingly desperate as the deadline approaches. When payoffs accrue after the deadline, or agents do not discount, this effect totally dominates: at any point in time, the market is segmented into a first class of acceptable agents and a second class of unacceptable agents. This points to a different interpretation of unraveling observed in some markets and provides a benchmark for other studies of nonstationary matching markets. The market admits a simple intervention participation costs which dramatically improves efficiency. 
ESADE Business School The Social Value of Information with an Endogenous Public Signal [pdf] Abstract I analyse the equilibrium and welfare properties of an economy characterised by uncertainty and payoff externalities, in a general model which nests several applications. Agents receive a private signal and an endogenous public signal, which is a noisy aggregate of individual actions. I analyse how endogenous public information, which causes an information externality, combines with payoff externalities in order to disentangle their joint effect on the agents' use of signals. I find that agents underweight private information in a larger payoff parameter region compared to when public information is exogenous. Furthermore, with endogenous public information I find that the sign of the social value of private information may be overturned and that it is empirically more plausible that increasing the precision of the noise in the public signal decreases welfare in some applications, such as in the beauty contest, thus contributing to the transparency debate. 
Hebrew U Monday, July 20, 10:15, Session C Networks of Complements [pdf] (joint work with Moshe Babaioff and Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan) Abstract
We consider a network of sellers, each selling a single product, where the graph structure represents pairwise complementarities 
U. of California, Berkeley Thursday, July 23, 14:45, Session A Affirmative Action as a Large Contest [pdf] (joint work with Aaron BodohCreed and Brent Hickman) Abstract
We develop a model of affirmative action as a large contest wherein students with heterogeneous underlying abilities compete for seats at vertically differentiated colleges that use colorsighted affirmative action policies to evaluate applicants. Students make costly human capital investments before applying, and these investments are both intrinsically productive and serve as signals of ability to colleges. We use a continuum model to approximate the outcomes of the game with large, but finite, sets of colleges and students. First, we show that (legal) admissions preference schemes and (illegal) quotas are, in fact, outcome equivalent. Second, we design affirmative action systems that maximize welfare, close the blackwhite test gap, and achieve fair outcomes. 
University of Colorado Friday, July 24, 14:45, Session C Understanding the Influence of Adversaries in Distributed Systems [pdf] (joint work with Holly Borowski and Jason Marden) Abstract
Transitioning from a centralized to a distributed 
University of Texas, Austin Friday, July 24, 15:15, Session C Strategic exit with random observations [pdf] Abstract In the standard optimal stopping problems, actions are artificially restricted to the moments of observations of costs or benefits. In the standard experimentation and learning models based on twoarmed Poisson bandits, it is possible to take an action between two sequential observations. The latter models do not recognize the fact that timing of decisions depends not only on the rate of arrival of observations, but also on the dynamics of costs or benefits. We combine together these two strands of literature and consider bandits of "evolving shade of grey" instead of twoarmed bandits who are either "white knights" or "black villains." Stopping decisions in a model with Poisson bandits of "evolving shade of gray" are qualitatively different from those in optimal stopping or Poisson bandit models. We consider a case of two firms operating a technology which may experience costly breakdowns. The cost of breakdowns follows a jumpdiffusion process. Breakdowns occur at random times, which follow a Poisson process independent of the cost process. The arrival rate of breakdowns may be high or low, but it is initially unknown. The firms differ by the rates of arrival, recovery rates and costs of breakdowns. We solve for the optimal exit strategy of the players. 
New York University Friday, July 24, 10:15, Session A How to Divide Things Fairly [pdf] (joint work with D. Marc Kilgour and Christian Klamler) Abstract We analyze a simple sequential algorithm (SA) for allocating indivisible items that are strictly ranked by n ≥ 2 players. It yields at least one Paretooptimal allocation which, when n = 2, is envyfree unless no envyfree allocation exists. However, an SA allocation may not be maximin or Borda maximin—maximize the minimum rank, or the Borda score, of the items received by a player. Although SA is potentially vulnerable to manipulation, it would be difficult to manipulate in the absence of one player’s having complete information about the other players’ preferences. We discuss the applicability of SA, such as in assigning people to committees or allocating marital property in a divorce. 
The University of Colorado at Boulder Monday, July 20, 15:15, Session C Optimal Mechanisms for Robust Coordination in Congestion Games [pdf] (joint work with Philip N. Brown, Jason R. Marden) Abstract Uninfluenced social systems often exhibit suboptimal performance; a common mitigation technique is to charge agents speciallydesigned taxes, influencing the agents' choices and thereby bringing aggregate social behavior closer to optimal. In general, the efficiency guaranteed by a particular taxation methodology is limited by the quality of information available to the taxdesigner. If the taxdesigner possesses a perfect characterization of the system, it is often straightforward to design taxes which perfectly optimize the behavior of the agent population. In this paper, we investigate situations in which the taxdesigner lacks such a perfect characterization and must design taxes that are robust to a variety of model imperfections. Specifically, we study the application of taxes to a networkrouting game, and we assume that the taxdesigner knows neither the network topology nor the taxsensitivities and demands of the agents. Nonetheless, we show that it is possible to design taxes that guarantee that network flows are arbitrarily close to optimal flows, despite the fact that agents' taxsensitivities are unknown to us. We term these taxes "universal," since they enforce optimal behavior in any routing game without a priori knowledge of the specific game parameters. In general, these taxes may be very high; accordingly, for affinecost parallelnetwork routing games, we explicitly derive the optimal bounded tolls and the bestpossible efficiency guarantee as a function of a toll upperbound. 
University of Rochester Monday, July 20, 14:45, Session C Dynamic Revenue Maximization on a Network [pdf] (joint work with Esat Doruk Cetemen and Heng Liu) Abstract
This paper studies the allocation of several heterogeneous objects to buyers with multidimensional 
Stony Brook University Wednesday, July 22, 14:45, Session A Resource Allocation with Budgets: Optimal Stable Allocations and Optimal Lotteries [pdf] (joint work with Jing Chen) Abstract
We introduce the resource allocation problem where a planner needs to purchase different resources from providers of different qualities and costs, and then allocates them to consumers with different preferences. The planner has a budget on how much he can spend. He wants to maximize the social welfare generated from the consumers, while keeping his total expenditure within his budget. Previous studies have either focused on the resource acquisition part, with one buyer and many strategic sellers, or the resource allocation part, with one seller and many strategic buyers. 
Stony Brook University Monday, July 20, 10:15, Session A Learning Game Parameters from MSNE: An Application to Learning IDS Games [pdf] (joint work with Luis Ortiz) Abstract A survey is a popular and common method for eliciting behavioral data on a topic from a sample population. Such behavioral data captures the actions of the sampled population under some possibly unknown environment. Quite often, we do not have information about the individual responses due to privacy concerns or bookkeeping overloads. Instead, what we typically observe is some form of aggregation or summarization of the individual responses that represents the percentages of the individuals who reportedly took certain actions. Because, as we assume, each person is strategic and takes the best action given the actions of other people, we view the given behavioral data as a set of possible (approximate) mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) of some game. Given this, our goal is to learn a game that would best explain or rationalize the behavior of the population. In this work, we introduce a machine learning (generative) framework to learn the structure and parameters of games given a set of possible (approximate) MSNE for the purpose of predicting and analyzing behavior, even under causal intervention or counterfactual queries. Under our framework, we show that, under some mild assumptions, maximizing the loglikelihood of a game given behavioral data is equivalent to finding a game that maximizes the number of (approximate) MSNE in the data while maintaining the overall proportion of (approximate) MSNE of the game as low as possible. Moreover, we illustrate the effectiveness of our framework by learning the parameters of generalized interdependent security games from realworld vaccination data publicly available from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States. 
Yale University Friday, July 24, 11:15, Session D The Role of Commitment and Outside Options in Bargaining [pdf] Abstract This paper examines the role of commitment and outside options in bargaining with incomplete information. An investor negotiates over profit shares with an entrepreneur in the startup stage. The entrepreneur has the outside option of waiting for other investors, and the investor can invalidate the entrepreneur’s outside option by purchasing the core patent. The values of the project and the outside option are unknown to the investor. We first characterize the upper bound of the investor’s profit from direct mechanisms with commitment. The investor’s profit is enhanced with the way to invalidate the outside option, and the optimal mechanism indeed invalidates the entrepreneur’s outside option with a positive probability. Finally, we show that this upper bound is achievable in the bargaining game even without commitment nor the explicit way to invalidate the outside option, as long as the outside option’s arrival rate is sufficiently high. 
University of Louisville Monday, July 20, 11:15, Session D Nonlinear Pricing with Asymmetric Competition In the Absence of Private Information [pdf] (joint work with Guofu Tan, Adam Chi Leung Wong) Abstract
We study a threestage game with complete information in which a dominant firm offers a general tariff first and then a rival firm responds with a perunit price for homogeneous products, followed by a buyer making her purchase decision. The buyer can purchase products from both firms. We characterize the dominant firm's optimal tariff structure: a continuous and convex tariff schedule based on quantity, instead of a single point takeitorleaveit (TIOLI) offer. The main advantage of such a nonlinear pricing schedule over a single point offer is that it can better restrict its rival's choices and profits, and reduce the buyer surplus and possibly efficiency, even in the absence of any private information. It is shown that nonlinear pricing mechanisms, e.g., various conditional rebates in intermediate goods markets, can reduce the price, quantity, market share and profits of the rival firm, even if markets are not fully foreclosed. Antitrust implications of our findings are further discussed. 
Durham University Business School, UK Friday, July 24, 11:15, Session B Auctions versus Sequential Mechanism When Resale is Allowed [pdf] (joint work with Tilman Klumpp) Abstract We examine the impacts of resale opportunity on entry and bidding strategies in simultaneous bidding process (auction mechanism) and sequential bidding process (sequential mechanism) with costly entry, and relative performance between the two mechanisms. Resale opportunity reinforces the partialpooling equilibrium that a bidder submits a jump bid (even higher than his value) to deter following entry. In equilibrium, the sequential mechanism is still more efficient. We finally identify sufficient conditions  if the participation cost is sufficiently small and sufficiently large number of potential buyers exists  under which the sequential mechanism gives higher expected seller revenue. 
Nanjing University Tuesday, July 21, 15:15, Session C On Decentralizability of MultiAgency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation [pdf] Abstract This note examines when the centralized mechanism design can be equivalently implemented by the decentralized menu design in generalized multiagency games with Bayesian implementation. Our delegation principle identifies that Bayesian menu design is strategically equivalent to bilateral Bayesian mechanism design, which simplifies collective Bayesian mechanism design by ignoring relative information evaluation. Since our generalized multiagency environment permits comprehensive interrelation among the agents and the principal, this delegation principle cannot be viewed as a straightforward aggregation of the delegation principle in single agency. Based on it, we take advantage of interimpayoffequivalence to further provide conditions on the primitives for the overall equivalence between collective mechanism design, bilateral mechanism design, and menu design. 
University of South Carolina Friday, July 24, 15:45, Session C Equilibrium Selection of Public Good Provision Mechanisms [pdf] (joint work with Alexander Matros; Yue Liu) Abstract It is well known that using a lottery is more efficient than a VCM for public good provision. However, we observe coexistence of these two mechanisms in reality. Why does this happen? This paper develops a model to study an equilibrium selection of public good provision mechanisms, under evolutionary settings, when both the VCM and the lottery are available at the same time. First, three absorbing states are described: where all agents use the VCM, where all agents use the lottery, and where both mechanisms coexist. Then, we find the longrun outcomes. 
Yale University Friday, July 24, 15:15, Session E Strategic Experimentation On A Common Threshold [pdf] Abstract
A multiagent dynamic game of experimentation is examined where players noncooperatively search for a common unknown threshold. Time is discrete and players take turns in adjusting their individual level of performance. There is assumed to be a common threshold of performance below which a player suffers a (lump sum) cost of breakdown. Information is shared by all, and players start with a common prior with regard to the distribution of the threshold. 
London School of Economics Monday, July 20, 15:15, Session B Spying in Contests [pdf] (joint work with Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen) Abstract In real life contests, players tend to spy on each other. Built on Fang and Morris (2006), spying in contests is modeled by a symmetric private value allpay auction (APA), where both players observe their own valuations as well as a noisy spying signal about opponent's valuation, through a costly spying technology (ST). I show that the equilibrium can be nonoverlapping or overlapping depends on the accuracy of the ST; the revenue of APA is lower than second price auction (SPA), and could be higher or lower than first price auction (FPA). Then the model is extended to study information acquisition prior to the contest, where players acquire an ST in an earlier period before the contest. When the accuracy of ST acquired is observable to the opponent, players do not always prefer more information (even when it is not more expensive); when the accuracy is unobservable to the opponent, level of information acquisition is decreasing with the cost. Under both cases, the seller/regulator can manipulate revenue by affecting the acquisition cost. Numerical examples suggest higher incentive of spying in FPA than APA. 
University of Maryland Tuesday, July 21, 15:45, Session F Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition [pdf] Abstract The pioneering model of electoral competition was developed by Harold Hotelling and Anthony Downs. The model developed by Hotelling and Downs and many subsequent models in the literature about electoral competition have assumed that candidates embody policies and, if a voter is not indifferent between the policies embodied by two candidates, then the voter’s choices are fully determined by his preferences on possible polices. More specifically, those models have assumed that if a voter prefers the policies embodied by one candidate then the voter will definitely vote for that candidate. Various authors have argued that i) factors other than policy can affect a voter’s decision and ii) those other factors cause candidates to be uncertain about who a voter will vote for. These authors have modeled the candidates’ uncertainty by using a probabilistic description of the voters’ choice behavior. This paper provides a framework that is useful for discussing the model developed by Hotelling and Downs and for discussing other models of electoral competition. Using that framework, the paper discusses work that has been done on the implications of candidates being uncertain about whom the individual voters in the electorate will vote for. 
University of Warwick Efficient Teamwork [pdf] Abstract
In multiagent projects under dynamic stochastic environment, adaptive and cooperative decision making is necessary for efficiency. We introduce a very general model where the principal can choose which subset of competing agents to hire in her project, based only on their reported abilities. Then they execute their own private workflow in parallel, with private and unverifiable decisions, chance events and costs, but with contractible externalities (e.g. completion times, usage histories of shared resources). Finally, the principal pays transfers depending only on the history of reports and externalities. We design an efficient and priorindependent mechanism which is quasidominant strategy incentivecompatible, individually rational and avoids freeriders. Another version of the mechanism is also collusionresistant but only approximately efficient. We will elaborate on how to use the mechanism in practice. 
University of Iowa Dynamic pricing of experience goods with learning [pdf] (joint work with Yifan (Anovia) Dai) Abstract We develop a dynamic pricing model of experience good between one seller and one buyer. The buyer can learn about how the product fits him by consumption. We characterize a class of equilibria in which the seller offers low price to induce learning in the earlier period, followed by high price to extract the consequence of learning in the later period. Moreover, we show that shorter contract duration generates more learning. 
MIT Auctions defying intuition Abstract The best way to sell n items to an additive buyer who values each of them independently and uniformly at random in [c,c+1] is to bundle them, as long as c is large enough. Still, for any c, the grand bundling mechanism is never optimal for large enough n, despite the sharp concentration of the buyer's total value for the items as n grows. Multidimensional mechanisms are rife with such unintuitive properties, making generalizations of Myerson's celebrated mechanism a daunting task. In this talk, I will develop a duality framework, based on optimal transport theory, characterizing the structure of revenueoptimal mechanisms in singlebidder multiitem settings. Our framework provides closedform descriptions of mechanisms, generalizing Myerson's result, and exhibits simple settings with rich structure in their optimal mechanism. 
National Polytechnic Institute (I.P.N.) Friday, July 24, 10:45, Session C Computing the Strong Nash Equilibrium For Conforming Coalitions (joint work with Julio B. Clempner) Abstract
Computing the equilibrium point of games plays an important in computer science. A large number of methods are known for finding a Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, Nash equilibrium can be adopted only for noncooperative games. In the last years, there has been a substantial effort in the development methods for finding the Strong Nash Equilibrium useful when coalitions are a fundamental issue. 
Utrecht University Monday, July 20, 15:45, Session B Competing first price and second price auctions [pdf] (joint work with Kris De Jaegher) Abstract Items of a homogeneous commodity are often sold simultaneously in different selling mechanisms. As such, (online) auctioneers find themselves competing against one another to attract bidders. This paper theoretically investigates the revenue ranking of competing first price and second price auctions while allowing for endogenous entry by homogeneously risk averse bidders. In doing so, we consider an auction selection game in which two items of a commodity are offered simultaneously. Both items may be offered by a single auctioneer or by two competing auctioneers each offering one item. First, each seller selects a first price or second price auction. Next, bidders learn which auctions have been selected and subsequently enter one of these auctions. We find that a symmetric entry equilibrium in mixed strategies exists and is unique, and that the corresponding entry probability crucially depends on bidders' degree of absolute risk aversion. We further find that, independent of the degree of absolute risk aversion, the auctions' joint revenue is maximized when both items are sold in first price auctions. Sellers in a duopoly have a dominant strategy to select first price auctions when bidders exhibit constant or increasing absolute risk aversion, but the existence of other equilibria cannot be ruled out when bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
SUNY at Stony Brook John Nash: Some Personal Reminiscences Abstract

University of Bonn Allocating divisible and indivisible resources according to conflicting claims: collectively rational solutions [pdf] (joint work with Karol Szwargzak) Abstract We consider the problem of allocating multiple divisible and indivisible resources according to conficting claims on these resources. We prove that choosing allocations maximizing a separable social welfare function is a consequence of three basic principles: consistency, resource monotonicity, and the independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
Brown University Friday, July 24, 10:15, Session D Polarization and delay: uncertainty in reputational bargaining [pdf] Abstract I show how uncertainty about fundamentals can cause delay in bargaining when agents have reputational concerns. Agents' publicly observable costs of delay change stochastically at some revelation time. In addition to rational agents, there are behavioral types committed to many different fixed demands. I show that even when the probability of behavioral types is arbitrarily small, agreement may be delayed until after the revelation time and rational agents may demand almost the entire surplus. If behavioral types can make timevarying demands, however, then the outcome converges to the solution of a complete information alternating offers game. 
University of Arizona Matching with Continuous Bidirectional Investment [pdf] Abstract We develop a onetoone matching game where men and women (interns and employers, etc.) exert costly efforts to produce benefits for their partners. We prove the existence and Pareto optimality of interior stable allocations, and we characterize the relationship between players’ costs, efforts, benefits, and payoffs in such allocations. We find, for instance, that men and women with lower marginal costs of effort choose to provide their partners with higher benefits by exerting more effort; in return, they receive higher benefits from their partners and attain higher payoffs. 
Paris 1 Monday, July 20, 10:45, Session C Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria [pdf] (joint work with Marco SCARSINI) Abstract We consider a Hotelling game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential customers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest store. We show that when the number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium and we construct it. We then compare the equilibrium cost bore by the consumers with the cost that could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of a benevolent planner. We perform this comparison in term of the induced price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of the worst equilibrium cost and the optimal cost, and the induced price of stability, i.e., the ratio of the best equilibrium cost and the optimal cost. We show that, asymptotically in the number of retailers, these ratios are two and one, respectively. 
TU Dortmund Thursday, July 23, 15:15, Session A Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests [pdf] (joint work with Wolfgang Leininger, Cedric Wasser) Abstract
We characterize revenue maximizing head starts for allpay auctions and lottery contests 
Harvard University Communication Cooperation and Credibility in Repeated Games Abstract In our experiment, subjects play an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma with noise and communication: Each period, participants choose both their intended action and a binary message indicating the action they intended to play. The messages are transmitted without error, but there is a constant (and known to the participants) probability that the action they chose is not the one that is implemented. The payoffs at each stage depend only on the implemented actions the messages are a form of “cheap talk” with no direct payoff consequences. 
University of Leicester Tuesday, July 21, 10:15, Session E Delegation of Authority in Noncontractible Cost Setting [pdf] Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical model of delegation of authority in a signaling game setting 
Indiana University and ISEG/UECE Monday, July 20, 15:15, Session D Strategic Complementarities and substitutabilities in R&D networks [pdf] (joint work with Penelope Hernandez and Manuel Munoz Herrera) Abstract Firms form R&D joint ventures in order to benefit from the scale economies that make it likely to be successful in the R&D process. However, the same firms also compete in the market and R&D investments can lead to softer or more intense competition against specific rivals. We show, in a model of R&D networks with asymmetric spillovers that strategic substitutability and complementarity arises depending on whether the firms are connected in the network or not. We also show that the investment in R&D is negatively correlated to the degree of the R&D network. However, the presence of spillovers from neighbor and nonneighboring firms leads to higher R&D investment than in the absence of spillovers from nonconnected firms. 
University of Zurich Tuesday, July 21, 10:45, Session E Debiasing strategic communication? [pdf] Abstract This paper studies strategic communication with lying costs and hidden conflicts of interest. I present a simple economic mechanism under which the disclosure of conflicts of interest can lead to more biased messages with average receivers following them more closely. Receivers who delegate their choice or who are naive towards the conflict of interest are then hurt by disclosure while nondelegating, rational receivers benefit from it. In consequence, disclosure is often not a Paretoimprovement among the set of receivers and can even lead to a decrease in efficiency. I find that the correlation between the sender's incentives to bias his message and the true state of the world is decisive for determining i) when mandatory disclosure hurts receivers, ii) when senders would voluntarily commit to disclose their conflicts of interests, and iii) when mandatory disclosure is efficient. 
University of St. Gallen Tuesday, July 21, 14:45, Session C Betting on Others' Bets: Unions of Surplus Extraction Mechanisms [pdf] Abstract We construct the generalized CrémerMcLean mechanism where i’s participation fee depends not only on the valuations reported by i at the second stage, but also on the choice of the participation fee by i at the first stage. Such construction allows to exploit the convex hull property of beliefs whenever it appears in beliefs about beliefs rather than in beliefs about preferences. As such betting retrieves agents’ entire hierarchies of beliefs, it reveals what is common knowledge among them. Hence for any given finite or countable collection of type spaces, each type space verifying the convex hull property within itself, the designer can propose a union of GCM mechanisms and extract the surplus across type spaces, i.e., regardless of absence of knowledge by the designer which type space agents share (and without relying on the shoottheliar mechanism). We discuss when the technique of using a union of individual mechanisms is extendible to more general cases. 
University of St. Gallen Wednesday, July 22, 14:45, Session C The Genericity of the McAfeeReny Condition for Full Surplus Extraction in Models with a Continuum of Types [pdf] (joint work with Martin Hellwig) Abstract
McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full 
Carnegie Mellon University Tuesday, July 21, 11:15, Session E Good Manners: Signaling Social Preferences [pdf] Abstract Certain messages, even when not directly payoff relevant, can be a credible form of communication in light of natural social preferences. Social image concerns and otherregarding preferences interact to create incentives to communicate about how one feels about other people. Recognizing the prevalence of the incentive to communicate about one's social preferences suggests that many social and economic phenomena  from norms of etiquette to cooperation to gift exchange  should be seen, in part, as forms of signaling. These behaviors may be surprisingly robust to material costs, yet sensitive to context. 
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Research Friday, July 24, 14:45, Session A Cascading to Equilibrium: Hydraulic Computation of Equilibria in Resource Selection Games [pdf] (joint work with Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Moshe Tennenholtz) Abstract Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games (i.e., asymmetric singleton congestion games) with nonatomic players, the coincidence of strong equilibria and Nash equilibria in such games, and the invariance of the cost of each given resource across all Nash equilibria. Our proofs allow for explicit calculation of Nash equilibrium and for explicit and direct calculation of the resulting (invariant) costs of resources, and do not hinge on any fixedpoint theorem, on the Minimax theorem or any equivalent result, on linear programming, or on the existence of a potential (though our analysis does provide powerful insights into the potential, via a natural concrete physical interpretation). A generalization of resource selection games, called resource selection games with I.D.dependent weighting, is defined, and the results are extended to this family, showing that while resource costs are no longer invariant across Nash equilibria in games of this family, they are nonetheless invariant across all strong Nash equilibria, drawing a novel fundamental connection between group deviation and I.D.congestion. A natural application of the resulting machinery to a large class of constraintsatisfaction problems is also described. 
Université SaintLouis Network formation among rivals [pdf] (joint work with Wouter Vergote) Abstract
We study the formation of bilateral agreements when the payoff of an agent increases 
Brown University Wednesday, July 22, 15:15, Session A Solving for BestResponses and Equilibria in ExtensiveForm Games with Reinforcement Learning Methods [pdf] (joint work with Jiacui Li and Eric Sodomka) Abstract
We present a framework to solve for best responses and equilibria in 
MIT Wednesday, July 22, 15:15, Session C Reverse Mechanism Design [pdf] (joint work with Nima Haghpanah and Jason Hartline) Abstract
Myerson's 1981 characterization of revenueoptimal auctions for singledimensional agents follows from an amortized analysis of the incentives: Virtual values that account for expected revenue are derived using integration by parts and are optimized pointwise by an incentive compatible mechanism. A challenge of generalizing the approach to multidimensional agents is that a mechanism that pointwise optimizes ``virtual values" resulting from a general application of integration by parts is not incentive compatible. 
University of Rochester Thursday, July 23, 10:45, Session D The Importance of Learning in Market Design [pdf] (joint work with Vikram Manjunath) Abstract Individuals often form preferences through search, interviews, discussion, and investigation. Endogenizing information acquisition in a stylized object allocation problem, we demonstrate that learning decisions depend on the incentives provided by the chosen allocation rule with important consequences for individual and social welfare. In particular, top trading cycles rules dominate serial priority rules under progressive measures of social welfare. 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem Evidence Games: Right to Remain Silent, Left to Disclose (joint work with Ilan Kremer, Motty Perry) Abstract An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an agent who has different pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose and which ones to conceal, and a principal chooses an action (a "reward"). The agent's preference is the same regardless of his information—he always prefers the reward to be as high as possible—whereas the principal prefers the reward to be most fitting to the evidence. We compare the setup where the principal chooses the action only after seeing the disclosed evidence, to the setup where the principal can commit ahead of time to a reward policy (the latter is the standard mechanismdesign setup). We show that under natural conditions on the truth structure of the evidence the two setups yield the same equilibrium outcome. 
Northwestern University The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions Abstract
In this talk I will show that the theory of optimal auctions approximately extends from the ideal setting of agents with singledimensional linear preferences to more realistic settings of multidimensional and nonlinear agent preferences (Alaei, Fu, Haghpanah, and Hartline, 2013). This result connects several focal results for approximation in mechanism design which I will review (see Hartline, 2012). 
University of Heidelberg Wednesday, July 22, 10:15, Session E Bayesian signaling [pdf] Abstract
This paper introduces private sender information in a senderreceiver game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to fully characterize the set of equilibria selected by the D1 criterion. The sender's equilibrium strategy consists of signals which are either separating, i.e., the sender's choice of signal reveals his private information to the receiver, or fully disclosing, i.e., the outcome of the sender's chosen signal fully reveals the payoffrelevant state. Whether the equilibrium signals are separating or fully disclosing is completely determined by the optimality properties of fully disclosing signals. Incentive compatibility requires the sender to use suboptimal signals in any equilibrium which is not fully disclosing and then generates a cost for the sender in comparison to a full information benchmark in which the receiver knows the sender's type. 
University of Groningen Catastrophe and cooperation [pdf] (joint work with Lammertjan Dam) Abstract We study international environmental agreements in a setting that incorporates catastrophic climate change, and sovereign countries, who are heterogenous in their exposure to climate change. This leads to a stochastic game with an absorbing state whose equilibrium structure is very different from the infinitely repeated games that are usually studied in the literature on environmental agreements. In particular there is no folk theorem that guarantees that the social optimum can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium as long as players are sufficiently patient. However, in most circumstances, it is feasible to implement an abatement scheme with a level of aggregate abatement that is close to the social optimum. Moreover, the discount rate has a nonmonotonic effect on the optimal environmental agreement. 
Bar Ilan University Monday, July 20, 10:15, Session B Sex and Portfolio Investment [pdf] (joint work with Omer Edhan and Dana SherillRofe) Abstract We attempt to answer why sex is nearly ubiquitous when asexual reproduction is ostensibly more efficient than sexual reproduction. From the perspective of a genetic allele, each individual bearing that allele is akin to a stock share yielding dividends equal to that individual's number of offspring, and the totality of individuals bearing the allele is its portfolio investment. Alleles compete over portfolio growth. Evolutionary reproduction strategies can essentially be seen as online learning algorithms seeking improved portfolio growth, with sexual reproduction a goaldirected algorithmic exploration of genotype space by sampling in each generation. We show that in finite population models the algorithm of sexual reproduction yields, with high probability, higher expected growth than the algorithm of asexual reproduction does. We thus seek to explain why a majority of species reproduce sexually. The model assumes a stochastically changing environment but not weak selection. 
University of Bonn Wednesday, July 22, 15:45, Session C Pricing Heterogeneous Goods under Ex Post Private Information [pdf] Abstract This paper studies the role of exchange policies as a price discrimination device in a sequential screening model with heterogeneous goods. In the first period, agents are uncertain about their ordinal preferences over a set of horizontally differentiated goods, but have private information about their intensity of preferences. In the second period, each individual privately learns his preferences and consumption takes place. Revenuemaximizing mechanisms are completely characterized. They partially restrict the flexibility between the goods in the second stage for consumers that care little about which variety they obtain while granting always the favorite good to consumers that care much. The optimal design of the partial restriction of flexibility can be implemented by offering Limited Exchange Contracts. A Limited Exchange Contract consists of an initial product choice and a subset of products to which free exchange is possible in the second period. The use of exchange fees in contracts is not optimal for the purpose of price discrimination. 
University of Oxford School rankings, student allocations and school choice reforms [pdf] Abstract With school choice reforms, families choose where to apply and more public funding is allocated to highlydemanded schools. Given families' informational constraints, it is unclear whether demand for places at highquality schools increases. Families infer schools' relative quality from performancebased rankings and trade off choosing a higherranked nonlocal school over their local school. I solve for a BayesianNash equilibrium consistent with a steadystate level of informativeness of rankings. I find that rankings become more informative and more families apply to highquality schools, if families can choose where to apply and schools can choose whom to accept. 
Harvard Tuesday, July 21, 10:45, Session A Cooperate without looking: Why we care what people think and not just what they do [pdf] (joint work with Erez Yoeli, Martin Nowak) Abstract Evolutionary game theory typically focuses on actions but ignores motives. Here, we introduce a model that takes into account the motive behind the action. A crucial question is why do we trust people more who cooperate without calculating the costs? We propose a game theory model to explain this phenomenon. One player has the option to “look” at the costs of cooperation, and the other player chooses whether to continue the interaction. If it is occasionally very costly for player 1 to cooperate, but defection is harmful for player 2, then cooperation without looking is a subgame perfect equilibrium. This behavior also emerges in populationbased processes of learning or evolution. Our theory illuminates a number of key phenomena of human interactions: authentic altruism, why people cooperate intuitively, oneshot cooperation, why friends do not keep track of favors, why we admire principled people, Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, taboos, and love. 
The Pennsylvania State University Thursday, July 23, 14:45, Session B Authoritarian Election as an Incentive Scheme [pdf] (joint work with TszNing Wong) Abstract Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, members of the elite class may lack incentives to contribute efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study authoritarian rulers' decision to introduce election. In our model, election motivates the ruling class to devote more effort in public good provision. As a result, election alleviates the moralhazardinteams problem within authoritarian government. While too much electoral control hinders the introduction of election, mild electoral control facilitates it. This offers a new perspective in understanding authoritarian elections and explains a number of stylized facts in authoritarian regimes. 
University of Paderborn Friday, July 24, 10:15, Session E Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents in a University Clearinghouse [pdf] (joint work with Nadja Maraun) Abstract
In this work we consider the matching process used in a university clearinghouse to find out which strategies heterogeneous constraint rational agents are using when they take part in a clearinghouse which uses the Boston Mechanism. We use data from the actual clearinghouse as well as a survey conducted in March 2015. The survey data allows us to compare students' actual and stated preferences and extract strategies used in the clearinghouse. Additionally, we will test different matching algorithms using the stated and the true preferences of students and analyze the outcomes with regard to their efficiency and stability properties. We will thus be able to compare the results found in experiments on school choice to the results in an actual clearinghouse with students' real and stated preferences and therewith we aim to add to the literature on matching with heterogeneous constrained rational actors. 
University of Washington Monday, July 20, 14:45, Session B Hybrid Mechanism: Structural Model and Empirical Analysis [pdf] (joint work with Quan Wen) Abstract We study a hybrid mechanism that combines auction and lottery to allocate indivisible goods. One advantage of hybrid mechanism is to balance efficiency, revenue, and equality. In this model, players selfselect into a multiunit auction with unknown number of bidders. We characterize one symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium where auction participants use a monotone bid function. Based on this equilibrium, we identify structural primitives of the model from observables, from which we are able to quantify various performance measures. We then apply the model to analyze the hybrid mechanism adopted in Guangzhou to allocate new vehicle licenses. With this application in mind, we develop a byperiod estimation method to balance modelfit and interpretability of estimation results. Our analysis shows that Guangzhou's practice increases equality by 10fold at a cost of $1.45 million revenue every month. 
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management Wednesday, July 22, 14:45, Session F Potential, voting, and power [pdf] (joint work with André Casajus) Abstract In this paper, we advocate a new index of absolute power that not only recognizes a player's inherent power but also her power over other players. This index exhibits appealing properties, in particular, with respect to overall power assigned in a voting game, which are not met by the PenroseBanzhaf index, for example. In proper voting games, overall voting power is greatest only if a game contains a dictator. 
University of Miami Friday, July 24, 10:45, Session D A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock [pdf] Abstract I study a dynamic onesidedoffer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller may receive an outside option, the value of which depends on the quality of the product. If the outside option is sufficiently important, there is an equilibrium in which the uninformed buyer fails to learn the product’s quality and continues to make the same randomized offer throughout the bargaining process. As a result, the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles the outcome of a bargaining deadlock and its resolution. The equilibrium with deadlock has inefficient outcomes, such as a delay in or breakdown of the negotiation. Bargaining delays do not vanish even with frequent offers, and they may exist when there is no static adverse selection problem. The mechanism behind the limiting delay is novel in existing bargaining literature. Under stronger parametric assumptions, the equilibrium with deadlock is the only one in which behavior is monotonic in the buyer’s belief. Further, under these restrictions, all equilibria exhibit inefficient outcomes. 
Microsoft Research New England The impact of status concerns in social interactions (joint work with Rachel Kranton, Mihai Manea, Greg Stoddard, and Vasilis Syrgkanis) Abstract Since at least Veblen’s (1899) classic work on conspicuous consumption, economists and social scientists have recognized that social comparisons can influence individual decisions. People compare their consumption, their awards, and their belongings to those of people around them, and they strive to maintain their position within their community. In this talk, we survey the impact of these status concerns on individual welfare in a networked setting, and on optimal contest design with applications to usergenerated content websites. We find that status concerns can cause individuals to overconsume, and relate consumption levels to the social network structure. On the other hand, status concerns can also be leveraged by usergenerated content websites to incentivize increased participation. We derive optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms for doing so through the use of virtual rewards like leaderboards and badges. 
KAIST Tuesday, July 21, 11:15, Session D A new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution: fictitious play [pdf] Abstract We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a purestrategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately implement the Nash bargaining solution. 
University of the Basque Country A new solution concept for the roommate problem: Qstable matchings [pdf] (joint work with Peter Biró, Elena Inarra and Elena Molis) Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce maximum irreversible matchings and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. (2006) and maximum stable matchings (Tan (1990), (1991). These solution concepts are all core consistent. We find that almost stable matchings are incompatible with the other two concepts. Hence, to solve the roommate problem we propose matchings that lie at the intersection of the maximum 
Bowdoin College Wednesday, July 22, 15:45, Session A Causal Inference in GameTheoretic Settings with Applications to Microfinance Markets [pdf] (joint work with Mohammad T. Irfan, Luis E. Ortiz) Abstract Performing interventions is a major challenge in economic policymaking. We propose causal strategic inference as a framework for conducting interventions in gametheoretic settings and apply it to large, networked microfinance economies. The basic solution platform consists of modeling a microfinance market as a networked economy, learning the parameters of the model from the realworld microfinance data, and designing algorithms for various causal questions. For a special case of our model, we show that an equilibrium point always exists and that the equilibrium interest rates are unique. For the general case, we give a constructive proof of the existence of an equilibrium point. Our empirical study is based on the microfinance data from Bangladesh and Bolivia, which we use to first learn our models. We show that causal strategic inference can assist policymakers by evaluating the outcomes of various types of interventions, such as removing a lossmaking bank from the market, imposing an interest rate cap, and subsidizing banks. 
Universitat de Barcelona Friday, July 24, 11:15, Session C The core and the bargaining set for convex games [pdf] (joint work with Rafels, C.) Abstract
Within the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity 
Stanford University Repeated Favor Exchange and the Structure of Social Networks Abstract
We analyze equilibria in games of repeated exchange of favors in societies such that any two individuals interact too infrequently to sustain exchange of just one type of favor, but such that combinations of the exchange of multiple types of favors and potential interactions in a network with other individuals can provide incentives for people to perform. 
The Ohio State University Wednesday, July 22, 15:15, Session F On the (ir)relevance of anonymity constraints in mechanism design [pdf] (joint work with Yaron Azrieli) Abstract We study anonymity constraints in a general bayesian mechanism design setting. We say that a mechanism is anonymous if every agent has the same message space and the outcome function is invariant under the permutation of the message profile. We show that the revelation principle might not hold in this setting and explore the use of indirect mechanisms. A SCF is said to be implemented anonymously if there is an anonymous mechanism which implements it (in bayes nash equilibrium). Our main result characterizes the class of SCF's which can be implemented anonymously. An important special case of our analysis is the widely studied case of independent private values. Under the assumption of independent private values we show that any incentive compatible SCF can be implemented anonymously. Therefore under IPV assumption anonymity constraints are vacuous from the point of view of mechanism design. Let us point out that our analysis is general. We allow for correlated beliefs, allow the preferences of the agents to depend on the realized types of others (interdependent valuation) and we do not require the use of monetary transfers. 
Universidad de Santiago de Chile Wednesday, July 22, 15:15, Session D Rationalizability and Mixed Strategies in Large Games [pdf] (joint work with Pedro JaraMoroni, Pablo Moyano) Abstract We show that in large games with a finite set of actions in which the payoff of a player depends only on her own action and on an aggregate value that we call the aggregate state of the game, which is obtained from the complete action profile, it is possible to define and characterize the sets of (Point)Rationalizable States in terms of pure and mixed strategies. We prove that the (Point)Rationalizable States sets associated to pure strategies are equal to the sets of (Point)Rationalizable States associated to mixed strategies. By example we show that, in general, the PointRationalizable States sets differ from the Rationalizable States sets. 
Ariel University, Israel Monday, July 20, 15:15, Session F Attacking the Unknown Weapons of a Possible Provocateur: How Intelligence Aects the Strategic Interaction [pdf] (joint work with Artyom Jelnov,Yair Tauman,Richard Zeckhauser) Abstract
We consider the interaction of two enemy nations. Nation 1 wants to develop a 
The Ohio State University Wednesday, July 22, 10:45, Session E Cheap Talk and Collective DecisionMaking: Voting Rules and Informed Decision Makers [pdf] Abstract We investigate a cheap talk model with a collective decision making. In our model multiple decision makers vote on a proposal which determines their payoffs, and an expert tries to persuade them to choose the outcome she prefers. We allow decision makers to possess not all but some of information regarding the state of nature, which determines the gross utility of them based on the voting outcome. Two different types of experts has been considered: a heavily biased expert who always wants a rejection and a surplus maximizing expert who tries to maximize the total surplus of the group of decision makers. We show that experts can transmit credible and influential information to voters by using their respective optimal cheap talk strategies and try to prevent voters from taking informative actions. This limited information aggregation induced by each type of experts results in either polarization or unification of the voters: the highly biased expert polarizes the voters to achieve her aim, while the surplus maximizing expert unifies them. 
Trinity University Friday, July 24, 14:45, Session B Resource Graph Games: A Compact Representation for Games with Structured Strategy Spaces (Extended Abstract) [pdf] (joint work with Kevin LeytonBrown) Abstract
Many realworld multiagent systems have structured strategy spaces: there are an exponential number of pure strategies for each player, although the set of pure strategies for each player has a short description. Examples from recent literature include network congestion games, simultaneous auctions, dueling algorithms, and security games. However there is a lack of a general modeling language that captures a wide range of commonly seen strategy structure and utility structure, as well as generalpurpose algorithms for computing solution concepts. 
Bank of Korea Monday, July 20, 14:45, Session D Entry of nonfinancial firm and competition in the retail payments market [pdf] Abstract
We investigate the effects of nonfinancial firms' entry on the competition in retail payments market from the perspectives of duopoly between an incumbent and an entrant with potential vertical restraints. 
Northwestern University Stability Cycles in Big Games (joint work with Eran Shmaya) Abstract
A big game is one played repeatedly by a large population of players. The game changes as fundamentals of nature change and player type distribution depends on the changing fundamentals. The population of players may change, but information about the outcomes of plays is passed from one generation to the next. Differential incomplete information and imperfect monitoring are present. 
University of Oxford Tuesday, July 21, 10:15, Session C Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks [pdf] Abstract Networks play a crucial role in how ideas, innovations, or diseases spread among members of a society. Understanding the dynamics of the underlying diffusion process enables us to find ways to protect us against extremist ideologies, to control infection rates, or even to optimise product placement. In this article I derive and solve a differential equation that describes such a diffusion process. I focus on three questions: What are the dynamics of the process at different time stages and how do they depend on the network? How robust is the process with respect to small perturbations in the network? And: In how far can the processes in different networks on the same set of players be compared? The latter question is the key to derive measures in order to promote the diffusion of ideas, or prevent the spread of a disease. 
University of Heidelberg (Germany) Tuesday, July 21, 15:15, Session E Games with exogenous uncertainty played by ”Knightian” players [pdf] Abstract We provide a general model of games which involve exogenous uncertainty, but no private information. It turns out that there may occur unusual behavior when these games are played by uncertainty averse players with nonBayesian preferences (Knightian players). That is, mixed strategies can be unique best responses to some strategies of other players. This behavior can be interpreted as randomization in order to avoid ambiguity. We show that whether this behavior occurs depends on how players perceive the sequence of lotteries in the game. Under the assump tion that players exhibit minimum expected utility and Choquet expected utility preferences, we prove the existence of equilibria. Furthermore, we establish some necessary and sufficient conditions for a strict preference for mixed strategies. 
University of Miami Friday, July 24, 14:45, Session E Trading dynamics in the market for lemons [pdf] (joint work with Kyungmin Kim) Abstract We present a dynamic model of trading under adverse selection. A seller faces a sequence of randomly arriving buyers. Each buyer receives a noisy signal about the quality of the asset and offers a price. We show that there is generically a unique equilibrium and characterize the resulting trading dynamics. Buyers’ beliefs about the quality of the asset gradually increase or decrease over time, depending on the initial level. By encompassing various patterns of trading dynamics, our model broadens the applicability of dynamic adverse selection theory. We also demonstrate that improving asset transparency does not necessarily lead to gains in efficiency. 
SUNY at Buffalo Tuesday, July 21, 14:45, Session B Building the Auction Markets for the World's Premier RiskFree Securities: A Structural Analysis of the Primary Dealer System in the United States Treasury Auctions. [pdf] (joint work with Leonard Tchuindjo) Abstract This paper studies the optimal issuance strategy in the US Treasury auctions and studies the impact of the primary dealer system on the bidder behavior, the market outcome, and the debt management objective. The new idea of the paper is that the primary dealer system reduces the volatility of bids when a primary dealer routes indirect bidders' bids ("the information pooling channel"), thus, reduces the yield volatilities without losing the revenue when primary dealers are required to place bids in the auction and indirect bidders' bids are verified ("the competition channel"). We develop a novel framework of uniform price auctions of discrete units with the primary dealer system to partially identify the effect of policy counterfactuals based on bidder private values consistent with the observed market outcomes. Counterfactual simulations find that the primary dealer system provides the lowest price volatilities while maintaining the equal level of auction prices in comparison with the direct bidding system and the joint bidding system. These properties of the primary dealer system could have been valuable during the period of financial crisis. 
University of Pennsylvania Privacy, Game Theory, and Terrorism Abstract Differential privacy is a wellstudied model for balancing the social utility of aggregated data (for instance, for medical studies or web search) with the desire for privacy by individuals. Recently it has been applied to equilibrium selection in gametheoretic settings, where it has emerged that privacy yields desirable mechanism design properties (such as truthfulness) as a byproduct. We will survey these developments, and also describe an adaptation of differential privacy for problems such as counterterrorism, where a subset of the population may have no privacy protections. 
Uni Bonn Tuesday, July 21, 10:45, Session C Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk [pdf] (joint work with Christian Kellner, Mark Thordal Le Quement) Abstract
We provide a rationale for ambiguous communication. We do so by considering a 
Middlesex University London Overconfidence, Imperfect Competition, and Evolution [pdf] Abstract This study explores whether market competition between firms owned and run by managers favors overconfident managers. We study this question in a linear duopoly setting with dif ferentiated products. The main result is that when there is complete information about the competitor’s type, evolutionary market selection forces will always favor a positive degree of managerial overconfidence. This result is robust to both the form of the strategic interaction and the nature of product differentiation. We also study the case of incomplete information about the competitor’s type under quantity competition and show that evolutionary forces may still favor overconfident managers if market selection is driven by relative rather than absolute profit performance. 
University of Mannheim Friday, July 24, 15:45, Session E Collective Experimentation with Breakdowns and Breakthroughs [pdf] Abstract I study a dynamic game of collective experimentation. Players strategically vote for whether to stay with a safe alternative or to experiment with a risky one, which is either better or worse independently across players. The action undertaken is determined via majority voting. I show that either outcome, the safe or risky alternative implemented, is possible, and that sharing decision power influences players' incentives to experiment. I obtain closedform cost functions of players and conduct comparative statics. The analysis extends to any game with qualified majority voting and allows to compare different majority rules in terms of efficiency. 
Korea Military Academy Wednesday, July 22, 14:45, Session E Stochastic Dominance of Signals and Reparametrization in Adverse Selection Model [pdf] (joint work with Sunghee Lee) Abstract
This paper investigates how a pair of signals about the type of the agent can be compared in the classical principal agent model with adverse selection. Signal comparison in this model has two distinctive features that make it difficult to directly apply the results from decision theory: timing of the game and the number of incentive compatibility constraint. 
The University of NebraskaLincoln Tuesday, July 21, 10:15, Session A The Economics of the Right To Be Forgotten [pdf] (joint work with ByungCheol Kim) Abstract We examine the underlying economics behind the emerging issue of the socalled "right to be forgotten," which subsumes the right for individuals to ask for 'inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive' information about them to be dropped from Internet searches. At stake is the conflict between the privacy right and other fundamental rights such as the freedom of speech, expression, and access to information. First, we analyze a legal dispute game between a petitioner, claiming the right to be forgotten, and an Internet search engine. In particular, we characterize conditions under which litigation arises as an equilibrium outcome. Then we provide comparative static results on the probability of lawsuits and the likelihood of brokenlinks, in connection to the social value of information. Our model offers a useful framework in understanding the effects of Europe's expansion of the right to be forgotten to nonEuropean websites: If the European ruling applies to all global search engine domains, then the expected amount of brokenlinks would fall. 
University of Iowa Trading Dynamics in the Market for Lemons [pdf] (joint work with Ayca Kaya) Abstract We present a dynamic model of trading under adverse selection. A seller faces a sequence of randomly arriving buyers. Each buyer receives a noisy signal about the quality of the asset and offers a price. We show that there is generically a unique equilibrium and characterize the resulting trading dynamics. Buyers' beliefs about the quality of the asset gradually increase or decrease over time, depending on the initial level. By encompassing various patterns of trading dynamics, our model broadens the applicability of dynamic adverse selection theory. We also demonstrate that improving asset transparency does not necessarily lead to gains in efficiency. 
Nazarbayev University Thursday, July 23, 14:45, Session C Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests with Sabotage [pdf] Abstract
Contest is a powerful mechanism to induce the right incentives from the agents. In a contest with multiple participants particular prize distribution can allow a principal to maximize the expected effort he gets. In the paper of [Moldovanu and Sela(2001)] it is shown that if principal allocates positive prizes 
Cornell University LongRange Planning with TimeInconsistency (joint work with Ashton Anderson, Dan Huttenlocher, Jure Leskovec, and Sigal Oren) Abstract
There are many settings where people set longrange goals and make plans to achieve them. Such longrange planning is becoming an integral part of the experience in many online contexts, where for example people work toward reputational milestones in questionanswering sites, build up to administrative roles in opensource authoring domains, and reach educational goals in online learning communities. 
Hanyang University Incentive and Sampling Effects in Procurement Auctions [pdf] Abstract We study an auction contest for a procurement of innovation. Firms exert effort and the resulting quality of innovation is ex ante uncertain. Given the uncertainty of the quality, there is a tradeoff regarding the number of participating firms in the contest: If there are too many firms, they may be discouraged from expanding their investments because each of them has a small chance of winning (incentive effect). At the same time, as the number of participants increases, the procurer has a growing chance of getting a high quality innovation due to the randomness of the quality (sampling effect). Thus, the procurer faces a nontrivial problem of how many firms to invite. We show that when the randomness is large, it is optimal for the buyer to invite as many firms as possible. However, when the randomness vanishes, inviting only two firms is optimal. 
Duke University Games Played on Networks (joint work with Yann Bramoullé) Abstract
This paper studies games played on fixed networks. These games capture a wide variety of settings including local public goods, peer effects, and technology adoption. The paper establishes a common analytical framework, with which we establish new connections between games in the literature, in particular between binaryaction games, like coordination and bestshot games, and those with continuous actions and linear best replies. The framework brings together key notions including Bonacich centrality, maximal independent sets, and the lowest and largest eigenvalue of the network graph. The paper further studies the interplay of individual heterogeneity and the network to develop a new notion  interdependence  to analyze how a shock to one agent's action affects the action of another agent. 
Wednesday, July 22, 15:15, Session E Observing Each Other's Observations in the Electronic Mail Game [pdf] (joint work with Dominik Grafenhofer) Abstract We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different types of information, there exists a coordination game in the evaluation of this information. And even though the precisions of both signal types is exogenous, the precision with which agents predict each other's actions at equilibrium turns out to be endogenous. As a consequence, we find that there exist multiple equilibria if the private signals' precision is high. These equilibria differ with regard to the way that agents weight their private information to reason about each other's actions. 
Lehigh University Monday, July 20, 15:15, Session Meaning and Credibility in Experimental CheapTalk Games [pdf] (joint work with Wooyoung Lim) Abstract
We design four simple cheaptalk games to experimentally investigate the refinement concept of neologismproofness. All four games admit fully revealing equilibrium, but whether the equilibrium is neologismproof varies across the games. We find that neologisms played an evident role in how subjects played the games. Overall, fully revealing equilibria that are robust in the sense of being neologismproof were played more often. Senders and receivers were, however, affected differently by neologisms. The mere existence of meaningful neologisms, even though noncredible, attracted deviating behavior on senders' part. Receivers' behavior, on the other hand, was affected by whether the neologisms were credible or not, with credible neologisms attracting more deviating behavior 
University of Alberta FinanciallyConstrained Lawyers [pdf] (joint work with Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin) Abstract Financial constraints reduce lawyers' ability to file lawsuits and bring cases to trial. As a result, access to justice for true victims, bargaining impasse, and caretaking incentives for potential injurers might be compromised. We present the first cradletograve model of legal disputes involving financiallyconstrained lawyers, thirdparty lawyer lending, and asymmetric information. In equilibrium, access to justice is denied to some true victims and bargaining impasse occurs. Counterintuitively, policies that relax lawyers' financial constraints might be welfare reducing if the positive impact on access to justice is weak and the potential injurers are overdeterred. 
ETHZ  Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Monday, July 20, 15:15, Session A The OptionImplied FosterHart Riskiness [pdf] (joint work with Heinrich H. Nax) Abstract Foster and Hart (2009) introduce an objective measure of the riskiness of an asset that implies a bound on how much of one’s wealth is ‘safe’ to invest in the asset while (a.s.) guaranteeing nobankruptcy in the long run. In this work, we translate the FosterHart bound from abstract repeated oneplayer games to applied finance using riskneutral densities that are nonparametrically estimated from S&P 500 call and put option prices covering 2003 to 2013. The optionimplied FosterHart bound is analyzed and assessed in light of wellknown risk measures including value at risk, expected shortfall and riskneutral volatility. 
University of Zurich Wednesday, July 22, 10:45, Session A Designing Institutions for Diversity [pdf] (joint work with Armin Schmutzler, University of Zurich) Abstract This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research approach of the supplier, but the best approach is unknown. Diversity of approaches is beneficial because of the resulting option value. An auction induces the social optimum, while a fixedprize tournament induces insufficient diversity. The optimal contest for the buyer is an augmented fixedprize tournament, where suppliers can choose from a set of at most two prizes. This allows the buyer to implement any level of diversity at the lowest cost. 
University of Oxford Friday, July 24, 15:15, Session A Projections and Functions of Nash Equilibria [pdf] Abstract We show that any compact semialgebraic subset of mixed action profiles on a fixed player set can be represented as the projection of the set of equilibria of a game in which additional binary players have been added. Even stronger, we show that any semialgebraic continuous function, or even any semialgebraic uppersemicontinuous correspondence with nonempty values, from a bounded semialgebraic set to the unit cube can be represented as the projection of an equilibrium correspondence of a game with binary players in which payoffs depend on parameters from domain of the function or correspondence in a multilinear way. 
University of British Columbia TBA Abstract TBA 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Transparency of Outside Options in Bargaining [pdf] (joint work with Ilwoo Hwang) Abstract
This paper studies the effects of the transparency of an outside option in bilateral bargaining. A seller posts prices to screen a buyer over time, and the buyer may receive an outside option at a random time. We consider two information regimes, one in which the arrival of the outside option is public and one in which the arrival is private. The public arrival of the outside option works as a commitment device that forces the buyer to opt out immediately. The Coase conjecture holds in the unique equilibrium. In contrast, private information about the outside option leads to additional delay and multiplicity. The Coase conjecture fails in some equilibria. The buyer's preference about transparency is timeinconsistent: Ex ante, she prefers public arrivals, but ex post she prefers not to disclose her outside option if it is private. 
Yale University Tuesday, July 21, 11:15, Session C A Network Approach to International Relations [pdf] Abstract
This paper presents a network approach to study countries' strategic interaction in international relations. Combining tools from various fields of applied mathematics, it predicts countries' strategic behavior and potential game outcomes on fixed networks, and examines their endogenous relation formation and deviation. I claim that every case in international relations should be scrutinized from a ``networked'' perspective. The paper shows how the framework can provide new perspectives towards the commonly accepted hypotheses in theories of international relations. 
NYU Stern Thursday, July 23, 10:45, Session E Repeated Delegation [pdf] (joint work with Joao Ramos) Abstract
We consider an ongoing relationship of delegated decision making. A principal, facing a stream of projects to potentially finance, must rely on an agent to assess the returns of different opportunities. As the cost of initiating a project is borne by the principal alone, the players disagree about which projects are worth financing. That the principal cannot commit limits the rewards she can credibly offer the agent for his fiscal restraint. Even so, we show that the principal can credibly—and indeed, should— employ the promise of some bad projects (future lenience) to incentivize the agent. We characterize the optimal contract, termed Dynamic Capital Budgeting, which consists of two distinct regimes. In the first regime, Capped Budgeting, the principal allocates an expense account (populated by “funny money”) to the agent and fully delegates project choice, funded from the account; the account grows at the interest rate so long as its balance stays below a given cap. Only at the cap, where the account can grow no further, the agent is inconsiderate of the principal’s interests. After enough projects have been initiated, a Controlled Budgeting regime begins, and the agent loses his autonomy forever. 
Stony Brook University Tuesday, July 21, 15:15, Session D Using clients' rejection to build trust [pdf] (joint work with Yukfai Fong) Abstract
This paper studies the impact of an expert's concern for future business on his conduct and market efficiency. 
Copenhagen Business School Collusion in Multiunit Auction with Ex Ante Asymmetric Bidders: Uniform vs Discriminatory [pdf] (joint work with Yun Liu) Abstract This paper studies a simple multiunit auction game in which two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among N bidders. We introduce ex ante asymmetry through a public observable partition structure S on the set of bidders in which bidder's value distribution is affiliated with the size of subset she belongs to. Only bidders with the highest value (the active bidder) within each subset will participate the grand auction game. We characterize the asymmetric monotone BayesNash equilibria of two standard multiunit auction formats. In a uniformprice auction (UPA), the active bidder of a larger subset tends to converge her low bid to high bid (i.e., submit a flatter demand curve), which indicates that inefficient allocation becomes less serve when bidders' expected valuations are more separated. Such asymmetric equilibria are not observed in the discriminatoryprice auction (DPA) counterpart. We further apply this model to analyze bidders' coalition incentives at the ex ante stage. We claim that UPA is more vulnerable to collusion than DPA in the sense that: 1) bidders' expected payoff is higher (resp. lower) from a larger ring in UPA (resp. DPA); 2) only the grand coalition has nonempty core in DPA, whereas all rings are corestable in UPA. 
University of Pittsburgh Wednesday, July 22, 15:45, Session E Is Reputation Bad?—Loyalty and Competence Tradeoff (joint work with Yiming Liu) Abstract Abstract: Reputation is bad in in Morris (2001) and Ely and Valimaki (2003). In their models, good type agent whose preference is aligned with the principal has incentive to separate herself from bad type agent who has different interests with the principal to build up reputation of preference alignment (loyalty). To achieve this, the good type agent always reports the message that is not preferred by the bad type independent of her private information. No information in conveyed in equilibrium if reputation concern is severe enough. However, one key element is missing in this literature: the agent's reputation concern for competence. Lying to build a higher reputation for loyalty is costly in the sense that it hurts agent's competence reputation. Lying leads to higher probability of wrong message and wrong message is bad news for competence. In this paper, we add competence concern to the bad reputation literature by assuming that agents also differ in signal accuracy: the competent type is perfectly informed but the incompetent type's signal is noisy. Our result suggests that with reputation concern for competence, there exists two kinds of informative equilibria. In the partial truthtelling equilibrium, only the good type always truthfully reports. No matter how severe the reputation concern is, this partial truthtelling equilibrium exists if incompetent type's information correct rate is lower than a threshold. There also exists a full truthtelling equilibrium in which both types truthfully report in the beginning when reputation concern is severe enough. The intuition is in this case the bad type has no incentive to lie and thus the good type has no incentive to separate. In general, when reputation concern is large or small enough, there exists informative equilibria. Only when reputation concern is in the middle, we still face the bad reputation problem. 
Rovira i Virgily University (Spain) Tuesday, July 21, 14:45, Session On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games [pdf] (joint work with Pedro Calleja and Francesc Llerena) Abstract
On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there 
MIT Sloan School of Management Thursday, July 23, 10:45, Session B Auction Design with Advised Bidders [pdf] (joint work with Anton Tsoy) Abstract
This paper studies efficient and optimal auction design where bidders do not know their values and solicit advice from informed but biased advisors via a cheaptalk game. When advisors are biased toward overbidding, we characterize efficient equilibria of static auctions and equilibria of the English auction under the NITS condition (Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008)). In static auctions, advisors transmit a coarsening of their information and a version of the revenue equivalence holds. In contrast, in the English auction, information is transmitted perfectly from types in the bottom of the distribution, and pooling happens only at the top. Under NITS, any equilibrium of the English auction dominates any efficient equilibrium of any static auction in terms of both efficiency and the seller's revenue. The distinguishing feature of the English auction is that information can be transmitted 
Yale University Monday, July 20, 10:15, Session F Dynamic Coordination and Learning [pdf] Abstract This paper examines the interplay of informational and payoff externalities in a twoplayer strategic investment game. Each players learns about the quality of a new technology by observing a private signal and the action of his opponent, and has the option of irreversibly adopting it. I characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs in the timing game in which there is secondmover advantage and weak benefit from coordinating. All symmetric equilibria are in mixedstrategy and involve late adoption. In contrast with the case pure informational externalities, players may invest at the same time: in the best symmetric equilibrium they first attempt to coordinate by simultaneously adopting the new technology and then randomize over investment time. In the unique nonatomic equilibrium, the introduction of payoff externalities enriches the learning dynamics, compared to existing models. For a fixed learning rate, if the payoff from preempting are significantly lower than the outcome from coordinating or being the second to invest, learning is never complete. In the extreme case in which there are no payoff externalities, learning halts over the investment period, as shown by Murto and Valimaki (2011). 
University of South Carolina Wednesday, July 22, 10:15, Session C Contests on Networks [pdf] (joint work with David Rietzke) Abstract We consider contests on networks where N players compete for M prizes. Player i is “connected” to di ≥ 1 prizes, or competes for di prizes. She chooses a single effort, xi ≥ 0, to increase her probability of winning each contest in which she competes. We describe equilibria for different contest success functions. In particular, we compare equilibrium behavior in Tullock contests and allpay auctions. It turns out that total effort is higher in Tullock contest if the network is “symmetric.” However, if the network is a start network, then total effort is higher in the Tullock contest. 
Northwestern University Wednesday, July 22, 11:15, Session E Monotone Persuasion [pdf] Abstract
We explore when it is optimal for senders to commit to signal structures 
McGill University Thursday, July 23, 14:45, Session E RentSeeking Group Contests with Private Information [pdf] Abstract
A model of rentseeking group contest is developed. The contested good is a local public good. Individuals have private information 
Dortmund University Thursday, July 23, 15:15, Session E Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information [pdf] Abstract
This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a prestage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if 
Goettingen University Tuesday, July 21, 14:45, Session D Dynamics of Yardstick Regulation: Historical Cost Data and the Ratchet Effect [pdf] Abstract Real life applications of yardstick regulation frequently refer to historical cost data. While yardstick regulation cuts the link between firms' own costs and prices firms may charge in a static setting, it does not do so in a dynamic setting where historical cost data is used. A firm can influence the price it will be allowed to charge in the future if its behavior today can affect future behavior of other firms that determines the price this firm will be able to charge later on. This paper shows that, assuming that slack, inflation of costs, is beneficial to firms, a tradeoff between short term profit through abstinence from slack and the benefit of slack in (infinitely) many periods arises. A ratchet effect that yardstick regulation was meant to overcome can occur and firms can realize positive rents because of the use of historical cost data, even if firms are identical. Equilibria with positive slack can exist without any collusion between firms or threat. Moreover, this problem is more severe if the firm with the lowest costs of all other firms instead of the average firm is the yardstick. 
University of Oxford Wednesday, July 22, 14:45, Session B Spiteful Bidding in the Dollar Auction [pdf] (joint work with Marcin Waniek, Agata Niescieruk, Tomasz P. Michalak and Talal Rahwan) Abstract Shubik's (allpay) dollar auction is a simple yet powerful auction model that aims to shed light on the motives and dynamics of conflict escalation. Common intuition and experimental results suggest that the dollar auction is a trap, inducing conflict by its very design. However, O'Neill (1986) proved the surprising result that, contrary to the experimental results and the intuition, the dollar auction has an immediate solution in pure strategies, i.e., theoretically it should not lead to conflict escalation. In this paper we reconsider these results following recent literature on spiteful bidders. That is, we ask the question whether the escalation in the dollar auction can be induced by meanness. Our results confirm this conjecture in various scenarios. A strongly spiteful player is often able to escalate the auction and force the nonspiteful opponent to spend most of the budget. Still, it is the spiteful bidder who wins the prize. 
Stony Brook University About John Nash (Slides: http://www.math.stonybrook.edu/~jack/Nashprint.pdf) Abstract Slides: http://www.math.stonybrook.edu/~jack/Nashprint.pdf 
Maastricht University Common Belief in MaximinRationality [pdf] Abstract
We model players not as Subjective Expected Utility Maximisers but as Maxmin Expected Utility Maximisers in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Moreover, we introduce an epistemic model that models hierarchies of ambiguous belief based on Ahn (2007). Using the epistemic model, we define maximinrationality and common belief in maximinrationality (CBMMR) to formulate a model that generalises common belief in rationality (CBR) (Tan and Werlang, 1988). 
ETH Zurich Monday, July 20, 15:45, Session Meritocracy Can Dissolve the EfficiencyEquality Tradeoff: the Case of Voluntary Contributions Games [pdf] (joint work with S Balietti, RO Murphy, D Helbing) Abstract
One of the fundamental tradeoffs underlying society 
University of Southern California Sharing Information Without Regret in Managed Stochastic Games [pdf] (joint work with Michael J. Neely) Abstract
This paper considers information sharing in a multiplayer repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset of components of a random vector and then takes a control action. The utility earned by each player depends on the full random vector and on the actions of others. An example is a game where different rewards are placed over multiple locations, each player only knows the rewards in a subset of the locations, and players compete to collect the 
DIW Berlin Thursday, July 23, 10:15, Session F Learning from unrealized versus realized prices [pdf] (joint work with Georg Weizsäcker) Abstract Our market experiment investigates the extent to which traders learn from the price, in situations where orders are submitted before or after the price has realized. When market participants have to submit their bids conditional on the price, they show a bias by reacting only to their private information and not to the hypothetical value of the price. In a sequential trading mechanism, where the price is known at the time of bid submission, bids react to price to an extent that is roughly consistent with the benchmark theory. 
University of South Carolina Wednesday, July 22, 10:15, Session F Optimal Lottery for Fundraising: The Organizer’s Problem [pdf] Abstract This paper looks at fixedprize lottery as a means for the private provision of public good in a local (smaller scale) context and considers the problem of the organizer of the lottery. A theoretical solution is derived for the problem pertaining to the number of tickets that must be issued for sale by the organizer; given that an individual participant’s marginal per capita return is private information. 
Higher School of Economics Wednesday, July 22, 10:15, Session A Financially Constrained Lawyers [pdf] (joint work with Claudia M. Landeo) Abstract
Financial constraints reduce lawyers' ability to file lawsuits and bring cases to trial. As 
University of the Basque Country Wednesday, July 22, 10:45, Session C A unifying model of strategic network formation [pdf] (joint work with Federico Valenciano) Abstract We provide a model that bridges the gap between two benchmark models of strategic network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal's twoway flow model, where links can be unilaterally formed. In both models, as in the one introduced here, flow through links occurs in both directions with some degree of decay. In our model a link can be created unilaterally, but when it is only supported by one of the two players (weak link) the flow through it suffers some friction or decay, which is smaller when it is supported by both players (strong link). When the decay in weak links is maximal (i.e. there is no flow) we have Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model, while when flow in weak links is as good as in strong links we have Bala and Goyal's twoway flow model. In this setting, a joint generalization of the results relative to efficiency and stability in both seminal papers is achieved. 
Univeristy of Pennsylvania, Department of Economics Wednesday, July 22, 15:15, Session B Privacy Preserving Market Design [pdf] (joint work with Marzena Rostek, Ji Hee Yoon) Abstract
Preserving privacy is, increasingly, a concern in auctions and exchanges. To examine 
UNC Chapel Hill Friday, July 24, 15:45, Session D On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders [pdf] (joint work with Fei Li) Abstract In a multisender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2012) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) senders reveal information simultaneously, (ii) senders' information can be arbitrarily correlated, and (iii) senders play pure strategies. This paper shows that these three conditions are also necessary to the result. In sequential persuasion games, the order of moves matters, and we show that adding a sender as a first mover and keeping the order of moves fixed for the other senders cannot result in a loss of information. 
Stony Brook University Tuesday, July 21, 10:15, Session Graphical Potential Games [pdf] Abstract Potential games, originally introduced in the early 1990's by Lloyd Shapley, the 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics, and his colleague Dov Monderer, are a very important class of models in game theory. They have special properties such as the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. This note introduces graphical versions of potential games. Special cases of graphical potential games have already found applicability in many areas of science and engineering beyond economics, including artificial intelligence, computer vision, and machine learning. They have been effectively applied to the study and solution of important realworld problems such as routing and congestion in networks, distributed resource allocation (e.g., public goods), and relaxationlabeling for image segmentation. Implicit use of graphical potential games goes back at least 40 years. Several classes of games considered standard in the literature, including coordination games, local interaction games, lattice games, congestion games, and partyaffiliation games, are instances of graphical potential games. This note provides several characterizations of graphical potential games by leveraging wellknown results from the literature on probabilistic graphical models. A major contribution of the work presented here that particularly distinguishes it from previous work is establishing that the convergence of certain type of gameplaying rules implies that the agents/players must be embedded in some graphical potential game. 
SABANCI UNIVERSITY Expert Advice for Multiple Audiences with Conflicting Interests [pdf] Abstract This paper examines a simple (repeated) cheap talk game between a single expert and two audiences with conflicting interests. The expert, who is informed about a payoff relevant parameter, sends an unverifiable message to the receivers. Conditional on the message they observe, the receivers simultaneously choose their actions, which collectively determine the payoffs of all three. The paper answers the following questions: How valuable and informative are the expert's advice? Under what conditions is deception consistent with equilibrium? Furthermore, if the expert is a longlived agent who also cares about the reliability of her messages in the longterm, then what makes the expert more or less deceptive? 
University of Maryland Monday, July 20, 10:15, Session E A simple learning rule with monitoring leading to Nash Equilibrium under delays [pdf] (joint work with Richard J. La) Abstract
We first propose a general gametheoretic framework for studying 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Wednesday, July 22, 15:45, Session B Dropout in Small and Large Contests [pdf] Abstract We study participation in contests with heterogeneous agents. For the allpay auction with multiple (identical) prizes where contestants belong to group H or L; valuations (for the prizes) are independently and, within groups, identically distributed, we provide a sufficient condition for all L contestants to dropout – always choose zero effort. The dropout is possible even if there is some chance that an L contestant’s valuation might be higher than an H contestant’s, Pr[VL > VH] > 0. In particular, even when an L contestant is almost certain to have a higher valuation than an H contestant, Pr[VL > VH] near 1, the dropout can still happen, provided VH’s distribution has a ‘fatter upper tail’ than VL’s distribution and there are enough H contestants relatively to prizes. The dropout condition is invariant with the scale of the contest, only the ratio of prizes to H contestants matters. 
Energid Technologies Wednesday, July 22, 11:15, Session A Game TheoryInspired Evaluation of Ground Vehicle Autonomy [pdf] (joint work with Ryan Penning, Douglas Barker, James English, Paul Muench) Abstract The promise of selfdriving cars is almost as old as the idea of the car itself. Recently, technological advances in sensing and control have made them a real possibility within the next decade. However, although this possibility is attractive, there are a number of unanswered questions. Perhaps most important among these is how to verify that the selfdriving system is safe for use on public roads, both on its own and in the presence of other vehicles. We propose a simulationbased validation system that actively seeks out failures by optimizing multiple (potentially competing) metrics. This multioptimization system is built from multiple individual components that optimize the statistics of a Monte Carlo experiment system. The result is a system that can find isolated corner cases, and is robust to uncertainty in the system and environment models. In this paper, we describe a general framework for this system, and present results demonstrating the effectiveness of both the individual core components, and the full multioptimization system. 
New York University Monday, July 20, 14:45, Session F Media Competition and the Source of Disagreement (joint work with Jacopo Perego and Sevgi Yuksel) Abstract
We identify a novel channel through which increased competition among information providers decreases the efficiency of electoral outcomes. A number of profitmaximizing firms compete to sell information to a group of Bayesian agents about how two political candidates compare on several issues. Voters can disagree on which issues are important to them (agenda) and on how each issue in their agenda should be addressed (slant). We show that competition forces firms to differentiate the type of information they produce. In particular, differentiation leads to higher provision of information on issues where there is higher disagreement in the electorate. Although voters become individually better informed, the share of votes going to the socially optimal candidate decreases. We also show that this inefficiency is magnified if there is higher polarization in the underlying preferences of the society. 
University of South Carolina Thursday, July 23, 15:15, Session C Blind Stealing Games [pdf] (joint work with Alexander Matros) Abstract For at least 100 years p0ker game analysis has drawn the attention of game theorists, mathematicians, and economists. Two clear branches of game design grew from this longterm infatuation: the Borel (1938) model and the von NeumannMorgenstern (1944) model. The theorists produced numerous variations of these two models (Bellman and Blackwell (1949), Goldman and Stone (1959), Kuhn (1950), Nash and Shapley (1950),Cutler (1975), etc.),however few investigated a p0ker design with asymmetric ante amounts paid in by the players. Below, we examine a twoperson zerosum “Blind Stealing” p0ker model. The Blind Stealing model differs from most p0ker models in that players pay different ante amounts prior to receiving hands. In Section 1 we describe equilibrium values for both discrete and continuous hands. We then locate the optimal prescribed bet size for both cases. Finally, we place our model in the large literature where surprisingly only one recent paper also considers a setting with different antes. This paper by Van Essen and Wooders (2015) )  analyzes a particular case of our discrete model for B equals 3. 
University of Pittsburgh Wednesday, July 22, 15:45, Session D Rationalization and Robustness in Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information [pdf] (joint work with Peio ZuazoGarin) Abstract In this paper we show a formal connection between the epistemic characterization of a solution concept and its robustness to the misspecication of parameters. This provides both an important conceptual link and a direct method for checking robustness when the epistemic characterization is known. We use this result to show that extensive form rationalizability (EFR) is upperhemicontinuous. We also present a new framework that relaxes the common knowledge restrictions regarding the space of payoff parameters. Within this framework, we propose a new type of robustness, srobustness, to modeling errors of the player understanding of the space of uncertainty, which is of particular importance in dynamic environments. We then characterize this notion through an our epistemic framework and show that EFR is also srobust. Finally, we provide a structure theorem for EFR with personal spaces of uncertainty that shows that no common knowledge assumptions regarding the existence of dominance states are required to achieve generic dominance solvability. 
Corvinus University of Budapest Thursday, July 23, 15:45, Session E A new epistemic model [pdf] Abstract
Meier (2012) gave a "mathematical logic foundation" of the purely measurable universal type space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998). The mathematical logic foundation, however, discloses an inconsistency in the type space literature: a finitary language is used for the belief hierarchies and an infinitary language is used for the beliefs. 
Bates College Monday, July 20, 10:45, Session B A simulation on the evolution of markets: Call Market, Decentralized and Posted Offer [pdf] (joint work with Olga Rabanal) Abstract We apply standard evolutionary dynamics to study of stability of three competing market formats call market (CM), posted offer (PO) and decentralized market (DM). In our framework, heterogeneous buyers and sellers seek to transact a homogeneous good, which can be done by allocating their time among three different market formats. We study the allocation of time among different formats using simulations of a large (evolutionary) dynamic system. Our results show that (i) the final participation of traders in CM is much higher compared to the two other formats, (ii) the PO can coexist with CM, and (iii) DM vanishes against CM in the long run but can survive against PO, depending on the initial participation conditions. 
London School of Economics and Political Science Tuesday, July 21, 15:15, Session A Team Reasoning and a RankBased Function of Team's Interests [pdf] (joint work with Jurgis Karpus) Abstract
Orthodox game theory is sometimes criticized for its failure to single out intuitively compelling solutions in certain types of interpersonal interactions. The theory of team reasoning provides a resolution in some such cases by suggesting a shift in decisionmakers' mode of reasoning from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team. The existing literature in this field discusses a number of properties for a formalized representation of team's interests to satisfy: Pareto efficiency, successful coordination of individuals' actions and the notion of mutual advantage among the members of a team. For an explicit function of team's goals a reference is sometimes made to the maximization of the average of individuals' personal payoffs, which meets the Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria, but at times fails with respect to the notion of mutual advantage. It also relies on making interpersonal comparisons of payoffs which goes beyond the standard assumptions of the expected utility theory that make numerical representations of individuals' preferences possible. In this paper we propose an alternative, rankbased function of team's interests that does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of payoffs, incorporates the notion of mutual advantage and satisfies the weak Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria. We discuss its predictions using a number of examples and suggest a few possibilities for further research in this field. 
University of Chicago Sequential Equilibria of Multistage Games with Infinite Sets of Actions and Types Abstract We consider how to extend Kreps and Wilson's 1982 definition of sequential equilibrium to multistage games with infinite sets of types and actions. A concept of open sequential equilibrium is defined by taking limits of strategy profiles that can consistently satisfy approximate sequential rationality for all players at arbitrarily large finite collections of observable open events. Existence of open sequential equilibria is shown for a broad class of regular projective games. Examples are considered to illustrate the properties of this solution and the difficulties of alternative approaches to the problem of extending sequential equilibrium to infinite games. 
Utrecht university Thursday, July 23, 10:45, Session F Cultural Differences in Prisoner's Dilemma Game Experiments: Evidence from a MetaAnalysis [pdf] (joint work with Tahereh Rezaei Khavas) Abstract Abstract The existence of social and cultural norms and the effect of these norms on people\'s behavior was always a debatable issue for cognitive scientists and is still a dilemma. This paper is a MetaAnalysis of 37 papers with 107 observations from repeated prisoner\'s dilemma experiments comprising more than 6000 participants and conducted in 12 different countries. The findings provide evidence that there is no significant difference on repeated prisoner\'s dilemma\'s cooperation rate between different countries and cultures. While the impact of methodology of such games on cooperation rate is relatively big. 
visiting graduate researcher at UCLA Thursday, July 23, 10:15, Session E The optimal group size in microcredit contracts [pdf] Abstract
We analyze a model of a repeated microcredit lending and study how group 
University of Leicester Thursday, July 23, 10:15, Session C A Beauty Contest with Flexible Information Acquisition [pdf] Abstract
This paper studies a beautycontest coordination game. A continuum of players get payoffs based on the squared distance of their action from an unobserved fundamental state of the world and the average action among all players. Each player receives a signal whose probability distribution conditional on the value of the fundamental is part of their strategy. This flexible information acquisition technology allows players to choose not only how precise but also what kind of information they want to get about the fundamental. Information is costly, in particular cost is linear in Shannon's mutual information measure between the prior of the fundamental and the player's chosen conditional distribution. When unit costs are high enough, there is a unique equilibrium where players do not obtain information. For lower information unit costs, players restrict their attention around the expected value of the fundamental while paying little attention to fundamental values away from it. As costs get lower, players follow the value of the fundamental more closely. A stronger coordination motive or a more concentrated distribution of the fundamental have the same effect as a higher information cost. When information costs exceed a certain threshold, players do not acquire any information and play the exante expected value of the fundamental with probability 1. The case of a normally distributed fundamental is examined in more detail. Only in this case there exist equilibria whereby the average action of the population is an affine function of the realized value of the fundamental. In most parameter combinations, there exists a unique equilibrium within the classes of affine equilibria and equilibria without information acquisition. Interestingly, when the coordination motive is high and for relatively high information costs, there is multiplicity of equilibria within the classes considered. 
University of Bath NonSincere Voting in Common Value Elections [pdf] (joint work with Javier Rivas) Abstract
We consider a common value election between two candidates where there is imperfect 
HEC Paris Friday, July 24, 14:45, Session D Regulation and the Structure of Information: The Effects of Peer Monitoring on Capital Adequacy Regulation [pdf] Abstract This paper analyzes games of incomplete information in a regulatory context. We utilize game theoretic tools to highlight a cost effective framework that allows a regulator, e.g. a central bank, to achieve a second best outcome (with respect to the complete information optimum) implemented only through cheap talk communication. More importantly, such outcomes have the features that i.) the regulator learns the private information of the agents and ii.) the regulator extracts this information without engaging in costly monitoring nor having to threaten misbehavior with harsh punishments. We provide an example of how such a framework can be utilized to induce banks to hold higher levels of capital in the case when the regulators monitoring of the banks' portfolio risk is imperfect. Motivated by information transmission due to peer monitoring in interbank lending networks (see Rochet and Tirole (1996)), we then analyze how the transmission of private information between players affects the previously mentioned set of achievable equilibrium outcomes available to the regulator. We show that, for general games of incomplete information with preplay communication, more information transmission between players leads to a smaller set of equilibrium outcomes and illustrate this with our example on capital adequacy regulation. 
Universitat de Barcelona Friday, July 24, 10:45, Session E Oneseller assignment market with multiunit demands [pdf] (joint work with Marina Núñez) Abstract We consider an assignment market with one seller who owns several indivisible heterogeneous goods and many buyers each willing to buy up to a given capacity. Our aim is to study the relationship between the core of the game and the set of competitive equilibria. The core is nonempty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation in which every buyer gets his marginal contribution to the grand coalition. The set of competitive equilibrium price vectors also has a lattice structure and we determine the minimum and maximum competitive equilibrium prices. Necessary and sufficient conditions under which the buyersoptimal and the selleroptimal core allocations come from a competitive equilibrium are provided. In addition, we characterize in terms of the valuation matrix the coincidence between the core and the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. As a consequence, we obtain that this coincidence always holds if the capacities of all buyers are large enough. 
Stanford University When Do Simple Mechanisms Suffice Abstract
For many mechanism design settings, the theoretically optimal mechanism is too complex for practical use. Examples include Myerson's revenuemaximizing auction when bidders are not symmetric, and the VCG mechanism when players' type spaces are large. Are there interesting scenarios where "simple" mechanisms are almost as good? 
University of Haifa Wednesday, July 22, 10:15, Session B Impulsive decisions: nature or nurture? A stochastic approximation approach [pdf] (joint work with InKoo Cho) Abstract
In a search for a positive model of decisionmaking with observable primitives, 
University of Guelph Does Contamination affect Residential Property Values? (joint work with Jack Williamson)

Pennsylvania State University Tuesday, July 21, 15:45, Session D Identification of solution concepts for semiparametric discrete games with complete information [pdf] (joint work with Nail Kashaev) Abstract Empirical analyses of discrete games rely on behavioral assumptions that are crucial not just for estimation, but also for the validity of counterfactual exercises and policy implications. We find conditions for a general class of completeinformation games under which it is possible to identify whether actual behavior satisfies some of these assumptions. We propose different applications for our general approach. For instance, our results allow us to identify whether and how often firms in an entry game play Nash equilibria, which equilibria are more likely to be selected, whether they use mixed strategies, whether they make choices simultaneously or sequentially, and whether profit functions are private information or common knowledge. 
Tel Aviv University Tuesday, July 21, 14:45, Session A The sure thing principle Abstract Savage introduced the surething principle in terms of the dependence of decisions on knowledge, but gave up on formalizing it in epistemic terms for lack of a formal definition of knowledge. Using a standard model of knowledge, the partition model, we examine the surething principle, presenting two ways to capture it. One is in terms of knowledge operators, which we call the principle of follow the knowledgeable; the other is in terms of kensbodies of agents\' knowledgewhich we call independence of irrelevant knowledge. We show that the two principles are equivalent. We present a stronger version of the independence of irrelevant knowledge and show that it is equivalent to the impossibility of agreeing to disagree on the decision made by agents, namely the impossibility of different decisions made by agents being common knowledge. 
LUISS Monday, July 20, 10:45, Session F Atomic Dynamic Network Games [pdf] (joint work with Marc Schröder, Tristan Tomala) Abstract
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and single sourcedestination pair. The latencies of edges are composed of freeflow transit time and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. This allows to give a precise description of the dynamic induced by individual strategies of players and to study how the steady state is reached, either when players act selfishly, or when the traffic is controlled by a planner. Our contributions are threefold. 
University of Bonn Thursday, July 23, 15:45, Session C Dynamic Formation of Teams: When Does Waiting for Good Matches Pay Off? [pdf] (joint work with Holger Herbst) Abstract
This paper studies the tradeoff between realizing match values early and 
University of Connecticut Wednesday, July 22, 10:45, Session B Frame Dependent Utility Theory [pdf] Abstract A large literature on nonexpected utility models has developed preference functionals which are nonlinear in probabilities to explain attitudes toward risk. In this paper, we introduce a framedependent utility model which resolves many of the paradoxes that motivated nonexpected utility models while retaining expected utility analysis for any given decision. In particular, we embed the von NeumannMorgenstern model of risk preference in a model which also accounts for the decision maker's risk perception and the framing of lotteries. A correspondence between risk perception and risk preference then provides a unified explanation for the classical anomalies. 
The Pennsylvania State University Friday, July 24, 10:45, Session A Discrimination in Organizations [pdf] Abstract A number of the largest U.S. firms have been found guilty of labor discrimination despite having policies in place that have been designed in order to avoid the outcome. This paper diagnoses the phenomenon and proposes a contractual solution to ameliorate the situation using a mechanism design approach. Existing research (e.g., Becker (1957), Coate and Loury (1993)) studies a situation in which an individual person practices discrimination. In contrast, the paper considers a hierarchical organization in which a manager (the agent) has a discriminatory taste toward his subordinates, whereas an owner (the principal) is unbiased and only cares about profit. The manager perfectly observes productivity of his black and white subordinates and decides whom to promote. Both the black and white subordinates are exante identical in terms of their productivity distribution. The owner only sees results of his manager’s decision, the promoted worker’s identity, and that worker’s performance. That is, the manager knows, but the owner does not know what would have been the productivity of the worker who was not promoted. In this environment, I study a direct mechanism in which the manager reports all information to the owner and the owner makes decisions on promotion and compensation. In the optimal direct mechanism (Bonusmechanism), which maximizes the firm’s expected profit subject to incentive compatibility conditions, the black worker is promoted if the productivity gap between the black and white workers exceeds the manager’s disutility associated with the discriminatory preference. In this case where the black worker is promoted, the owner provides a fixed amount of bonus to the manager. Additionally, I compare the allocation implemented by this Bonusmechanism to the firstbest (full information) allocation and finally discuss effectiveness of current regulations (e.g. affirmative action, auditing, taxation on the minority promotion ratio). 
Harvard University Friday, July 24, 15:15, Session B A Model of Mechanism Design in the Presence of a PreExisting Game [pdf] (joint work with Benjamin N. Roth) Abstract We study a model of mechanism design in which the designer cannot force the players to use the mechanism. Instead they must voluntarily sign away their decision rights, and if they instead keep their decision rights they act on their own accord. We ask what social choice functions can be implemented uniquely in this setting. We show that when there is no incomplete information among the players our analysis differs little from that of the standard framework. However when there is incomplete information among the players we identify social choice functions which are uniquely implementable in the standard framework but cannot be implemented uniquely in ours. In some cases, simple mechanisms intended to produce desirable equilibria also produce equilibria with very bad welfare properties. We see this as a caution to applications of the standard analysis to the design of real markets. 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem Wednesday, July 22, 10:45, Session F Risk of Monetary Gambles: An Axiomatic Approach [pdf] Abstract In this work we present five axioms for a riskorder relation defined over (monetary) gambles. We then characterize an index which satisfies all these axioms  the probability of losing money in a gamble multiplied by the expected value of such an outcome  and prove its uniqueness. We propose to use this function as the risk of a gamble. This index is continuous, homogenous, monotonic with respect to first and secondorder stochastic dominance, and simple to calculate. We also compare our index with some other risk indices mentioned in the literature. 
Stony Brook University Monday, July 20, 10:45, Session A Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers [pdf] (joint work with Jing Chen, Samuel McCauley, Shikha Singh) Abstract
Interactive proofs model a world where a verifier delegates computation to an untrustworthy prover, verifying the prover’s claims before accepting them. These proofs have applications to delegation of computation, probabilistically checkable proofs, crowdsourcing, and more. 
Yale University Monday, July 20, 14:45, Session E Optimal Feedback and Wage Policies [pdf] Abstract We consider a principalagent setting in which the principal has superior expertise to assess performance of the agent. The agent, if capable and making an effort, generates successes exponentially distributed over time. The principal observes successes and may disclose them to the agent via (i) a feedback policy, if transfers are not allowed, or (ii) a wage policy, if transfers are allowed. We solve for principal's optimal policies and find that they are coarse in both cases; the principal postpones revealing information about the agent's performance. When transfers are not allowed, the optimal feedback policy prescribes a single revision at a fixed date; it leaves the agent with procrastination rents when his actions are not observable. When transfers are allowed, the optimal wage policy starts with a probation period that is followed by permanent employment if the agent has ever been successful; it satisfies limited liability and extracts full surplus even when agent's actions are not observable. 
Center for Research and Advanced Studies Solving Stackelberg Security Games for Multiple Defenders and Multiple Attackers [pdf] (joint work with Cesar U. Solis, Alexander S. Poznyak and Julio B. Clempner) Abstract
In the last years, there has been a substantial effort 
Corvinus University of Budapest Tuesday, July 21, 15:15, Session Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs in assignment games [pdf] (joint work with Marina Nunez) Abstract
We consider various lexicographic allocation procedures for coalitional games with transferable utility where the payoffs are computed in an externally given order of the players. The common feature of the methods is that if the allocation is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core. We first investigate the general relationships between these allocations and obtain two hierarchies on the class of balanced games. 
Northwestern University Thursday, July 23, 10:15, Session A Backward Induction in the Wild: Evidence from the U.S. Senate [pdf] Abstract Backward induction is a cornerstone of modern game theory. Yet, laboratory experiments consistently show that subjects fail to properly backward induct. Whether these findings generalize to other, realworld settings remains an open question. This paper develops a simple model of sequential voting in the U.S. Senate that allows for a straightforward test of the null hypothesis of myopic play. Exploiting quasirandom variation in the alphabetical composition of the Senate and, therefore, the order in which Senators get to cast their votes, the evidence suggests that agents do rely on backward reasoning. At the same time, Senators' backward induction prowess appears to be quite limited. In particular, there is no evidence of Senators reasoning backwards on the first several hundred roll call votes in which they participate. 
University of Bielefeld, IMW A new characterization of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in continuous time [pdf] Abstract This paper continues the study of a new class of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring launched by Sannikov (2007). I provide a new characterization of selfgenerating sets for a class of games in continuous time and Brownian information. This new characterization relies on partial differential equation techniques. Our approach gives a geometric characterization of the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs, similar to the 2player characterization obtained by Sannikov (2007) who obtains a curvature relation through a direct argument. Our characterization via partial differential equations is obtained by first identifying selfgenerating sets as stochastically viable under the dynamic determining the continuation payoff process induced by the players' strategies. Based on this formal identification we use viscosity solution techniques to derive a geometric characterization of the boundary of selfgenerating sets. In case of two players my characterization reduces to the result reported by Sannikov (2007), relating the curvature parameters of a set to incentives. 
University at Albany Monday, July 20, 11:15, Session A Realization Plans for Extensive Form Games without Perfect Recall [pdf] (joint work with Richard E Stearns) Abstract
Given a game in extensive form and a player $p$ in the game, 
National Taipei University Monday, July 20, 15:15, Session E Information Revelation in the Property Right Theory of the Firms [pdf] Abstract I incorporate revelation of asymmetric information through shared ownership (partnership) into the Property Right Theory of the firms. Shared ownership is optimal as a joint result of mitigating holdup and inducing information revelation. Due to the incomplete contracting nature, partnership is incentive compatible if it induces a positive probability of truthful revelation within the relationship as well as when the relationship breaks. This offtheequilibriumpath incentive compatibility results in the optimality of partnership even for the most efficient type of the informed party. Incentive to invest in the relationshipspecific asset is then distorted downward as the holdup concern is not efficiently mitigated. The level of shared ownership reflects the relative magnitude of the information rent effect and the holdup effect. 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Thursday, July 23, 10:15, Session B Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release [pdf] (joint work with Nikolaus Schweizer) Abstract Auctions are the allocationmechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k and kmdispersion, for understanding the impact of information release. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by information release, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa. 
University of Washington A Dynamic Opinion and Network Formation Model [pdf] (joint work with Xu Tan) Abstract Social networks have a profound influence on opinion formation, and at the same time opinion similarity and diversity can draw individuals together or drive them apart. In light of this, we propose a dynamic model in which individuals, belonging to 2 different groups, sequentially update both their opinions and their connections. We show that with probability one this dynamic process converges to a steady state, a state in which no one wants to change their opinions and add/delete their links. If small trembles occur during link creation and deletion, there are only two types of steady states of opinions. Intuitively, in the dynamic process, it could be either individuals' opinions get closer with creation of more crossgroup connections, or individuals' opinions get further away with deletion of crossgroup connections. Thus, in one type of steady states, the distance between individuals' opinions is minimized (so a consensus if possible), which is consistent with the predictions of most models on social learning. More interestingly in the other type, the distance between individuals' opinions is maximized, which is rarely predicted from a weightedaverage or Bayesian learning model, but yet it is consistent with evidence on opinion polarization, such as the increasing polarization in ideology between political parties. 
The Graduate Center of CUNY Thursday, July 23, 11:15, Session A The Strategy of Campaigning [pdf] (joint work with Rohit Parikh) Abstract
We prove an abstract theorem which shows that under certain circumstances, a candidate running for political office should be as explicit as possible in order to improve her impression among the voters. But this result conflicts with the perceived reality that candidates are often cagey and reluctant to take stances except when absolutely necessary. Why this 
Stony Brook University and IDC Bargaining on the Sale of a New Innovation in the Presence of Potential Entry [pdf] (joint work with Yoram Weiss, Chang Zhao) Abstract We consider an industry with one incumbent and many potential entrants. Initially the high entry cost does not enable a profitable entry. Suppose an outside innovator holds a patent on a technology that eliminates the entry cost but has a marginal cost at least as high as the current one. The innovator wishes to sell his intellectual property (IP) to the incumbent, through bargaining. Even though the technology itself is useless for the incumbent, he may purchase the IP to limit or exclude further entry. The innovator may sell a few licenses to new entrants before approaching the incumbent. This on one hand reduces the total industry profit but enables a better credible threat on the incumbent and hence may increases the innovator's payoff. A licensing contract with an entrant specifies the license fee together with the maximum number of licenses that can be sold. The contracts are signed sequentially and they are bound by previous commitments. The firms are engaged in Cournot competition in the last stage. It is shown that depending on the marginal cost of the new technology and on the bargaining power of the innovator relative to that of the incumbent, there are three types of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE): (1) the innovator sells first a license to one entrant before selling his IP to the incumbent. The incumbent then put the technology on the shelf to exclude further entry. (2) the innovator sells one license to an entrant before selling the IP to the incumbent. The incumbent then licenses the new technology to one additional entrant and (3) the innovator sells the IP directly to the incumbent who then put the technology on the shelf. 
University of Pittsburgh Thursday, July 23, 15:15, Session D Learning the Krepsian State: Exploration through Consumption [pdf] (joint work with Evan Piermont, Norio Takeoka and Roee Teper ) Abstract
We present the idea of responsive subjective learning and provide a behavioral foundation 
University of Bonn Tuesday, July 21, 10:15, Session B Gathering information before signing a contract: the case of imperfect information [pdf] Abstract I study information gathering for rentseeking purposes in contracting. In my model,an agent learns his payoff type only after accepting a contract, but can at costs acquire imperfect information while deliberating whether to accept. I show that the principal deters the acquisition if and only if the costs are high. The result stands in contrast to a finding by Crémer and Khalil (1992), who demonstrate that the acquisition of perfect information will always be deterred. A key insight is that the case of imperfect information is an instance of a sequentialscreening problem. 
University of Chicago Tuesday, July 21, 15:45, Session Strategyproof and Efficient Fair Scheduling [pdf] Abstract In this paper, I study dynamic and sequential fair division problems for players with dichotomous preferences and devise a systematic approach of designing efficient, envyfree, and strategyproof mechanisms for any generic problem. The mechanisms developed here can accommodate common discount factors to represent players' time preferences between different periods. I also show that the mechanisms proposed in the current research outperform in efficiency the repeated applications of a static strategyproof mechanism by a factor of the size of set of players in refined problems with unbounded demands. I also contribute a novel comparative statics result on the egalitarian solutions to monotone and concave cooperative games with transferable utilities in characteristic function form. In the process of doing so, I discover a dualitylike property of the egalitarian solutions and reconcile the seemingly contradictory process to the objective in the search for them. Finally, I highlight the relative importance of identifying the correct order of priority over choices of payoffs in the pursuit of equality. 
Universitat de Barcelona Friday, July 24, 10:15, Session F Rationing problems with exante conditions [pdf] (joint work with Josep M. Izquierdo) Abstract An extension of the standard rationing model is introduced. Agents are not only identified by their respective claims on some amount of a scarce resource, but also by some exogenous exante conditions (characteristics), different from claims (e.g., endowments, entitlements, wealth, obligations, assets). Inequalities in the exante conditions induce compensations between agents which influence the final distribution. Within this framework, we provide a generalization of the constrained equal awards rule. We characterize this generalized rule by means of consistency, pathindependence and compensated exemption. Finally, we use the corresponding dual properties to characterize a generalization of the constrained equal losses rule. 
University of Virginia Designing Mechanisms to Make WelfareImproving Strategies Focal [pdf] (joint work with Daniel E. Fragiadakis) Abstract Many institutions use matching algorithms to make assignments. Examples include the allocation of doctors, students and military cadets to hospitals, schools and branches, respectively. Most of the market design literature either imposes strong incentive constraints (such as strategyproofness) or builds mechanisms that, while more efficient than strongly incentive compatible alternatives, require agents to play potentially complex equilibria for the efficiency gains to be realized in practice. Understanding that the effectiveness of welfareimproving strategies relies on the ease with which realworld participants can find them, we carefully design an algorithm that we hypothesize will make such strategies focal. Using a lab experiment, we show that agents do indeed play the intended focal strategies, and doing so yields higher overall welfare than a common alternative mechanism that gives agents dominant strategies of stating their preferences truthfully. Furthermore, we test a mechanism from the field that is similar to ours and find that while both yield comparable levels of average welfare, our algorithm performs significantly better on an individual level. Thus, we show that, if done carefully, this type of behavioral market design is a worthy endeavor that can most promisingly be pursued by a collaboration between institutions, matching theorists, and behavioral and experimental economists. 
MIT Auction Design with Advised Bidders [pdf] (joint work with Andrey Malenko) Abstract This paper studies efficient and optimal auction design where bidders do not know their values, but solicit advice from informed advisors via a cheaptalk game. When advisors are biased toward overbidding, we characterize equilibria of static auctions and the English auction satisfying the dynamic version of the NITS condition (Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008)). In all equilibria of static auctions, advisors transmit a coarsening of their information and a version of the revenue equivalence holds. In contrast, in the English auction, information is transmitted perfectly from types in the bottom of the distribution, and pooling happens only at the top. The English auction dominates any static auction in terms of both efficiency and the seller's revenue. The distinguishing feature of the English auction is that bidders cannot submit bids below the current price of the auction. This results in a higher efficiency due to better information transmission and allows the seller to extract additional profits from the overbidding bias of advisors. When advisors are biased toward underbidding, there is an equilibrium of the Dutch auction that is more efficient than any equilibrium of any static auction, but it can bring lower expected revenue. 
Jose Francisco Tudon Maldonado University of Chicago Wednesday, July 22, 11:15, Session F Price dispersion with ex ante homogeneity: A reassessment of the Diamond paradox [pdf] Abstract If identical firms set prices in a first stage and identical consumers search sequentially in a second stage, then price dispersion arises in the form of a mixed strategy subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium when the search cost is not prohibitively high. The result does not depend on heterogeneity and bridges the gap between monopoly pricing (Diamond, 1971) and marginal cost pricing. Thus, price dispersion is solely supported by information frictions. 
Hebrew University Thursday, July 23, 11:15, Session B Generalized Thirdprice Auctions (joint work with Yair Tauman) Abstract We study an auction mechanism – Generalized Thirdprice (GTP) Auction – that could be used by search engines to sell online advertising. The properties of GTP are investigated in the paper in comparison to practically used auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG. 
University of the Basque Country Thursday, July 23, 10:45, Session C The impact of negotiable costpaying on basic models of network formation [pdf] (joint work with Norma Olaizola) Abstract
A model introduced by us in a different paper merges two basic models of strategic network formation, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) connections model and Bala and Goyal (2000) twoway flow model, and integrates them as extreme cases. The basic idea consists of assuming that two types of links can be formed: strong links, which work better and must be supported by the two players involved, and weak links, which work worse and are supported by only one player who pays its cost c. Following the seminal models and in order to bridge them, it is assumed that the cost 2c of strong links must equally shared by the two players forming it. In this mixed model, as in the seminal ones, efficient structures are stable only within a part of the region (of values of the parameters) where they are efficient. 
Tel Aviv University Tuesday, July 21, 15:15, Session B Truthful Secretaries with Budgets [pdf] (joint work with Alon Eden, Michal Feldman) Abstract
We study online auction settings in which agents arrive and depart dynamically in a random (secretary) order, and each agent's private type consists of the agent's arrival and departure times, value and budget. 
NYU Stern School of Business Monday, July 20, 15:45, Session E Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets [pdf] (joint work with Benjamin Lester, Ali Shourideh, Venky Venkateswaran and Ariel ZetlinJones) Abstract We develop a tractable framework for analyzing adverse selection economies with imperfect competition. In our environment, uninformed buyers offer a general menu of screening contracts to privately informed sellers. Some sellers receive offers from multiple buyers while others receive offers from only one buyer, as in Burdett and Judd (1983). This specification allows us to smoothly vary the degree of competition, nesting monopsony and perfect competition \`{a} la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) as special cases. We show that the unique symmetric mixedstrategy equilibrium exhibits a \emph{strict rankpreserving} property, in that different types of sellers have an identical ranking over the various menus offered in equilibrium. These menus can be all separating, all pooling, or a mixture of both, depending on the distribution of types and the degree of competition in the market. This calls into question the practice of using the incidence of separating contracts as evidence of adverse selection without controlling for market structure. We examine the relationship between \emph{exante} welfare and the degree of competition, and show that in some cases an interior level of frictions maximizes welfare, while in other cases competition is unambiguously bad for welfare. Finally, we study the effects of various policy interventions  such as disclosure and nondiscrimination requirements  and show that our model generates new, and perhaps counterintuitive insights. 
Zhejiang University Monday, July 20, 10:45, Session E The social cycling in FixedPaired Matching Pennies Game [pdf] (joint work with Bin Xu) Abstract Matching Pennies game (MP) and RockPaperScissors game (RPS) are the two elementary games to illustrate the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Under the traditional randomly pairwisematching repeated game experiment protocol, in both games, using the definitive measurement, it has been found that the equilibrium (or randomization) hypothesis was violated, and the systems were in persistently cycling. One question left  At the simplest twoperson fixedpaired (e.g., MP) game, whether or not the equilibrium hypothesis can be hold? It may be argued that, difference from the multiperson protocol, in simple twoperson fixedpaired condition, people having full information may engage in more strategic thinking; And then the equilibrium behaviors could be realized, as expected in classical game theory. We test this point in MPG experiments. In statistical physics, entropy production rate (EPR) is a realvalue observable for nonequilibrium steady state  In the long run, when a system is in equilibrium, its EPR would be zero; otherwise in nonequilibrium, it would be persistently nonzero. In the laboratory experiment data, we observed the persistently nonzero EPR with real value. To confirm this result, we propose a visible and countable graph approach, namely netloop, to show and count the time irreversibility. We compare the two observable (EPR and netloop) and find that they are positively and linearly correlated in significant. These results are supported by 10 existed generalized MPG experiments. In Summary, we suggest that  The system of fixed pair twoperson MPG, in which the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is commonly expected, is actually in nonequilibrium. Importantly, the nonequilibrium has its own realvalue and clear physical picture  a persistently cyclic motion. 
SUNY Stony Brook Tuesday, July 21, 10:15, Session F Information Acquisition, Signaling and Learning in Duopoly [pdf] (joint work with Thomas D. Jeitschko, Ting Liu) Abstract This paper analyzes a twoperiod Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products in which firms face uncertainty in demand. Firms can acquire costly information of different precision about their own demand prior to market competition. We find that firms always have an incentive to acquire information. Moreover, in equilibrium firms will distort first period price above the shortterm optimal price level so as to manipulate the rival firm's belief. Such belief manipulation incentives reduce firms' willingness to acquire information. 
Stanford University Monday, July 20, 15:45, Session A Initiation of Merger and Acquisition Negotiation with TwoSided Private Information [pdf] (joint work with Yi Chen) Abstract Abstract In a dynamic model of merger negotiation assuming twosided private information and common knowledge of gains from trade, this paper investigates (1) what determines the delay in timing of M&A initiation, and (2) who initiates the M&A negotiation. The key driving force for the results is that the timing of initiation can reveal information about each firm's private signal. In addition, interpretation of the timing of initiation as a signal for private information depends crucially on whether the private information is about standalone value or about synergy. We conclude that if private information is about standalone value, the firm whose type is in the lower tail of its own population distribution compared to that of its opponent becomes the initiator. If private information is about synergy, then the firm whose type is in the upper tail of its own population distribution compared to that of its opponent becomes the initiator. In addition, discount rate, bargaining power, and cash constraint also affect who initiates first. The results obtained are broadly consistent with empirical evidence that emphasizing the role of private information in dealinitiation (Masulis and Simsir (2013)). Finally, we show that most results extend to an environment with marketwide uncertainty modeled as a Diffusion Process, in which the decision of Merger and Acquisition initiation is a real option. 
University of Bonn Friday, July 24, 15:45, Session B Dissolving Partnerships Optimally [pdf] (joint work with Simon Loertscher) Abstract We study a partnership model with nonidentical type distributions and interdependent values. For any convex combination of revenue and social surplus in the objective function, we derive the optimal dissolution mechanism for arbitrary initial ownership and use this mechanism to determine the optimal initial ownership structures. These ownership structures are nontrivial because private information is a transaction cost that makes the model nonCoasian. Equal ownership is always optimal with identical distributions but not with nonidentical distributions. When distributions are ranked by stochastic dominance, stronger agents receive higher initial ownership shares when the weight on revenue is small but not necessarily when it is large. 
University of Texas at Austin Tuesday, July 21, 10:45, Session B Too Good to Fire: NonAssortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game [pdf] (joint work with Benjamin Sperisen (Tulane), Thomas Wiseman (UT Austin)) Abstract We study a simple twosided, onetoone matching market with firms and workers. When a firmworker pair is matched, they play an infinitehorizon discounted dynamic game. The range of feasible payoffs of the dynamic game is increasing in the players' types, and their types are complementary  that is, maximal payoffs are a supermodular function of types. Classic results from the twosided matching literature show that when types are complementary, then stable matchings are positively assortative: hightype workers match with hightype firms. In our setting, that result does not hold. There is positively assortative matching at the top and bottom ends of the market, but not in the middle. Intuitively, in this middle region increasing the quality of a match harms cooperative incentives. That effect dominates the direct positive effect of complementarity in types, so that highertype firms prefer lowertype workers who will exert more effort. 
Pennsylvania State University Thursday, July 23, 10:45, Session A Free Riding and Duplication in R&D [pdf] Abstract We study a model of R&D race in the exponentialbandit learning framework (Choi 1991; Keller, Rady, and Cripps 2005), in which two research firms, each endowed with an independent R&D process, choose when to exit the R&D race irreversibly. Each R&D process can be either good or bad. In the absence of research breakthrough (innovation), a firm becomes more pessimistic about its R&D process over time. We shows that strict patent may lead to excessive duplication of research efforts, while the lack of patent protection leads to free riding and underexperimentation of research opportunities. The choice of optimal patent system involves a tradeoff between duplication in the early stage of R&D when both firms are optimistic and underexperimentation in the later stage when one firm has already exited and the remaining firm is pessimistic. 
Clemson University Wednesday, July 22, 11:15, Session B Vague Messages in Biased Information Transmission: Experiments and Theory [pdf] Abstract Spoken language allows for rich communication, but the message spaces used in most cheap talk models and experiments are usually quite restrictive. I show theoretically that introducing vague messages into a strategic information transmission game a la Crawford and Sobel (1982) increases communication between boundedly rational players if some senders are moderately honest. My model treats vague messages as explicitly imprecise messages, e.g., "the state is 1, 2, or 3" in contrast to a precise message, which might say "the state is 2". Senders would like to bias the receivers' beliefs upwards. Theoretically the introduction of vague messages causes more honest senders in some cases to send a truthful but vague message rather a precise lie. These message switches replace lowinformation lies with more informative message and have an additional indirect effect of making the remaining precise messages more informative as well. increasing how informative the average message is about the state. I test this prediction experimentally and find that messages are more likely to be truthful and to be believed credulously in a treatment where both kinds of messages can be sent. Finally I structurally estimate the parameters of my model, and find that about half of subjects get utility from truthtelling equal to around $0.30 (average earnings per round are around $0.70). 
University of Oregon Monday, July 20, 15:45, Session F The Political Roots of Inequality and Inefficiency: An Evolutionary Model Under Political Institutions [pdf] Abstract This paper considers an evolutionary model under political institutions. A population of agents are divided into a majority group and an alternative group according to their strategy types. The two groups interact in the context of a political institution to determine the allocation of two positions (high and low) in the social hierarchy. The allocation of positions determines the material payoffs of the individuals and the fitness levels of the two groups. The fitness levels in turn determine the evolution of strategy types. We examine two types of political institutions. First, under unadulterated majoritarianism, the majority has absolute de jure political power. We find that strategy types that as if maximizing an low position agent's material payoff are evolutionarily stable. Second, under egalitarianism, the de jure political powers of the two groups are proportional to the groups' sizes and thus the equilibrium allocation of positions is determined by the two groups' marginal benefits of getting more high positions. We find that the evolutionarily stable strategy types satisfy: the agents with the high positions are as if trying to maximize the total material payoffs of all agents, while agents with the low positions are as if trying to minimize the total material payoffs of all agents. These results are robust when evolution operates either on the strategy level or on the preference level with incomplete information. We apply the results to applications in which the high position agents determine redistribution and the low position agents determine production. We find that both political institutions lead to inefficient production, while only egalitarianism lead to high transfer. Hence, we provide a novel perspective to understand the trend of decreasing work effort in the modern democratic welfare states. 
Washington University in St. Louis Friday, July 24, 15:15, Session D Learning in Persuasion with Multiple Advisors [pdf] Abstract This paper studies a persuasion game with multiple advisors revealing information to a decision maker in order to change his behavior. The advisors share perfectly aligned incentives, and they persuade the decision maker by conducting (possibly biased) investigations of noisy signals that suggest the true state of the world. When the decision maker consults multiple advisors, on the one hand he is potentially exposed to a richer set of information, but on the other hand the advisors counteract this effect by choosing more biased investigations. This paper shows that in equilibrium the latter effort never offsets the former effect. In particular, when there are multiple advisors, advisors are worse off compared to the case in which the decision maker only consults a single advisor, but the decision maker is not necessarily better off. In fact, having fewer advisors may be a Pareto improvement. 
Stanford University Tuesday, July 21, 14:45, Session E Information and Dynamic Trade [pdf] (joint work with Yizhou Xiao) Abstract This paper investigates the possibility of informationbased trading in a dynamic world. Informationbased trading becomes possible in the dynamic world even when all assumptions in Milgrom and Stocky (1982) still hold. This result arises because the monotonic increasing feature of the information filtration implies that the current payoffs of securities can't be made conditional on future events, constraining agents from smoothing their consumption paths through ex ante trades. Informationbased trading is desirable because news about future consumption enables agents to readjust their asset portfolios to smooth consumption over time. The notrade theorem still holds in the dynamic environment when agents have concordant beliefs in each period and their concerns for risk aversion dominate the needs for intertemporal substitution. 
University of Melbourne Tuesday, July 21, 15:45, Session B Awarding Scarce Ideas in Innovation Contests [pdf] (joint work with Nisvan Erkal) Abstract This paper studies the relationship between optimal award and scarcity of ideas in innovation contests. We consider contests with different distributions of idea qualities and conduct comparative static analysis of optimal  revenue maximizing  awards with respect to the distributions. We find that a distribution with scarcer ideas leads to higher optimal awards if the marginal value of innovation quality is low, and it leads to lower optimal awards if the marginal value is high. 
Singapore University of Technology and Design Tuesday, July 21, 10:45, Session F Bestresponse Dynamics in Zerosum Stochastic Games [pdf] (joint work with David Leslie and Steven Perkins) Abstract Given a twoplayer zerosum discountedpayoff stochastic game, we introduce three classes of continuoustime bestresponse dynamics, stoppingtime bestresponse dynamics, closedloop bestresponse dynamics, and openloop bestresponse dynamics. We show the global convergence of the first two classes to the set of minimax strategy profiles, and the convergence of the last class when the players are not patient. We also show that the payoffs in a modified closedloop bestresponse dynamic converge to the asymptotic value in a zerosum stochastic game. 
Academia Sinica Thursday, July 23, 15:45, Session D Strong belief and weak assumption [pdf] Abstract Battigalli and Siniscalchi's [Journal of Economic Theory 106, 356391 (2002)] notion of "strong belief" in conditional probability systems and Yang's [Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming] notion of "weak assumption" in lexicographic probability systems are unified by the same requirements on preferences. Our analysis, hence, reconciles the tension between Battigalli and Siniscalchi's characteriztion of extensiveform rationalizability and Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler's [Econometrica 76, 307352 (2008)] impossibility result. 
University of Pittsburgh Thursday, July 23, 14:45, Session D When Monitoring Hurts: Endogenous Information Acquisition in a Game of Persuasion [pdf] (joint work with TszNing Wong) Abstract We study a persuasion game between a decision maker (DM) and an expert. Prior to the communication stage, the expert exerts costly effort to obtain decisive information about the state of nature. The expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We show that monitoring of information acquisition hampers the expert's incentives to acquire information. Contrary to everyday experience, monitoring is always suboptimal if the expert's bias is large, yet sometimes optimal if the expert's bias is small. 
The Ohio State University Biased News Media Abstract Private information is important in decision making under uncertainty and it is assumed to be exogenously provided from information structures. In many cases, however, information structure is also a decision maker's choice variable; news media, investment reports and rating agencies. This paper investigates a model in which decision makers can choose information structure and the structure can be asymmetric; the accuracies of signals can be different over states. The asymmetry is interpreted as bias of information structures. In the model, information providers choose their accuracy of signals conditional on states under some restrictions at the first stage. Next, decision makers choose which information providers they would like to receive private signals from. After they receive private signals, they make decisions. For decision makers, correct decision is more important than their private preferences, but their expected payoffs are increasing in bias of information providers towards their private preferences. Hence, information providers have incentive to be biased and they are chosen by rational decision makers. 
The Basque Country University Thursday, July 23, 15:15, Session B An axiomatic characterization of the OwenShapley spatial power index [pdf] (joint work with Hans Peters and Jose M. Zarzuelo) Abstract We present an axiomatic characterization of the OwenShapley spatial power index for the case where issues are elements of two dimensional space. This characterization employs a version of the transfer condition, which enables us to unravel a spatial game into spatial games connected to unanimity games. The other axioms are spatial versions of anonymity and dummy, and two conditions concerned particularly with the spatial positions of the players. We show that these axioms are logically independent. 
Stony Brook University Tuesday, July 21, 10:15, Session D Bargaining Over Property Right Sale with Credible Threat (joint work with Yair Tauman, Yoram Weiss) Abstract We consider an industry with one incumbent and many potential entrants. Initially the high entry cost does not enable a profitable entry. Suppose an outside innovator holds a patent on a technology that eliminates the entry cost but has a marginal cost at least as high as the current one. The innovator wishes to sell his intellectual property (IP) to the incumbent, through bargaining. Even though the technology itself is useless for the incumbent, he may purchase the IP to limit or exclude further entry. The innovator may sell a few licenses to new entrants before approaching the incumbent. This on one hand reduces the total industry profit but enables a better credible threat on the incumbent and hence may increases the innovator's payoff. A licensing contract with an entrant specifies the license fee together with the maximum number of licenses that can be sold. The contracts are signed sequentially and they are bound by previous commitments. The firms are engaged in Cournot competition in the last stage. It is shown that depending on the marginal cost of the new technology and on the bargaining power of the innovator relative to that of the incumbent, there are three types of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE): (1) the innovator sells first a license to one entrant before selling his IP to the incumbent. The incumbent then put the technology on the shelf to exclude further entry. (2) the innovator sells one license to an entrant before selling the IP to the incumbent. The incumbent then licenses the new technology to one additional entrant and (3) the innovator sells the IP directly to the incumbent who then put the technology on the shelf. 
University of Toronto Thursday, July 23, 15:45, Session B Information Acquisition in Heterogeneous Committees [pdf] Abstract This paper studies the impacts of preference heterogeneity and voting rules on information acquisition in decisionmaking committees where members fully share their costly acquired information. We find that in equilibrium members' incentive to acquire information are monotonically related to their preferences. A more polarized committee can acquire more information in equilibrium, but unanimous voting rules do not necessarily induce the most information acquisition. However, if a committee designer can choose both the committee members and the voting rule, she will form a heterogeneous committee that adopts a unanimous rule. In this committee, one member moderately biased toward one decision serves as the decisive voter, and all other members have extreme preferences opposed to that of the decisive voter and serve mainly as information providers. The preference of the decisive member is not perfectly aligned with that of the designer. 
Maastricht University Friday, July 24, 15:45, Session A Zerosum games with charges [pdf] (joint work with János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen) Abstract We consider twoplayer zerosum games with countably infinite action spaces and bounded payoff functions. The players' strategies are finitely additive probability measures, called charges. Since a strategy profile does not always induce a unique expected payoff, we distinguish two extreme attitudes of players. A player is viewed as pessimistic if he always evaluates the range of possible expected payoffs by the worst one, and a player is viewed as optimistic if he always evaluates it by the best one. This approach results in a definition of a pessimistic and an optimistic value for each player. We provide an extensive analysis of the relation between these values, and connect them to the classical values. In addition, we also examine existence of optimal strategies with respect to these values. 
Temple University Tuesday, July 21, 11:15, Session F Best response dynamic in a multitask environment [pdf] (joint work with Ryoji Sawa) Abstract We formulate best response dynamic in a multitasking environment; while agents engage in two separate games concurrently, an agent can switch action only in one of them upon receipt of a revision opportunity. The choice of the game in which to revise action makes the multitasking dynamic significantly behave differently from the separate dynamics so the transition of action distribution in each game might look inconsistent with incentives if the endogenous choice of the focusing game is ignored. Despite of such complexity in the transitory phase of the dynamic, we verify that, in a wide class of games, global stability of equilibria can be predictable from that in the separate dynamics. 